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> When a social science journal which also at times concerns itself with a social policy, appears for the first time or passes into the hands of a new editorial board, it is customary to ask about its "line."[1]

Despite a new editor and editorial board, the "line" of the *American Political Science Review* has not changed. It remains devoted to publication of outstanding scholarship in all subfields of the discipline. Our fundamental criterion is that research and writing be exceptionally meritorious. Contributions must demonstrate the highest standards of excellence in conceptualization, exposition, methodology, and craftsmanship. And because the *Review* reaches a diverse audience of scholars and practitioners, contributors should demonstrate how their analysis or exposition illuminates a significant research problem, or answers an important research question, that will be of general interest in political science.

All of the familiar sections of the *Review* are retained, but the "Controversy" section is being renamed "Forum." Apart from the name change, there will be two more substantial changes. First, formatting of contributions in this section will henceforth be consistent with articles published in other sections of the *Review.* In recent years, the Controversy section has included only critiques of previously published articles along with responses from original authors. These contributions have been published in an integrated format that combined the acknowledgments, notes, and references of critics and respondents and included an explanatory introduction written by the Editor. The Forum section will continue to print critiques and responses, but they will appear as the independently written papers that they are and, except in unusual circumstances, the presumption will be that explanatory material by the Editor is not required. Where a critique focuses heavily on one particular author or small group of authors, they will always be given an opportunity to reply in the same issue; however, if timetables and schedules do not permit that, authors may reply in a subsequent issue. Authors of critiques suitable for this section should consult the "Instructions to Contributors" for the procedures used for refereeing this type of submission.

Second, the change of name from Controversy to Forum is intended to indicate an expansion in the coverage of this section to include a variety of types of discussions about current research, ranging from commentary on previously published articles and books to wide-ranging reviews of the literature in a given field. The mission of the Forum section is to encourage dialogue and interchange of ideas about research. Its definition will be flexible so as to accommodate a variety of types of submissions. Nevertheless, submissions will be refereed and, even if brief, will be expected to be significant contributions to the research literature.

While the intellectual goals of the *Review* remain the same, a number of formatting changes have been made to make it easier for readers to find useful information. Authors' affiliation and mailing addresses now appear in a note on the title page. Footnotes are placed at the bottom of pages rather than at the end of articles. Beginning in the next issue, citation format will change to include season, month, or issue number of cited articles. The spine of the journal now contains page numbers for the convenience of those using unbound copies. The Editor's Notes are now combined with the Instructions to Contributors and other business-related information at the front of the journal. Forthcoming articles are listed at the end of the Table of Contents. The Table of Contents includes book reviews, eliminating the need for the separate Book Review Contents previously located on inner pages. The names and affiliations of book reviewers appear at the beginning rather than the end of their reviews.

Beginning with this issue, we are using a typeface named "Dutch" that is approximately the same size as Palatino, used formerly, but that we think is easier to read and will give the *Review* a less dense look.

Regardless of any format or other superficial changes in the *Review*, its overall goals remain, as always, to publish the best writing and research available about political thought, processes, institutions, and behavior. Any changes are intended as incremental improvements that build on the contributions and visions of past editors, editorial boards, and authors. In that sense, it is fitting that this issue represents the work of two editors. It exhibits the format changes designed in my office but because of the lead time required for publication of accepted articles, all of the contributions that appear in this issue were accepted under the editorship of G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and I thank him for his contribution to the intellectual content of this issue. Above all, his unfailing generosity in sharing ideas, experiences and advice during the 15 months that we worked together on the editorial transition made the process much easier and more agreeable than it would otherwise have been.

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Manuscripts being submitted for publication should be sent to Professor Ada W. Finifter, Editor, *American Political Science Review*, Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, 303 South Kedzie Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824-1032. Correspondence concerning manuscripts under review may be sent to the same address or, preferably, by e-mail to apsr@ssc.msu.edu.

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[1] Max Weber, in 1904, on assuming co-editorship of *Archiv.* Max Weber, 1949. *The Methodology of the Social Sciences.* Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, translators. Glencoe: Free Press, p. 50. I am grateful to Mark Lichbach for pointing out my commonality with Weber.

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American Political Science Review Vol. 90, No. 1 March 1996

The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Surveys and American Democracy
Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1995

SIDNEY VERBA *Harvard University*

Citizen participation is the main way in which the public communicates its needs and preferences to the government and induces the government to be responsive. Since participation depends on resources and resources are unequally distributed, the resulting communication is a biased representation of the public. Thus, the democratic ideal of equal consideration is violated. Sample surveys provide the closest approximation to an unbiased representation of the public because participation in a survey requires no resources and because surveys eliminate the selection bias inherent in the fact that participants in politics are self-selected. The contrast between the participatory process and the sample survey is used to highlight the nature of the bias in the former. Surveys, however, are not seen as a practical way of providing more equal representation.

The study of political participation and the sample survey are closely linked. The latter is the main method by which the former has been studied (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1979; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). There is a good reason for that connection, since surveys give the researcher access to the "public," an otherwise broad, amorphous, and hard-to-deal-with phenomenon. Surveys tell us what the public does and provide data for analyses of why they do it.

Surveys are especially useful for dealing with issues of democratic representation. Participation is a mechanism for representation, a means by which governing officials are informed of the preferences and needs of the public and are induced to respond to those preferences and needs. It is crucial, therefore, to know how well or how badly the participatory system represents the public to those leaders. But how do we know what the "real" picture is, the interests, preferences, and needs of the public? The sample survey is key to answering this question. In the work on participation by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), the representative sample survey was used to provide baseline information on the state of the public—its needs and preferences—in order to ascertain the extent to which the messages communicated by the active citizens distort the situation of the public as a whole.

There is a close connection between subject and method in this research, between citizen participation and representative democracy, on the one hand, and survey research, on the other. The sample survey is a major social science tool. In addition, it is a technology with an important influence on representative democracy. The nature of the technology, particularly the use of random sampling, has an intimate connection with issues of representation. Social science technology, the political theory of representation, and some real issues in contemporary American politics all come together in relation to political surveys.

Surveys create information that would not otherwise exist. What would our democracy be like if no one had invented them? In particular, I want to consider the social survey as a means of political participation. Citizens participate as voters, protesters, letter writers, campaign contributors, and in many other ways. That participation is one of the major means by which governing officials learn about the needs and preferences of the public. It is not the only means, of course; interest groups and the media also provide input. But citizen activity is perhaps the major way the public's needs and preferences are communicated to governing elites. When citizens participate as respondents, what is added to that flow of information by surveys? In trying to answer this question, I hope to address not only the role of surveys but also some more general questions about the nature of democratic representation.

POLITICAL EQUALITY

The problem in representation with which I wish to deal is as follows: Democracy implies responsiveness by governing elites to the needs and preferences of the citizenry. More than that, it implies equal responsiveness; in the democratic ideal, elected officials should give equal consideration to the needs and preferences of all citizens. This equal consideration is embodied most clearly in the principle of one person, one vote.

Equality, as we all know, is one of the more complex and multidimensioned concepts we have, given the variety of factors on which it can be based and the fundamental heterogeneity of human beings. Let me briefly indicate what I have in mind. I am not concerned with the extent to which the government in fact treats all citizens equally in the policies it produces; what that would mean and whether it is possible is beyond me. I want to deal with a narrower but still basic issue. Rather than looking at the results of the policy process, I want to focus on the extent to which governing officials have the capacity to provide equal consideration, in particular, whether they have equal information about the needs and preferences of all citizens. If some citizens are invisible, one cannot respond to them.

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The data for this paper come largely from the Citizen Participation Study, a large-scale survey of activism in U.S. political life supported by the National Science Foundation as well as the Ford, Hewlett, and Spencer foundations. The main analysis of these data can be found in Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995). I am grateful to Kay L. Schlozman and Henry E. Brady for helpful comments and the collaboration out of which much of this paper grew.

This means, in turn, that citizens have to supply that information. Thus, if the government is to have the capability of giving equal consideration to the needs and preferences of all citizens, the public must be equally capable of providing that information. They must provide information about themselves—who they are, what they want, what they need. If citizen activity is the main way in which that is done, then democratic responsiveness depends on citizen participation, and equal responsiveness depends on equal participation.

Of course, things do not work out that way. Citizen voices are very unequal. Not everyone votes. More important, there are many more ways in which citizens can be active, and here, of course, voices are more unequal. Only small proportions of the citizenry work in campaigns or make contributions. There may be a flood of letters to Washington and, more recently, a flood of faxes and e-mail. But only a small proportion of the public uses these means, and that minority is not a random sample of the population; it comes disproportionately from the more advantaged members of society (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

Furthermore, not only are some voices raised while others are still, but also those who raise their voices differ in their effectiveness when they do so. In summer 1995, members of the American Political Science Association received a memorandum about threatened abolition of National Science Foundation (NSF) support for the social sciences. Through intense efforts the program was saved. In the office of Congressman Walker, who introduced the amendment to eliminate social science funding in NSF, one staffer is quoted as saying: "Those ladies and gentlemen in the social sciences sure know how to write letters." We ought to. Writing compelling communications is our business.

In our research (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, chapter 11) we measured the opportunities of our respondents to learn civic skills—how to write a letter, make a public presentation, organize a meeting. As you would expect, there are great differences across social groups in their capacity not only to speak up but also to speak up effectively. The differences in our data are striking. Among people with advanced education and a professional level job, about 90% say they plan meetings and give public presentations. The comparable figure for workers with high school education in lower status jobs is around 5%. The point is obvious but also crucial for understanding political capacity.

That some are active and others are not would be important only if the activists differed in politically relevant ways from the inactive, that is, if they differed in their needs and preferences. Some studies suggest that it does not matter much who is active, since the policy preferences of activists differ relatively little from those of the inactive (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). But that finding concerns the difference between voters and nonvoters in relation to policy preferences (as revealed in standard National Election Studies [NES] questions). The finding does not generalize to political participation more broadly. When one compares activists and inactivists not in terms of responses to issue questions designed by the surveyor but in terms of economic circumstances, need for government assistance, or participatory agendas—the actual issues that animate activity—the discrepancies are much more substantial. In addition, there is variation across activities in the extent to which participants are similar to or different from inactive citizens. Voters are relatively representative of the public. In terms of other forms of participation—acts with both more clout and a greater capacity to communicate information—distortion in participatory input is more substantial (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, chapter 7). As we noted, the participatory input is tilted in the direction of the more advantaged demographic groups in society. Their voices convey a different message than would be conveyed by the more quiescent.

All this means that governing officials receive more information about needs and preferences from some parts of the public than from others. If we believe that each individual is the best judge of his or her needs and preferences, then the differential expression of these needs and preferences through differential activity levels means that officials receive a biased view of the public.

In a market—in an economic system—such differential engagement is expected and poses no problem. Customer voices, as revealed by their consumer behavior, are not equal. People have different preferences and different budget constraints. No one expects equality in a market-based economy with differential income and wealth.

What about politics? Here, too, preferences vary; some people want things from the government, others do not; and those who want things want different things. Budget constraints also differ. Some people have more resources than others—money, time, skills, connections—and these enable them to act and act effectively. This is what explains differential political activity and the resulting bias in information received by the government.

That some are active and some quiescent is inevitable. But it makes a big difference whether the quiescence is due to preference or resources—to not wanting to act or to being unable to act. If people are not active because they have nothing they want from the government or because they choose to allocate their time to other activities, this poses little challenge to the notion of equal consideration of the needs and preferences of all. But if they are not active because they do not have the resources to be active, that is more of a challenge.

In his recent book, *Inequality Reexamined* (1992), Amartya Sen argues for an approach to equality based on the equal capability to achieve one's goals. It is an attractive notion in relation to political equality. It is something less than equality of outcome—policies that treat everyone equally. But it is something more than the usual notion of equality of opportunity, which ordinarily refers to the absence of barriers to accomplishment. In Sen's approach, equal capability includes the absence of barriers and the presence of the means or the resources needed to accomplish one's objectives. The participatory system in the United States today provides equality of opportunity in that there are few if any legal impediments to political activity. But it is a system based on unequal resources and, therefore, unequal capabilities.

SURVEYS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL LIFE

This is the background to my concern with surveys. Citizens also participate as respondents. The sample survey is a special source of information about the public because the citizen voice expressed does not, as does the participatory voice, depend on having resources or—and this adds an important complexity—on being motivated to participate. This makes the survey a special kind of voice of the people, with some interesting advantages and disadvantages.

The pioneers of political surveys, Gallup, Crossley, and Roper, were optimistic about this new technique. Surveys, they predicted, would be widely used, would bring science and precision into an area where there had previously just been speculation, and would create a new and more responsive democracy (Converse 1987, Gallup and Rae 1940).

They were right about how much surveys would be used. Public opinion polls have become ubiquitous in politics. No political campaign can be conducted without them. Polls provide information that did not previously exist. They allow adjustments of campaign strategies to the winds of opinion, something impossible before polling, when a campaign strategy would be set at the beginning of a campaign and basically adhered to. Anthony Downs predicts that campaign managers will steer their parties and candidates toward the middle of the distribution of opinions. That may be the approach dictated by the logic of vote maximization, but one can only steer in that direction if one knows where the median voter is located. Now, surveys give both parties information on this and may indeed allow campaigners to follow the dictates of theory (Geer 1991).

Polls are closely watched between elections. A presidential administration without a pollster is as unlikely as one without a national security advisor. From the President of the United States on down, elected officials monitor presidential popularity and the response of the public to policy initiatives. The presidential approval questions—one of the longest series of replicated questions—are a running retrospective evaluation of the chief executive's performance. The evidence seems fairly clear that they affect the ability of the president to be effective in Washington (Brody 1991, Edwards 1980, Rivers and Rose 1985). In addition, polls give some content to the level of public support by dealing with the reactions of the public to particular policies. Polls on every issue, large and small, appear in the media. Indeed, virtually every report on a current issue—from Medicare to Bosnia to the O.J. Simpson trial—contains information on what the public thinks. The range is very wide. Surveys hold, as it were, the mirror up to the nation.

Surveys are, I have always believed, a peculiarly U.S. product. The survey industry is now worldwide, but there are good reasons why it developed in and diffused from the United States as an academic research tool, as an instrument in politics, and as a technique for commerce. It fits the consumer-oriented U.S. economy. It fits U.S. culture, where individuals are supposed to have ideas and express them, and where people are accustomed to listening and talking to strangers. And it fits the U.S. polity, where institutions are weak, and therefore the views and attitudes of citizens—as autonomous individuals—make more of a difference in their political behavior than is the case where a person's party, religion, or ethnicity is more predictive.

SURVEYS AS SCIENCE, SURVEYS AS REPRESENTATION

Two main features of the sample survey make it particularly attractive in the U.S. context: its "scientificness" and representativeness (Herbst 1993). Our society vacillates between a belief in science and the expert and a belief in populism and the wisdom of the ordinary citizen. Surveys satisfy both. They give us a scientific measure of the people's will. It is no wonder that surveys play such a major role in the market, in politics, and in academic research.

Surveys produce just what democracy is supposed to produce—equal representation of all citizens. The sample survey is rigorously egalitarian; it is designed so that each citizen has an equal chance to participate and an equal voice when participating. Here is where science and political representation meet. In the social sciences one of the great threats to valid inference, perhaps the most common, is selection bias (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Researchers go to great lengths to avoid it. The random sample is a method for eliminating bias. Survey design eliminates bias in two ways: The respondent does not self-select to enter the survey (that is why we reject mail-in polls using forms clipped out of magazines), and the interviewers are given careful instructions as to whom they should select (that is why we reject quota sampling).

Surveys are by no means perfectly random. Poll respondents are not perfectly representative. Some are hard to find; increasingly, many refuse to participate. Pollsters seek out the respondents, but many cannot be reached, a problem especially severe for telephone surveys. Nor are those who cannot be reached a random group. They tend to be like those uncounted by the census—people with no stable dwelling place, people who are missed by society in general. Once contacted, people may refuse to take part, a growing problem in recent years. In the early days of the NES, refusal rates were below 10%. In recent years, surveys such as NES or the General Social Survey (GSS) of the National Opinion Research Center have been experiencing refusal rates in the 25–30% range.[1]

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[1] The nonparticipants in surveys are analyzed by Brehm (1993, chapter 2), who calls them phantom respondents. They differ from the public as a whole but in somewhat surprising ways. Respondents overrepresent the elderly and women, which is not a surprise. According to Brehm's analysis, however, the underrepresentation of the poor and minorities that we might have expected does not appear in the data. The patterns are somewhat varied across survey organizations, but it appears as if the NES and the GSS both overrepresent African Americans and underrepresent the rich. Education is the best single predictor of political activity. NES telephone interviews are consistent with this, as they underestimate the proportion in the population with less than a high school education. Yet, the face-to-face interviews of NES and GSS overrepresent those with lower education levels.

Surveys are not perfectly representative but offer, nevertheless, a better cross-section of the public than do almost any other means, and certainly they are more representative than any of the modes of citizen activity. Surveys provide us with a relatively unbiased view of the public by combining science and representativeness, indeed, by achieving representativeness through science. They are very like elections in which each individual has an equal voice only better. They get better turnout, since good surveys seek out the participants and do not passively wait for them to come to the polls. They get richer information. The vote says little about the preferences of voters except in the narrow sense of their choice of candidate. Surveys can probe preferences on many issues. Indeed, one of the uses to which surveys are put is the reduction in mandate uncertainty after an election. And surveys are more continuous; they monitor the public between elections.

RANDOM AND BIASED SELECTION: SOCIAL SURVEYS AND THE REAL WORLD OF POLITICS

The essence of the science of surveys and the essence of the representativeness of surveys are both found in the random processes by which participants are selected. But this also makes surveys very unreal. The processes by which participants are selected are fundamentally different in the controlled world of the social survey and the real world of political participation. Politics may be studied with techniques that try to eliminate selection bias—that is what our profession is all about—but real life is dominated by selection bias. We select the circumstances that then affect our social and economic life. We choose schools, jobs, spouses, locations. We choose within constraints to be sure, but the constraints are by no means constant or random across individuals. The constraints are biased as well.

The same happens in political life. The recent analysis by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) of the processes by which citizens come to be active is, in fact, a study of selection bias in the real world. Citizens differ in motivation and resources; thus, they self-select to take part in politics because of this differential motivation and because they are differentially constrained by resources. This biased selection process produces a biased participatory population. The voices of the well educated and the well heeled sound more loudly.

Each method of selection—unbiased survey sampling and the socially structured real world processes of selection—produces a different result. Random sample surveys are statistically sound, and they treat each individual qua individual the same. Polls provide information about the public as a whole, motivated or unmotivated, resource rich or resource poor, rather than about those who make their presence known through their political participation. Polls are thus an important tool for equal representation. This also means that polls take no account of race or ethnicity, wealth or education, passion or political commitment. In short, they ignore the mainsprings of political life, and this makes them very artificial.

Of what use are such artificial measures of the public? Here is where surveys intersect with one of the basic issues of citizen representation: the meaning of quiescence. Ordinary modes of citizen activity—voting, writing letters, going to a protest, taking part in a campaign or a community project—allow quiescence; they are voluntary, and no one has to take part and express preferences. Surveys do not let people be quiescent; they chase them down and ask them questions. If people are hard to find, the good survey looks for them, calling again and again. And random-digit dialing rather than phone book listings are used in order to catch those would-be shirkers who get unlisted numbers so they can avoid their civic obligation to take phone calls during dinner.

PREFERENCE OR CAPABILITY

How important it is to hear the voice of the otherwise silent depends on why they are silent: because they do not want to voice their preferences or because they do not have the capability to do so. What people do is a result of their choices within constraints, of their preferences and their capacity to achieve them. Much of the debate between liberals and conservatives over government provision of benefits is about the relative importance of choice and constraint. Do people on welfare choose that status by their unwillingness to look for jobs and their earlier willful neglect of education? Or are they constrained by lack of job opportunities and bad schools? The battle is currently being won by those who stress choice. But constraints are also important.

All of this applies to citizen participation. If some are inactive, is it because they lack motivation or lack capability? Distinguishing between motivation and capability is easy conceptually but often hard in practice. The two are related. If people lack the capability, their motivation goes down. If they have little motivation, they do not try to increase their capability. Those who have few resources will be discouraged from taking part in politics; those who are uninterested in public affairs will not care to develop civic skills.

Despite the difficulty, the distinction can be made in particular cases. Let me draw on the data from our civic voluntarism study to present two contrasting situations, one in which differential activity is driven by differential motivation, and one in which it is driven by differential capacity.

Motivation and the Politics of Abortion

Consider motivation or the lack of it. Much activity derives from the greater intensity of preferences among the activists. The examples of the intensely concerned minority are legion; indeed, they are the basis for much of the political action in the United States. I will choose one example from our research, the politics of abortion (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, chapter 14). The

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Academic surveys, although not perfect, have better response rates than media polls, many of which have rates that call the accuracy of the survey into question (Brady and Orren 1992).

public at large—as revealed by surveys—is divided on abortion rights. Exactly how they divide depends on the questions asked. Most citizens are not pro or anti; they are pro under some circumstances and anti under others. On balance, however, the public tilts in a pro-choice direction. Twice as many respondents in our survey are in the farthest pro-choice position as are in the farthest pro-life position. In addition, those with the strongest pro-choice views have more participatory resources than do those with the strongest pro-life views. They are three times as likely to have a college education and substantially more likely to belong to an organization. They are the kinds of people you would expect to be more active in politics, and they are. That activity, however, is spread across all sorts of issues. Those who take the more extreme pro-life positions are not particularly well endowed with participatory resources, tending on average to be less affluent and less skilled. They are, however, very motivated—intense in their views, concentrated on that particular issue, and likely to act on that issue. Thus, they provide much more of the action, especially the heated action like protesting, on abortion.

The concentration of activity among the pro-life respondents in our study is striking. We asked them about the subject of their activity, whether some issue motivated their letter to a representative, or the protest in which they took part, or their activity in a campaign, and so on. We can then see how much of an individual's activity—across various acts—is focused on the same subject. Eleven percent of the activity of the pro-choice respondents concerns abortion; they are very active but are active about many things. The pro-life respondents, 58% of whose activity concerns abortion, are much more single-minded.

If elected officials heed the voices of the active citizens, they will give greater attention to the pro-life group than its proportion of the population warrants. That does not seem inappropriate, even in the face of the notion that each person's preferences should be given equal weight. There are preferences and preferences, and those strongly held ought to weigh more.

In such a situation, polls do not and should not eliminate the special consideration likely to be given to the intense minority. Rather, they mitigate it somewhat by providing information about preferences in the public at large. Officials can know, at least, that the activists do not represent the population as a whole. And the existence of a gap between the public as a whole and the activists can be used as part of the debate about the proper policy to follow. The quiescence of inactive citizens when they could be active if they cared more justifies paying less attention to them, but knowing their views adds an important ingredient to the political debate.

Resources and the Politics of Benefits Programs

Consider, however, a situation in which the reason for silence is not lack of concern but lack of resources. Being the recipient of a government benefits program creates a motive for political activity, whether in order to protect the program in general or to monitor one's own benefits. Recipients of some programs are less active than recipients of others. It is not that they care less about their program; rather, they lack the money and skills to undertake activity. A properly conducted survey can reveal that fact. It can uncover a part of the population whose silence does not reflect indifference.

An example is found in comparing those who receive Social Security and those who receive AFDC. There is reason to believe that the latter are more needy than the former. For example, our data show that people on AFDC are more than twice as likely to report serious problems in satisfying basic health, housing, and food needs in the previous year. Yet, the AFDC recipients are less well endowed with participatory resources; they have much less education and many fewer civic skills. The result is that three times as many of the Social Security recipients reported activity concerning that program as did AFDC recipients concerning theirs. The former are eight times more likely to belong to an organization concerned with Social Security than are AFDC recipients to belong to an organization concerned with their benefits program. As one would expect, those who receive benefits like Social Security, that is, widespread benefits that are not means tested, not only are more likely to be active in regard to their benefits than those receiving means-tested, welfare-type benefits but also are much more skilled in their activity.

Here, then, is a silent group which can be located through a survey and whose silence does not reflect low motivation but few resources. Note that what is learned through the survey is not the on-the-fly opinion of a group about whether to balance the budget by 2002 or 2007 but information about real needs—needs about which respondents are well informed and, indeed, better informed than anyone.

The ability of polls to get at a sample of individuals who might otherwise not be active is especially useful as a counter to organized expressions of preferences. In one sense, organized interests can benefit more from survey research. Polls are weapons of those who can afford to mount them, and this is more likely to be an organized interest than an unorganized group. Yet, surveys may reduce the monopoly that interest groups might otherwise have over information about the preferences of the public as a whole regarding the interest groups' issues or of their own membership and their purported clientele.

The NRA remains the classic example. Poll results on gun control have not overridden the power of the NRA, but they has been useful as a counterfoil. Legislators may still fear the concentrated resources the NRA can bring to bear, but polls showing that the public at large (and even gun owners) disagrees with the NRA give some ammunition—perhaps the wrong term here—to the other side.[2] Similarly, polls have shown that half the Cuban Americans in the United States disagree with the position of the National Cuban American Foundation, which believes we ought to isolate Cuba,[3] or that many fundamentalist Christians do not support the political agenda of the religious right.

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[2] *International Herald Tribune*, May 27, 1995, p. 3.

[3] *New York Times*, June 12, 1995, p. 9.

It takes a poll to locate resource poor, unorganized, and otherwise silent citizens. In general, polls can show that the noisy and overt "representatives" of the public or of particular parts of it do not necessarily speak for everyone. If the voices of activists are louder because of their greater intensity of concern, then they deserve the extra clout they have. If their amplified voices result from greater capacity to make themselves heard, however, then the principles of equality of consideration are violated. In the latter case, by searching out the otherwise inactive, asking them questions, and recording their answers, surveys may be thought of as providing the capacity for articulation that some citizens would otherwise lack.

SURVEY DEMOCRACY?

I am certainly not recommending a government by survey. Gallup referred to the survey as a "sampling referendum," but even he did not think of it as a means of legislating. Rather, I am arguing that one has to view surveys in the context of the participatory process, which exists with or without surveys. Some argue that surveys create a leadership which follows the polls rather than leading. But surveys per se do not make some leaders abandon leadership to follow public whim. In the absence of surveys, such leaders would still sway with the wind of opinion. The wind would just blow from different quarters, more likely from the better parts of town.

Polls are thus a way to give everyone a voice, but they do not reflect the strongest of voices. The information polls communicate may be equal, but it is also limited. And the limitation derives from the strongest feature of polls, the fact that they represent all citizens equally. What message is sent by a method that gives voice to all citizens, with little regard for their level of information or their motivation to participate, and one whose messages are all *in response* to questions selected by and posed by strangers at the door? Certainly, the messages are not the clearest.

One limitation on the role of surveys relates to agendas. First, because the initiative is taken by the surveyor rather than the surveyed, the agenda reflects the interests of the poll taker. It gives the inarticulate a chance to express their views and their concerns, but only on the issues that the surveyor thinks are important. Second, since surveyors have their own agenda—to increase readership, or find information to help a particular candidate, or test a pet academic theory—the set of issues covered may be very different from that which is on the mind of the respondents.

Another limitation has to do with the questions asked: The answers received depend on them. The voice of the citizenry, especially the otherwise quiescent who are of special interest here, can sound very different depending on what is asked.

There is another qualification on the ability of surveys to equalize the voice of the resource poor. Few resources may be needed to respond to a survey, but real resources are required to conduct a survey. Although the selection of respondents may not be biased, the selection of when to have a survey and what to ask (and how to interpret the data) certainly are. This gives a louder voice to the more affluent in several ways. Well-heeled campaigners and wealthy interests can afford to take their own polls. They can then use them as they want, including selective reporting. On top of that, to do a poll one needs to hire professionals, which takes money, and campaigns thus value contributions of money rather than time. Money is, in turn, much more stratified than time; the affluent have money (of course), but time is more equally available to both the advantaged and the disadvantaged (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, chapter 10). Thus, the survey process reintroduces some of the socioeconomic stratification found in political activity through decisions as to when, what, and whom to survey.

Another qualification is that what people answer—what they think is important, how they evaluate policies and politicians—is in good part a reaction to what they hear from the media or from governing officials. Thus, the questions asked and the answers given do not come from a separate autonomous public but are affected by the processes of politics and policy that they may, in turn, influence. As in so many other areas of politics and political analysis, there is a serious problem of endogeneity.

Finally, polls provide low-grade information. Answers to closed questions do not capture the richness of individuals' views. And the views, themselves, are often ill-formed. Indeed, it is commonplace to note that the opinions are often nonexistent until the question is asked and the respondent is faced with the necessity to answer.

This last point, about the quality of information in polls, needs qualification. We have all been trained to be suspicious of survey results on issues far from the consciousness of respondents, when they are asked for opinions on some policy matter. But surveys can give better information than that. It all depends on the subject of the questions. Some information about the public is fairly solid—its positions on issues, its social circumstances, its needs; people know the answers, and the answers are stable. In some of the examples I gave above, questions were asked about whether the respondents participated in Social Security or in AFDC and whether they had faced serious problems paying for necessities in the past year. These are important questions about citizen need, and the individual citizen—of whatever level of sophistication—knows the answers better than anyone. Citizens know their own life circumstances. They also know their own values, and although their values may be in conflict one with another (whose values are not?), they are likely to be fairly stable.[4]

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[4] Attitudes on complex public policies may be ill-informed and changeable. But as John Zaller (1993) has argued, the "on-the-fly" answers that polls elicit have a certain logic to them. They often reflect a balancing, not a careful balancing but a balancing nevertheless, of alternative values. They are a form of quick-and-dirty reasoning.

CAN THE QUIESCENT GAIN A VOICE?

This brings me back to my concern with the politically quiescent. How can constraints be broken to achieve the democratic ideal of equal voice? Surveys break the constraints by seeking out those who would otherwise be inactive, but the voice is not very strong or clear. Another means of bringing in the quiescent is political mobilization. Resource poor and apathetic citizens can be brought out to vote or take other actions by social movements or political organizations. There are many historical examples, the civil rights movement being one of the most important. Our research shows, however, that for most activity, the forces of mobilization bring in the same people who would be active spontaneously. There is a vast network of what one might call day-to-day political recruiters, people who call for campaign contributions, get people out to a community meeting, or mobilize citizens to write their representative. These recruiters seek those with motivation and resources. The recruitment process largely reinforces the other biased processes that lead to political activity (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1995).

Political inequality is, thus, embedded deeply in American society. Can the ideal of political equality be achieved? More modestly, can we move closer to that ideal? It is hard to see how. The constraint on political participation from unequal resources derives from the basic institutions in society, from differential education and differential economic position. Mobilization breaks the pattern from time to time, but the system of mobilization is also embedded in the same set of institutions, and mobilization generally reinforces the inequality of political voice. Surveys, if done well and used honestly (two significant qualifications), may help, but they can hardly change things. Greater equality in our basic institutions—greater income equality and, more important perhaps, greater educational equality—would certainly help equalize political resources. That is a tall order, and I certainly have no scheme to achieve it nor any expectation that others do either.

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The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary Rights in the House, 1789-1990

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Conventional accounts of the institutional development of Congress suggest that expansion of the size and workload of the House led members to distribute parliamentary rights narrowly: Majority party leaders accrued strong procedural powers while minority parties lost many of their parliamentary rights. I offer an alternative, partisan basis of procedural choice. Using an original data set of changes in House rules, I present a statistical model to assess the influence of partisan and nonpartisan factors on changes in minority procedural rights in the House between 1789 and 1990. I find that short-term partisan goals—constrained by inherited rules—shape both the creation and suppression of rights for partisan and political minorities. Collective institutional concerns and longer-term calculations about future parliamentary needs have little impact on changes in minority rights. The findings have important theoretical implications for explaining both the development of Congress and the nature of institutional change more generally.

> As it is always in the power of the majority, by their numbers, to stop any improper measures proposed on the part of their opponents, the only weapons by which the minority can defend themselves against similar attempts from those in power are the forms and rules of proceeding.
>
> —Thomas Jefferson, 1801

> It is but too evident, that when the right of debate is taken away—when a majority can . . . screen themselves from exposure (however weak, arbitrary or wicked their measures may be) by sealing the lips of a minority on the floor of congress, we may soon bid adieu to our best and dearest rights. It is laying the axe at the very root of the tree of liberty.
>
> —Rep. Archibald McBryde to constituents, 1810

Compiling a manual of parliamentary practice in 1801, Thomas Jefferson emphatically recognized the importance of procedure in securing the rights of minority party members in the U.S. Congress. In a democratic political institution, majority parties would achieve their favored outcomes by taking advantage of their superior size, and minority parties would resist by availing themselves of protective rules to amend, delay, or obstruct the majority's agenda. Yet, as suggested by Archibald McBryde (Federalist-North Carolina) just a few years later, the portrait of congressional rules as stable guarantors of the minority's right to participate meaningfully in the legislative process is deceptive. Far from rigidly securing the rights of the opposition, congressional rules are themselves the object of choice (Riker 1980). Just as policy outcomes are contested by coalitions within each chamber, so too are the formal rules of the legislative game.

What leads members of Congress—in theory entitled to full and equal participation as members of a democratic legislature—to alter the procedural rights afforded members of the minority party? I shall articulate and test several competing explanations to account for formal changes in the rules of the House of Representatives that have created or suppressed minority rights from 1789 to 1990. Although conventional accounts suggest that changes in the size and complexity of the House and its agenda necessitated the development of firm majority rule and restrictions on minority rights (Cooper 1977; Stewart 1992), my findings indicate otherwise. The results, I argue, suggest the power of a partisan theory of procedural choice to explain the timing and direction of formal change in House rules. The distribution of parliamentary rights in the House is conditional on the shape of partisan forces in the chamber. In allocating rights to the minority, partisan advantage rather than collective institutional concerns drives members' procedural choices.

Although this study focuses on a narrow category of congressional rules, the evolution of minority rights has broad theoretical implications. First, explaining the politics of minority rights is necessary for modeling the course of congressional development. Although it is well known that the House had become, by the late nineteenth century, a highly partisan and majoritarian institution (and remains so today), we know little as yet about why the House chose that particular historical path and the Senate did not. Second, understanding the politics of procedural choice will help both formal and empirical students of institutions to answer a more general question: What leads members of an institution to agree to new organizational arrangements? The evolution of minority rights will suggest that a theory of institutional change should start with a simple premise: Institutions reflect purposive behavior. Political bodies are designed and altered, in other words, to secure their members' preferred outcomes. Importantly, however, past procedural choices are inherited by subsequent majorities, thereby constraining their own future choices over rules. Any theory of institutional change arguably must integrate such inherited institutional arrangements with the array of contemporary political preferences.

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CONGRESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THEORIES OF CHANGE

Traditional works on congressional development—including studies of committees (McConachie 1898), early legislative methods (Harlow 1917), and party government (Hasbrouck 1927)—charted institutional change in rich detail but fell short in identifying and explaining patterns of change in Congress's past. Indeed, congressional scholars have produced little theory about institutional change (Shepsle 1989). Even with the emergence of "new institutionalism" studies in the late 1970s, rules have generally remained exogenous to the study of congressional decision making (Shepsle 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1987).

Although formal theorists are now elaborating how institutional features structure policy outcomes, their models generally depict institutions as ex ante bargains struck prior to the legislative game.[1] Moreover, these models generally assume that legislators hold fixed sets of preferences. But when preferences and contexts change, an institution's rules are often no longer satisfactory to a majority of its members.[2] Although we know that both policy preferences and environmental change appear to drive institutional change (Cooper and Brady 1981; Cooper and Young 1989; Sinclair 1989; Smith 1989), theoretical work that predicts the timing and direction of such change is limited.

A growing number of scholars are now turning to the historical record to explain change in legislative institutions. Several of these studies focus on specific aspects of congressional development, including the emergence of standing committees (Gamm and Shepsle 1989), the development of bill introduction rules (Cooper and Young 1989), and the development of committee seniority norms (Katz and Sala 1996). Such studies often draw distinctions between macro (contextual) and micro (individual) levels of explanation. The macro approach argues that changes in external demands and institutional norms shape institutional arrangements. For example, Cooper and Young (1989) argue that House majorities gradually changed bill introduction rules in the nineteenth century largely in response to changes in the size and complexity of the House's agenda. In contrast, the micro approach posits the rational choice of rules to secure legislators' preferences, with institutional changes reflecting the aggregate outcome of members' calculations. For example, in explaining changes in congressional budgetary structures at the turn of the century, Stewart (1989) argues that members' demand for localistic policy induced preferences for a decentralized appropriations process, although preexisting economic and institutional forces constrained members' pursuit of such goals.

These contrasting micro and macro perspectives provide the basis for several alternative explanations of change in congressional minority rights. I shall now elaborate these competing explanations and draw out testable propositions for further study.

External Demands and Procedural Choice

The macro perspective on institutional change—linking external pressures and internal change—is not new to the study of Congress. Indeed, in his seminal article on the institutionalization of the House, Polsby (1968) argued that as the responsibilities of the national government increased and as career paths led to longer terms of service within the chamber, the House developed an organizational structure that emphasized a division of labor and more routinized modes of procedure. Isolating size and increasing workload, Polsby argued that relating the size of the House to the amount of work it performs would likely explain much of the institutionalization of the House (pp. 164–65).

Such an organizational theory approach roots conventional accounts of the development of House procedure (see Cooper 1977). The logic of the argument is relatively simple: The rapid early growth of the House and its leading role in the new national government led to the swift introduction of limits on individual rights. Institutional strains, in short, are said to have made "legislative egalitarianism impossible" (Stewart 1992, 86). Because every member's ability to achieve his or her political goals is in theory equally and adversely affected by expansion of the chamber's agenda, it would be in the collective interest of members under conditions of increasing House size and legislative activity to support new rules aimed at better management of chamber activity. Such procedural changes would increase the likelihood that both majority and minority party coalitions would gain the time necessary to pursue legislative goals important to their respective coalitions, increasing individual members' support for such change.

Of course, because rules changes in the House are adopted by simple majority vote, majority party leaders in practice only need to convince their own party members of the need for such restrictive procedural change. Thus, drawing from Binder (1995a), a workload/size theory of procedural change leads to the following expectation:

> WORKLOAD HYPOTHESIS (SUPPRESSION). *The majority party is more likely to suppress minority rights when increases in the level of demands on the chamber increase the value of time for the majority.*

A second expectation drawn from such an institutional logic would connect changes in workload and size to efforts to reinforce minority rights. If increases in the size and workload of the chamber lead to restrictions on minority rights, then lessening of external demands ought to increase members' incentives to expand minority rights. On those occasions on which majority parties have responded to minority party demands for new procedural rights, we would expect to find a relationship between workload and procedural rights again:

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[1] See, e.g., Shepsle and Weingast 1987 and Shepsle's 1989 critique. An alternative rational choice approach models institutions as endogenous outcomes of noncooperative games (Calvert 1992).

[2] Aldrich (1989) develops an argument about "frustrated majorities" and institutional failure. From an ecological perspective, Kaufman (1985) also details the ways in which organizations often fail to meet the demands of their changing environments.

WORKLOAD HYPOTHESIS (CREATION). *The majority party is more likely to create minority rights when workload and resulting time pressures on the chamber decrease.*

There is reason to be cautious, however, in arguing that changes in legislative activity will elicit calls for changes in minority rights. Although many structural arrangements clearly are not partisan matters, there is arguably a direct link between procedural rules and the balance of power within an institution (Knight 1992). By setting the bounds of permissible action and thereby limiting choices of an institution's members, rules distribute power among decision makers (Levi 1990; Schauer 1991). Rules, in other words, may be said to reflect the prevailing balance of forces within an institution. Because the balance of power in Congress is generally measured along a partisan dimension and because rules governing minority rights affect the allocation of power within each chamber, we should expect conflict over minority rights to engage partisan considerations directly. Change in parliamentary rights, in other words, is likely to have partisan implications, making it unlikely that majority party members would suppress rights simply in response to increasing chamber activity. Alternative explanations of change in minority rights thus draw on the politics of partisan advantage, rather than collective institutional concerns, to account for procedural change.

Party Competition and Procedural Choice

In assessing the modern House—in which minority rights to offer amendments are routinely limited by the majority party and many committees are disproportionately stacked in the majority party's favor (Bach and Smith 1988; Smith 1989)—many observers have speculated about the impact of the near-permanent Democratic majority and near-permanent Republican minority on procedural choice. Because the majority often limited minority party rights when the Democrats controlled the House from 1955 to 1994—the longest period of uninterrupted party control of either chamber in American history—many scholars have argued that the majority was simply incapable of understanding what it was like to be in the minority. As argued by Mann and Ornstein before Republicans took control of the House in the 1994 midterm congressional elections. "What may be missing today is any sense on the part of the minority of the demands and responsibilities of government, and any appreciation on the part of the majority of the frustrations and constraints of assuming the role of the opposition. The majority seems to view its power as an entitlement and has set up a structure of patronage that pervades the institution" (1993, 55). In contrast, Democratic and Republican parties in the modern Senate have experienced legislative life in both the majority and minority, and "partisan tensions and their effects have been much more subdued" (p. 55). Without a doubt, they conclude, with more frequent party turnover in the House, each side would develop an institutional memory of life in both positions.

An implication of this perspective is that members choose procedural arrangements based on their calculations about future parliamentary needs. Recognizing the partisan impact of procedural rights, majority party members seek those procedural rights that would best serve their longer-term partisan interests. Assuming that both majority and minority party members can make a reasonable calculation about their future status in the institution, each side would make procedural choices about minority party rights accordingly. Majority parties anticipating defeat in the coming election would create minority rights to prepare for their parliamentary future; majority parties anticipating continued control of the chamber would suppress minority rights knowing that such changes would make it easier for them to control the House agenda in the future. Linking longer-term electoral calculations with short-term preferences about rules leads to two testable propositions:

PARTY COMPETITION HYPOTHESIS (SUPPRESSION). *The majority party is more likely to suppress minority rights when it discounts its chances of losing majority control.*

PARTY COMPETITION HYPOTHESIS (CREATION). *The majority party is more likely to create minority rights when it anticipates losing control of the chamber.*

A scenario at the close of the Forty-Third Congress in 1875, however, raises questions about the relevance of future parliamentary needs to procedural choice. In 1875, majority party Republicans brought the House back into a lame-duck session, the November 1874 elections having cost them control of the coming Congress for the first time in nearly 20 years. Facing persistent obstructionism by the Democratic minority and anxious to ensure passage of what would be the last Reconstruction-era civil rights bill before losing control of the House, Republicans changed the rules to limit minority obstructionism (see Foner 1988; Kelly 1959; Wyatt-Brown 1965). Instead of expanding minority rights to prepare for their impending minority status, the majority altered chamber rules to secure its immediate policy goals. The 1875 case suggests that short-term, rather than long-term, partisan calculations might motivate members' procedural choices—a possibility I explore next.

Partisan Preferences and Procedural Choice

Large and cohesive majorities can set legislative agendas, assemble policy coalitions, and secure legislative victories with relative ease (Brady 1988; Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1990; Hurley, Brady, and Cooper 1977). Unlikely to face factional disputes among their members, such majorities can also easily defeat most minority obstructionism. Given a strong enough coalition, such majorities will rarely be constrained by decision rules requiring either a bare majority or supermajority vote for passage. Indeed, when a majority party so dominates the chamber, there should be little debate over the set of chamber rules: Given the similarity of members' views, nearly any set of rules would produce similar legislative results.

It is fairly unusual, however, for the majority party to enjoy such unchallenged power within Congress.[3] As majority party strength declines, it becomes tougher for a majority to successfully pursue its policy agenda. Given the difficulties of assembling and maintaining a majority coalition under such conditions, the advantages and disadvantages conferred by existing rules become far more salient to members (Fink and Humes 1992). Because legislative rules determine, for example, which proposals may be advanced, who may propose them, and how the proposals will be pitted against each other, chamber rules have a much larger effect in determining the winning legislative coalition when party members' preferences begin to diverge.

It follows then that members' procedural choices should closely reflect their views about policy. Indeed, as suggested by the 1875 case (as well as by Binder 1995 and Fink 1994 for the early Congresses and Dion 1991 for part of the nineteenth century), majority parties are likely to try to change the rules in their favor if they believe such changes will increase their chances of legislative success. Unless such changes are deemed necessary for securing policy goals, a majority party would not necessarily invest in efforts to alter chamber rules in its interests. Instead, efforts to change House rules are more likely when the achievement of majority party legislative goals is hampered by minority obstructionism. Thus linking partisan preferences to procedural choice yields an expectation about the partisan conditions leading to suppression:

> PARTISAN NEEDS HYPOTHESIS (SUPPRESSION). *The higher the level of minority obstructionism, the more likely the majority party will suppress minority rights.*

Partisan need alone, however, is arguably insufficient to produce restrictive procedural change. Instead, a majority party must also be sufficiently stronger than the minority to succeed in its procedural effort. Because suppressing minority rights, by definition, limits the minority's ability to amend, debate, or obstruct the majority's agenda, we should expect the minority party to oppose any effort to limit its parliamentary rights. Further, because rules protecting the minority party rarely preclude dissident majority party members from taking advantage of the rule (see Appendix), the majority party must be sufficiently united over its legislative goals in order successfully to limit minority rights. Minority obstructionism is unlikely to impel support for restrictions on minority rights if the majority party itself is factionalized over policy. Thus sufficient partisan capacity, as well as partisan need, is necessary for suppressing minority rights, which leads to the following expectation:

> PARTISAN CAPACITY HYPOTHESIS (SUPPRESSION). *The stronger the majority party relative to the minority party, the more likely the majority party will suppress minority rights.*

A reverse logic holds for the creation of minority rights. The weaker the majority party, the more likely a faction of the majority will join a cross-party coalition in favor of expanding minority rights. Under such conditions, extending minority rights would serve the policy interests of both minority party members and those majority party members desiring to challenge the majority party's control of the agenda. If cross-party coalitions are necessary to extract procedural rights from the majority, then strong minority parties are essential to the creation of new rights: the stronger the minority party, the fewer the number of majority party defectors necessary to form a winning coalition in favor of extending minority rights. Thus the alignment of partisan policy preferences also leads to a testable proposition:

> PARTISAN CAPACITY HYPOTHESIS (CREATION). *The weaker the majority party relative to the minority party, the more likely a cross-party coalition will create new minority rights.*

Immediate short-term policy preferences, rather than longer-term calculations about party control or broader institutional concerns about managing the legislative agenda, would thus motivate members either to suppress or to create minority party rights.

Preference alignments, external demands, and party competition, of course, might vary independently. Variation across all three factors might influence the probability of changes in House minority rights. My goal is to assess the relative influence of each of these variables in explaining the suppression and creation of minority rights across the history of the House. Contrary to conventional expectations about the impact of workload and changing party control on procedural change, the findings here will suggest the influence of partisan alignments and inherited rules in structuring change in procedural rights.

DATA AND METHODS

I define a minority right as a *procedural advantage protected from arbitrary change that enables the minority party to amend, debate, or obstruct the majority's agenda*. To test the suppression and creation hypotheses, I assemble a data set of all minority rights that have existed at any point during the history of the House between 1789 and 1990.[4] I then determine when each minority right was formally created and/or suppressed as part of House rules. This yields two dichotomous dependent variables—one indicating when minority rights have been suppressed and the other indicating when they have been created (see appendix).

Changes in the procedural context, however, make it inappropriate to model the entire span of House history in the same way. Because minority parties alter their procedural strategies to take advantage of changing rules and political conditions, the particular form of minority obstructionism changes over time as well. Inherited rules, in other words, make possible certain types of obstructive activity while foreclosing others. To assess appropriately the influence of minority obstructionism and other factors on rights suppression, I divide House history into two periods intended to capture a major shift in ways of conducting chamber business.

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[3] Indeed, according to Brady (1988), the dominant majorities associated with realignment periods have emerged only three times in the nation's political past.

[4] Selection of minority rights is addressed in the appendix.

The first period lasts from 1789 through the readoption of Reed's rules in 1894 (1st–53d Congresses), the second, from 1895 to 1990 (54th–101st Congresses).[5] During the first period, House majority parties gradually accrued a set of rules ensuring majority party control of the legislative process. Indeed, throughout much of the period, House rules served the minority party's interests. Majority parties generally needed a two-thirds majority to obtain consideration of favored bills; and minority parties persistently exploited traditional individual rights to offer dilatory motions and often refused to vote, thereby preventing action on legislation preferred by the majority (Bach 1990; Dion 1991; Garfield 1981, 3:17–18). By the beginning of the second period in 1895, the majority party had gained firm procedural control over the chamber's legislative agenda—control rarely challenged in the twentieth century.

To test the hypotheses of rights creation and suppression, I construct several independent variables to tap the conditions underlying changes in minority rights and then use bivariate statistical tests and multivariate maximum likelihood logit models to assess the factors influencing changes in minority rights over time. I shall describe measures used to tap the workload, party competition, and partisan factors shaping procedural change.

Workload

Tapping workload over the history of the House poses several measurement problems. First, although the current *Congressional Record* chronicles levels of legislative activity down to minutes in session for each chamber, no such records are available for the period prior to 1945. Second, no single measure of legislative activity fully captures the scope of legislative demands. Given these difficulties, I instead assemble several proximate and correlated measures of workload and perform a principal-components analysis to extract a general "workload" factor from the variables for each period.

For the first period (1789–1894), I use the number of House members, the number of public laws enacted, and the length of each Congress in days—measures that arguably tap the level of demands generated by the membership, the scope of the congressional agenda, and the amount of time consumed by that agenda.[6] For the second period, I include only laws enacted and days in session, because the increase in membership is flat after 1915. In each period, the principal components analysis produces a single workload factor. I then generate a factor score for each Congress that represents the level of "workload" in that Congress.[7] Based on the workload hypotheses, I would expect increases in workload to increase the chances of suppression and decrease the likelihood of creation.

Change in Party Control

The hypotheses of future needs assume that members of the majority party are reasonably able to calculate their electoral prospects in the coming election.[8] Thus, to test the effects of expected change in party control on procedural change, I code for each Congress whether the majority party lost control of the House in the following election.[9] I would expect change in party control to increase the chances of creation and to dampen the probability of suppression.

Partisan Needs

To tap a majority party's need for a procedural fix to its legislative problems, I need a measure of minority party obstructionism. No single measure, however, captures minority obstructionism across House history. Instead, I use several different variables to measure obstructive activity within the two periods described above.

For the period 1789 to 1894, minority parties persistently used dilatory motions to obstruct the majority's efforts to pass its favored legislation. In particular, minority parties resorted to using motions to adjourn to delay and frustrate the majority. Thus, I use the percentage of floor votes in each Congress consumed by motions to adjourn to tap levels of minority obstructionism.[10] Because over a third of the suppression cases occurred at the opening of a new Congress, I lag the level of obstructive motions by one Congress. The use of a lagged measure then tests for whether the majority party acts to redress obstructionism experienced in the previous Congress.[11] Even if a rule change does not occur at the start of a new Congress, lagged obstruction still taps recent minority party floor tactics and the array of existing rules. The higher the percentage of obstructive floor motions, the more likely the majority party will suppress rights in the following Congress.

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[5] Reed's rules, originally adopted under Speaker Thomas Reed (R-Maine) by the Fifty-First Congress (1889–91) and readopted by a Democratic majority in the Fifty-Third Congress (1893–95), ended a century of minority obstructionism (Chiu 1928; Dion 1991; Follett 1902). Reed's rules also capped a century of incremental restrictions on minority rights (appendix). Cooper and Young (1989) and Bach (1990) both note the significance of Reed's rules as a turning point in the procedural development of the House.

[6] *Size of the House* is taken from Martis (1989), *laws enacted* is from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, 1987, 1993), and *days in session* appears in U.S. Congress 1993a.

[7] I use the regression method of the *SPSS 6.01 for Windows* factor analysis module to estimate factor score coefficients for each variable. Factor scores for each Congress are then obtained by multiplying the standardized value of each variable by its factor score coefficient.

[8] There is arguably no easy way to measure whether or not a party anticipates retaining control of the chamber in the following Congress. Of course, if a Congress meets in a lame-duck session after the November elections (as it routinely did before ratification of the Twentieth Amendment in 1933), the two parties already know their respective positions in the coming Congress.

[9] Change in party control is coded as 1, 0 otherwise.

[10] Motions to adjourn were routinely used by the minority party to prevent the majority from taking further action on its agenda (see, e.g., Garfield 1981, 3:18). Numbers of motions to adjourn appear in Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) Congressional Voting Records, 1st to 53d Congresses (File 0004). In counting motions to adjourn from ICPSR codebooks, I exclude motions to set a future time of adjournment, because these motions were often used by the majority party as a scheduling tool.

[11] Even if party control of the chamber has switched between the two Congresses, the lagged obstruction measure still taps the extent to which the new majority party is likely to face obstruction by the new minority party.

No single measure accurately taps minority obstructionism in the period after 1895. Instead, I construct several measures to tap reported sources of minority obstructionism. As suggested by the incidence of changes in the discharge rule in the early twentieth century (see appendix), minority party use of the discharge rule motivated majority members repeatedly to revise the discharge rule in that period in an effort to limit its use by the minority party (Beth 1990; Hasbrouck 1927).[12] Indeed, after a century of restrictive rules changes, the majority party had all but sealed access to the floor agenda from the minority party, leaving the committee discharge process as one of the few means available to the minority to challenge majority agenda control. Thus, to measure activity by the minority deemed noisome by the majority, I use the total number of discharge petitions filed in the House, lagged by one Congress.[13] The higher the level of discharge efforts, the more likely minority rights will be suppressed.

As another proximate measure of minority obstructionism, I use the total number of recorded floor votes in each Congress, again lagged by one Congress. Limits on members' rights to request recorded votes and to offer amendments were clearly motivated by majority party frustration with the increase and type of minority-sponsored amendments in the 1970s (Bach and Smith 1989; Smith 1989). The higher the number of recorded votes, the more likely minority rights will be suppressed.

Because accounts of the modern period also suggest that newly created minority rights were often retracted in the following Congress (see Davidson and Oleszek 1977; Hasbrouck 1927), I use a dummy variable to indicate whether or not a minority right was created in the prior Congress.[14] If a minority right has just been created, the majority party's motivation to retract the concession is arguably highest when it seeks to change the rules at the opening of the next Congress.

Partisan Capacity

Party capacity for assembling a winning coalition (i.e., party strength) can be considered a function of a party's relative size and its cohesiveness across all roll-call votes. A large party that is incohesive may be no stronger than a small party that is tightly cohesive. Thus, to measure majority and minority party strength over time, I interact each party's percentage share of chamber seats with its Rice cohesion score.[15] To relate majority and minority party strength in each Congress, I use the difference in majority and minority party strength.[16] The larger the difference in party strength, the more likely minority rights will be suppressed; the smaller the difference, the more likely rights will be created.

PATTERNS OF SUPPRESSION IN THE HOUSE

Looking first at simple bivariate relationships during the first period (1789–1894), the conditions fostering suppression of rights lend initial support for both workload and partisan preference hypotheses (Table 1). Minority rights are more likely to be suppressed under conditions of higher workload, higher majority party advantage in strength over the minority, and higher levels of minority party obstructionism.[17] Contrary to the party competition hypothesis, however, subsequent change in party control does not dampen the suppression of minority rights. In fact, although the difference is statistically insignificant, minority rights are more likely to be suppressed prior to a switch in party control than when the majority retains its control of the chamber. Thus, a rise in legislative activity, as well as increases in the majority party's perceived need and actual capacity for procedural change, appear to have statistically significant effects on the likelihood of suppression.

Judging from bivariate tests, suppression in the second period appears to occur under slightly different conditions (Table 2). High partisan capacity and partisan need are still strongly related to the suppression of minority rights. The relationship between legislative activity and suppression, however, is weaker than in the first period: workload is not statistically higher in Congresses with restrictive rules changes than in those without. There is, however, some support for the party competition hypothesis: majority parties retaining control of the chamber in the second period are more likely to suppress minority rights. To make sense of the relative influence of these partisan and nonpartisan

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[12] But Hasbrouck notes some majority abuse of the discharge rule in 1910 in an effort to prevent the minority from using its newly acquired procedural right (1927, 142–45).

[13] Data appear in Beth 1990. Prior to the creation of the discharge rule in the Sixty-First Congress (1910), I code each Congress as 0. For the Sixty-First through Sixty-Seventh Congresses, I use the number of discharge *motions* (rather than *petitions*) filed because the discharge petition was not created until the Sixty-Eighth Congress. Although early changes in the discharge rule affected the ease with which members could file discharge motions and petitions, the number of discharge motions and petitions filed is still a reasonable method of tapping efforts to discharge committees.

[14] The variable is coded 1 if a right was created, 0 otherwise.

[15] Rice cohesion scores are calculated for each party as the mean absolute difference of the percentage voting *aye* and the percentage voting *nay* over all roll-call votes for each Congress. In measuring party size, I use each party's share of chamber seats, rather than the share of seats held by the majority and minority parties, to account for the presence of minor parties in several mid-nineteenth-century Congresses. House cohesion data provided by Garry Young and are based on roll-call data from ICPSR, File 0004. Members' party affiliations and party sizes are those reported in Martis 1989.

[16] An identical measure is used by Hurley, Brady, and Cooper (1977) to measure the majority party's capacity for major policy change. Alternative measures of party strength narrow their focus to party votes (a majority of one party opposing a majority of the other) on the grounds that party strength should only be relevant on votes showing interparty disagreement (Brady, Cooper, and Hurley 1979; Hurley 1979). Arguably, however, a party's capacity to muster a majority for procedural change will be grounded on its performance across all roll-call votes in a Congress. Moreover, variation in interparty disagreement can be captured more directly by measures of minority party obstructionism as discussed.

[17] I report one-tailed significance tests throughout because there are clear expectations about the direction of effects.

TABLE 1. Conditions Fostering Suppression of Minority Rights, 1789–1894

		Mean		
Hypothesis	Variable	Suppression Congresses (n = 10)	Nonsuppression Congresses (n = 41)	Difference
Partisan capacity	Difference in majority and minority party strength	15.45	8.70	6.75**
Partisan need	% obstructive floor motions (lagged)	13.30	6.10[a]	7.20***
Workload	Workload factor score	.70	−.20	.90***
Party competition	Change in party control in following Congress	.50	.25[b]	.25

[a] n = 40 (excludes 1st Congress).
[b] n = 40 (excludes 18th Congress due to discontinuity in chamber parties; see Martis 1989).
**$p < .01$, one-tailed test.
***$p < .001$, one-tailed test.

TABLE 2. Conditions Fostering Suppression of Minority Rights, 1895–1990

		Mean		
Hypothesis	Variable	Suppression Congresses (n = 9)	Nonsuppression Congresses (n = 37)	Difference
Partisan capacity	Difference in majority and minority party strength	19.50	13.00	6.50*
Partisan need	Number of recorded votes (lagged)	656.00	290.00	366.00*
	Discharge motions filed (lagged)	37.00	17.00[a]	20.00
	Newly acquired minority right	.44	.08	.36*
Workload	Workload factor score	.22	−.10	.32
Party competition	Change in party control in following Congress	0.00	.19	.19**

[a] n = 36 (missing data for 101st Congress).
*$p < .05$, one-tailed test.
**$p < .01$, one-tailed test.

factors on rules changes in both periods, I turn to multivariate tests of the politics of rights suppression.

Predicting Suppression, 1789–1894

A maximum likelihood logit model of suppression in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries confirms the importance of partisan need and capacity in shaping procedural choice (Table 3).[18] In a model assessing the impact of minority obstructionism, the difference in majority and minority party strength, subsequent change in party control of the chamber, and levels of legislative activity, the coefficients for lagged obstruction and party strength difference are both significant and in the predicted (positive) direction. Coefficients for changes in workload and change in party control are both insignificant. Overall, the model correctly classifies 90% of the cases and reduces error by 50%.[19]

Unlike ordinary least squares regression, the impact of each independent variable in a logit model depends on the values of each of the other variables. Thus, to interpret the model's coefficients, I assess the impact of each independent variable over a specified range, hold-

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[18] Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, ordinary least squares regression is inappropriate (Aldrich and Nelson 1984). Coefficients in a logit model are estimated using a maximum-likelihood method: The coefficients making the observed results most likely are chosen.

[19] The model fails to predict suppression when it was observed in the Seventeenth (1822), Twenty-Fifth (1837), Thirty-Sixth (1860), and Fortieth (1868) Congresses. Dion (1991), however, shows that majority parties in both 1837 and 1860 restricted minority rights in an effort to redress prior obstructive activity. Both floor debates and voting alignments on the rules changes provoked sharp partisan divisions. For the 1868 case, the model yields a 47% probability of suppression. In that year, facing persistent minority obstructionism from Democrats opposed to impeaching Andrew Johnson, majority Republicans in a party-line vote during consideration of the articles of impeachment suppressed the right to offer dilatory motions (Hinds 1907, 5:925). The 1822 case, occurring during an era of diminished partisan conflict under one-party rule by the Republicans, clearly is an outlier, although at least one minority party Federalist protested the rule change as a restriction on individual rights (see *Annals*, 17th Cong. 1st sess. 1299, 13 March 1822; U.S. Congress 1983).

TABLE 3. Minority Rights Suppression, 1789–1894 (Maximum Likelihood Logit Models)

Hypothesis	Variable	Coefficient	Change in X (from, to)	Impact[a] (%)
Partisan capacity	Difference in majority and minority party strength	.16* (.07)	(1.95, 18.09)	26
Partisan need	% obstructive motions (lagged)	23.46* (11.33)	(.02, .14)	31
Workload	Workload factor score	.04 (.59)	(−1.03, .97)	1
Party competition	Change in party control in following Congress	1.06 (1.14)	(0, 1)	12
	Constant	−5.92*** (1.9)	—	—

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). −2 log likelihood = 30.68; model chi-squared 18.9, $p < .001$; correctly predicted = 90%; reduction in error = 50%; N = 49.
[a]For explanation of "impact," see n. 20.
*$p < .05$.
***$p < .001$.

ing the other variables constant at their means.[20] Contrary to the conventional wisdom, increases in workload do not increase the probability of suppression. In fact, increased legislative activity has virtually no effect on the choice of restrictive rules.[21] Instead, suppression is 31% more likely when obstructionism increases from 2% to 14% of all floor motions and 26% more likely when the majority party's advantage in strength over the minority climbs sixfold. Although the party competition hypothesis predicts that suppression is more likely when the majority anticipates retaining control of the House, the results suggest that suppression is actually more likely (but only nominally so) when the majority party loses control.

Predicting Suppression, 1895–1990

By 1894, when Reed's rules had been readopted by the majority party, the role of party had been formalized in House rules, granting the majority party almost unfettered control over the floor agenda. Under this different procedural context, however, minority parties still devised procedural strategies intended to limit the majority's control of the agenda. Unlike the earlier period, however, there has been no single form of minority obstructionism in the latter period. Thus, in modeling the pattern of suppression after 1895, I try several alternatives to tap the procedural difficulties encountered by majority parties.

One method of capturing the increased incidence of minority obstructionism is to use a dummy variable that indicates whether a minority right was created in the previous Congress. By extending new rights to the minority, the majority party potentially makes itself vulnerable to nettlesome activity by the minority. Testing for the effects of changes in party strength difference, workload, party control of the chamber, and newly created minority rights, the first model in Table 4 suggests moderate support for the partisan preference hypotheses. The coefficient for a newly created minority right is statistically significant and in the predicted (positive) direction. The coefficients for the difference in party strength and workload variables are also significant in the predicted (positive) direction. As expected, the coefficient for the change in party control variable is not. The model, however, provides only a 25% reduction in error over the modal category.

As noted, however, changes in the discharge process and floor voting rules opened the majority party to periodic procedural threats from the minority party. The second model in Table 4 begins to test for the effects of these rules changes by adding a variable to tap the number of recorded votes cast in the previous Congress. Nearly doubling the model's reduction in error, the addition of the variable lends further support for the partisan preference and workload hypotheses. Majority parties are more likely to suppress minority rights when their perceived capacity and need for change increases and when legislative activity is increasing as well. The expectation of retaining control of the House, in contrast, does not have a measurable effect on the likelihood of suppression.

In the third model in Table 4, I add a variable to tap the introduction and use of the discharge rule—a rule change that provides minority members a chance to shape the legislative agenda. Although the discharge variable does not reach statistical significance, its intro-

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[20] The effect of each independent variable is calculated as P (suppression) = $1/(1 + e^{-z})$, where $z = b_0 + b_1$ (difference) + b_2 (obstruction) + b_3 (change in party control) + b_4 (workload). "Impact" is the change in the probability of suppression as X varies from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean value for the continuous variables. For the dichotomous variable (change in party control), the impact of the variable is shown as it changes from 0 to 1.

[21] Although workload increases over time, it is not a simple monotonic trend; there is enough variation in the series not to think that it is a simple linear trend. To control for the possible effects of increases in workload over time, I reran the model to include a "Congress" variable—in effect, controlling for "time." The estimated coefficient for Congress is statistically insignificant and there is no appreciable change in the model. The same holds for the twentieth-century models.

TABLE 4. Minority Rights Suppression, 1895–1990 (Maximum Likelihood Logit Models)

			Model		Change in X	Impact (%)
Hypothesis	Variable	1	2	3	(from, to)	(model 3)
Partisan capacity	Difference in majority and minority party strength	.13*	.240*	.320*	(5.45, 23.11)	2
		(.07)	(.120)	(.150)		
Partisan need	Number of recorded votes (lagged)	—	.005*	.006*	(12, 740)	1
			(.002)	(.003)		
	Discharge motions filed (lagged)	—	—	.030	(0, 57)	0
				(.030)		
	Newly acquired minority right	4.40**	9.430*	9.800**	(0, 1)	79
		(1.80)	(4.400)	(4.400)		
Workload	Workload factor score	1.80*	3.900*	4.400*	(−1.04, .97)	7
		(.95)	(2.100)	(2.100)		
Party competition	Change in party control in following Congress	−8.80	−8.600	−8.400	(0, 1)	0
		(53.80)	(52.200)	(48.800)		
	Constant	−4.80**	−11.100**	−14.500**	—	—
		(1.60)	(4.900)	(6.300)		
−2 Log likelihood		27.47	19.030	16.310	—	—
Model chi-squared		18.01**	26.000***	28.720***	—	—
correctly predicted (%)		84.80	88.900	90.100	—	—
reduction in error (%)		25.00	45.000	56.000	—	—
N		46.00	45.000	44.000	—	—

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).
*$p < .05$, one-tailed test.
**$p < .01$, one-tailed test.
***$p < .001$, one-tailed test.

duction improves the overall fit of the model, increasing the reduction in error to 56%. All three models suggest that accounting for levels of partisan capacity and partisan need, as well as the level of workload, is essential for predicting patterns of rights suppression, even after implementation of Reed's rules.[22] Moreover, in the most robust of the three models, change in party control is unrelated to the probability of suppression.

Assessing the impact of each variable from the third model (Table 4, column 5), partisan need again has the largest influence on the likelihood of suppression, with newly created minority rights all but certain to be suppressed in the following Congress. In contrast, a switch in party control has no effect on restrictive procedural change. The rest of the findings, however, show some interesting changes in the post-Reed era. First, an increase in workload has a very weak but positive effect on the likelihood of suppression. Second, although an increase in partisan capacity bolsters the probability of suppression, the relative impact is highly diminished in comparison to the earlier period.[23] Such a finding is consistent with the general change in House politics after the adoption of Reed's rules. Because of rules changes secured in the nineteenth century, the role of the majority party in structuring the chamber agenda was formalized in House rules by the end of the 1890s. By ensuring the power of a simple majority to control the content of the agenda, as well as floor debate and amending opportunities, nineteenth-century rules changes endowed twentieth-century majority parties with an inherent advantage over the minority. That development appears to have reduced the majority party's reliance on coalition strength to suppress new minority obstructionism in the modern House.[24]

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[22] The third model only fails to predict suppression of minority rights that occurred in 1965 and 1983 (Eighty-Ninth and Ninety-Eighth Congresses, respectively). Both cases are consistent, however, with the finding that restrictive rules changes are motivated by high partisan capacity and partisan need. Democrats in 1965, bolstered by the 1964 Johnson landslide, eliminated the privilege of demanding an engrossed copy of a bill—a move intended to prevent the obstructive tactics of minority Republicans such as H. R. Gross (R-Iowa) (Davidson, Kovenock, and O'Leary 1966, 138). A similar dynamic recurred in 1983. Majority Democrats, whose ranks increased in the 1982 midterm elections, made it more difficult in 1983 for members to offer certain types of riders to appropriations bill, a practice that had been used disproportionately by Republicans and Democratic conservatives (Smith 1989, 60–61).

[23] To ensure that such an interpretation is not an artifact of the introduction of the dummy variable measuring a newly acquired minority right, I reran the nineteenth-century model adding an identical variable. There was only a negligible and statistically insignificant change in the overall fit of the model and in the impact of the party strength variable in the first period.

[24] A final word on the robustness of the logit models is in order here. Despite the use of over-time data, there are no theoretical reasons to expect the presence of autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity in the data and hence no reason to model such variation directly. The historical record lends no evidence that past reforms have been mimicked by subsequent majorities or that there have been any learning effects from one Congress to another. Even with the clustering of suppression in

TABLE 5. Conditions Fostering Creation of Minority Rights, 1789–1990

Hypothesis	Variable	Mean: Creation Congresses (n = 7)	Mean: Noncreation Congresses (n = 89)	Difference
Partisan capacity	Difference in majority and minority party strength	6.72	12.39	5.67*
	Minority party strength	31.47	24.47	7.00***
Workload	Workload factor score	.05	−.03	.08
Party competition	Change in party control in following Congress	.43	.23	.20

$^{*}p < .05$.
$^{***}p < .001$.

PATTERNS OF CREATION IN THE HOUSE

The politics of suppression suggests that immediate partisan goals have historically motivated majority parties to alter the distribution of minority rights. The politics of creation leads to a similar conclusion. Because the distribution of cases makes inappropriate a multivariate test of the influence of partisan and nonpartisan factors on creation, I use bivariate tests to study the creation pattern.[25]

The size of the majority party's advantage in strength over the minority is statistically smaller in Congresses when rights are created than in Congresses with no new minority rights (Table 5). Thus, as suggested in the partisan capacity hypothesis, the weaker the majority party relative to the minority, the more likely a right will be created. Indeed, minority parties gaining new rights are statistically stronger than minority parties that fail to procure new rights. Under these conditions, a cross-party coalition in favor of extending minority rights is most likely to form. With such a strong minority, only a few majority defectors are necessary to form a winning coalition in favor of reallocating parliamentary rights. In contrast, there is no evidence that declining workload or anticipation of minority status leads majority parties to extend minority rights.

The requirement of a cross-party coalition to procure new rights is consistent with historical circumstances under which rights have been created. The extension of new minority rights has historically occurred when a faction of the majority party agrees with members of a strong minority party that reinforcing minority rights would serve both coalitions' interests. Cross-party coalitions of Progressive "insurgent" Republicans and minority party Democrats in 1910, 1924, and 1931 were driving forces behind the extension of new minority rights. For example, a coalition of Progressive Republicans and minority Democrats in 1924 forced the Republican leadership to alter the discharge rule in its favor, earning the right for 150 members to call up a discharge motion on the floor and defeating an effort to increase the required number to 218 (Hasbrouck 1927). In the 1970s as well, cross-party coalitions were responsible for procuring new minority rights. For example, Democrats offered increases in minority staff and a ban on proxy voting to entice Republican support for broader institutional reforms, many opposed by senior majority party Democrats (Davidson and Oleszek 1977).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Contrary to conventional themes about the development of the House, the emergence of a partisan, majoritarian institution was not inevitable. Far from being the inescapable consequence of secular trends, restrictive procedural choices in the House appear to reflect short-term partisan goals of the majority party, rather than longer-term partisan considerations or broader collective concerns about increasing efficiency of the chamber. When increased partisan capacity and need for procedural change coincide, majority parties have been most successful in limiting minority rights and moving the House toward a more partisan and majoritarian chamber. But when minority parties strengthen and attract the support of a majority faction, the process stalls and minority rights are reinforced. There is, in other words, a partisan basis to procedural choice in the House. Across the history of the House, crucial procedural choices have been shaped not by members' collective concerns about the institution but by narrow calculations about partisan advantage.

To be sure, students of congressional development recognize that rules battles have at times been fought along a partisan dimension. In fact, most studies of

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the 1970s, there is no evidence that reforms directly "fed" on each other. Majority party Democrats in those years successfully sought to deal with a host of both recurring and new sources of minority obstructionism. A successful rule change in any given Congress did not make it more or less likely that a subsequent majority would also suppress rights.

[25] Minority rights were created once in the first period, and in only 7% of the second-period Congresses. Given such a distribution of cases, I consider the 1789–1990 span as a single period. I drop from the analysis Congresses with rights created and suppressed simultaneously (1847 and 1880), because I would not expect similar conditions to prevail when rights are created and when a compromise produces both creation and suppression in a single procedural package. I have also dropped the 1822 case, as it is a clear outlier. In short, the minority right created in 1822 (requiring a two-thirds vote to suspend the rules) was an inadvertent byproduct of the majority party's attempt to *suppress* minority rights. Although the rule today protects minorities, there was no such intent when it was adopted in 1822—precisely the opposite. The politics of the 1822 rule change are treated in detail in Binder 1995.

congressional change highlight the role of Speaker Reed in silencing minority party obstructionism in 1890 (Davidson and Oleszek 1977; Follett 1902; Galloway 1976). Reed's innovations are generally cited as a significant turning point in House procedure, because the majority party claimed the right to strictly limit the procedural role of the minority in making policy. By taking a longer-term perspective, however, this study suggests that Reed's actions were but part of a more gradual course of institutional change. Indeed, rules changes in the 1890s both followed and preceded a century of strategic partisan calculations by the majority party about favored policy outcomes and the rules necessary to achieve them.

Such an emphasis on the evolution of minority rights, rather than simply on major institutional reforms such as Reed's rules, arguably provides a unique theoretical route to explaining institutional change. As suggested by Aldrich, "the dynamic path, that is to say, the political history, is the central object of our theoretical inquiry" (1994, 223). What the historical path of House minority rights suggests is that both partisan preferences and inherited rules shape future institutional choices. The influence of members' goals on institutional choice is seen clearly in the relationship of party strength and change in minority rights. As the electoral strength of the major parties shifts over time, so, too, does the distribution of parliamentary rights: stronger *majority* parties succeed in limiting minority rights, and stronger *minority* parties attract majority party defectors to reinforce minority rights.

Still, the evolution of minority rights suggests that members' goals are themselves both shaped and constrained by the inherited institutional context. First, members' procedural choices depend in large part on existing rules. When minority parties devise new ways of obstructing the majority, the preferences of the majority party about desired institutional arrangements shift as well. If inherited rules did not affect procedural choice, then change in partisan capacity alone would account for most of the variation in minority rights—which it does not.[26] Instead, minority exploitation of inherited rules has a substantial impact on change in minority rights, as majority parties realize a partisan need for changing the rules of the game.

Second, and relatedly, members' procedural choices depend on past procedural choices. Once majority rule is firmly entrenched at the end of the nineteenth century, there should be little reason for subsequent majority parties newly to suppress minority rights. But when minority parties procure and then exploit parliamentary rights after 1900, majority parties once again perceive that their party goals are threatened, and they proceed to adjust the procedural score accordingly. Changes in the political landscape, in conclusion, often make past decisions about procedural arrangements untenable (Aldrich 1995). As goal-seeking actors, politicians will continue to try to alter institutional arrangements in response to a shifting historical context.

APPENDIX

No single concept accurately captures the nature of congressional minority rights. At one end of a spectrum are party-based or *partisan* minority rights—procedural privileges allocated narrowly and explicitly to the minority party (e.g., the right of the minority party to call witnesses at committee hearings). At the other end are nonparty or *political* minority rights—rules writ broadly enough to guarantee procedural protection to any individual or minority dissenting from the majority party or its leadership (e.g., guaranteeing debate time for opponents of a conference report).

To develop a data set of the full range of minority rights, I start with a definition of minority rights and two criteria for determining what "counts" as such a right. I define a minority right as a procedural advantage protected from arbitrary change that enables the minority party to amend, debate, or obstruct the majority's agenda. Rules meeting either or both of the following criteria are counted as minority rights:

1. *Minority identification standard*. Rules advocated by the minority party to provide procedural advantages for members of the minority party qualify as minority rights.

Under the identification standard, any rule considered by the minority party to be a minority right is counted as such, allowing me to count as minority rights rules that do not explicitly mention the minority party and that might therefore also benefit a faction of the majority party. The second criterion concerns the effects of chamber rules, rather than simply intent:

2. *Effects standard*. Rules that have the effect of helping the minority party to challenge the majority qualify as minority rights, regardless of the original purpose or supporting coalition of the rule.

Under the effects standard, a rule qualifies as a minority right if over time the minority party takes advantage of the rule and uses it to challenge or influence majority control of the agenda. The effects standard is essential for identifying minority rights because rules often develop uses contrary to their original purpose. In using these two criteria, I err on the side of liberally selecting rules that protect minority rights.

With these guidelines, I then use several sources to identify all minority rights in House history, including the House rules manual (U.S. Congress 1993b), histories of the House (Alexander 1916; Galloway 1976; Hasbrouck 1927; McConachie 1898), primary accounts of rules changes in the *Annals of Congress*, the *Congressional Globe*, and the *Congressional Record*, secondary accounts of rules debates such as those appearing in *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, and diaries and biographies of members such as James Garfield (1981), Thomas Reed (Robinson 1930), and Champ Clark (1920). After identifying the universe of minority rights, I determine from these sources the dates of their creation or suppression by a formal rule change in the House for the period 1789–1990:

Congress (Year)	*Rule Change Creating Minority Rights*
17th (1822)	2/3 vote required to suspend the rules
26th (1840)	Previous question motion altered to guarantee votes on pending amendments
30th (1847)	Guaranteed 5 minutes to debate amendments
46th (1880)	Required debate on suspensions and previous question
60th (1909)	Calendar Wednesday created
61st (1909)	2/3 vote to suspend Calendar Wednesday; motion-to-recommit secured for the minority
61st (1910)	Discharge petition created
65th (1917)	Party committee slates not divisible
68th (1924)	Discharge signatures reduced to 150; Rules's pocket veto banned; 2/3 to waive layover rules

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[26] The impact of inherited rules on procedural choice is equally dramatic in the case of the Senate. Early procedural decisions that inadvertently created the filibuster in 1806 had lasting procedural consequences: partisan majorities seeking to alter Senate rules in their favor were unable to overcome procedural hurdles inherited from the past. (On the politics of Senate reform, see Binder 1995b and Smith 1989.)

Congress (Year)	*Rule Change Creating Minority Rights*
72d (1931)	Discharge signatures reduced to 145
90th (1967)	Equal majority/minority representation on ethics committee
91st (1970)	1970 legislative reorganization: minority party guaranteed right to call witnesses; minority party committee statutory staff increased; guarantee of 1/3 investigatory staff funds; protect minority reports; guaranteed debate time for opposition on amendments, motion to recommit, and conference reports; 7-day notice for committee hearings
93d (1974)	1974 legislative reorganization: minority party guaranteed 1/3 committee statutory staff and investigatory staff funds; proxy voting banned

Congress (Year)	*Rule Change Suppressing Minority Rights*
12th (1811)	Adoption of the previous question (PQ) motion brings the House to an immediate vote on the pending question without debate
17th (1822)	Motion to postpone indefinitely given least precedence; only one motion to postpone (indefinitely) per day per member
25th (1837)	Only one call of the House after PQ called for; questions of order stemming from PQ motion to be decided without debate
27th (1841)	One-hour limit per member for floor debate; majority vote can discharge bill with pending amendments from Committee of the Whole (COW) at any time
30th (1847)	Suspensions restricted to Mondays and session's end
36th (1860)	Limits on quorum calls after PQ ordered; alter effect of PQ on motions to postpone and amendments; alter effect of negative outcome of PQ motion
40th (1868)	One dilatory motion only pending a vote on motion to suspend the rules (dropped in next Congress)
43d (1874)	Motions to suspend must be seconded by a majority (dropped in next Congress)
43d (1875)	Dilatory motions limited to one motion to adjourn and one motion to set a date/time of adjournment (dropped in next Congress)
46th (1880)	Suspensions restricted to 1st and 3d Mondays and session's end; seconding of suspensions motions reinstated
47th (1882)	Dilatory motions limited to one motion to adjourn before or after PQ ordered on election cases
47th (1883)	Required votes to suspend the rules reduced from 2/3 to simple majority for specified bills
51st (1890)	Reed's rules: disappearing quorum prohibited (all members present counted in a quorum); dilatory motions not to be recognized; quorum size in COW reduced from House majority to 100 (dropped in 52d Congress)
53d (1894)	Reed's rules readopted
62d (1911)	Discharge petition rule tightened: prohibited before 15 days after referral; bills read by title, two motions on calendar per member
62d (1912)	Discharge Calendar delayed in order of business
69th (1925)	Discharge petition rule tightened: 218 signatures required; majority of membership vote required to pass and second a motion to discharge; restricted to once a month in the order of business
74th (1935)	Discharge petition signatures raised to 218
89th (1965)	Demanding engrossed bills prohibited
91st (1970)	Reading of Journal dispensed with, unless ordered by a majority
92d (1971)	Minority party guarantee of 1/3 funds for committee investigatory staff eliminated
93d (1973)	Number of suspension days increased
93d (1974)	Quorum calls prohibited: once quorum established, until additional business transacted, and other situations; chair may end call once quorum reached; cluster voting on suspensions
94th (1975)	Proxy voting ban in committee eliminated; minority party guarantee of 1/3 funds for committee investigatory staff eliminated
94th (1976)	Rules Committee can report resolution waiving two-hour availability of conference reports
95th (1977)	Increase number of suspension days; quorum calls prohibited during debate, permitted only when vote pending; committee markup quorums reduced to 1/3 of the committee
96th (1979)	Increase threshold for demanding a recorded vote; eliminate seconding of suspensions; no quorum necessary prior to approving Journal; one vote only on approving the Journal.
98th (1983)	Motion to rise must be defeated to offer limitation amendment

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Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection

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Most scholars agree that members of Congress are strongly motivated by their desire for reelection. This assumption implies that members of Congress adopt institutions, rules, and norms of behavior in part to serve their electoral interests. Direct tests of the electoral connection are rare, however, because significant, exogenous changes in the electoral environment are difficult to identify. We develop and test an electoral rationale for the norm of committee assignment "property rights." We examine committee tenure patterns before and after a major, exogenous change in the electoral system—the states' rapid adoption of Australian ballot laws in the early 1890s. The ballot changes, we argue, induced new "personal vote" electoral incentives, which contributed to the adoption of "modern" congressional institutions such as property rights to committee assignments. We demonstrate a marked increase in assignment stability after 1892, by which time a majority of states had put the new ballot laws into force, and earlier than previous studies have suggested.

A common theme in research on congressional institutions is that members of Congress adopt institutions and rules that serve their desire for reelection. Important structural features of the committee system, for example, should be explicable in terms of their effects on reelection efforts. Often criticized, this Mayhewian reelection incentive premise is itself almost never put to the test, for the simple reason that significant changes in American electoral institutions have been quite rare.

We shall develop and test an explicit, electoral explanation for one of the key features of the modern House committee system—the norm of reappointing incumbent members of Congress to their same committee assignments at the start of each Congress. We argue that this so-called property right norm of reappointment reflects personalistic reelection incentives arising from the single-member district, secret ballot electoral system used in U.S. states.

The states' conversion from party-strip balloting to Australian (secret) ballots in the 1890s profoundly altered the electoral environment faced by incumbent members of Congress. The secret ballot allows voters to reward or punish each of their elected representatives (local, state, and national, all of whom might appear on the same ballot) individually. These reforms, we argue, made credit-claiming and other personal vote activities by members of Congress significantly more important for reelection, even at the very height of "strong party government" in the United States (Brady 1973).

The changes in balloting, therefore, were a key precursor to House adoption of a host of "modern" practices with important credit-claiming effects, from the reappointment norm to the expansion of professional staffs. Secure committee tenure allowed incumbent members of Congress to develop "careerist" patterns of behavior in the House (Price 1977)—including committee-related policy expertise—that provided fuel for increased legislative activity in the decades following the Australian ballot reforms.

We test these claims by examining committee tenure patterns for House members during the period between Reconstruction and the New Deal. Specifically, we show a significant increase in the probability of an individual House member retaining his assignments from one Congress to the next (about 10% for the typical member in our sample) immediately following a flurry of state adoptions of Australian ballot laws in the 1889–92 period.[1] This effect shows through even after controlling for such other significant influences as turnover in House membership and party control and each member's lengths of service in the chamber and on a particular committee.

We shall present the logic of our argument about electoral incentives and the structure of the House, then suggest and critique two stylized, alternative explanations for the origins of the seniority system, emphasizing their implications for committee tenure. The first, which we label the *institutionalization hypothesis*, emphasizes the revolt against Speaker Cannon in 1910 as a "critical moment" in the House's institutional development (Carmines and Stimson 1989). The second, which we call the *realignment hypothesis*, posits the election of 1896 as the critical moment that launched a wholesale transformation of House membership to "careerist" types from "amateur" types.

Next, we present a statistical model of committee tenure that allows us to examine the key, testable implication of our story against the stylized alternatives. The main testable difference between the models lies in the predicted timing of changes in tenure patterns. We show that our prediction—a marked increase in the rate

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[1] "Typical" results in nonlinear models such as ours should be interpreted with care. We discuss this point further below in the data analysis section.

at which incumbents retain committee assignments from one Congress to the next after 1892—better explains the observed data than do the two stylized alternatives.

ELECTORAL INCENTIVES, BALLOT REFORM, AND STANDING COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE

Do members of Congress design congressional institutions to accommodate their reelection interests? Legislative scholars have used Mayhew's simplifying assumption that contemporary members of Congress are "single-minded seekers of reelection" to motivate parsimonious, powerful models of how the modern Congress works (1974, 5). Of course, members of Congress are interested in more than just reelection. Nonetheless, more often than not the reelection incentive seems to work as a proximal goal, shaping members' behavior. We follow Mayhew's lead by maintaining it as our primary motivational assumption for incumbent members of Congress, even for the nineteenth-century members of Congress who are our main focus here.

We shall outline the theoretical underpinnings of our approach to congressional organization and then focus in on the key historical events we wish to explain. We show that the incentives arising from ballot reforms had a clear, independent effect on member of Congress preferences over House structures and that the reforms helped create the context for the modern, professionalized House. First, we shall discuss the relationship between electoral incentives and member of Congress preferences about committee assignments. Our basic thesis is that while there is a reelection value to committee assignments (e.g., opportunities to develop a reputation as a policy "expert," procurer of pork or influential decision maker in a particular policy arena), this value will also reflect characteristics of the electoral system. We then take an initial look at the empirical evidence on committee transfers and ballot law changes.

LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT, AND THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION

The conventional wisdom on single nontransferable vote elections (of which the plurality district elections used in the United States are a special case) dictates that incumbents try to build up their "personal reputations" in order to hold office. Candidates generally have two characteristics with which to seek office: the collective reputation of the party to which they belong and their own, personal reputation (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; see also Fenno 1978). Personal reputations refer to the attributes of a candidate that voters perceive to be particular to that individual, such as how personable, competent, or trustworthy he or she is. Collective reputations refer to the attributes that voters ascribe to all candidates bearing a particular party label, such as the perception that Democrats, on average, are more sympathetic to the interests of the poor than are Republicans or that Republicans are "tougher" on law-and-order issues.[2]

A single congressional candidate generally can do very little to affect his party's reputation. However, a weak collective reputation can in some cases be compensated for by a very strong personal one. As Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina put it, "Visibility is the cornerstone of an effective district strategy. Without visibility, representatives cannot have independent standing in the electorate's collective mind, and without independent standing they cannot anticipate personal success in otherwise unfavorable political circumstances" (1987, 27).

The electoral system itself, however, can limit the degree to which a candidate can establish "independent standing." For example, in proportional representation parliamentary elections, voters generally cast a vote for an entire list of party candidates rather than allocating votes to individuals within the list. The larger the district magnitude, the smaller the role any individual candidate's "personal reputation" will likely play in voters' choices between lists.[3] An individual member of parliament may be only one of several party candidates offered from that district. Thus, in a large-district-magnitude, closed-list proportional representation system, incumbents should care first and foremost about being ranked high on the party list. Logically, this motivation need not induce in the incumbent much interest in developing a personal reputation with voters.

The party-printed ballot used in most states' elections in the United States for several decades prior to the advent of the Australian ballot was similar to the proportional representation ballot in how it limited the relevance of any individual candidate's personal reputation for the voter's choice. The voter generally cast only a single ballot to weigh in on a number of contests (Albright 1942; Evans 1917; Fredman 1968). Hence, before the Australian ballot, the process of voting a "split" ticket (i.e., a mixture of different parties' candidates for different offices) was physically difficult.

The difficulty arose from two primary sources. First, the states required ballots to be written or printed. Because a large percentage of the potential electorate was illiterate in the nineteenth century, this requirement limited the ability of many voters to scratch or substitute for individual candidates (Kousser 1974). Second, ballots were generally deposited publicly in the ballot box, without the benefit of a private voting booth in which a voter could evaluate his choices away from prying eyes. Party agents could easily monitor voters to whom they had given ballots to make sure that those ballots were cast unaltered (Albright 1942).

A vote in favor of an individual candidate was tantamount to a vote for the entire partisan ticket. The less important the office, the less likely it seems that a voter would hinge his ballot choice on the personal characteristics of a single candidate. What this meant for the candidates is obvious: holders of low-ranking offices would have almost no *electoral* incentive to distinguish themselves in the eyes of voters. In presidential election years especially, the electoral fates of members of Congress were largely subject to the attractiveness of the top of the ticket. As Kernell put it, "The use of party ballots produced extremely high levels of straight party voting for every office from President down to Registrar of the Deeds.... Not until the adoption of the Australian ballot throughout the country in the late 1890s did many congressmen have much prospect of 'controlling' their district" (1977, 672; see also Rusk 1970).

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[2] Petrocik (1991) refers to this as partisan "issue ownership."

[3] Of course, the personal reputations of candidates who have been tabbed by their party as prospective cabinet ministers (especially the party's nominee for prime minister) will likely have some effect on voting.

A system that commingles a member of Congress's reelection efforts with those of his party's candidates for other offices sets up a collective action problem for members of a party ticket. Conceptually, each candidate on a ticket wants the others to do the hard work of attracting voters to the party slate. Without a solution to this collective dilemma, we might expect most candidates to shirk—to fail to put into the reelection campaign the kind of effort that we have come to expect from modern legislative candidates.

It appears instead that in the postbellum period candidates for various offices solved their collective dilemma by leaving electioneering to local party organizations and reputation building to the head of the ticket (see, e.g., Mayer 1967; Morgan 1969). As a result, the ticket's "collective reputation" was closely identified with the "personal reputations" and policy platforms of its top candidates and of the local machine. The private reputations of many candidates on a ticket probably were quite weak and the marginal impact of lower-office candidates on voters' choices, controlling for these first two effects, was probably nil.[4]

The Australian ballot system personalized elections by allowing voters to cast their votes office-by-office instead of forcing them to use a party ticket. Whereas members of Congress formerly would rationally have undersupplied patterned credit-claiming and position-taking activities in the House, they now would want to define and expand their personal reputations with voters. Reelection-seeking members thenceforth had incentives to blow their own credit-claiming horns as often as possible.

This is our argument in a nutshell: The ballot changes raised the interest of members of Congress in institutional arrangements that would help them build personal reputations. Stable committee assignments give members the leeway and confidence they need to become policy experts within their committees' jurisdictions. Policy experts are better equipped to claim credit and are more noteworthy position takers on policies within their committee's jurisdictions than are randomly selected members of Congress. Hence, a "norm" of reappointing incumbents to their same committees would be consistent with a widespread desire for building personal reputations.

Instituting this norm, however, would require the compliance of House agents responsible for making committee assignments. Prior to the revolt against Speaker Joseph Cannon (R-IL) in 1910, this authority resided in the speakership (since then they have de facto been chosen by party caucus committees; see Alexander 1916; Cox and McCubbins 1993; McConachie 1973). Given that the ballot reforms were adopted at the state level at different times and not imposed on all states simultaneously, when should the Speaker have reacted to this hypothesized change in member preferences over assignment patterns?

We assume that the Speaker was a responsive agent of the majority caucus and that his goal in making assignments would have been to maximize his party's probability of retaining its majority in the next election. When incumbent member of Congress's personal reputations do not significantly affect their reelection chances, all that matters to the Speaker in assignment decisions would be each member of Congress's marginal contribution in different committees. Depending on the jurisdictions of the differing committees and the relative salience of various issues to the electorate, the importance of individual committees to the party's overall reelection effort could rise and fall over time. Hence, the Speaker would have incentives to move his most productive members where they could have the greatest marginal effect—and to move slackers and disloyal members to where they would do the least damage.[5]

When personal reputations are important to reelection, however, the Speaker would want to take that fact into account. This implies that the Speaker may have treated members of Congress differently as their respective states adopted Australian ballot laws. There are two problems with this supposition, however.

First, committee assignments for members in a given Congress are *not* independent of one another, although we effectively treat them as such in our empirical model. We can think of the Speaker's prereform task as trying to maximize the net positive electoral externalities being generated by the various standing committees for majority party members seeking reelection. In other words, he wants to compose the committees so that the *system* best helps all members win reelection. But with the reforms, he must also worry about how transfers will affect the reelection chances of individual members of Congress. These constraints create a tension between the positive externalities that might arise from making a transfer and the potentially negative particular effects on the transferred member. Removing certain members of Congress from the pool of potential transferees would have a general effect on how well the Speaker could accomplish the goal of maximizing the positive effects of the system, so we cannot simply analyze members of Congress from early-adoption states separately.

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[4] Aldrich (1995) provides a more in-depth discussion of the pre-Australian ballot collective action problems that we discuss here.

[5] This reasoning would seem to apply in reverse to the minority party's assignments. In other words, the Speaker would seem to have had incentives to minimize the contributions of minority party members of Congress to their party's probability of seizing control of the chamber. Historically, however, it seems that the minority party's leadership strongly influenced the actual assignments received by its members. Wholesale discrimination against minority members in the assignment process probably would have generated a strong response from the minority in the form of dilatory tactics on the floor and in committee, with negative net consequences.

Second, as we shall discuss in the next subsection, the ballot reform movement swept very rapidly through the United States in the 1889–92 period. So many states adopted the new balloting procedures in such a short period of time that attempting to separate out the individual state effects on the assignment process would not likely be very informative. Further, as we shall discuss, the cluster of states adopting in the early period accounted for majorities of both parties. Since the Speaker is in effect the elected leader of his party, we would expect such a large change in his party constituency to affect critically his decision making on key institutional issues, such as committee assignments.

ELECTORAL REFORMS AND COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS IN THE POSTBELLUM ERA

We have argued that the modern electoral connection between individual candidates and the voters hinges on the structure of the electoral system. Voters consider both an incumbent's personal characteristics and the collective characteristics of the coalitions with which their member is aligned (i.e., party affiliation), but the weights voters attach to these separate components are at least partially determined by how votes are cast and aggregated. Hence, a system that allows voters to evaluate and vote for candidates on an office-by-office, case-by-case basis encourages incumbents to invest more in their personal reputations than when voters cannot discriminate between individual candidates on a partisan slate.

We shall provide some initial, empirical support for our focus on ballot reforms and the early 1890s as the critical period for the rise of "modern" congressional practices. This approach does not deny that the secret ballot had other effects as well. Probably the most important of these was its depression of turnout. Kousser (1974) noted that the official, secret ballot constituted a de facto literacy test, which effectively barred many thousands of potential voters (North and South) from exercising their franchise. He shows that this effect was known to many of the supporters of secret ballot legislation and argues that depressing the turnout of certain classes of voters was in fact the goal of many ballot "reformers" in the states.[6] The disfranchising effects of the secret ballot may have had important effects on the policy agendas pursued by incumbent legislators (by eliminating blocs of potentially like-minded voters), but we see no reason to believe that they significantly detracted from the personal-vote incentives of the ballot reforms.

The electoral incentive explanation we offer for changing patterns of member of Congress behavior does not directly imply that the Speaker should change the way he makes committee assignments or that party caucuses should become more active (or, for that matter, less active). Instead, for our purposes here, we have assumed that party leaders tend to be good, responsive agents for their party caucuses. But even if the leaders were of a more recalcitrant type, the rules also specified that the House could elect committee members by ballot in lieu of appointment by the Speaker.

FIGURE 1. Percent of Committee Assignments Retained, by Year



Party leaders' assignment authority has thus always been constrained, at least in principle. Before 1911, the Speaker was constrained both ex ante by the promises he had made vis-à-vis committees in order to win the post and ex post by the threat of revolt against specific assignments (Follett 1896; Stewart 1992a). Since 1911, the party caucuses or caucus committees have faced the same threat of revolt on the floor by ad hoc majorities opposed to their proposed slates. Any change in electoral incentives that affected a large majority of House members, therefore, could have induced a change in assignment practices.

Empirically it is easy to demonstrate that a major increase in the rate of reappointment (of incumbents to their same committees) took place in the 1890s. Figure 1 shows this aggregate effect; it plots the percentage of committee assignments held in House *t* that were retained by the same members in House $t + 1$.[7] The figure shows a sharp, decade-long climb in the percentage of assignments retained beginning in about 1892, followed by a relatively stable period during the first decade of the twentieth century. Fewer than half of all assignments held by returning members were retained by those members in the next House during 1877–90, whereas nearly three-quarters were retained by incumbents between 1896 and 1910.

A total of 32 states had installed secret, official ballot laws in time for the presidential election of 1892 (Evans 1917, 27; Ludington 1911). Seven more states adopted secret ballot measures prior to the 1896 presidential election. Table 1 details the dates when each state

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[6] In addition to the turnout effect cited by Kousser, Rusk (1970) showed that the form of the secret ballot also affected voting. The Massachusetts office-bloc format proved to be significantly more amenable to "independent" (i.e., split-ticket) voting than was the Indiana party-column format.

[7] The graph implicitly controls for turnover, because only committee assignments held by returning members are considered.

TABLE 1. State Adoption of Australian Ballot Laws

State	Year Adopted	State	Year Adopted
	Elections Prior to 1892 (235 seats in 1892)		
AR	1891	MT	1889
DE	1891	NH	1891
IN	1889	OR	1891
ME	1891	SD	1891
MI	1891	WA	1890
MO	1889	WY	1891
NV	1891	CO	1891
OH	1891	IL	1891
RI	1889	KY	1892
VT	1890	MA	1888
WI	1889	MS	1890
CA	1891	NE	1891
ID	1891	ND	1891
IA	1892	PA	1891
MD	1890	TN	1891
MN	1889	WV	1891
	During 1893–96 (69 Seats, 1892)		
AL	1893	NY	1895
LA	1896[a]	KS	1893
FL	1895[a]	VA	1894
	After 1896 (39 Seats, 1892)		
AZ	1912[b]	NC	after 1910
NJ	after 1910	SC	after 1910[a]
OK	1908[b]	GA	after 1910
UT	1896[b]	NM	after 1910
CT	1909[a]	TX	1905

Sources: Ludington 1911 and U.S. Dept. of Commerce.

Note: For more detail on the laws adopted by the various states, see Ludington 1911. Alaska and Hawaii were not admitted to the Union until after the end of our study period.

[a] State adopted a multibox ballot law prior to 1892 (CT, FL, LA, NC, and SC).

[b] State admitted to the union after 1892 (AZ, NM, OK, and UT). In each case, an Australian ballot law was originally adopted by the territorial legislature and reaffirmed after statehood. The table notes the date of reaffirmation or of admission to statehood.

adopted the secret ballot and the size of each state's House contingent after the apportionment of 1890. As the table shows, the 32 early-adoption states accounted for nearly two-thirds of House membership in the Fifty-Third Congress (elected 1892), and most of those states adopted their laws during 1891 or 1892.[8]

The Australian ballot affected majorities in both parties right from the start. Out of 218 Democrats in the Fifty-Third House, 121 (55%) hailed from early-adoption states. On the Republican side, 109 of 127 came from early adopters. Nor was the ballot movement merely regional. Southern and border states with Australian ballot laws in place by 1892 accounted for 54 Democrats in the Fifty-Third. Several of the heavily contested northern and border states were also in the mix. Illinois sent 11 Democrats to the Fifty-Third House, against 11 Republicans; Indiana, 11 against 2; Kentucky, 10 against 1; Missouri, 14 against 1; Ohio, 11 against 10; Pennsylvania, 10 against 20. These same states in the 1894 midterm Republican landslide victory sent a total of only 13 Democrats to the Fifty-Fourth House (including zero from Illinois and Indiana), against 103 Republicans (for partisan affiliations of members of these Congresses, see Martis 1989).

The distribution of ballot law changes, therefore, was both widespread enough and balanced enough to support our claim that attentive Speakers should have responded positively to the new electoral incentives they induced in incumbent members. The ballot movement was no hare-brained, western populist scheme that could be ignored or marginalized by more sophisticated eastern party leaders. On the contrary, it had captured most of the crucial "swing" states, such as Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania; and it had affected the election of majorities of both parties' memberships. Neither party could afford to ignore the ballot's effects if it were to challenge for national power.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND REALIGNMENT: ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR HOUSE "MODERNIZATION"

As we have noted, the literature on the House's historical development provides two rival explanations of its "modernization." Neither of these directly addresses the committee tenure question, although both approaches, we argue, imply the rise of something like a property right in committee membership. We shall present highly stylized interpretations of those explanations as applied to committee tenure patterns. The first such explanation we call the *institutionalization hypothesis* (after Abram and Cooper 1968; Polsby 1968; Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist 1969), as we see its explanation for tenure rights arising out of a general process of institutional maturation. The second arises primarily from several papers by Price (1971, 1975, 1977). We labeled this approach the *realignment hypothesis*, as Price says the realignment of 1896 was causally important for the timing of "professionalization" in the House.

House modernization for the institutionalization authors was a long-term process of institutional maturation. In this view, Congress changed very gradually over the post-Reconstruction and early Progressive periods from an organization with high membership turnover and ill-defined and unstable internal (chamber) rules and roles to one with slow turnover and clear rules and roles for its career-oriented members. In the premodern House, party leadership cliques ruled. But in the modern, institutionalized House, power devolved from party leaders through the decentralized, standing committee system to the members themselves.

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[8] Evans attributed the flurry of ballot-law activity in 1889–92 to a reformist reaction to "the unprecedented use of money in the election of 1888" (1917, 27). Progressive reformers argued that the secret ballot would enhance the "independence" of candidates from the machines by reducing the participation of low-information voters (who were presumed to be manipulable). We prefer Kousser's argument that the secret ballot's turnout-depressing effects served the political interests of certain party elites (Southern Democrats in his case—to which we would add Northern Republicans). The most important case of delays in adopting a secret ballot law was that of New York, where Democratic Governor David Hill vetoed Republican-supported Australian ballot bills in 1888 and 1889 (Evans 1917, 20). A further partisan motivation for the official ballot lied in its regulation of entry to the ballot. Official ballot laws typically incorporated some specification of the requirements for nomination, such as a number of signatures on a petition. Pennsylvania, for example, required as many as 3,000 signatures to get a candidate on the ballot in Philadelphia County. California required more than 12,000 signatures to nominate a candidate for statewide office (Fredman 1968, 48). These stiff nominating requirements gave the more established organizations a distinct advantage—and encouraged wayward factions back into the organizational fold (or at least into fusion arrangements) in some cases.

This devolution of power implied a demand for committee tenure property rights for, as Orfield put it, "slow turnover of members causes Congress to be dominated by members with a vested interest in the organizational status quo" (quoted in Brady 1980, 178). Institutionalization, therefore, ran contrary to the interests of party politicians and to the maintenance of "responsible" party government. For the institutionalists, it led ultimately to the replacement of the "czarist" Reed-Cannon, "strong Speaker," party-oriented House with the textbook "committee government" mode of politics familiar to most students of American politics.

The question for institutionalists (and for testing their claim vis-à-vis tenure patterns) is what form the transition should have taken. One simple supposition would be to expect committee tenure probabilities to increase incrementally (i.e., gradually and steadily over the transitional period). What counts as "incremental" is largely in the eye of the beholder, however, and therefore is difficult to falsify.

In order to identify a clear, testable hypothesis for this approach, we take advantage of the fact that the institutionalists place considerable emphasis on the revolt against Speaker Cannon in 1910–11 as "the single most important watershed in the history of the House and [an event] of crucial significance for an understanding of the modern House" (Abram and Cooper 1968, 54; see also Brady, Cooper and Hurley 1979; Fiorina 1977; Galloway and Wise 1976; Goodwin 1959, 1970; for an alternative view, see Jones 1968). We make use of this linkage between the institutionalization view and analyses of the revolt against Cannon to suggest a stylized reinterpretation of the institutionalization thesis.[9]

Polsby (and others) argued that the structure of the House changed critically following the revolt—from a world in which committee assignments reflected the discretionary authority of the Speaker to one in which "committees have won solid institutionalized independence from party leaders both inside and outside Congress" (Polsby 1968, 156).[10] The institutionalization approach to seniority, therefore, asserts that there are long-term effects at play but that the observable data should reflect the cataclysmic effects of the Cannon Revolt. The revolt against Cannon was in this view a "critical moment" in the institutional history of the House (Carmines and Stimson 1989). In our interpretation, the institutionalization thesis thus identifies causal factors both internal (gains from specialization and universalistic application of rules) and external (changes in turnover) that lead to the critical moment of the revolt, which we stylize as an internal, proximal cause of the changes in tenure patterns.

Price's critique of Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist's model of seniority argued that it was misspecified because it failed to account directly for membership turnover (and changes in majority party control of the House). We agree with these criticisms. We are less interested in his critique of Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist than we are in his explanation for the change, however. Our stylization of Price's realignment approach suggests that the timing of seniority (both tenure rights and promotion practices) as a "system" substantially predated the Republican factional disputes that culminated in the revolt. The key to the seniority system in Price's (1971) view was a cultural change in the House's membership. This change, in his view, did not require a cataclysmic *internal* event, such as the revolt, to trigger its manifestation in the institutional roles of members of Congress. Professionalized members sought and received stable committee assignments.

The source of the seniority system was a critical change in House membership from mostly "amateurs" to mostly "professionals." That changeover, Price argued, was signaled "above all by the collapse of the Democrats in the 1896 Bryan campaign" (1971, 9). The Democrats' collapse triggered a tremendous increase in incumbent Republicans' desire to stay in the House, such that "from 1896 on, career patterns and expectations had undergone basic structural change" (pp. 17–18). This formulation, again, suggests a "critical moment" in the House's institutional history, this time driven more by external factors than internal ones.

To be sure, there are many nuanced and sophisticated treatments of realignment in the literature that do not insist on the 1896 election as *the* critical date (e.g., the essays in Campbell and Trilling 1980). It is not our goal here to determine whether or not the 1896 election was realigning.[11] Indeed, we largely agree with Price's theoretical points that member of Congress goals and desires drive House organization and therefore that we should look first to external causal mechanisms to explain important changes in House organizational patterns. Rather, it is our goal to extend and clarify Price's theoretical speculations on professionalism in the House by proposing a simple behavioral model that better predicts the timing of the shift toward professionalization.

We are not the first to critique the behavioral implications of the mid-1890s realignment. Indeed, Polsby's own work includes one effort to reject the supposed realignment as a causal factor in the 1910 revolt against Speaker Cannon (Budgor et al. 1981). Some scholars go so far as to reject the realignment label altogether for the 1890s, at least as far as observable behaviors in Congress are concerned (see, e.g., Poole and Rosenthal 1993). On the other hand, Brady (1980) employs comparisons between committee assignments in the Fifty-Fifth House (elected 1896) and the preceding Fifty-Fourth (1894) and Fifty-Third (1892) Houses to argue in favor of 1896 as a realigning election.[12] There appears to be sufficient scholarly weight in favor of the 1896 date to justify our stylization for the purposes of providing a clear alternative hypothesis to our own explanation of changes in committee tenure patterns.

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[9] Price ascribes this explanation to Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist, as well (Price 1971, 17).

[10] As Polsby puts it, "In part, it was Speaker Cannon's increasing use of [his appointment power] in an attempt to keep control of his fragmenting party that triggered the revolt . . . and that led to the establishment of the committee system as we know it today" (1968, 156). Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist themselves focus on whether or not would-be committee chairs whose seniority was violated received "compensation." They convincingly show that "uncompensated" violations on chair appointments all but disappear after the Cannon revolt. From this they infer the broader point about the installation of an "automatic" seniority system.

[11] On this question, Nardulli (1995) presents convincing support for 1896 as a "critical moment" in presidential elections, based on an extensive analysis of local election returns.

We shall now examine more closely the empirical evidence on committee tenure patterns by modeling and testing these two alternative hypotheses about the timing of the adoption of a seniority norm, against our hypothesis, extending the Price and Polsby-Gallaher-Rundquist analyses of committee leadership selection to consider tenure probabilities for all incumbent members of Congress. We argue that our hypothesis, grounded as it is in a change in electoral incentives, better explains the data and further points the way to a new explanation of other changes in House Rules left unexplained or accounted for in an ad hoc fashion by the Price and Polsby-Gallaher-Rundquist models.

DATA ANALYSIS

The central empirical implication of our approach is that committee tenure should rise after the widespread adoption of the Australian ballot. In order to test this claim, we need to build a statistical model of the length of time a member stays on a given committee assignment and see if there is a significant change after the ballot reforms. In particular, we predict a significant upward shift in committee tenure as personal vote opportunities become more worthwhile to the member.

There are three general characteristics of the committee tenure data that make it somewhat difficult to model, however. First, we note that it is integer-valued—that is, our data set is coded in such a way that a member serves one term, two terms, and so on. Thus, a model that predicted a stay on a committee of, say, 1.7 terms would imply that we know more about tenure than we in fact know. The second characteristic of the data is that we expect it to display "duration dependence." If our expectations about committee tenure are correct, then each additional term on a given committee represents an investment in the member of Congress's personal brand name. Over time, the member will be less interested in transferring away from a given assignment, all else equal, because giving up an assignment means he would lose the accumulated investment. Thus, a member who has been on a committee for five terms should be less likely to give up his assignment than would a freshman member, all else equal. In effect, we would like our model to weight the other determinants of committee exit by a member's length of prior service on the committee.

The last problem modeling the data is that the observed data are censored: as noted, our data set only includes surviving members. We do not get to observe the counterfactual—what would have happened to committee assignments had another incumbent retained his seat, rather than getting booted out of office. It is well known that House turnover rates declined significantly during the late nineteenth century (Fiorina, Rohde, and Wissel 1975). This potentially introduces a time-dependency problem as well. Later-elected members of Congress are more likely to win reelection; turnover per se probably affects the stability of committee assignments. While this turnover effect is important (as was pointed out by Price), it does not speak to the question we wish to answer: Does individual member of Congress behavior change after ballot reforms?

One approach to this problem could have been to focus on panel data, that is, to follow a "class" elected in a particular year throughout its members' lives. This was the approach used by Budgor and his colleagues (1981) to argue that the realignment of 1896 was not a significant cause of the revolt against Cannon in 1910. However, focusing on only a single "class" at a time would prevent us from making full use of the information available in the committee assignment data. What we would really like to do, in effect, is to incorporate observations on all of the respective "classes" that are present in a given House into a single model.

The class of models used to solve these three problems (referred to as *duration models*) is widely applied in labor economics to study employment patterns (for a general review, see Kiefer 1988). The primary choice we must make is whether to model the distribution of durations directly (as is suggested in King et al. 1990) using some discrete distribution or, instead, to model the conditional probabilities of leaving a committee at the end of a term. Such conditional probabilities are referred to as "hazard rates" in the duration literature.

Both the distribution of durations and the hazard rate contain the same information (as is shown in the appendix), so we must make this modeling choice based on other criteria. King and his colleagues might argue that because our predictions are about average durations, we should model the central tendency in durations directly, for example, $E(Y_i) = \exp(X_i\beta)$.

By doing so, however, we would sacrifice the ability easily to include time-varying covariates. King and his colleagues' goal in modeling cabinet durations was to determine what ex ante factors lead governments to last, such as investiture rules. Hence, excluding time-varying covariates was not a problem. In our case, however, time-varying covariates are particularly important because the hypothesis we wish to test is whether or not tenure patterns changed after a particular date. We also need to account explicitly for such things as turnover in congressional membership, which affects all the returning members of that Congress. Finally, we lose little in the way of intuition by using the hazard rate. Our prediction in terms of hazard rates is that after the ballot reforms, the conditional probability of a member giving up an assignment decreases (he becomes less likely to transfer off the committee, all else constant). This is equivalent to assuming that the expected length of tenure increases after the ballot reforms.

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[12] Brady presents membership turnover on 13 House committees in 1896 as supporting evidence for that election as realigning. In every case, turnover in the Fifty-Fifth Congress compared to membership in the Fifty-Fourth exceeded 50% and reached 100% for 10 of the 26 party-contingents on the 13 committees. In contrast, turnover in the Fifty-Third Congress averaged just over 30%. Because Brady wanted to present evidence relating to the validity of 1896 as a realigning election, he did not restrict his analysis to only returning members of Congress. Hence, his results commingle members *transferred* from committee to committee with members of Congress not reelected.

Thus we need to build a model similar to more common binary choice models (e.g., logit or probit) in which we want to infer an underlying probability for a series of binary outcomes: Either the member did or did not give up his assignment in a given term on a committee (ignoring for the moment any problems due to censoring). As with other binary choice problems, a linear model generally does not work well because the probabilities must lie between zero and one. We therefore adopt a proportional hazard model commonly used to model duration data to test our claims.[13] The basic model is

$$\lambda(t, X, \beta) = \lambda_0(t)\exp(X_t \times \beta), \qquad (1)$$

where $\lambda(t, X, \beta)$ is the probability of leaving a committee in committee-term-of-service t, given that the member has been on the committee for all terms prior to t and given a set of covariates X_t (that can change for each period of observation of a member of Congress on a committee) and parameters β; and $\lambda_0(t)$ is the "baseline" probability of leaving a committee when all covariates are zero, so that $\exp(\cdot)$ is one.[14]

We want to ask, Does this hazard rate as modeled in equation 1 decline after the reforms? We test this by including in X_t a dummy variable, *Reform*, which indicates whether a Congress was before or after the cut point we have identified as signaling the general adoption of Australian ballot.[15] Our test then boils down to asking: Is the coefficient β_1 on the variable *Reform* significantly negative? If β_1 were negative then $\exp(Reform \times \beta_1)$ would be less than one, so that the probability after the reform would be some fraction of the baseline probability. This is true regardless of the initial value of the baseline hazard for a given term.

This analysis is contingent on the assumption that the only relevant change affecting the hazard rate is ballot reform. But the alternative hypotheses suggest otherwise. Thus we want also to test the institutionalization and realignment hypotheses that there should be changes in the hazard rate after the Cannon revolt of 1910 or after the reelection of 1896, respectively. We therefore augmented equation 1 to include a dummy variable equal to one for all post-1896 Congresses and a dummy variable equal to one for all post-1911 Congresses, similar to the reform variable already in the model. Again, according to both of these alternative theories, the coefficients on these dummy variables should be negative, indicating a decline in the probability a member gives up an assignment.

We also need to control for other factors that should systematically alter the hazard rate. Recall that our goal essentially is to combine Budgor and his colleagues' "cohort" or "class" approach with a duration model—that is, we want to plug into the equation the relevant information about congressional classes, even though our duration data are organized by "spells" of committee service and the hazard function is written to talk about spells. Drawing on Price's critique of Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist, we included a control for turnover. Turnover in our model represents the opportunities a member has to change a committee assignment, because the fewer returning members there are, the more committee slots there are to be filled. A similar logic also requires us to include a dummy variable for change in partisan control of the House, because changing party control leads also to changes in the committee ratios between parties. This gives members of the new majority party possible assignment opportunities above and beyond the effects of turnover. Given this logic, both increased turnover and a change in partisan control should increase the likelihood that a member gives up his assignment.

Decreasing turnover may have other effects that are not picked up by the simple turnover variable. Lower chamber turnover, of course, implies longer average careers in the House, which may have its own effect on committee assignments. To account for this possibility, we also included a control variable for seniority in the House—the cumulative terms served by member i as of time t. We expected, consistent with Price's interpretation, that as members settle into careers in the House, they become less likely to change their committee assignments, all else constant. Thus we expect the sign on this variable to be negative: higher service in the House leads to a lower probability of losing a given assignment.

We also include a dummy variable indicating whether the committee assignment is to one of three privileged committees: Appropriations, Rules, or Ways and Means. This draws on the work that shows that some committees are more desirable than others (Munger 1988; Stewart 1992b). If there are in fact "more desirable" committee assignments, for whatever reason, members should loathe giving them up. We lack a good theoretical model for distinguishing what these desirable committees might be, but a defensible approximation should be to distinguish those committees that are defined by the House rules to have privileged access to the floor.[16] Finally, we included a control for party membership. We had no particular expectation for the effect this variable would have, but we note that committee assignments are handled at the level of the party caucus, so that there might be systematic, idiosyncratic differences in tenure patterns between the two parties that our model cannot otherwise pick up. The variable, *Democrat*, is coded as one if the member is a Democrat and zero otherwise.

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[13] We do not use a logit or probit, because these, while satisfying the constraint of producing probabilities, imply a rather odd duration dependence. For details of the difference between the logit, probit, and other duration models, see Sueyoshi 1991.

[14] The baseline hazard rates $\lambda_0(t)$ can be modeled in a number of ways. We essentially model it as a term-specific dummy variable—referred to as a *semiparametric duration model*. Alternatives include parametric restrictions, which lead naturally to the Gompertz or Weibull distributions common in the duration literature. We tested these possible restrictions via a likelihood ratio test and rejected them. However, even under these restrictions, our qualitative results did not change.

[15] Note that for a member who is on a committee both before and after the reforms, this dummy variable changes from a zero to a one for all committee terms that occur after the reforms. Hence, the model says that ceteris paribus, this member would be more/less likely to give up the same assignment after the reforms. Hence, we do not have to partition the data set into individuals who entered before and after the reforms. We allow for members who bridge the reforms to change their behavior.

We estimate this fully specified model using data for all standing committee assignments excluding third-party members from 1874 to 1928.[17] The unit of observation is member/committee assignment/committee term. So a member who is on two committees for three terms per committee contributes a total of six observations to the estimation. Hence, in our data set there are only 3,411 individual members of Congress but a total of 20,007 observations. This may seem confusing at first, but recall that the model is really estimating the conditional probability that a member leaves a committee *assignment* in a given term of committee service (i.e., conditional on having served some previous number of terms on the committee). So multiple observations of a member on a committee give new information: The member's first year gives us information about the probability that a member in his first term will give up an assignment, the observation of his second term on the committee gives us information about his giving up a committee assignment after two terms, and so on.[18] Also note that we have progressively less information about the latter terms as members either leave Congress or give up their committee assignment. We have 11,555 observations of members in their first term of committee service (57.8% of the sample), 4,141 in their second term (20.7%), 1,958 in their third term (9.8%), 1,062 in their fourth term (5.3%), 576 in their fifth term (2.9%), 344 in their sixth term (1.7%), 182 in their seventh term (.9%), 98 in their eighth term (.5%), and only 59 in their ninth term of committee service (.3%). We should therefore be cautious of the inferences we draw about behavior of these very senior members. The details of the estimation are discussed in the appendix.

TABLE 2. Semiparametric Proportional Hazard Model of Committee Tenure, 1874–1928

Explanatory Variable	Parameter
Cumulative terms in house	−.017 (.005)
Percent returned	.208 (.136)
Change in party control	.080 (.028)
Democrat	.081 (.018)
Privileged committee	−.246 (.023)
Realignment	.053 (.043)
Revolt	−.028 (.023)
Australian ballot reform	−.280 (.035)
Baseline integrated hazards	
1st committee term	.081 (.030)
2d committee term	.258 (.033)
3d committee term	.355 (.040)
4th committee term	.509 (.050)
5th committee term	.501 (.064)
6th committee term	.359 (.077)
7th committee term	.324 (.102)
8th committee term	.810 (.168)
9th committee term	.547 (.188)

Note: Entries are maximum likelihood estimates. Asymptotic standard errors appear in parentheses. $N = 20007$. Log likelihood = −10389.737.

The results are found in Table 2. Our primary concern is the ballot reform dummy. As expected, it is significant and negative—evidence in support of our model. The results for realignment and the Cannon revolt are less impressive. The coefficient on the realignment dummy was positive, contrary to the realignment hypothesis, although the result was not statistically significant. The institutionalization hypothesis fared a little better, in that the sign of the revolt coefficient is in the correct direction. However, it too is statistically indistinguishable from zero.

While the results of these statistical hypothesis tests provide important support for our main hypothesis, it is hard, given the nonlinear form of the model, to see the effect of the ballot reform on the probability of giving up

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[16] These three substantive committees enjoyed privileged status throughout our study period. A number of other committees (which we did not code as "privileged") also enjoyed a measure of floor privileges off and on during the postbellum period, including the committees on Elections, Public Lands, Rivers and Harbors, Territories, Enrolled Bills, Invalid Pensions, Printing, Accounts, and the various committees with appropriations duties in addition to the Appropriations Committee itself.

[17] Data on committee assignments were originally collected by Garrison Nelson. The data were checked and then merged with the ICPSR Congressional Biography database in order to find out a member's party, cumulative terms in the House, and whether the member returned in the following Congress (i.e., Was the observation censored?).

[18] We are in fact ignoring some information in the sample. Because we get to observe many of our *members* multiple times we could in theory estimate individually based random effects (i.e., the most extreme form of heterogeneity). However, in practice these updated estimates are problematic and can lead to mistaken inferences (Heckman and Singer 1984).

TABLE 3. Probability of Giving up Committee Assignment

Committee Term	Before Ballot Reform	After Ballot Reform
1st	.662	.559
2d	.726	.624
3d	.760	.660
4th	.811	.716
5th	.808	.713
6th	.761	.661
7th	.749	.648
8th	.894	.817
9th	.822	.729

Note: Probabilities are calculated by holding all covariates at their mean.

a given committee assignment. In order better to explore this effect, in Table 1 we calculated for a hypothetical member the probability that he gives up his assignment, both before and after the ballot reforms. Our hypothetical member of Congress has attributes set to their mean levels (all continuous covariates are measured as differences from mean, so they are zero when the mean value is attained) and all dummy variables are set to zero. In other words, this member of Congress would be a Republican member of a nonprivileged committee in a term that saw no change in party control of the chamber and whose chamber service was at the mean for the 1874–1928 period. From Table 3 we see that after the reforms our "typical" member about to begin his second term on a committee was almost 10% less likely to give up that assignment in the next Congress than he would have been before the ballot changes. A similar pattern holds for the other terms after the ballot reforms.[19]

CONCLUSION

In *The Personal Vote*, Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina wrote that "to understand legislative policy making, one must understand the electoral relationship between representatives and their constituents. . . . The nature of voter response is a critical variable, and voter response *is* a variable, not something etched in stone at the inception of a political system" (1987, 212). Students of Congress have long noted differences between the way things used to be in the responsible party government days of yore in the House, on the one hand, and the personalistic, "Why don't we do it on the floor" House of recent years. Few scholarly efforts, however, have sought to provide systematic explanations for how the nineteenth-century House transformed into the modern House. We have proposed a first step toward such an explanation, in which we take Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina's emphasis on the electoral connection to heart.

We have argued that most of the widely accepted models of the modern Congress begin with the reelection incentive and that this incentive itself reflects the formal structure of the electoral rules chosen by the states. The point of the reelection incentive assumption for understanding Congress, of course, is that member motivations in turn affect how members of Congress behave within Congress. Holding constant the rules and structures employed by the House, we expect members of Congress to allocate their limited time and energy optimally to secure reelection. The "seniority system" of tenure rights to committee assignments fits quite well with a reelection-oriented perspective on legislative organization. Only a member of Congress who believed he could affect his chances of reelection would invest heavily in credit-claiming human capital, such as a reputation for expertise in a particular policy arena. Hence, if the committee assignment process is sensitive to such investments, a change in electoral rules that raises the average level of investment in expertise should produce as well an increase in the average rate of reappointment.

In our view, then, tenure rights for reelection-minded members of Congress within a division-of-labor committee system makes sense both for members of Congress and for their parties. Members trying to get reelected will work harder at climbing the learning curve toward being experts on policies and policy implementation when they believe those skills will continue to serve them in future terms of office. Individual committee members in the pursuit of credit-claiming opportunities will be motivated both to seek out problems and solutions, and to publicize their findings.

We have argued that the development of the modern House in the late nineteenth century can best be accounted for in a model that explicitly considers the electoral motives of members of Congress. Congressional organizations are a matter of choice for incumbent members of Congress; they tend to reflect the forces that drive members' interests and incentives. Thus, events that alter the value of various electoral strategies, such as changes in electoral laws, should have predictable effects on House organizations. Australian ballot electoral laws at the state level provided the necessary conditions for modern, "personal vote" coalition-building activities in the House.

APPENDIX

We shall derive in some detail the statistical model used to test our claims about changes in committee tenure patterns discussed in the text.[20] Since hazard models are not so commonly used in political science, we first show the relationship between the hazard function and the distribution of duration times, which is normally used to generate a maximum likelihood model. We then use the hazard model to generate a likelihood function and show how the hazard model specified can be thought of as an unusual binary choice model, which aides in both estimation and interpretation. Finally, we turn to specifying the functional form of the hazard model in the text.

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[19] The careful reader will note that the hazard rates in Table 2 actually increase somewhat in committee terms 8 and 9, contrary to our (implicit) hypothesis of negative duration dependence, which follows from an "expertise-driven" explanation of lengthening tenure. As we noted, these estimates are based on relatively few observations (only 59 observations of members of Congress reaching their ninth term on a given committee). At the same time, we have little reason to believe that the "experience-driven" negative duration dependence should persist as the number of terms served gets large. Some of these more senior members may shift from committee positions into party leadership positions, for example. In other cases, very senior members may be stripped of their authority by a "changing of the guard" in party leadership or in recognition of the member's declining vitality (as the member, presumably, enters old age). But these stories all lie outside of the main purpose of our model, which is to investigate the systemic effects of ballot reforms on tenure.

[20] The discussion in the appendix is based on Sueyoshi 1991 and Kiefer 1988, which provide greater detail.

Our goal is to develop a statistical model of how long a member of Congress remains on a committee, taking into account possible right-censoring due to failure to be returned to Congress. Using standard econometric practice we would just specify either the conditional density $f(t|X,\theta)$ or distribution $F(t|X,\theta)$ and maximize the resulting likelihood function. However, it is often easier with grouped duration data such as the committee tenure data to specify instead the hazard rate—that is, the probability that an individual in the sample gives up his assignment in period t. We are able to specify the model in terms of the hazard rate because it completely determines the stochastic process.

We define the hazard function, ignoring covariates for the moment, as

$$\lambda(t) = \frac{f(t)}{1 - F(t)} = \frac{f(t)}{S(t)}, \qquad \textbf{(A-1)}$$

where $F(t)$ is the cumulative distribution of the durations, $f(t)$ is its associated density, and $S(t)$ is the survivor function—that is, the probability that the duration T is greater than t. Since $f(t) = F'(t)$, equation A-1 sets up an implicit differential equation that we can use to solve for S(t):

$$S(t) = \exp\left(- \int_{0}^{t} \lambda(s)ds \right). \qquad \textbf{(A-2)}$$

We therefore see that the density (and, of course, the cumulative distribution) can be expressed entirely in terms of the hazard function $\lambda(t)$ from equations A-1 and A-2:

$$f(t) = \lambda(t)S(t) = \lambda(t)\exp\left(- \int_{0}^{t} \lambda(s)ds \right). \qquad \textbf{(A-3)}$$

This implies that we can write the likelihood using the hazard function.

Before we can derive the likelihood function, we need to provide some more definitions and notation. We will first need to define $f(t)$ not in terms of $S(t)$ but instead in terms of the conditional survival function. Consider any two durations t_k and t_{k-1} ordered by their subscripts ($t_{k-1} < t_k$). We may define the conditional survivor function as

$$S(t_k | T > t_{k-1}) = Pr(T \geq t_k | T > t_{k-1})$$

$$= \exp\left(- \int_{t_{k-1}}^{t_k} \lambda(s)ds \right).$$

Then

$$f(t_k) = \lambda(t_k) \prod_{j=1}^{k} S(t_j | T > t_{j-1}),$$

because $S(t_k) = \prod_{j=1}^{k} S(t_j | T > t_{j-1})$; $t_0 = 0$.

We also need to extend the basic notation and results to the more general hazard function $\lambda(t, X, \theta)$, which allows for a parameterized influence of a set of covariates X given a set of parameters θ. Using this new notation we can redefine the conditional survivor function as

$$S(t_k, X, \beta | T > t_{k-1}) = \alpha_k(X, \theta) = \exp\left(- \int_{t_{k-1}}^{t_k} \lambda(s)ds \right) \qquad \textbf{(A-4)}$$

where $\alpha_k(X, \theta)$ represents the exponential of the k_{th} integrated hazard segment from t_{k-1} to t_k.

Turning to the problem of formulating the likelihood function, two possible cases will arise in the data. In the case where the failure time is not right-censored and is observed to occur at period t, all that is known is that the individual had not failed (i.e., left the committee) at the beginning of period $t - 1$ but has failed by the beginning of period t. Alternatively, given right-censoring at period t, all that is known is that the underlying duration exceeds $t - 1$. The probabilities associated with these two events (and hence their contribution to the likelihood) can be expressed in terms of the underlying hazards and integrated hazard segments:

$$Pr(t_{k-1} \leq T \leq t_k) = \int_{t_{k-1}}^{t_k} \lambda(s, X, \theta)S(s, X, \theta)ds$$

$$= (1 - \alpha_k(X,\theta)) \prod_{j=1}^{k-1} \alpha_j(X, \theta)$$

$$Pr(T \geq t_{k-1}) = \int_{t_{k-1}}^{\infty} \lambda(s, X, \theta)S(s, X, \theta)ds$$

$$= \prod_{j=1}^{k-1} \alpha_j(X, \theta).$$

Given these two probabilities, we are in a position to define the likelihood function for the grouped duration data. If individual i's duration takes the from (t_i, c_i), where t_i is the individual observed duration and c_i is a censoring indicator that takes on the value of one if the observation is censored and zero otherwise, then the likelihood function for the N individuals in the sample is

$$L(\theta) = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \left\{ (1 - \alpha_{t_i}(X_i, \theta))^{1-c_i} \prod_{j=1}^{t_i - 1} \alpha_j(X_i, \theta) \right\}. \qquad \textbf{(A-5)}$$

The common approach to estimation then would be to specify a functional form for $\lambda(\cdot)$ (and therefore $\alpha(\cdot)$) and maximize the log likelihood function given the observed data. We will come back to the choice of functional form for the hazard function.

In order to simplify the estimation of equation A-5, we need to consider the relationship of hazard models to other discrete choice models. We can think of an individual observation as a series of binary choices in each period: Individual i either survived or failed in each period. In terms of the likelihood function in equation A-5, each individual contributes $t_i - c_i$ nonidentical Bernoulli trials to the likelihood, where the success probabilities are given by a period-specific function for the probability of surviving to the subsequent period (Kiefer 1988).

In order to estimate the durations on committees as a series of binary choices, we need to construct a synthetic data set, with each period-individual survival as the unit of observation. Let the total number of observations in this synthetic data set be $\tilde{N} = \Sigma_i (t_i - c_i)$. We index these observations by n, define the indicator d_n, which takes on the value of one if the individual survives the interval and zero otherwise, and the time indicator t_n, which gives the time period with the interval associated with observation n. We can then write the equivalent likelihood function:

$$\tilde{L}(\theta) = \prod_{n=1}^{\tilde{N}} \alpha_{t_n}(X,\ \theta)^{d_n}(1 - \alpha_{t_n}(X,\ \theta))^{1-d_n}. \qquad \textbf{(A-6)}$$

This likelihood is strikingly similar to the standard binary choice models, except that the usual cumulative distribution (either the normal for probit or logistic for logit models) is replaced by $\alpha(\cdot)$, which depends on the integrated hazard components.

The only issue left to resolve in order to estimate the model is a specification of $\lambda(t,\ X,\ \theta)$. We choose to restrict our specification to the family of Cox (1972) proportional hazards defined as

$$\lambda(t,\ X,\ \theta) = \lambda_0(t)\ \exp\ (X\beta),$$

where $\lambda_0(t)$ is the baseline hazard that characterizes the dependence of the hazard upon time, which may depend on additional parameters, so that θ contains both β and the additional shape parameters. The specification derives its name from the fact that the explanatory variables alter the hazard proportionately, by scaling the baseline hazard up or down by a constant factor.

Although we have specified $\lambda(\cdot)$, our likelihood is written in terms of the α_k; so we must derive it. We do this by substituting our choice of $\lambda(\cdot)$ into the definition of α_k. This yields

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha_k(X,\ \theta) &= \exp\left(-\int_{t_{k-1}}^{t_k} \lambda_0(s)\ \exp\ (X\beta)ds\right)\\ &= \exp(-\exp(\gamma_k + X\beta)), \qquad \textbf{(A-7)}\end{aligned}$$

where

$$\gamma_k = \log \int_{t_{k-1}}^{t_k} \lambda_0(s)ds.$$

Hence, the γ_k embeds the nature of the duration dependence of the process.

Much of the econometric literature on proportional hazards has focused on specifying a parametric functional form for $\lambda_0(t)$, which places between-period restrictions on the γ_k. In our case, because we have no theoretical justification for restriction on the duration dependence, we estimate the γ_k's directly as period-specific constants—an approach referred to as *semiparametric* in the literature. We can thus estimate our model using a binary response model in which the probability of surviving an interval is given by $\exp(-\exp(\gamma_k+X\beta))$.

There are two advantages to likelihood function defined by equations A-6 and A-7. First, we do not need to restrict the duration dependence as is required by the parametric approaches. This is important in our application because, as noted, we have no theoretical basis upon which to place such restrictions. Second—and more important—this binary choice model of the duration is straightforward to compute. All that is needed to evaluate the likelihood is the ability to estimate nonlinear regression models. We estimated our model by first estimating the appropriate nonlinear regression using fixed weights. We then used these estimates as initial values to take one Newton-Raphson step in the direction of maximum likelihood.[21] This one-step estimator will achieve first-order efficiency and will offer considerable computational saving over a fully interactive estimation of equation A-5.

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Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

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The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the "better" of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred. Most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote "sincerely" in the collective decision making, a seemingly innocuous assumption, given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative. However, in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference. In particular, sincere voting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. A satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably "do better" than individuals, therefore, has yet to be derived.

Although never achieving the notoriety of his discovery that majority voting can be cyclic, the Jury Theorem proposed by Condorcet ([1785] 1994) has received periodic attention and in the last decade been the subject of substantial interest and analysis. Loosely speaking, the theorem is as follows. Suppose there are two mutually exclusive alternatives, $\{A, B\}$, such that one of these alternatives is unequivocally better for all of n individuals in a group but the identity of the better alternative (i.e., A or B) is unknown. Suppose further that for all individuals $i \in N = \{1, \ldots, n\}$, the probability that i votes for the better alternative is $p > 1/2$ and is independent of the probability that any $j \neq i$ votes for the better alternative. Then the Jury Theorem states that the probability that a majority votes for the better alternative exceeds p and approaches 1 as n goes to infinity (Black 1958, 164–65; McLean and Hewitt 1994, 34–40). Given this, the Jury Theorem has been used as a positive argument for decision making by majority rule: Majorities are more likely to select the "correct" alternative than any single individual when there is uncertainty about which alternative is in fact the best (e.g., Berg 1993; Ladha 1992, 1993; Grofman and Feld 1988; Miller 1986; Nitzan and Paroush 1985; Paroush 1994; Young 1988).

The proofs of the Jury Theorem and subsequent extensions are entirely statistical in nature (see Berg 1993; Ladha 1992, 1993; Nitzan and Paroush 1985). Specifically, they take the individual probabilities of correct decisions parametrically and then aggregate them in a particular way. An important—but largely implicit—assumption of such proofs then is that an individual deciding which of the two outcomes to select when voting as a member of a collective (or jury) behaves in exactly the same manner as when that individual alone selects the outcome. Alternatively (to use the language of voting theory), individuals are taken to vote "sincerely." This implicit behavioral assumption is seen in the use of the same probability terms in the aggregation to generate both the likelihood that a majority chooses correctly and the likelihood that any one individual chooses correctly.

Our purpose here is to bring the "sincerity" assumption into the light and determine its relevance for the Jury Theorem. One intuition is that the assumption of sincere voting is innocuous. After all, every individual in the collective has the same fundamental preferences over the given binary agenda in that all want to choose the "correct" alternative. Consequently, there is neither incentive nor opportunity for any individual to manipulate the collective decision to their particular advantage at the expense of others. We show, however, that this intuition is mistaken. The argument is illustrated by the following example.

Consider a group of three individuals, all of whom share identical preferences over two alternatives, $\{A, B\}$, conditional on knowing the true "state of the world." There is, however, uncertainty about the true state of the world, which may (without ambiguity) be either state A or state B. In state A (B), individuals each receive a payoff of 1 if alternative A (B) is chosen and receive a payoff of 0 otherwise. There is a common prior probability that the true state is A. Individuals have private information about the true state of the world. Specifically, prior to any decision on which alternative to choose, each individual i privately observes a signal, $s_i = 0$ or $s_i = 1$, about the true state: if the true state is A, then it is more likely that the received signal is 0; and if the true state is B, then it is more likely that the received signal is 1. Once each individual has received his or her signal, the group chooses an alternative by majority vote (with no abstention). Three sorts of voting behavior are of particular interest: *sincere voting*, in which each individual selects the alternative yielding his or her highest expected payoff conditional on their signal; *informative voting*, in which each individual i votes for A if and only if receiving a signal $s_i = 0$; and *rational voting*, in which individuals' decision rules constitute a Nash equilibrium (i.e., given everyone else's rule, each individual votes to maximize the expected payoff). To complete the example, we make two assumptions on individuals' beliefs: (1) sincere voting is informative in that on receiving a signal of 0 (1) an individual thinks A (B) is the true state; and (2) the common prior belief that the true state is A is sufficiently strong that if any individual i were to observe *all three* individuals' signals, then i believes B is the true state only if *all* the available evidence supports

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the true state being B (i.e., $s_1 = s_2 = s_3 = 1$). Then despite it being common knowledge that individuals' preferences before receiving any private information are in fact identical, in this example *sincere voting by all individuals is not rational.*

To see why sincere voting is not rational here, consider any individual i and assume that the remaining individuals, say j and k, vote sincerely. By assumption (1), j and k are voting informatively, in which case individual i must be in one of three possible situations: Either (a) j and k have both observed a 0 and vote for A, (b) j and k have both observed a 1 and vote for B, or (c) j and k have observed different signal-values and vote for different alternatives. Under (a) or (b) the outcome is independent of i's vote, and if (c) obtains, i's vote is decisive. Consequently, the difference in i's expected payoffs from voting for A versus voting for B depends entirely on what i does conditional on situation (c). However, if the situation is (c), then i infers that exactly one of the remaining individuals (it does not matter which) has observed a signal of 0 in which case, by assumption (2), i has an unequivocally best decision: vote for A *irrespective* of the value of i's signal. Hence all individuals voting sincerely cannot be a Nash equilibrium.

Before going on to the general formal analysis, it is worth emphasizing two points. The first point is that when any one individual votes "insincerely," she is in fact acting in *everyone's* best interest (given the common ex post preferences) and not just her own. Thus the distinction between sincere and rational voting when there are only two alternatives derives entirely from the information-based heterogeneity of individuals' preferences consequent on receiving their private information (*interim* preferences), in that the existence of such heterogeneity allows for valuable information to be inferred in equilibrium.

The second point is that the result that, in general, sincere and informative voting by all individuals cannot be a Nash equilibrium does *not* say that sincere or informative voting by *any one* individual is inconsistent with Nash equilibrium. Further, there may be equilibria in which some vote sincerely and others do not and where the resulting majority-rule outcome improves on individual decision making. Our goal here, however, is less ambitious than that of identifying all Nash equilibria of certain games, determining which generate better outcomes compared with individual decision making and which do not. Rather, we simply demonstrate that while the canonical statement and proofs of the Condorcet Jury Theorems are correct as they stand *given* the additional assumption that all individuals vote sincerely and informatively, such an assumption is inconsistent with a game-theoretic view of collective behavior. A satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably "do better" than individuals, therefore, has yet to be derived.[1]

We shall develop the basic framework, essentially elaborating on the setup underlying this example. Subsequently, we consider two extensions of the basic model to explore the robustness of the main result (i.e., that sincere voting by all individuals cannot generally be both informative and rational) to variations in the structure of individuals' information. Finally, we shall consider some implications of the results.

THE BASIC MODEL

One of the difficulties with previous work on the Jury Theorem is that from a behavioral perspective much of the analysis essentially "starts in the middle" of an information accumulation and aggregation process. The individual likelihoods of making correct decisions are often described as posterior probabilities, implying the existence of a prior belief, as well as some observed event statistically related to the true best alternative (e.g., Ladha 1992). In contrast, we describe in detail a model of prior beliefs and events that permits identifying optimal individual behavior. And because we wish the model to fall within the domain of problems to which previous work on the Jury Theorem speaks, it is constrained to generating a "middle" or interim stage consistent with the features of existing research on the Jury Theorem (e.g., individual probabilities of correct decisions, correlations between such probabilities).

There is a pair of alternatives $\{A, B\}$ and two possible states of the world; without ambiguity, we also label the states $\{A, B\}$. There is a set $N = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ of individuals; assume n is odd and $n \geq 5$. Individuals have identical preferences over alternatives and states of the world, represented by

$$\forall i \in N,\ u_i(A, A) = u_i(B, B) = 1 \textit{ and } u_i(A, B) = u_i(B, A) = 0, \quad \textbf{(1)}$$

where the first argument of u_i describes the alternative selected and the second describes the state. Hence, all individuals prefer to select alternative A when the state is A, and alternative B when the state is B.[2]

The true state of the world is unknown to the individuals; let $\pi \in (0, 1)$ denote the common prior probability that the true state is A. Before any decision is made over $\{A, B\}$, individual $i \in N$ receives a private signal, $s_i \in \{0, 1\}$, about the true state of the world. Individuals' signals are independent draws from a state-dependent distribution satisfying

$$\Pr[s_i = 0 | A] = q_a \in (1/2, 1) \textit{ and } \Pr[s_i = 1 | B] = q_b \in (1/2, 1). \quad \textbf{(2)}$$

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[1] But see Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1995 and Myerson 1994 for large population results.

[2] The imposition of symmetry on the payoffs for making the "wrong" decision is an expository convenience only. If, as Condorcet assumed, $u_i(A, B) \neq u_i(B, A)$, then some of the definitions to follow need to be modified in obvious ways, and the algebra supporting the results becomes correspondingly messier (McLean and Hewitt 1994). The qualitative results themselves, however, are unaffected by the symmetry assumption. To see this, recall the first example presented. Here, the intuition behind (general) sincere voting not being rational is independent of the payoffs. The key thing is that sincere voting is informative. With asymmetric payoffs, the condition governing when sincere voting is also informative will be modified, but that is all.

That is, if the true state of the world is A, then it is more likely that a signal of $s_i = 0$ will be observed, whereas if the true state is B, it is more likely that $s_i = 1$ will be observed. We refer to this description of preferences and information collectively as model I.

After observing her signal, each individual votes for either alternative A or B. Thus a *voting strategy* for individual i is a map v_i:$\{0, 1\} \rightarrow \{A, B\}$ describing which of the two alternatives i votes for as a function of her information. Let v:$\{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{A, B\}^n$ defined by $v(s) = (v_1(s_1), \ldots, v_n(s_n))$ denote a *voting profile*.[3] Based on her signal, an individual can update her prior belief of π and determine which of the two alternatives would provide the higher expected utility if she alone were making the decision. In particular, from relationship 1, the expected utility of the alternative A being chosen, given the signal s_i, is simply the probability that the true state is A, and similarly for B. Employing Bayes' Rule and relationship 2, these probabilities are given by

$$\Pr(A|s_i = 0) = \frac{\pi q_a}{\pi q_a + (1 - \pi)(1 - q_b)},$$

$$\Pr(B|s_i = 0) = \frac{(1 - \pi)(1 - q_b)}{\pi q_a + (1 - \pi)(1 - q_b)},$$

$$\Pr(B|s_i = 1) = \frac{(1 - \pi)q_b}{\pi(1 - q_a) + (1 - \pi)q_b},$$

$$\Pr(A|s_i = 1) = \frac{\pi(1 - q_a)}{\pi(1 - q_a) + (1 - \pi)q_b}.$$

Therefore we have that

$$E[u_i(A, \cdot)|s_i = 0] > E[u_i(B, \cdot)|s_i = 0]$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \pi q_a > (1 - \pi)(1 - q_b) \quad \textbf{(3)}$$

$$E[u_i(B, \cdot)|s_i = 1] > E[u_i(A, \cdot)|s_i = 1]$$

$$\Leftrightarrow (1 - \pi)q_b > \pi(1 - q_a). \quad \textbf{(4)}$$

DEFINITION. *A voting strategy* v_i *is* sincere *if* $v_i(s_i) = A\ (B)$ *if and only if*

$$E[u_i(A, \cdot)|s_i] > (<)\ E[u_i(B, \cdot)|s_i].$$[4]

Note that we can evaluate the individuals' preferences over the choices of alternative A and B at various hypothetical stages in the process, where these stages differ according to the information possessed by the individuals. For example, at the ex ante stage, before they have received their private signals, individuals have identical beliefs, as characterized by the prior π, and hence identical preferences over A and B. Similarly, at some ex post stage, where either the state is known with certainty or else remains unknown but where all of the private signals have been revealed, individuals again have identical preferences. On the other hand, at the interim stage, where individuals possess their private information but *only* their private information (and where this is the stage when actual decisions are made), preferences over the choice of A or B can diverge; that is, some individuals may now prefer alternative A, whereas others may prefer B (this difference of course emanating from their private signals). Thus we have heterogeneous policy preferences being generated endogenously within the model. Furthermore, the fact that this heterogeneity is *information-based* will play an important role in our results.

Second, note that if the prior π is sufficiently high relative to q_a and q_b, then sincere voting would prescribe choosing alternative A regardless of the signal observed; and similarly, a choice for B if π is sufficiently small. Under either of these circumstances it is clear that if individuals vote sincerely they will all vote for the same alternative, implying the probability of a correct majority decision will be exactly the same as the probability that any one individual chooses correctly. Hence, the Jury Theorem will not hold. In the present context, that is, the Condorcet Jury Theorem assumes not only that voting is sincere but also that sincere voting is *informative*.

DEFINITION. *A voting strategy* v_i *is* informative *if* $v_i(0) = A$ *and* $v_i(1) = B$.

Thus when all individuals adopt informative strategies all of their private information is revealed through their voting decisions.[5]

While recent extensions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem speak only to certain characteristics of majority rule, we wish to allow for other types of rules as well. Define an *aggregation rule* to be a map f: $\{A, B\}^n \rightarrow \{A, B\}$ describing the outcome of the process as a function of the individuals' votes. We restrict attention here to aggregation rules that are *anonymous* (i.e., that treat all individuals the same) and *monotonic* (if B is chosen when it receives k votes, then it is also chosen when it receives more than k votes). For any such aggregation rule f, we can define a nonnegative integer k_f such that B is the outcome if and only if B receives more than k_f votes.[6] For example, the *majority voting* aggregation rule is given by $k_f = (n - 1)/2$.

Given an aggregation rule f, we now have a well-defined *Bayesian game* $B(f)$ in which N is the set of players, $\{A, B\}$ is the action set for each $i \in N$, $\{0, 1\}$ is the set of "types" each individual can be, the appropriate probabilities over "types" and utilities over vectors of actions, are induced from relationships 1 and 2 and f, and this structure is taken to be common knowledge among the participants (see appendix).

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[3] Throughout, we will say that a voting profile satisfies a certain property if each of its individual components satisfies the property.

[4] We ignore instances where (π, q_a, q_b) are such that individuals are indifferent between choosing A and B, since these are (in a certain well-defined sense) not typical. Similarly, all inequalities below implicitly involving (π, q_a, q_b) will be taken to be strict.

[5] Of course, such information is also revealed when another strategy is played: $v_i(0) = B$ and $v_i(1) = A$. However, it is easily shown that this "contrary" strategy is weakly dominated.

[6] Note that this is exactly the class of rules considered by Condorcet, who, in the explicitly jury context, suggests that a defendant be convicted if and only if the number of votes for conviction exceeds some critical number depending, in general, on the parameters of the situation (McLean and Hewitt 1994).

DEFINITION. *A voting profile is* rational *in model I if it constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game* B(f).

It is worth emphasizing that, unlike the definitions of sincere and informative voting, rationality is a property of voting *profiles* and not of individual voting strategies.

The most important feature of Nash equilibrium voting in this environment is that there is, in principle, information about other individuals' private signals that can be incorporated into the decision to select alternative A or alternative B. This additional information comes about as follows: in computing whether A or B is the better response to other individuals' voting strategies, individual i only concerns herself with those situations where she is "pivotal"—that is, where her vote makes a difference in the collective choice, where here a situation is a particular list of the others' private information. Suppose, for example, that all other individuals were adopting the informative strategy described above and collective decision making is by majority rule. In those situations where at least $n/2$ of the others have observed 1s, i's vote is immaterial, because regardless of how she votes a majority will vote for B—and similarly for those situations where at least $n/2$ of the others have observed 0s. Therefore the only instance in which i's vote matters is when exactly $(n - 1)/2$ of the other individuals have observed 1s (and hence $(n - 1)/2$ have observed 0s). But then in making her voting decision, i can essentially *presume* that exactly $(n - 1)/2$ of the others have observed 1s, thereby generating this additional "equilibrium" information (see Austen-Smith 1990; Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1994). This argument is made precise in the appendix.

Finally, for any vector of signals

$$s = (s_1, \ldots, s_n), \text{ let } k(s) = \sum_N s_i.$$

Just as in the determination of i's sincere voting strategy, we can compute via Bayes' Rule the probability that the true state is either A or B—and hence the expected utility from alternative A or B being chosen, conditional on the vector s:

$E[u_i(A,\cdot)|s] > E[u_i(B,\cdot)|s]$ iff

$$\frac{\pi}{1-\pi} > [q_b/(1-q_a)]^{k(s)}[(1-q_b)/q_a]^{n-k(s)} \quad (5)$$

and

$E[u_i(A,\cdot)|s] < E[u_i(B,\cdot)|s]$ iff

$$\frac{\pi}{1-\pi} < [q_b/(1-q_a)]^{k(s)}[(1-q_b)/q_a]^{n-k(s)}. \quad (6)$$

Of course, since all individuals have the same preferences, relationships 5 and 6 give the optimal decision for any individual given all of the available information about the true state—and hence for the collective as a whole.

Because

$$k(s) = \sum_N s_i,$$

relationship 2 implies that the greater is $k(s)$, the more likely it is that the true state is B and the less likely it is that the true state is A. Suppose equation 5 holds when $k(s) = 0$ and suppose relationship 6 holds when $k(s) = n$. Then there must exist some critical value of $k(s)$, say k^*, such that $k(s) \leq k^*$ implies $E[u_i(A,\cdot)|s] > E[u_i(B,\cdot)|s]$, and $k(s) > k^*$ implies $E[u_i(A,\cdot)|s] < E[u_i(B,\cdot)|s]$. Then, k^* is defined implicitly by:

$$[q_b/(1-q_a)]^{k^*+1}[(1-q_b)/q_a]^{n-k^*-1} > \frac{\pi}{1-\pi} > [q_b/(1-q_a)]^{k^*}[(1-q_b)/q_a]^{n-k^*}, \quad (7)$$

where the dependence of k^* on (q_a, q_b, π) is understood. In general, then, k^* describes the optimal method of aggregating individuals' private information (if this information were known) in that the group unanimously prefers the collective decision to be A, rather than B at s if and only if $k(s) \leq k^*$. Of course, k^* may not exist for all parameterizations. In particular, if relationship 5 holds at $k(s) = n$, then all individuals would prefer A over B irrespective of the vector of signals s—and conversely if relationship 6 holds at $k(s) = 0$. To avoid such trivialities, hereafter assume the parameters (q_a, q_b, π) are such that relationship 5 holds at $k(s) = 0$ and relationship 6 holds at $k(s) = n$.

We now turn to the question of when the explicit as well as implicit assumptions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem are satisfied in model I. Note first that the probability that i votes correctly, given that her strategy is informative, is simply

$$p_i \equiv \Pr[s_i = 0|A]\Pr[A] + \Pr[s_i = 1|B]\Pr[B]$$
$$= \pi q_a + (1-\pi)q_b > 1/2, \text{ all } i \in N, \quad (8)$$

while the probability that any pair of individuals (i, j) both vote correctly is given by

$$r_{ij} \equiv \Pr[s_i = 0 \text{ and } s_j = 0|A]\Pr[A]$$
$$+ \Pr[s_i = 1 \text{ and } s_j = 1|B]\Pr[B]$$
$$= \pi q_a^2 + (1-\pi)q_b^2. \quad (9)$$

(Because p_i and r_{ij} are identical across all i, j $(i \neq j)$, hereafter we write $p \equiv p_i$ and $r \equiv r_{ij}$.) Now suppose $q_a = q_b = q$; that is, the probability that $s_i = 0$ when the true state is A is the same as the probability $s_i = 1$ when the true state is B (this will be relaxed later). Under this assumption, if individuals' voting strategies are informative then the probability that individual i votes correctly is independent from that of voter j: $p = \pi q + (1 - \pi)q = q$ and, therefore, $r = \pi q^2 + (1 - \pi)q^2 = q^2 = p^2$.

LEMMA 1. *Assume* $q_a = q_b$. *Then sincere voting in model I is informative if and only if* $k^* = (n - 1)/2$.

Proof. Assume $q_a = q_b = q$. By relationships 3 and 4, if sincere voting is informative, then

$$q/(1-q) > \frac{\pi}{1-\pi} > (1-q)/q \quad (10)$$

(or, equivalently, $q > \pi > 1 - q$). Now set $q_a = q_b = q$ in relationship 7 and collect terms to yield k^* implicitly defined as the integer such that

$$[q/(1-q)]^{2(k^*+1)-n} > \frac{\pi}{1-\pi} > [(1-q)/q]^{n-2k^*}. \qquad \mathbf{(11)}$$

Since $q/(1-q) > \pi/(1-\pi)$ by relationship 10,

$$[q/(1-q)]^{2(k^*+1)-n} > \frac{\pi}{1-\pi}$$

implies $k^* \geq (n-1)/2$; and similarly, since relationship 10 requires

$$\pi/(1-\pi) > (1-q)/q, \frac{\pi}{1-\pi} > [(1-q)/q]^{n-2k^*}$$

implies $k^* \leq (n-1)/2$. Therefore, if sincere voting is informative at (q_a, q_b, π) when $q_a = q_b$, $k^* = (n-1)/2$ necessarily. To check sufficiency, substitute $(n-1)/2$ for k^* in relationship 11 to yield relationship 10 and, by relationships 3 and 4, note that relationship 10 implies sincere voting is informative. *Q.E.D.*

Therefore if $q_a = q_b$ the only time sincere voting will be informative is when the optimal decision rule (i.e., the optimal way to aggregate individuals' information) is majority rule.

Lemma 1 states precisely when informative voting is sincere. The next result states precisely when informative voting is rational.

LEMMA 2. *For all* $(q_a, q_b) \in (1/2, 1)^2$, *informative voting in model I is rational if and only if the aggregation rule* f *is such that* $k_f = k^*$.

Necessity Proof. Suppose instead that $k_f \neq k^*$, where without loss of generality $k^* < k_f$. Consider the decision by individual i when all other individuals are voting informatively; if we can show that i does *not* want to vote informatively, then we will be done. The only time i is pivotal (i.e., the only time i's vote makes a difference in the collective decision) is when B receives exactly k_f votes. Assuming all other individuals are voting informatively, this only occurs when exactly k_f of the individuals other than i have observed 1s. But then given $k^* < k_f$, the optimal decision is to select alternative B regardless of i's signal, and therefore i's best response is $v_i(s_i) = B$ for $s_i = 0$ *and* $s_i = 1$; that is, i's best response is not to vote informatively.

Sufficiency Proof. Employing the same logic, if $k_f = k^*$, all other individuals are voting informatively and i is pivotal, then exactly k^* of the other individuals must have observed 1s. Thus if $s_i = 1$ then the optimal decision is to select B, so that i should vote for B, whereas if $s_i = 0$, the optimal decision is A, and i should vote for A. Hence i's best response to informative voting by the others is also to vote informatively, and informative voting constitutes a Nash equilibrium. *Q.E.D.*

Combining these two results, we get the following.

THEOREM 1. *Assume* $q_a = q_b$*; then sincere voting in model I is informative and rational if and only if* $k_f = k^* = (n-1)/2$.

That is, sincere voting is both informative and rational precisely when (a) majority rule is being used to aggregate individuals' votes and (b) majority rule is the optimal method of aggregating individuals' information.

As a corollary, we can identify when the parameters of the model (q, π) are such that the implicit, as well as explicit, assumptions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem hold: Under majority rule sincere voting is both informative and rational when $k^* = (n-1)/2$, that is, when majority rule is the optimal method of aggregating individuals' information.[7] For example, if $\pi = 1/2$, then $k^* = (n-1)/2$ and hence, given a uniform prior, sincere voting will be both informative and rational under majority rule.

Conversely, whenever it is the case that k^* does *not* equal $(n-1)/2$, one of the explicit or implicit assumptions of the Jury Theorem must be violated. In particular, we know that sincere voting is not informative when $k^* \neq (n-1)/2$ (by Lemma 1) and so, even if sincere voting is rational, the probability that a majority makes a correct decision will be exactly the same as that of any individual (since sincere voting in this case requires voting for either A or B regardless of the private information). And if sincere voting is not rational, then the implicit behavioral assumption in the proofs of the Jury Theorem is inconsistent with Nash equilibrium behavior. On the other hand, if we ignore this behavioral assumption, for any value of k^* (or, more properly, for any values of (q, π)), there will exist a voting rule for which the *conclusion* of the Jury Theorem (i.e., that the collective performs better than any individual) is true. The identity of this voting rule follows immediately from lemma 2: Whatever the value of k^*, set $k_f = k^*$. Then informative voting will be rational and—by definition of k^* and the fact that there is more than one individual (so the collective has strictly more draws than does an individual)—the probability that the collective makes a correct decision is strictly higher than that of any one individual. Thus an alternative view of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, from the perspective of model I, is this: For any value of k^* there exists a voting rule that the Jury Theorem conclusion obtains; and majority rule is that rule precisely when $k^* = (n-1)/2$, that is, when majority rule is the optimal method of aggregating the individuals' private information.

The symmetry assumption on q_a and q_b found in Theorem 1 is very special. For the Jury Theorem to say anything more than that majority voting aggregates information effectively when majority voting is the optimal way to aggregate information, it must apply in situations in which the latter is not the case. And by the preceding argument, this necessarily involves $q_a \neq q_b$. Unfortunately, under such circumstances, the theorem cannot generally assume that individuals are rational. To see this, recall that the original statement of the Condorcet Jury Theorem presumes that the probability that any individual votes for the better alternative is statistically independent of the same probability for any other individual. However, when q_a does not equal q_b, there is necessarily some amount of correlation between these probabilities (see relationship 9). But independence is only a sufficient condition. Ladha (1992) provides the following upper bound on the correlation r, denoted $\hat{r}$, for the Jury Theorem to apply:

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[7] Of course, the converse of this statement also holds: If $k^* = (n-1)/2$, then sincere voting is informative and rational if and only if f is majority rule.

$$\hat{r} \equiv p - \frac{n}{n-1}\,\frac{1-p}{p}\,(p - .25). \qquad \textbf{(12)}$$

That is, if the average correlation between the likelihoods of any two individuals (sincerely) voting for the correct alternative is less than $\hat{r}$, then the Condorcet Jury Theorem goes through. Now consider the following example:

Example 1. Let $N = \{1, \ldots, 21\}$, $q_a = .7$, $q_b = .8$, and $\pi = .5$. Making the appropriate substitutions, we calculate

i. from relationships 3 and 4, that sincere voting is informative
ii. from relationships 8 and 9, that $p = .75$ and $r = .565$
iii. from relationship 12, that $r = .575$
iv. from relationship 7, that $k^* = (n + 1)/2$.

By Ladha 1992, proposition 1, properties i–iii imply that the Jury Theorem applies to this case. But by property iv and Lemma 2 (which does not require $q_a = q_b$), informative—and hence sincere—voting under majority rule is not rational here.

ADDING DIVERSITY

In the model of the previous section, each individual was one of only two possible "types" following their private observations: those who believed A was the more likely state (relative to the prior) and those who believed B was the more likely state. These types then correspond to the two different posterior beliefs the individuals might hold. We shall modify the basic setup to allow for a third type to exist as well, namely, those whose posterior belief turns out to be "in the middle" of the first two. We do this by assuming that individuals observe not one draw from the true distribution but rather *two*. Thus a private signal is now a pair $s_i = (s_{i1}, s_{i2}) \in \{0, 1\}^2$ describing the observations of two independent draws from the true distribution found in relationship 2, and so an individual's strategy is now a mapping v_i: $\{0, 1\}^2 \rightarrow \{A, B\}$. (As before, $v(\cdot)$ will denote a voting profile.) Further, we make the symmetry assumption that $q_a = q_b \equiv q$, where $q \in (1/2, 1)$. Finally, we let the prior π on state A take on any value *except* 1/2 (the importance of this last assumption will become apparent) and restrict attention only to the majority aggregation rule. Together we refer to these assumptions as model II.

The definition of sincere voting is just as before, namely, that an individual chooses alternative A or B depending on which is the more likely state based on her private information. Since an individual's two draws are assumed to be independent, sincere voting can, without loss of generality, be written as a function of the number of 1s observed, so let $S_i = s_{i1} + s_{i2}$ and redefine v_i: $\{0, 1, 2\} \rightarrow \{A, B\}$. Further, since $q_a = q_b$, it is immediate from Bayes' Rule that the posterior belief associated with $S_i = 1$ is simply equal to the prior belief π. Therefore, sincere voting upon observing $S_i = 1$ prescribes voting for A if $\pi > 1/2$ and voting for B if $\pi < 1/2$.[8] For $S_i \in \{0, 2\}$, sincere voting is determined by the following inequalities, which are analogous to those found in relationships 3 and 4:

$$E[u_i(A, \cdot)|S_i = 0] > E[u_i(B, \cdot)|S_i = 0]$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{\pi}{1-\pi} > \left[\frac{1-q}{q}\right]^2 \qquad \textbf{(13)}$$

$$E[u_i(B, \cdot)|S_i = 2] > E[u_i(A, \cdot)|S_i = 2]$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{\pi}{1-\pi} < \left[\frac{q}{1-q}\right]^2. \qquad \textbf{(14)}$$

Two comments on these equations are in order. First, since $q > 1/2$, one of the relationships 13 and 14 must always hold: if $\pi > 1/2$ then necessarily relationship 13 is true, whereas if $\pi < 1/2$, then necessarily relationship 14 is true. Second, if relationship 13 holds but relationship 14 does not, then it must be that sincere individuals vote for alternative A regardless of their private information—and similarly for B if relationship 14 holds but relationship 13 does not. As previously, such behavior immediately implies that the Jury Theorem will not hold if all vote sincerely, because a majority decision is no more likely to be correct than any individual's decision. We thus have the following generalization of the earlier definition of an informative strategy:

DEFINITION. *A voting strategy* v_i *is* informative *if* $v_i(0) = A$ *and* $v_i(2) = B$.

Thus sincere voting will be informative if and only if both relationships 13 and 14 hold.

Finally, as before, we will say that a voting profile is *rational* if it constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game associated with model II. Again, the crucial distinction between sincere and rational voting will be due to the additional "equilibrium" information associated with the latter.

In model I we saw how sincere voting under majority rule can be both informative and rational in certain situations, namely, when majority rule was the optimal method of aggregating information. The following result states that no such conditions exist in model II.

THEOREM 2. *Sincere voting in model II cannot be both informative and rational.*

Proof. Suppose all $i \neq j$ vote sincerely and informatively, $S_j = 1$, and j is pivotal. Without loss of generality, let $\pi < 1/2$; thus a sincere vote by j would be to choose B. Since f is majority rule and j is presumed pivotal, she can infer that exactly $(n - 1)/2$ individuals have $S_i = 0$. Let $d \equiv (n - 1)/2$ and let $\mathscr{C}(s)$ denote the event $\{S_j = 1,$

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[8] Hence, assuming $\pi \neq 1/2$ ensures that individuals with $S_i = 1$ are not indifferent.

$|\{i \in N\backslash\{j\}: S_i = 0\}| = d\}$. The expected utility, conditional on $\mathscr{E}(s)$, for j of alternative A being selected is equal to the probability A is the true state conditional on $\mathscr{E}(s)$—and similarly for B. Using Bayes' Rule and the Binomial Theorem, we have

$$E[u_j(A,\cdot)|\mathscr{E}(s)] = \frac{X}{X+Y},\ E[u_j(B,\cdot)|\mathscr{E}(s)] = \frac{Y}{X+Y},$$

where

$$X = \pi(1-q)q\binom{2d}{d}q^{2d} \times \left\{\sum_{j=0}^{j=d}\binom{d}{j}(2q(1-q))^{d-j}(1-q)^{2j}\right\}$$

$$Y = (1-\pi)q(1-q)\binom{2d}{d}(1-q)^{2d} \times \left\{\sum_{j=0}^{j=d}\binom{d}{j}(2q(1-q))^{d-j}q^{2j}\right\}.$$

Therefore $E[u_j(A,\cdot)|\mathscr{E}(s)] > E[u_j(B,\cdot)|\mathscr{E}(s)]$ if and only if

$$\pi(1-q)q\binom{2d}{d}q^{2d}\left\{\sum_{j=0}^{j=d}\binom{d}{j}(2q(1-q))^{d-j}(1-q)^{2j}\right\} > (1-\pi)q(1-q)\binom{2d}{d}(1-q)^{2d}\left\{\sum_{j=0}^{j=d}\binom{d}{j} \times (2q(1-q))^{d-j}q^{2j}\right\} \Leftrightarrow \sum_{j=0}^{j=d}\binom{d}{j}(2q(1-q))^{d-j} \times [\pi(1-q)^{2j}q^{2d} - (1-\pi)q^{2j}(1-q)^{2d}] > 0.$$

Since $q > 1/2$ and relationship 13 holds,

$$\forall j = 0, \ldots, d-1,$$
$$[\pi(1-q)^{2j}q^{2d} - (1-\pi)q^{2j}(1-q)^{2d}] > 0.$$

Therefore all but the last bracketed term in this summation is positive, whereas the last term is negative. Moreover, considering only the first and last terms in the summation, we have

$$\binom{d}{0}(2q(1-q))^d[\pi q^{2d} - (1-\pi)(1-q)^{2d}] + \binom{d}{d}[\pi(q(1-q))^{2d} - (1-\pi)(q(1-q))^{2d}]$$
$$> \{[\pi q^{2d} - (1-\pi)(1-q)^{2d}] + [\pi(q(1-q))^d - (1-\pi)(q(1-q))^d]\}[q(1-q)]^d$$
$$= \{\pi q^d[q^d + (1-q)^d] - (1-\pi)(1-q)^d[q^d + (1-q)^d]\}[q(1-q)]^d > 0$$
$$\Leftrightarrow \pi q^d > (1-\pi)(1-q)^d,$$

where the last inequality holds by relationship 13, $q > 1/2$, and the fact that $n \geq 5$ implies $d \geq 2$. Hence, $E[u_j(A,\cdot)|\mathscr{E}(s)] > E[u_j(B,\cdot)|\mathscr{E}(s)]$, and therefore, conditional on being pivotal, j's best response is A; that is, if everyone else is voting sincerely, then j should not vote sincerely. *Q.E.D.*

Thus in model II sincere voting by all individuals is either uninformative (i.e., everyone votes for A or B independent of their private information), so that the *conclusion* of the Condorcet Jury Theorem that majority voting does strictly better than any one individual does not hold, or is not rational, in which case an implicit *assumption* of the theorem (i.e., that all individuals vote sincerely in collective decision making) prescribes irrational behavior.

Intuitively, it is apparent where the "problem" with the Jury Theorem lies in model II, in contrast to model I. In the former, there are now three possible "types" of voters (i.e., three possible posterior beliefs they could have), yet there are only two possible decisions, "vote for A" or "vote for B." Thus assuming sincere and informative voting, and $\pi < 1/2$, only one type ($S_i = 0$) votes for A, so that the private information possessed by those voting for A can be precisely inferred, whereas the remaining two types ($S_i = 1$ or 2) vote for B, thereby not allowing such a precise inference. This is in contrast to the informative voting found in model I, where such precise inferences always obtain. The problem, therefore, reduces to one of the "size of the message space," in that under a more complicated aggregation rule, individuals might simply announce their private information or (equivalently) announce their posterior beliefs.

This distinction between sincere and rational voting is to a certain degree reminiscent of that found in the complete-information voting literature. If, for example, individuals first vote on alternative x versus y, and then the winner of this contest is pitted against alternative z, then depending on the individual preferences one can have instances where sincere voting under majority rule is distinct from (and generates different outcomes from) rational or "sophisticated" voting. Such examples require at least three alternatives as well as a certain amount of heterogeneity in individual preferences. By contrast, in models I and II sincere and rational voting can differ when there are only two alternatives and where the ex ante and ex post preferences of the individuals are the same. As remarked in the introduction, the wedge between sincere and rational voting here rests on private information leading to heterogeneity in individuals' *interim* policy preferences, and such heterogeneity permits individuals to make inferences about the general distribution of private information in equilibrium.

Theorem 2 states that when relationships 13 and 14 hold, sincere voting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game associated with model II. This leaves open the question, What *are* the equilibria? Two candidates immediately come to mind, namely, everyone voting for A regardless of their private information and, similarly, everyone voting for B. As with most majority-rule voting games, either of these voting profiles is evidently a Nash equilibrium, because if everyone is (say) voting for A, then any one individual's vote is immaterial, so that voting for A regardless of private information is a best response. Now in complete-information voting games, these "trivial" equilibria are eliminated by requiring individual strategies to be undominated. Thus, if individual j prefers A to B, then voting for B is dominated. On the other hand, in the current incomplete-information voting game, such a refinement argument does not work. To see this, let $d = (n - 1)/2$, and have d individuals play the strategy "always vote for B" and d individuals play the strategy $v_i(S_i) = A$ if and only if $S_i = 0$. What is individual j's best response? Just as in the Nash calculations found in the proof of Theorem 2, j only need consider when she is pivotal; further, if one can show that a best response for j when $S_j = 2$ is to choose A, then A will be the best response for $S_j \leq 1$ as well. So suppose $S_j = 2$, and j is pivotal; then according to the others' strategies, it must be that the latter group of d individuals must all have private signals of $S_i = 0$, whereas j cannot make *any* inference about the former group's private information. Therefore, employing Bayes' Rule, we get that voting for A will be the better response as long as

$$\pi(1-q)^2q^{2d} > (1-\pi)q^2(1-q)^{2d}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{\pi}{1-\pi} > \left[\frac{1-q}{q}\right]^{2d-2},$$

where the latter inequality follows from $q > 1/2$, $d \geq 2$, and relationship 13. Therefore everyone voting for A regardless of their private information constitutes an undominated Nash equilibrium, and a similar logic shows the same to be true with respect to B.

What is most striking about these Nash equilibria is that they actually *reverse* the conclusion of the Condorcet Jury Theorem—that is, any one individual, acting alone (i.e. voting sincerely) will have a higher probability of making a correct decision than will a majority acting in accordance with one of these Nash equilibria. This follows from the fact that a sincere strategy maximizes the probability that a single individual makes a correct choice, and by relationships 13 and 14, such a maximizing strategy will depend nontrivially on the private information, in contrast to the "always vote A (or B)" strategy.[9]

Finally, Theorem 2 leaves open the possibility that whenever sincere voting is not rational, the Condorcet Jury Theorem fails to apply because the relevant correlations between individuals' likelihoods of voting correctly, when they vote sincerely, are too high. Were this invariably the case, Theorem 2 would not bear on the Jury Theorem directly. However this is not the case, as Example 2 below aptly demonstrates.

Example 2. Let $N = \{1, \ldots, 21\}$, $q = .9$, and $\pi = .6$. Then since $p = \pi[q^2 + 2q(1-q)] + (1-\pi)q^2$ and $r = \pi[q^4 + 4(1-q)^3q + 4q^2(1-q)^2] + (1-\pi)q^4$, we have

i. Informative voting is sincere
ii. $p = .918$, and $r = .8505$
iii. $\hat{r} = .8554$.

Thus, just as with Example 1, there exist environments where all of the explicit assumptions of the Jury Theorem are met, yet by Theorem 2 the implicit assumption of sincere voting prescribes irrational behavior.

A MODEL WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SIGNALS

We have found existing proofs of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to be applicable and consistent with rational voting only in those circumstances in which majority voting is ex ante the optimal method for aggregating information. However, the results are derived in a model without public signals, whereas, typically there are public signals. For instance, "opinion leaders," the media, or acts of nature can be commonly observed and lead people to update their beliefs about the true state of the world. Hence, we shall extend the model to include a public signal and argue that in this setting, the consistency of the Jury Theorem with rational behavior breaks down in a similar fashion to that seen in the previous section.

In model III, the source and structure of an individual's private information is as in model II: two independent draws, where $q_a = q_b = q \in (1/2, 1)$. Therefore, there are again three types of individuals, depending on their private information (or, equivalently, on their posterior beliefs). In addition, we assume for analytic simplicity that the prior π is equal to 1/2. Now, however, subsequent to observing their private draws but before voting on the two alternatives, all individuals observe one public draw $s_p \in \{0, 1\}$. A voting strategy is now a mapping v_i: $\{0, 1\}^3 \rightarrow \{A, B\}$, with again $v(\cdot)$ denoting a voting profile.

We allow this public signal to differ in its "informational content" from that of individuals' private signals, by assuming

$$\Pr[s_p = 0|A] = Q = \Pr[s_p = 1|B],\ Q \in (1/2, 1).$$

That is, private and public signals can be drawn from different (state-dependent) distributions.

As before, sincere voting describes an individual's optimal voting decision based solely on her own private information, as well as (here) on the public information associated with the value of s_p. As in model II, for such behavior we can characterize an individual's private information by $S_i = s_{i1} + s_{i2}$, and then define a sincere strategy as a map from $\{0, 1, 2\} \times \{0, 1\}$ into $\{A, B\}$. Employing Bayes' Rule (and recalling that π is set equal to 1/2 and $Q > 1/2$), we know that if $S_i = 1$, then sincere voting prescribes voting in accordance with the public signal, that is, for A if $s_p = 0$ and for B if $s_p = 1$. Likewise, if $S_i = 0$ and $s_p = 0$, sincere voting would select A, whereas if $S_i = 2$ and $s_p = 1$, sincere voting would select B. The remaining cases are when $S_i = 0$ and $s_p = 1$, and when $S_i = 2$ and $s_p = 0$, that is, where there is a certain amount of conflict in an individual's private and public signals. In these two cases, by the various symmetry assumptions (i.e., $q_a = q_b$, $\pi = 1/2$), we have

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[9] Of course, other equilibria involving mixed or asymmetric strategies might leave the conclusion of the theorem intact. But then a complete explanation for why majorities are more likely to choose the "better" alternative than any individual requires some sort of equilibrium selection argument.

$$E[u_i(A,\cdot)|S_i = 0, s_p = 1] > E[u_i(B,\cdot)|S_i = 0, s_p = 1] \Leftrightarrow q^2(1-Q) > (1-q)^2Q \Leftrightarrow E[u_i(B,\cdot)|S_i = 2, s_p = 0] > E[u_i(A,\cdot)|S_i = 2, s_p = 0] \quad \textbf{(15)}$$

If the inequalities do not hold, then sincere voting would have the individuals ignoring their private information and simply choosing between A and B based on the realization of the public draw. As previously, such a situation would render the probability of a correct majority decision under sincere voting equal to that of a correct individual decision. Therefore we again require the voting strategies to be *informative*:

Definition. *A voting strategy in model III is* informative *if* $v_i(0, 1) = A$ *and* $v_i(2, 0) = B$.

From relationship 15, we have that sincere voting is informative if and only if $q^2(1 - Q) > (1 - q)^2Q$; that is, the public signal cannot be "too" informative relative to the private signals.

As before, we say that a voting profile is rational if it constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game associated with model III.

Theorem 3. *Sincere voting in model III cannot be both informative and rational.*

Proof. The proof is almost identical to that for Theorem 2. Suppose all $i \neq j$ vote sincerely and informatively, $S_j = 1$, and j is pivotal; without loss of generality, let $s_p = 1$. Since f is majority rule and j is presumed pivotal, j can infer that exactly $(n - 1)/2$ individuals other than j have $S_i = 0$. Let $d \equiv (n - 1)/2$ and let $\mathscr{E}(s)$ denote the event, $\{S_j = 1, s_p = 1, |\{i \in N\backslash\{j\}: S_i = 0\}| = d\}$. The expected utility, conditional on $\mathscr{E}(s)$, for j, of alternative A being selected is equal to the probability A is the true state conditional on $\mathscr{E}(s)$—and similarly for B. Using Bayes' Rule and the Binomial Theorem,

$$\begin{aligned} &E[u_j(A,\cdot)|\mathscr{E}(s)] > E[u_j(B,\cdot)|\mathscr{E}(s)] \\ &\Leftrightarrow q(1-q)(1-Q)\binom{2d}{d}q^{2d} \\ &\quad\times\left\{\sum_{j=0}^{j=d}\binom{d}{j}(2q(1-q))^{d-j}(1-q)^{2j}\right\} \\ &\quad> q(1-q)Q\binom{2d}{d}(1-q)^{2d} \\ &\quad\times\left\{\sum_{j=0}^{j=d}\binom{d}{j}(2q(1-q))^{d-j}q^{2j}\right\} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \sum_{j=0}^{j=d}\binom{d}{j}(2q(1-q))^{d-j}[(1-Q)(1-q)^{2j}q^{2d} \\ &\qquad - Qq^{2j}(1-q)^{2d}] > 0. \end{aligned}$$

Since $q > 1/2$ and relationship 15 holds,

$$\forall j = 0, \ldots, d-1,$$

$$[(1-Q)(1-q)^{2j}q^{2d} - Qq^{2j}(1-q)^{2d}] > 0.$$

Thus all but the last terms in the above summation are positive, while the last term is negative. Moreover, considering only the first and last terms in the summation, we have

$$\begin{aligned} &\binom{d}{0}(2q(1-q))^d[(1-Q)q^{2d} - Q(1-q)^{2d}] \\ &\quad + \binom{d}{d}[(1-Q)(q(1-q))^{2d} - Q(q(1-q))^{2d}] \\ &\quad > \{[(1-Q)q^{2d} - Q(1-q)^{2d}] \\ &\quad + [(1-Q)(q(1-q))^d - Q(q(1-q))^d]\}[q(1-q)]^d \\ &\quad = \{(1-Q)q^d[q^d + (1-q)^d] \\ &\quad - Q(1-q)^d[q^d + (1-q)^d]\}[q(1-q)]^d > 0 \\ &\qquad \Leftrightarrow (1-Q)q^d > Q(1-q)^d, \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality holds by relationship 15, $q > 1/2$, and the fact that $n \geq 5$ implies $d \geq 2$. Hence, $E[u_j(A,\cdot)|\mathscr{E}(s)] > E[u_j(B,\cdot)|\mathscr{E}(s)]$, and therefore, conditional on being pivotal, j's best response is A; that is, if everyone else is voting sincerely, then j should not vote sincerely. *Q.E.D.*

A number of remarks about this result are in order. The proof demonstrated that those individuals whose private signals were split (i.e., one 0 and one 1) vote against the public signal if all others are voting sincerely. If we assume that $n \geq 9$, then the same logic yields the same result when an individual's private signal is perfectly consistent with the public signal: if j privately observes two 1s, the public signal is 1, and all other individuals vote sincerely, then j's best response is to vote for A, rather than the sincere choice of B.

Second, the result does not rely critically on the assumption that $\pi = 1/2$, that is, each state is equally likely ex ante. Setting π equal to 1/2 merely allowed us to cancel terms that would be close as long as π was close to 1/2. Hence, as long as the ex ante likelihood of the states are sufficiently close, the result remains the same.

Finally, the assumption that there is only a single public signal is not important either. Suppose instead that there were m public draws, were m is greater than 1 and odd and suppose these consisted of $(m + 1)/2$ 0s and $(m - 1)/2$ 1s. Then, given our symmetry assumptions, Bayesian updating reveals that this generates the same posterior belief as having observed one 0 and no 1s (recall the equivalence of relationships 7 and 10 when $q_a = q_b$). So, upon observing such public draws, sincere voting will not be rational. A single public signal, therefore, is used only for emphasis, because in such an environment sincere voting is not rational regardless of the public draw.

As before, Theorem 3 raises the question, What *are* the Nash equilibria? One possibility is that the individuals ignore the public signal and vote solely on the information contained in their private signal. However, it is apparent that for any value of π other than 1/2, such behavior is equivalent to that discussed previously, and therefore sincere voting based only on private information is not a Nash equilibrium. Conversely, ignoring all private information and voting exclusively on the basis of the public signal is clearly a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, such behavior is undominated. To see this, suppose that if the public signal is 0, the first $d \equiv (n - 1)/2$ individuals vote for A regardless of their private information, and the next d vote for B if and only if their private information is $S_i = 2$; and if the public signal is 1, the first d individuals vote for B regardless of their private information and the next d vote for A if and only if $S_i = 0$. What is individual n's best response when the public signal is, say, 1? Just as in the Nash calculations found in the proof of Theorem 3, individual n only needs consider when she is pivotal. Further, if we can show that n's best response when $S_n = 0$ is to choose B, then B will be the best response for $S_n \geq 1$ as well, thereby demonstrating the claim. Making the relevant calculations, we find

$$E[u_n(B,\cdot)|\cdot] > E[u_n(A,\cdot)|\cdot]$$

$$\Leftrightarrow (1-q)^2 Q q^{n-1} > q^2(1-Q)(1-q)^{n-1}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{Q}{1-Q} > \left(\frac{1-q}{q}\right)^{n-3}.$$

Because $Q > 1/2$, $q > 1/2$, and $n \geq 5$, this inequality necessarily holds.

Theorem 3 leaves open the possibility that whenever rational voting is not sincere, the Condorcet Jury Theorem fails to apply because the relevant correlations between individuals' likelihoods of voting correctly, when they vote sincerely, are too high. Just as with Theorem 2, however, we provide an example to show that this is not invariably the case:

Example 3. Let $N = \{1, \ldots, 21\}$, $q = Q = .9$ and $\pi = .5$. Then the sincere voting rule is informative, and we calculate:

i. $p = q^3 + 3q^2(1 - q) = .972$
ii. $r = (1 - q)q^4 + q[4q^2(1 - q)^2 + q^4 + 4q^3(1 - q)] = .9472$
iii. $\hat{r} = .9502$ (from relationship 12).

Once more, i–iii imply the Jury Theorem goes through assuming that all individuals vote sincerely (Ladha 1992). But by Theorem 3, sincere voting here is not rational.

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATION

The Condorcet Jury Theorem and its extensions assert that under certain conditions, the probability that a collective chooses the correct alternative by majority vote exceeds the probability that any constituent member of the collective would unilaterally choose that alternative. Implicit in these conditions is the assumption that individuals behave in the collective decision exactly as they would if choosing alone (and that such voting is informative). The intuition that an assumption of "sincere" voting is innocuous here turns out to be faulty. Although there is certainly no incentive or opportunity for individual gain at the expense of others, it does not follow that rational individuals behave identically in collective and in autarkic decision-making environments.

We have looked at the role of the "sincerity" assumption in the Jury Theorems with three variations of an extremely simple model, each of which differs from the others only in the specification of individuals' information. And in each case, the model is set up so that the features of the Jury Theorems typically taken as primitive (e.g., individuals' probability assessments on which alternative is best, the correlation between such assessments) are generated both endogenously within the model and consistent with the parametric restrictions imposed by the Jury Theorems per se. In only one circumstance is it the case that sincere voting is informative and rational. In model I, where individuals' information consists of a single independent and private draw from a state-dependent distribution, the Condorcet Jury Theorem obtains when and only when majority voting is the optimal way to aggregate individuals' private information. Moreover, if majority voting is not the optimal way to aggregate information, then sincere voting under majority rule cannot be rational. In particular, we provide an example in which the explicit assumptions of the Jury Theorem hold yet sincere voting is not rational. Indeed, when all other individuals are voting sincerely, any one individual has an incentive to vote *against* the advice of her private information. Within model I, therefore, the Condorcet Jury Theorem as usually formulated is either trivial or necessarily precludes Nash equilibrium behavior.

The situation is more stark in model II, where individuals' information comprises two independent draws from a state-dependent distribution, and model III, where individuals' model II information is augmented by a public signal from some (possibly) distinct state-dependent distribution. In both these environments we prove that sincere voting cannot be both informative and rational. Moreover, in both models II and III, all individuals voting for the same alternative irrespective of their information is an undominated Nash equilibrium. With respect to the probability of selecting the correct alternative, that is, majority voting can easily do worse than any individual acting alone (and this is true even when the parametric conditions for the Jury Theorem to hold are satisfied).

Two immediate implications follow from these results. The first is that ignoring the sources of information that support individuals' beliefs precludes analysis of individually rational behavior. And if the objective of the analysis is to understand how people behave under specific institutional constraints, this is clearly undesirable. Second, the appropriateness of majority rule (or, for that matter, any voting rule) in generating "good" collective outcomes will depend on the details of the situation of concern. For example, as was illustrated in model I, the identity of the optimal voting rule hinged critically on parameters governing individuals' information.

More generally, our results reveal the importance of addressing issues in collective decision making from a game-theoretic perspective. In particular, the appropriate approach to problems of information aggregation is through game theory and mechanism design, not statistics.

APPENDIX

Here we describe in detail the Bayesian game played by the individuals in models I and II, as well as the Nash equilibrium conditions; the description for model III is similar. Each individual has a set of *types* T_i, where in model I this set is equal to $\{0, 1\}$ whereas in model II it is $\{0, 1\}^2$; let

$$T = \times_{i \in N} T_i \text{ and } T_{-i} = \times_{j \neq i} T_j.$$

A *type profile* $t = (t_1, \ldots, t_n) \in T$ is drawn according to the prior $p(t)$ over T, where this prior is given by $p(t) = \pi \Pr[t|A] + (1 - \pi)\Pr[t|B]$, and where $\Pr[t|A]$ and $\Pr[t|B]$ are determined by relationship 2 and the presumed independence of the individual draws.

Let $\{A, B\} = D_i$ be the set of *decisions* available to individual i and let

$$D = \times_{i \in N} D_i.$$

Prior to making her decision, i observes her component t_i of the type profile t. Thus, a *strategy* for i is a function v_i: $T_i \rightarrow D_i$, where we let v: $T \rightarrow D$ denote a *strategy profile*; throughout, $v(t_{-i})$ will denote the vector of decisions by all individuals except i according to the strategy profile $v(\cdot)$.

From relationship 1 we can define preferences over vectors of decisions, d, and type profiles, t, in the following manner (for simplicity, we assume majority rule): Let $M(d) = A$ if $|\{i \in N: d_i = A\}| > n/2$ and $M(d) = B$ otherwise (recall n is assumed odd). Then we have

$$u(d, t) = \Pr[M(d)|t] = \frac{\Pr[M(d) \,\&\, t]}{p(t)}. \qquad \textbf{(A-1)}$$

That is, the expected utility from (say) a majority selecting outcome A given the vector of types t is equal to the probability that A is the true state conditional on t, which by Bayes' Rule is given by the probability the state is A *and* the type profile t is observed divided by the probability that t is observed.

Upon observing t_i, individual i updates her belief about others' types in a Bayesian fashion:

$$p(t_{-i}|t_i) = \sum_{T_{-i}} \frac{p(t)}{p(t_i, t_{-i})}. \qquad \textbf{(A-2)}$$

The expected utility from voting for $d_i \in D_i$, given the updated belief $p(t_{-i}|t_i)$ and the strategies of the others $v(t_{-i})$ is given by

$$EU(d_i; t_i, v) = \sum_{T_{-i}} p(t_{-i}|t_i)u(d_i, v(t_{-i}), t_i, t_{-i}).$$

Definition. *A* (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium *of the above Bayesian game is a strategy profile* $v^*(\cdot)$ *such that for all* $i \in N$ *and all* $t_i \in T_i$, $v_i^*(t_i) = A$ *only if* $EU(A; t_i, v^*) - EU(B; t_i, v^*) \geq 0$.

It turns out that we can simplify significantly the inequality found in this definition. By relationships A-1 and A-2, we know that

$$EU(d_i; t_i, v) = \frac{1}{\sum_{T_{-i}} p(t_{-i}, t_i)} \left\{ \sum_{T_{-i}} \Pr[M(d_i, v(t_{-i})) \text{ and } t] \right\}. \qquad \textbf{(A-3)}$$

More important, because only the *sign of the difference* in the expected utility in voting for A and B is relevant, we can ignore the denominator in relationship A-3 and write

$$EU(A; t_i, v) - EU(B; t_i, v) \propto \sum_{T_{-i}} \{\Pr[M(A, v(t_{-i})) \text{ and } t] - \Pr[M(B, v(t_{-i})) \text{ and } t]\} \qquad \textbf{(A-4)}$$

(where ∝ means "is proportional to"). Now define

$$T^{p}_{-i}(v) = \{t_{-i} \in T_{-i} | \, |\{j \in N \backslash \{i\}: v_j(t_j) = A\}| \} = (n - 1)/2\}.$$

$T^{p}_{-i}(v)$ thus gives those type subprofiles where, according to the strategy v, exactly half of the remaining individuals (i.e., all but i) vote for A. Thus, when $t_{-i} \in T^{p}_{-i}(v)$, voter i will be pivotal, so that for these subprofiles $M(d_i, v(t_{-i})) = d_i$, whereas for $t_{-i} \notin T^{p}_{-i}(v)$ i is not pivotal, so that the bracketed term in the summation on the right-hand side of relationship A-4 will be zero. Therefore, we can replace relationship A-4 with

$$\begin{aligned} EU(A; t_i, v) - EU(B; t_i, v) &\propto \sum_{T^{p}_{-i}(v)} \{\Pr[A \text{ and } t] - \Pr[B \text{ and } t]\} \\ &= \sum_{T^{p}_{-i}(v)} \{\pi \Pr[t|A] - (1 - \pi)\Pr[t|B]\}. \qquad \textbf{(A-5)} \end{aligned}$$

It is relationship A-5, then, which is employed to determine when sincere voting does or does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. Further, the "equilibrium" restriction to only those type subprofiles in $T^{p}_{-i}(v)$ is the source of the additional information alluded to in the text.

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Deliberative Democracy and Authority

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The topic of authority only rarely figures into theories of deliberative democracy, no doubt owing to the widely held view that authority is inherently undemocratic. But deliberative democrats need a concept of authoritative decision making, not least because the scale and complexity of contemporary societies radically limit the numbers of decisions that can be made by deliberatively democratic means. I argue for an inherently democratic conception of authority, in large part by examining and rejecting the view—held by radical democrats, conservatives, and most liberals—that authority involves a surrender of judgment by those subject to authority. In contrast, I develop the view that authority, particularly in posttraditional contexts, involves a limited suspension of judgment enabled by a context of democratic challenge and public accountability. An important point is that democratic authority supports robust deliberative decision making by enabling individuals to allocate their time, energy, and knowledge to the issues most significant to them.

It is remarkable that the topic of authority, so central to political theory, figures only rarely into the literature of radical democratic theory.[1] The reason, I suspect, has to do with the prevailing consensus that authority involves neither coercion nor rational deliberation but, rather, a justifiable surrender of judgment by subjects to those who rule on their behalf.[2] Surely, if radically democratic forms of rule mean anything, it is that citizens retain their powers of judgment about public matters. This claim has become the central proposition of the most promising of the radically democratic theories, "discursive" or "deliberative" theories of democracy, wherein the point is to increase the quality of democratic judgments through widespread citizen participation in multiple public spheres, both within and between the institutions of state, economy, and civil society.[3] While proposals differ, they would for the most part radicalize rather than replace the current mixes of majoritarian processes, rights, and deliberative procedures that exist in contemporary liberal democracies. In part, the aim is to enable existing institutions to work better by increasing the extent to which they produce judgments by deliberative means, rather than as an outcome of competing interests and powers. And in part the aim is to increase the extent to which institutions work democratically, ultimately increasing the control individuals have over their collective futures. With regard to authority, all proposals would limit the unchallenged authority of institutions, offices, and experts. So there seems even less place for authority here, except, perhaps, as a necessary evil.

But deliberative democrats should think about authority for at least four reasons, each of which suggests that key theoretical gaps remain between the ideal of discursive judgment in politics and radically democratic institutions. The first reason is functional: Advanced industrial societies produce a vast increase in the number and complexity of decisions. Limitations of time, expertise, and attention (that is, political participation is only one of many goods, and a good life would not be consumed by politics; Dahl 1970, Shapiro 1994) converge to limit radically individual participation and, conversely, to induce pressures for other kinds of decision making (Sirianni 1981). This point is especially important for theories of deliberative democracy, since many discursive mechanisms multiply the number of decisions and in this way press the constraints of time, attention, and knowledge. Because utopia is not, to cite a Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) vision from the 1960s, a nonstop meeting, authority will fill the vacuum in any conceivable deliberative democracy.

Second, in any differentiated and advanced society, many deliberative contexts will, as a practical matter, be closed to broad participation owing to their specialized discourses. To participate in the discourse of genetic engineering (let alone the broader field of molecular biology), one must not only learn the discourse but also be continuously attentive to uses that evolve, often very rapidly. One might argue that specialized discourses simply reflect attempts to use power as knowledge, or to define status markers that distinguish insiders from outsiders. Surely these are factors, but specialized discourses are also functional; in biology, for example, new discoveries are a daily occurrence that must be named and conceptually mapped so they can be communicated with relative efficiency to others. Other fields—such as law, computer science, drug certification, air traffic control, and even education—are subject to a similar logic, even if their domains are different. While anyone can, perhaps, master a specialized discourse, no one can master all discourses. For any individual this leaves an enormous domain of trust in authorities.

Third, if most decisions must be made outside deliberative mechanisms, then authoritative decisions are relatively desirable. After all, authority implies that "authorities" are "authorized" to decide, and their terms of authorization may also serve as standards of

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[1] The few exceptions include Connolly 1987; Gould 1988, chapter 8; and Jones 1993.

[2] Two exceptions are Flathman 1980, chapter 5, and Rosenblum 1987.

[3] While proponents of this view differ in the extent to which they would expand democracy beyond the state (which I take to indicate a radically democratic agenda), there is widespread convergence on this point. A few examples include Barber 1984; Cohen and Arato 1992; Dahl 1989; Dryzek 1990; Fishkin 1991; Habermas 1984, 1987, 1994, forthcoming; Manin 1987; Offe and Preuss 1991; Spragens 1990; Sunstein 1991; Walzer 1992; Yankelovich 1991; and Young 1990.

accountability. This element of justification is lacking in other alternatives to deliberation, such as coercion, manipulation, acquiescence, unthinking obedience, or decisions left to markets.

Finally, radical democrats face a political imperative that sometimes goes under the name "crisis of authority." In politics (as opposed to academic political philosophy), the issue of authority has been formulated primarily by conservatives, neoconservatives, and fundamentalists as a loss of cosmologically guaranteed order. Democracy, according to this view, is in part to blame for this loss since it encourages challenge to established authorities. By ignoring the question of authority, radical democrats have allowed the ideological agenda to be set in ways that align authority with increasing authoritarian approaches to politics.

Can authority be democratic? I shall argue that it can be, although, of course, not every kind of authority is. I shall sketch several dimensions of democratic authority in the second and third sections. To distinguish the kind of authority a deliberative democracy would involve, we shall need to look at the widely held notion that authority involves a surrender of judgment, a topic I discuss in the fourth and fifth sections. In contrast, I shall develop the view that (democratic) authority involves a limited suspension of judgment enabled by a context of democratic challenge and public accountability. The sixth section relates deliberative decision making to democratic challenge to authoritative decision making within a simple temporal/spatial model based on the notion that scarce deliberative resources are well distributed when they are allocated to decisions, institutions, or rules which are relatively "political"—beset by conflict—as opposed to the vast majority of decisions, which are (politically speaking) relatively settled. These latter kinds of decisions should constitute spheres of authority.

My general argument is that authority has a necessary and symbiotic relationship to deliberative democracy in at least five ways. The first is well recognized within democratic theory generally, namely, democracy is necessary to chasten authority, to limit its claims and dangers. When institutions are designed democratically, the political context is infused with the possibility of challenge. Here, democracy has an adversarial relationship to authority that serves to distinguish among spheres of authority and to limit authority to appropriate spheres.

Second, if a setting is democratic, authorities cannot hide behind tradition or power. They must, in the final analysis, justify their decisions and convince that they are deserving of trust. The possibility that decisions will have to be justified in the face of challenge pervades authority, which alters the grounds to which it can recur. Yet, when authorities can justify their decisions, they generate a trust that does not have to depend on the habitual loyalty or fearful obedience of subjects. Rather, they generate trust and hence authority by convincing that they are acting on behalf of the collective and are doing so in ways deserving of continuing obedience and support. Authority as trust can and ought to stand in for the multitude of decisions that, at any given time, cannot be made by deliberative means. I shall suggest that such a conception of authority moves away from epistemological models that recur to foundational sources of authority and toward a discursive model. Within such a model, authority is a relationship that operates when the possibility of discursive challenge exists but is not taken up by agents. The point, it will turn out, is that democratic authority can exist when an institutionalized possibility of challenge allows individuals to suspend judgment. Under such circumstances, individuals can act on the decisions of authorities without questioning simply because they know they could question if they were to allocate their time and attention to doing so. Or, more likely, individuals may identify with groups—attentive publics—that do, in fact, question. But even if most decisions are not questioned, the possibility of challenge encourages authorities to act as if they might have to justify their authority. Here, democracy has a discursive relationship to authority.

Third, when standard liberal-democratic mechanisms such as voting, checks and balances, and rights of speech and association are working in democratic ways, they help to align the interests of authorities and subjects. More radically democratic designs might focus more systematically upon aligning interests within civil society and economics. When interests are aligned, people are also more likely to trust others to make decisions on their behalf (see Mansbridge 1980, 26–28). Indeed, democracy may be the only way to generate authority when cosmologies—of God, transcendental reason, or tradition—have lost their authoritative stature. In contrast, authority is weak when individuals lack confidence that the interests of authorities complement their own. For this reason, democratic distributions of protections and securities have a *structural* relationship to authority.

Fourth, in a posttraditional era, politics emerges when common ground is lacking, or at least this is how I shall conceive politics for purposes here. Democratic institutional responses do not guarantee that common ground can be created, but if it can be created, that is more likely to happen through deliberative mechanisms which inform, build new relations, and change interests and dispositions of participants (see Warren 1992, forthcoming). When deliberative procedures result in consensus, they transform contested terrain into social ground which individuals can take for granted and which they are likely to experience as relatively predictable and secure. When democracy works in this way, it produces, as it were, an authoritative background of commitments and beliefs that both sustain and contain democratic challenges. Among these background commitments are the rules, dispositions, and beliefs that enable democratic interactions in much the same way a grammar enables speakers (De Tocqueville 1969, 72). Here, democracy and authority have a generatively reciprocal relationship.

Fifth, when most decisions can be made authoritatively most of the time, individuals can focus their time, energy, knowledge, and attention (to which I shall refer as their scarce deliberative resources) on those issues and contests that matter for them. For individuals, authority allows deliberative democracy to be less burdensome and more focused. They are likely to have greater chances to influence outcomes on any given issue than they could were their deliberative resources divided among all issues. Because authority can make democracy less costly in terms of time and energy, we might say that authority has a supportive relationship to democracy.

THE NEOCONSERVATIVE CHALLENGE

To elucidate and support my claims, I shall begin not by surveying the analytic literature within liberalism (I will come to that) but by looking at the challenge posed by the neoconservative view that democracy undermines authority. Although lacking in analytic sophistication, neoconservative approaches appeal to widespread fears that an increasing democratization of society erodes authoritative order, leaving anarchy in its wake. Neoconservatives understand that authority is not psychologically unattractive (as liberals too often assume). Authority often comes with place, meaning, and security, the desires for which are enhanced in increasingly fluid, decentered, and pluralistic societies. The neoconservative diagnosis has an ideological resonance lacking in other approaches. It transforms people's (often justifiable) fears of dislocation into an assault on democracy and its conditions, by presenting what are, I shall suggest, false alternatives between democracy and social order, alternatives which often translate into authoritarian demands for disciplinary order and social control. Thus, Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki write in *The Crisis of Democracy* (1975, 162–63) that

> a pervasive spirit of democracy may pose an intrinsic threat and undermine all forms of association, weakening the social bonds which hold together family, enterprise, and community. Every social organization requires, in some measure, inequalities in authority and distinctions in function. To the extent that the spread of the democratic temper corrodes all of these, exercising a leveling and an homogenizing influence, it destroys the bases of trust and cooperation among citizens and creates obstacles to collaboration for any common purpose.

And as Samuel Huntington puts it in *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (1981, 219), the "surge of participatory democracy and egalitarianism" in the 1960s and 1970s "gravely weakened, where it did not demolish, the likelihood that anyone in any institution could give an order to someone else and have it promptly obeyed."

In the neoconservative view, the general crisis of authority is reflected in the current crisis of governability in western democracies. As social institutions are questioned, they are less able to organize and constrain individual interests and demands, which in turn become politicized, spilling into the arena of the state. At the same time, the state is less able to respond, precisely because the general crisis of authority erodes its ability to organize and act (Offe 1985, 818–19). Radical forms of democracy, especially those that reach into the institutions of society and economy, undermine the ability of authorities to contain decision making to discreet spheres. Democratization produces a surge of demands which cannot, by their very nature, be solved by political means. To democratize the family, the firm, the church, or the university is to destroy family values, organizational efficiency, authoritative spiritual guidance, and authority of knowledge.

In particular, what seems so problematic about democracy for the neoconservative is its discursive aspect: Authority is irreducibly damaged by *questioning*. According to Claus Offe (1985, 819), "it is this *evaporation of uncontested and noncontingent premises (both structural and evaluative) of politics* that the neoconservative project is trying to [reverse] in a sometimes desperate search for nonpolitical foundations of order and stability. What is therefore needed, according to the neoconservative project, is the restoration of uncontestable standards of an economic, moral, or cognitive nature."

The neoconservative thesis is a direct challenge to arguments for extending democracy in ways that would enable deliberative means of social and political organization. The thesis rests not only on an appeal to the functional necessity of authority but also on the view that discursive argument is not, and cannot be, a means of social organization; that wherever unquestioned bases of authority are eroded, no authority (and therefore no society or government) is possible. If we assume, as we must, that authority is a necessity in today's societies, the burden of argument for deliberative democrats includes at least the following: (1) specify the senses in which authority is necessary in a deliberative democracy, and (2) specify the relationship between democratic decision making (both deliberative and majoritarian) and authoritative decision making. In doing so, it will be important to show that (a) grounds for authority need not be uncontestable to serve authoritative functions and (b) because democratic authority is generated by settling political issues into patterns of warranted trust, it can provide at least as much social and psychological security for citizens and authorities alike as can the uncontestable authority it would replace, if not more.

WHAT KINDS OF AUTHORITY ARE NECESSARY IN A DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?

I shall sketch five dimensions of authority necessary to a deliberative democracy, suspending for the moment the question of whether they add up to a concept of democratic authority equal to the burden of argument. I refer to these dimensions as the authority of function, of distinctive goods, of talk, of voice, and of shared futures.

The Authority of Function

There is a certain obviousness to the notion that authority is necessary in a functional sense; we cannot participate in all the decisions made by institutions on our behalf. We simply must count on most decisions being well made. This means that trust—particularly in abstract systems and routines—is pervasive and essential in modern societies, pervasive owing to complexity and essential in the sense that many goods we now take for granted could not otherwise be provided (Giddens 1990, Luhmann 1979). For these reasons, authority to make decisions about collective matters is intimately connected to the functional necessity of trust and the benefits that flow from it (Hardin 1992; see Putnam 1993, chapter 6).

For the most part, we do not experience such trust as problematic unless something goes wrong. We trust airline controllers, food inspectors, and the judicial system, and we do not feel any particular compulsion to substitute our judgment for theirs simply because those who guide planes, inspect food, or handle criminals and conflicts do so according to appropriate standards of expertise and appropriate procedures. In principle, their discretion is limited and justifiable. But we do notice our lack of control (a key dimension of trust) when things go wrong: when planes have accidents, when contaminated food reaches consumers, or when the judicial system releases criminals and incarcerates innocents. The fact that these things happen, that we feel our trust in these systems is misplaced, indicates that trust is the norm, that we *expect* to be able to trust authorities to do their work appropriately and well. So the lure of democratic participation operates at the margins. This is because the scarcity of time, attentiveness, and knowledge relative to the countless decisions affecting our life leaves most decisions to domains of trust, which must be the rule rather than the exception for any individual in advanced industrial societies.

From the individual's perspective, then, democratic participation will be especially important at margins of trust. Few object to this; we want safe airplanes and food, not the chance to participate in meat inspection and airline safety. We wish, perhaps, to participate to the extent that we are assured the rules and routines regulating such matters will put to best use the expertise of those responsible. But most of us are quite willing to trust authorities for the daily decisions that make these sorts of things work. Limited time, large scale, complexity, and interdependency mean that—as generic social relationships—decisions taken on authority flowing from trust are more important now than ever before (Raz 1990a, 9–11).

Although these points are obvious enough, they help put the question of authority into perspective. In particular, they suggest there is something odd about the way neoconservatives couch the issue, namely, as a necessary trade-off between democratic participation and authority. If we accept this opposition, we can only conceive democracy negatively, as a misplaced assault on a functional necessity. In contrast, I am suggesting that democratic procedures, especially those that enable and protect critically attentive publics, serve to constitute and reproduce the boundaries of authority, and in so doing they help generate the terms of trust and authorization. After all, as the above examples suggest, democracy seems important when authorities abuse their trust. Very often, our trust is conditional upon procedures that tend to prevent this from happening (Hardin 1991). While we may not wish to participate most of the time, we want procedures that allow us to do so when authority becomes questionable, and this occurs when authorities make decisions no longer functionally specific to the goods they serve. When questions of profitability compromise the safety of food or airline travel, when priests use their powers over salvation to gain sexual access to bodies, when office managers use their powers of organization to gain personal favors or excessive rewards, when elected officials sell their influence for money, at points such as these "democracy" is important and often demanded. This pattern of questioning emerged most obviously in the 1960s and 1970s, the decades seen by neoconservatives as representing the most devastating assault on authority as such.

The Authority of Distinctive Goods

Functional distinctions have authority when they serve distinctive goods. This is a modern or even postmodern point (although perhaps anticipated by Aristotle), that is, modernity is characterized by increasing distinctions between domains of activity and organization in terms of the goods they serve. Challenges and deliberations that develop at the boundaries of functionally distinct domains recur to the goods justifying the distinctions, a central point of Michael Walzer's *Spheres of Justice* (1983). So there must be, to some extent, a shared "authoritative" sense that there ought to be distinctions. We can see the force of such authority when, for example, we grant it to physicians in matters of medicine as long as this authority seems to serve the good of healing; but it is questioned once it is used primarily for profit making (as when doctors use their authority to order tests from a lab which they partly own). Professors should grade students on intellectual merit rather than, say, their family's potential as university donors, and so on. In liberal-democratic societies we demand (however ineffectively) "accountability" of authorities, which usually means that, if we ask, we want them to justify their decisions in terms of the good of their function. Such distinctions are not limited to public or semipublic officials. We increasingly hold, for example, that marriage relationships should develop out of love and respect. We do not think that intimate partnership should be ruled by economic criteria, or that husbands should have the right of property over their wives.

Of course, each of these distinctions is contestable, but without the evolving authoritative status of distinctions there would be nothing to challenge or question. Moreover, distinctions between goods do gain authoritative status and become established consensus. This happens when goods become plural and lose their premodern, hierarchical relationship to an overriding Good. That marriage is about love and respect is, at least in Western cultures, a relatively recent distinction about which there is virtually unanimous consent, despite many implications that remain to be resolved and some ambiguities that will not be resolved. For neoconservatives, however, pluralism implies relativism, which in turn implies (wrongly) that there are no goods to which authority can recur.

What does follow is that under such circumstances individuals do not find their identities ready-made. Rather, they face social and psychological imperatives to mold their own, in part by ordering their lives in terms of a hierarchy of goods. As Charles Taylor (1989) has argued eloquently in *Sources of the Self* (although to different ends), ethical vision is so constitutive of persons that, without such bearings, no person would have a commitment to the future or to acting on its behalf. We might even say that a compulsion toward authoritative meaning exists within the personality as such. Certainly, without such a compulsion, democratic politics would be at a loss; deliberation and challenge require agency, which in turn requires that at least some core of meaning be taken for granted, removed—for the time being if not permanently—from the possibility of questioning, thus investing it (psychologically speaking) with an authoritative status. Exceptions are really quite exceptional and occur only in cases of extreme personal dysfunction or within the sheltered context of psychoanalytic therapy. So we might say that a deliberative democracy must be infused with goods which are authoritative for individuals and which, in effect, provide principled motivations for negotiating areas of conflict, boundaries among goods, and collective futures. The point of deliberative democracy is not to exclude principled stands but to ensure that whatever force they have is established discursively rather than coercively (Warren 1994).

The Authority of Talk

There are, of course, many dangers hidden here. One is that because of the deep ways in which goods constitute identities, many individuals may lack the psychological capacity to view certain goods as contestable. Questioning may seem an assault on the self, deliberation an insipid and weak response to intolerable situations.

Such dangers may be inevitable, but our institutional responses are not. A deliberative democracy must be infused with authoritative goods, differently assembled by different individuals, without being defined exclusively by any single hierarchy. Such a situation can exist, however, only when individuals are empowered to rank and integrate goods but lack any means other than talk (and, of course, shares of political power in the form of votes) to negotiate conflicts and contested interpretations. We already know how to empower individuals while also denying them power over others through distributions of rights and securities. What is less obvious is that such arrangements, if pursued consistently and thoroughly, endow talk with an authoritative status as a medium of resolving disputes and organizing collective actions.

The authority of talk is indirect; it is not necessary for individuals to have a confidence that deliberation can produce consensus. It is only necessary for individuals to believe that talk is better than the alternatives, such as fighting or coercive imposition, and then design institutions in such a way that recourse to these alternatives is difficult for the parties to deliberation. Most liberal-democratic constitutions presuppose this kind of authority, although it is not to be taken for granted, as evidenced by the many situations today in which people prefer principled fights to the inevitable compromises of talk.

The authority of talk may, of course, extend beyond this minimum. For example, Habermas suggests how, under ideally democratic conditions, discourse generates its own ethical commitments (Cohen and Arato 1992, chapter 8; Habermas 1990). When this happens, democracy takes on a generatively reciprocal relationship to authority. In contrast, neoconservatives fail to recognize the authority of talk primarily because they understand authority only as representations of objective cognitive, moral, or religious foundations (see Arendt 1961, chapter 3).

The Authority of Voice

Talk can be authoritative in a democratic way only when it is complemented by *voice*. That is, individuals must have authoritative standing as speakers in deliberative contexts. Authoritative standing in this sense means that individuals are "authorized" to speak on behalf of their own experiences and interests; that they are owed responses to the cognitive content of claims, challenges, and arguments of others. This implies a uniquely privileged relationship of individuals to their own experiences. The "authorization" of voice implies that their "expertise" ought to be recognized has having "authority" (Jones 1993, Phelan 1989). The authority of voice does not mean that accounts of experiences and interests are accepted without question but, rather, presumes individuals are the best representatives of themselves—a presumption with roots deep in liberalism. So the authority of voice is necessary not just to actualize the authority of talk but to counter the dangers of shared meanings, with which it will often be in tension (Connolly 1987, 1991). Voice is necessary precisely because, more often than not, shared meanings will fail to articulate many kinds of experiences and in so doing will leave injustices in silence (Lyotard 1988).

The authority of voice has implications for both institutions and political culture. The institutional implications follow from what might be called the "epistemology" of voice: All other things being equal, people who possess some characteristic that subjects them to marginalization (women, African-Americans, gays and lesbians) are likely to have distinctive experiences that cannot be replicated by representatives, at least not those representing geographical districts rather than identities and social locations. No doubt this is why new social movements often devise ways of circumventing representation based upon territory and why a deliberative democracy would have to devise nonterritorial means of representation (Young 1990).

The cultural implications are perhaps even more pronounced, since the authority of voice implies that within deliberative contexts a person's claims and challenges are taken seriously as *claims*, that is, participants recognize one another as having political standing. More often than not, inclusion within formal political processes cannot be gained by deliberative means alone, although discursive strategies are always a part of any political struggle. For example, voting rights in the United States were secured by African-Americans only after a war followed by a century of struggle. Establishing an authority of voice sufficient for deliberative decision making, however, is less amenable to struggle by means of resistance and force (however necessary) than to cultural strategies that change people's dispositions. This is why the targets of new social movements often are not specific institutions, power relations, or patterns of power distribution but instead cultural identities that deny standing as (political) persons, as "authors."

It is easy to assert, of course, that a deliberative democracy requires the authority of voice to be distributed broadly and equally. But such authority is unlike opportunities for challenge and participation, which can be distributed by means of institutional supports and protections, because it depends upon changes in culture and psychology that are not easily or properly achieved by legal or administrative means. Nonetheless, broader distribution of voice is emerging in any case, driven by other kinds of forces. Differentiation of both institutional authorities and the goods/values to which they recur also induces a reflexivity with regard to authority. Since individuals in modern societies do not find their identities premade for them, they are not automatically assimilated to relations of hierarchy and deference. It is unlikely today that any single authority will have hegemony over an individual's identity. Even children are subject to the competing authorities of parents, schools, often religious institutions, and always television. They are not in a position simply to "accept" authority without question. Because authorities compete, children must actively integrate the goods and identities these authorities represent. And we hope that they will choose for good reasons, that is, will question authorities and allocate to them the spaces in their life that will produce self-confidence and growth. As part of this process, children are more likely than ever to encounter questions of identity that cannot be resolved without challenges that establish an authority of voice.

The Authority of Shared Futures

Deliberative democracy requires authority in another sense as well. As William Connolly (1987, 14–15) has argued, modern societies do not dispense with faith but instead direct it toward the future. Such faith becomes, of course, more political because it focuses collective actions. But faith in shared futures is fragile; it requires the sense that we are all in this together, that the life I have is, in some substantial way, the life shared by authorities. I do not think a deliberative democracy requires shared ways of living, but it does require some structural guarantees that those who make authoritative decisions will, like everyone else, be subject to the risks and burdens resulting from their decisions. We can see such democratic instincts at work when, to take a famous example, the engineer of a water treatment plant demonstrates its effectiveness by drinking a glass of the output. Or when the head of a tobacco company reveals that he smokes, thus subjecting his future to the same risks as other smokers. Of course, examples such as these also suggest that shared futures cannot be taken for granted. In fact, authorities often have resources that others do not to escape economic hardship, environmental hazards, disease, crime, and war. Differential risks and burdens are devastating to democratic authority, as the current cynicism about American democracy attests. Because neoconservatives see authority as a matter of disposition and not condition, they cannot take seriously the structural conditions that corrode authority.

The preceding sketch suggests that deliberative democracy requires authority but of a specific kind, an authority that simultaneously complements and reinforces deliberative decision making, enables a society to make good use of its resources and capacities, allows individuals to experience their environment as relatively secure and predictable, and underwrites opportunities and encouragements for political participation. This is a tall order, and I will not be able to fill it here. What I shall indicate in the next three sections is something less: that we do not now possess an adequate concept of authority and that the key to such a concept lies in the relationship between authority and democratically enabled challenge to it.

ARE DEMOCRATIC CONCEPTIONS OF AUTHORITY AVAILABLE?

Hannah Arendt (1961, 140) notes in her well-known account of authority that the "famous 'decline of the West' consists primarily in the decline of the Roman trinity of religion, tradition, and authority." These cannot be recovered, she notes, without the (impossible) recovery of the world in which they were anchored. It is not surprising, then, that "authority as we once knew it, which grew out of the Roman experience of foundation and was understood in the light of Greek political philosophy, has nowhere been re-established, either through revolutions or through the even less promising means of restoration, and least of all through the conservative moods and trends which occasionally sweep public opinion" (1961, 141).

Given Arendt's enthusiasm for democratic deliberation in public space, we might expect her to point the way toward a new concept of authority. She does not. Arendt identities authority quite specifically with the Roman concept, the concept that recurs—as does the neoconservative conception—to certain and nonpolitical foundations. For this reason, she views authority as destructive of politics and especially of the egalitarian, face-to-face democratic participation she favors. "For to live in a political realm with neither authority nor the concomitant awareness that the source of authority transcends power and those who are in power, means to be confronted anew, without the religious trust in a sacred beginning and without the protection of traditional and therefore self-evident standards of behavior, by the elementary problems of human living-together" (1961, 141). So, for Arendt, authority and politics, that is, attending to "elementary problems of human living-together," are conceptual opposites. For this reason, authority and democracy are irreconcilable.

We find even less help in other radically democratic quarters. Robert Paul Wolff's much discussed argument in *In Defense of Anarchism* (1970) polarizes autonomy and authority, so that to the extent one values the autonomous judgment of individuals, authority is an illegitimate way of organizing society. Authority cannot be democratic precisely because it requires a surrender of autonomous judgment.

Might we look to Rousseau? After all, he crafts a conception of democracy that bridges authority and autonomy. For him, one's autonomy (or freedom) is actualized by participating in collective legislation; in obeying laws one has had a hand in creating, one is obeying self-given laws, which is what defines autonomy. To Rousseau, then, the authority of laws and the officials who administer them expresses the autonomy of those who participate in making the laws.

This is, indeed, a democratic conception of authority, but not one that gets us very far. This is owing not just to its ideal quality but to the nature of the ideal. Rousseau's constructions suggest a self that is completed in the act of legislating in accordance with a General Will. In democratic participation, all selves are completed in the same way, since the General Will is unitary and indivisible. So democracy bridges autonomy and authority when there is a principled unity of wills. But this, of course, is democracy without politics, which after all is necessary only because of—as Arendt puts it—the plurality of the human condition (see Connolly 1988, chapter 3, Kateb 1992, 52–56).

LIBERAL APPROACHES TO AUTHORITY

Liberals seek to conceive authority in ways that preserve the agency of individuals by limiting the scope of authority while also asking how its goals are determined by the people. These are democratic problems, and so we might look here for a democratic conception of authority. It is promising that liberal conceptions were born in reaction to the absolutist claims of monarchs and religion. They conceive the question against the background of the social contract: Authority is justified when it stems from individuals' consent to be governed in ways that align with their interests. Authority is a creation of the people, and authorities are to serve the people. This is why, as Connolly (1987, 13) puts it, "the relationship among agency, consent, and authority must always be close in modernity; for without the element of consent the moral presupposition of agents to accept authority can find no footing." This is also why liberals expect different things from authority than do neoconservatives; although authority may be necessary for security and order, cosmological guarantees of order ought not to be political matters. The force of authority should be located elsewhere—ideally, in the goals and interests of free and rational individuals. Thus, notes Nancy Rosenblum (1987, 104), within liberalism "political authority, which constrains action but is neutral with respect to loyalty or belief, is differentiated from authority that molds beliefs and inhibits judgments." This is why the question of the extent to which a "surrender of judgment" is essential to authority is central to liberalism. "The special problem with authority," writes Joseph Raz (1990a, 5), "is not that it requires one to regard the will of another as one's reason for action, but that it requires one to let authoritative directions preempt one's own judgment." Democratic theory shares this problem with liberalism.

By far the most common response within liberalism is to view political and expert authority as distinct, that is, to be *in* authority is not the same as being *an* authority (Friedman 1990, 77–85). Thus, political authorities may regulate behavior and actions, but they have no claim over judgments per se. This distinction is closely related to the idea that legally structured political processes ought to be neutral with respect to competing interests and beliefs. Political officeholders derive their authority from the collective good of procedures that are neutral with respect to the conflicts they mediate and the interests they aggregate (e.g., Dworkin 1990, Flathman 1980, Nagel 1990). On this model, we retain our judgment over private matters while surrendering judgment over matters of collective concern. For these, we authorize others to exercise judgment in our name and on our behalf if they hold duly constituted offices and follow prescribed procedures. An official's decisions are authoritative if s/he acts within the boundaries of the office, as established by the law. In its liberal-democratic form, the procedures themselves should have a democratic element: Offices are established by generally agreed rules, such as a constitution, while officials are chosen by election or under the direction of elected officials.[4] Whatever authority officials have flows from the legitimacy associated with such agreed procedures.

There is much to be said for this approach, not least that it seems protective of individual judgment as well as sensitive to the dangers and excesses of authority. Moreover, in important ways it is sensitive to politics; recognizing that political terrain is marked by disagreement, it seeks to avoid basing authority on agreed cognitive or moral foundations. In this way, it seeks both to recognize and manage the conflicts that define the spaces of politics.

Yet, as hardly needs to be pointed out, the view that authoritative procedures can be neutral has fared badly at the hands of critics. From the perspective of democratic theory, critics have underscored three difficulties with the liberal-neutralist approach. First, it obscures the fact that different kinds of procedures support different ways of life. It thus seems to remove basic kinds of commitments from democratic deliberation while begging the question of where commitments to neutralist procedures might originate. Second, and closely related, the approach is often insensitive to the fact that certain kinds of procedures can, when applied universally, produce unjust outcomes in specific contexts, such as the right of contract when applied within a context of unequal distribution of productive resources. Third, neutralist procedures are presumed to be inhabited by rational, autonomous subjects, thus begging the question of how political capacities and identities develop. That is, for the liberal-neutralist the question of voice cannot occur. At least three dimensions of authority necessary to deliberative democracy thus have no place: distinctive goods, voice, and shared futures.

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[4] As Max Weber's account of rational forms of authority makes clear, no necessary relationship exists between legitimacy of rationalized procedures and the bureaucratic decision routines they represent on the one hand, and liberal-democratic mechanisms, on the other, which represent only one form in which procedures might have an authority that is not reducible to the authority of persons and the substance of their judgments.

But owing to criticisms such as these, fewer contemporary liberals hold to rigid distinctions between procedure and substance, between *in* authority and *an* authority, and between surrender of judgment and surrender of action. I shall consider briefly two arguments, those of Joseph Raz and Richard Flathman, to see whether more contemporary liberal approaches encompass a conception of authority sufficient for deliberative democracy.

Raz on Independent Reasons

Joseph Raz has developed a liberal conception of authority that seeks to avoid these distinctions and thus some of the difficulties associated with them. In particular, authority is justified by the needs, goods, and interests it seeks to fulfill. In this respect, procedural authority resembles expert authority, or, as he puts it, "political authority resembles theoretical authority" (Raz 1990a, 5). Clearly, once we admit that the point of political authority—including political processes—is to enable a society (or the individuals composing it) to achieve the goods it values, then the distinctions between procedures and goods break down, and we must talk about how these goods figure into procedural authority. What justifies authority is that many goods only can be addressed through social coordination, such as defense, public works, and distributive justice. So political authorities (and their policy experts) serve social coordination, allowing a society to attain goods it otherwise would have to forgo. Thus, as in the liberal contract tradition, authority is justified when it is *in service* to the people, by attaining goods that would not otherwise be possible (Raz 1990a, 5–8).

Raz also notes that inevitably we surrender judgment to political authorities, who make decisions on matters about which we know little, and we trust them to do so. Indeed, authority is pointless unless it preempts at least some of an individual's reasons for acting.[5] But the preempted reasons, in Raz's view, cannot be mysterious or arbitrary; they must be independent of authority, at least in principle, so that any rational observer might understand the reasons authority is exercised and the goods it serves. These are the kinds of reasons subjects should follow even if they were not commanded to do so by political authorities (such as paying one's fair share of the taxes necessary for common provisions). Authority is justified when authorities require individuals to follow independent reasons that result in better outcomes, on average, than would result if individuals were to follow their own reasons. It may often be transparently rational to surrender judgment to authorities, especially if the outcome is clearly better; Raz uses the example of surrendering judgment to a stockbroker to choose stocks, a case in which one can quantify differential outcomes (1990b, 139). But even when one trusts authority in an uncritical way, the trust can still depend upon reason: "Trust in an authority is trust that the authority is likely to discharge its duties properly. It therefore presupposes a principle which should govern its activities" (1990b, 139). Raz refers to this stipulation as the *dependence thesis*, that is, political authority depends on independent reasons.[6] With this formulation, he aims to rule out authority that is based on faith, charisma, or thoughtless obedience while justifying authority that is rational and in service to the people.

Does Raz's approach draw us any closer to a democratic conception of authority? It does in one respect, for he reattaches political authority to goods, thus avoiding many of the difficulties of the neutralist approach. In principle, liberal procedures can be challenged on the basis of their substantive effects, thus opening the entire spectrum of political issues to deliberation. We might say that, of the kinds of authority necessary for a deliberative democracy, Raz is attuned to the authorities of function, distinctive goods, and shared futures.

There may be more. In a recent essay, Raz concludes a survey of questions about authority with a suggestive but unelaborated comment to the effect that political authority cannot be justified without participatory mechanisms which enable individuals to understand its rationale and to see its rationale as their own. The aim of political philosophy, he writes,

> is to develop a doctrine of political authority which makes its legitimacy conditional on the existence of a population which regards the government as its representative, and in which people identify with the common interest, so that they regard its pursuit as their business and the law as their law. Here too, consent by itself, actual consent to a social contract, cannot solve the problem. But a theory of participatory government in a society in which conditions exist that enable each to see his own well-being as tied up with the prosperity of others can do so. The development of such a theory has been the aim of political philosophy since Rousseau. Its achievement is eagerly awaited (Raz 1990a, 17).

Raz seems to be suggesting that participation might serve an essential epistemological function in constituting authority. Participation would, presumably, help formulate reasons for political authority as well as educate people about these reasons. So Raz gestures toward what I am calling the authority of talk, although questions of voice do not appear on the horizon.

But these thoughts seem to be a departure from his previous thinking, for in a 1987 essay, "Government by Consent," democracy is hardly a consideration. Raz argues that since authority recurs to right reason (justifications that are "independent" of authority), there is very little that consent (let alone participation) can contribute to justifying political authority. The reason is that authority works by displacing the judgments of subjects, while recurring to right reason (1987, 79). Right reason is right reason, and it is available to authorities whether subjects consent to it or not, and (because it is right) subjects should be bound by it whether they consent or not. What consent adds, Raz argues, is an "expressive value" that "deepens and cements" a relationship of trust in authority. Such trust is intrinsically valuable because the reasons that justify trust are intrinsically valuable. "Hence consent has an independent, but auxiliary and derivative, place as a source of legitimacy" (1987, 90–92).

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[5] According to Raz (1990b, 124): "*The fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for its performance which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them.*"

[6] Raz States (1990b, 125): "*All authoritative directives should be based, in the main, on reasons which already independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to their action in the circumstances covered by the directive.*"

Democracy has little place in Raz's argument for two reasons. First, Raz misses the key epistemological problem in democratic theory. He seems to take the "independence" of right reason literally, as if political reasons could be known independently of political interactions. Raz conceives reasons for political authority as if they were accessible independently of political deliberation and expression. An important reason for democracy, however, is precisely to make reasons available to authorities, who are unlikely to know what a good reason is without, at minimum, airing it in public and inviting reaction. In politics, a reason gains its authoritative stature by means of public dialogue enabled by democratic protections and supports, a point made by John Stuart Mill and John Dewey and one which remains persuasive today (Warren 1994, 156–65). How are authorities to know how reasons embody common goods without an intimate and institutionalized attachment to "voice"? How, without democracy, can authorities judge what is for the good of the community? How, without democracy, can subjects understand the criteria authorities use in making decisions? Upon what is their trust to be based? How would subjects ever know if trust is deserved? Against his intentions, Raz in effect resurrects a premodern conception of authority, wherein subjects are tied to authorities through affective attachment and loyalty. Authorities justify their authority by referring to independent reasons, but there are no political mechanisms that would facilitate an understanding of these reasons by subjects.[7]

Second, these deficits are not obvious to Raz because he assumes an idealized rational and autonomous subject, one whose capacities for calculation and access to the criteria of right reason are pregiven in such a way that the specter of premodern authority is, apparently, held at bay (cf. Lukes 1987, 72–73). A philosophical presupposition that stands in for what are, in fact, contingent capacities and dispositions will often obscure more than it illuminates. The victory over premodern authority rests on a counterfactual premise—not enough to inform a political argument but just enough to obscure the difference.

Flathman on Surrender of Judgment

Richard Flathman's account of authority is more promising. Like Raz, Flathman takes as his point of departure the liberal distinction between the political authority of neutral procedures and the substantive authority of expertise. Unlike Raz, Flathman is concerned with the inability of the liberal distinction to account for the hermeneutical qualities of political judgments. As Flathman points out, advocates of formal-procedural models (as he calls the liberal approach) understand authority to inhere in the procedural rules (or laws) themselves. He makes the Wittgensteinian point that "authority" cannot be located within rules in this way, any more than the meaning of a sentence can be determined by the definition of terms and rules of grammar (1980, chapter 3). As in the case of sentences, the meaning of a law or procedure is in its use. Thus, the authority of offices depends on a relationship of the office to those who authorize as well as on the context of authorization. In particular, the authority of procedures implies that individuals who surrender judgment know enough about the meaning of the procedures to know what it means to "authorize" them, so that surrender is implicitly qualified by a broader context of commitments presumably served by authorities.

Procedural authority cannot be neutral: It depends upon beliefs within a political culture that support and define specific procedures and upon which a commitment to *these* procedures, and not others, ultimately rests (see Lukes 1987). The offices and procedures established by the U.S. constitution are supported by substantive commitments within the political culture—a certain suspicion of government, a certain kind of individualism, a certain image of the good life, a certain view of how the "the blessings of liberty" ought to be secured, and so on. Procedural models, Flathman argues, ignore this substantive context and so cannot make sense of the authoritative force of political procedures (1980, 88).

Flathman's point cuts to the core of the democratic deficit in procedural models of authority. Insofar as these portray authority as residing "in" rules, then an authority relationship can be said to involve a *surrender of judgment* to those in authority. And so the model reproduces the conflict between democratic judgment and political authority that is at the heart of the democratic objection. To be sure, the procedural model accommodates democracy to authority, but only in the manner of a truce, thus limiting the instances of democratic judgment and challenge. Clearly, this kind of accommodation is inadequate to deliberative models of democracy, demanding, as they do, a broad participation in processes of political judgment.

The significance of Flathman's critique is that it begins to suggest how authority might be conceived in democratic terms. We need to recall that the good of an authority relationship is that those subject to it see judgments made on their behalf as legitimate. The relationship is not one of coercion, domination, manipulation, or mere acquiescence. Authority is not these things because of the kind of relationship the agent has to rules and the offices they establish. In relations of authority, the meaning of authority (its ability to evoke willing obedience, its legitimacy, and so forth) depends on agents authorizing others and judging that the authorization is warranted. Thus, Flathman argues, the widely shared notion that authority involves a surrender of judgment misses what is going on in authority relations. Authority depends upon the judgments of subjects, specifically, the judgments embedded in deeply held beliefs and commitments. It is these judgments that distinguish authoritative relationships from coercion, domination, manipulation, or mere acquiescence.

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[7] See Jean-François Lyotard's analysis of the "paradox of authority" when conceived in terms of reasons independent of politics (1988, 142–44).

To make this point, Flathman suggests that political authority is established in ways substantially similar to the authority of expertise (1980, chapter 5). To be recognized as an authority, an individual must demonstrate his or her expertise or knowledge and subject it to the scrutiny of an audience. The authority of an expert is the result of the audience's judgments about the merits of his or her knowledge. If individuals defer to the judgment of the authority, they do so because they accept that the authority has been earned and demonstrated. This does not relieve the authority of continuing justification. Indeed, the more "authority" gained, the more the authority may find his or her judgments the subject of critical scrutiny by competitors, even as broader audiences see the judgments as more authoritative. Thus, when authority means recognized expertise, we do not find that those who recognize the authority have surrendered their judgment; to the contrary, they have judged that the authority has a better grasp of the topic or good than others and, all other things being equal, deserves a trust and deference in his or her areas of expertise. Clearly, what establishes authority in this sense is an open context of engaged criticism. This is why Flathman's approach points toward deliberative democracy, although he does not make the connection for reasons I shall discuss shortly.

Advocates of formal-procedural models of authority, Flathman points out, will accept these points with regard to experts but see them as irrelevant to the authority of officials, whose authority depends (they argue) on holding a duly-established office. The irrelevance follows from a categorical distinction between the relationships held by the two kinds of authorities with their audience. The judgments of officials (those who are in authority) are not statements for which they seek belief (as do experts) but are orders they expect to be obeyed. One who accepts the authority of an official does not make obedience conditional upon a personal examination of an order but simply obeys it without regard to its merit. In this view, this kind of authority—the kind most directly relevant to political life—should be described as a "surrender of judgment" (1980, 102–103).

Flathman notes, correctly, that a strict separation between belief and (authoritative) obedience is not sociologically possible. The one subject to authority must decide to obey an authority if the relationship is to be one of authority (which requires obedience in the sense of discharging an obligation) rather than imposition or compulsion. Authority "needs the support of some array of beliefs and values that has acceptance in the society or association of which it is part" (1980, 106). Moreover, rules and procedures always have normative purposes, and the authority they carry depends on these. They are never neutral, and our decisions to abide by them cannot be neutral. We hold rules as authoritative (or lacking in authority) because of the normatively significant work they do. If the rules and procedures produce normatively questionable outcomes, then they tend to lose their authority, and they become subject to public debate and political challenge. Likewise, we rarely divorce the substantive expertise of persons from the office they hold. Over the long term, unqualified officials undermine the authority of their office. We may obey such officials but only because they can impose their will, not because we endow them with authority.

We can see, then, that authority requires subjects to constitute procedures as authoritative. If so, we can also see why relations of political authority are not themselves normatively neutral; they imply a mode of rule that requires subjects of a certain kind, namely, autonomous agents capable of political judgment. Flathman puts the point as follows: "A practice of political authority can be justified only if it is understood, organized and conducted so as to maximize its compatibility with and contribution to the agency of its members. In most general terms, this must be done because the freedom, rationality and moral integrity of individuals is and ought to be a primary human value. More particularly, it must be done because the maximum possible scope for individual agency is and ought to be a feature of a specifically political existence" (1980, 186).

RETHINKING THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF AUTHORITY

If authority were to be organized in an ideal way, it seems, it would require widespread opportunities to participate in decision making. Of course, because the question of authority arises owing to limits of time, scale, and complexity, we must now provide a somewhat different account of participation; we might say that authority stands in for participation in deliberative decision making, for most decisions, most of the time. But its manner of standing in should be determined by (1) institutionalized opportunities for discursive challenge and (2) a critical political culture, institutionalized as public spheres. Authority constituted in this way should be the kind of rule most compatible with deliberative democracy and would encompass its necessary forms of authority.

But Flathman does not tie authority specifically to deliberative designs. It seems to me that he might have done so, had he examined more closely the intrinsic requirements of political judgment. Flathman shows that procedural authority depends on a background context of beliefs and values, and he prefers those beliefs and values that contribute to individual agency. It remains unclear, however, as to how such a preference might be institutionalized. There is no inherent requirement for democracy or discursive challenge in Flathman's account: Authorities simply need to be attuned to the culture of beliefs and values within which their orders will come to have meaning. In a political context in which there are few opportunities for challenge and in which individuals are isolated from one another, officials may maintain their authority by evoking very general normative identities (freedom, patriotism, security, the National Way of Life, and so on) or identities that depend upon evoking and exploiting insecurities and resentments through appeals to race, nationalism, or religion. These are, of course, the tactics of dictators.

Placing the weight of authority on the beliefs of individuals may be sufficient to show that authority depends on certain kinds of judgments by individuals. But it is not sufficient to Flathman's own criteria, for the background of judgment necessary to constitute individuals as free, rational, and moral agents requires that these judgments be of a certain kind. The problem Flathman sets for himself is to show that authority does not require individuals to surrender their judgments; indeed, authority actually requires their judgment in some sense. The question is as to this sense: What is it to judge? If we only mean that authorities must evoke agreement, this is a very low threshold, since individuals can agree almost automatically, without examining their preferences, simply by falling back on received commitments, values, and prejudices. We should not count such reactions as judgments, because they are not considered, not autonomous. Nor would we expect an unreflective consensus to be open to questions of authoritative political standing, the authority of voice, which requires that prejudices be disturbed by challenge. Political agency in the strong sense Flathman suggests can develop only in contexts that enable reflective judgments (Warren 1995).

Setting the threshold higher, we could think of judgment on the Kantian model, as involving rational reflection by individuals about their normative decisions. Individuals could presumably endow rules, procedures, legislation, and officials with authority to the extent that they measure up to the individual's considered judgments. Still, the Kantian model, which conceives of persons judging in isolation, misses the world of political judgments, even if it could provide determinate judgments (which it cannot; see Arendt 1982).

More illuminating, I think, is the model of expert authority, even though this model seems to set the threshold for judgment too high. If we focus, however, on the context that enables expert authority, we can also learn something about how political authority is enabled by individual judgments. As I suggested above, the force of expert authority in contemporary societies is established by a critical context of experts and attentive nonexperts. Expert authority is generated by the fact that attentive individuals do not surrender their judgment. Specifically, (1) critical scrutiny is essential to establishing expert authority; (2) when authorities respond to critical questioning, their authority is increased when they respond adequately; and (3) ongoing critical challenge is essential to maintaining an authority as an authority. The judgments of those inclined to accept the judgments of an authority are essential to constituting the relationship as one of authority. Thus, it cannot be said that expert authority requires a surrender of judgment. Authority requires precisely the opposite; only because authorities are scrutinized critically do they come to possess authority.

Of course, in most cases individuals will lack the time, skills, attentiveness, and even interest to challenge authorities. Therefore, critical scrutiny will often come from other experts (assuming institutions are structured so as to protect and encourage scrutiny) as well as concerned, attentive nonexperts. For most people, the importance of this limited critical context is that, knowing it exists, they can trust experts and even prefer the judgment of experts to their own. Trust in authority is generated by a background context of critical scrutiny, and deference depends on the knowledge that there is a circle of attentive individuals who are capable of challenge and who can make their judgments widely known.

The authority of officials is generated in much the same way and has much the same kind of relationship to a broader audience. One important function of public pressure groups in a democratic setting is that they constitute a critical and attentive public. For the most part, I trust USPIRG (United States Public Interest Research Group) and Greenpeace to scrutinize the authorities at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and environmental legislation pending in Congress since I do not have the time or expertise to do so myself. I follow their scrutiny at a distance, and my trust in EPA authorities and congressional committees increases when the pressure groups reflecting my broader convictions find relatively insignificant things to complain about. In this sense, we might say that authority involves not a surrender of judgment but a limited suspension of it in favor of a trust that is enabled (when warranted) by a context of public criticism. We already know how to structure institutions to protect public criticism by means of rights and securities, even if in most institutions we fail to do so. What we should notice, however, is that the authority of experts depends on similar kinds of institutional designs. Science (and the authority of science) depends on institutions that protect and facilitate argument and challenge. Whenever the "authority" of the scientist is protected by status hierarchies, differential access to resources, or imposed agendas, expert authority falls under a cloud of suspicion, just because the institutional conditions of challenge have been inappropriately constrained or damaged. Likewise, democratic authority requires a context of critical challenge that is all too easily damaged by hierarchies of status and inequalities of resource distribution.[8]

Authority can be constituted in the strong sense suggested by Flathman, that is, as a deference to institutions and individuals that presupposes the agency, freedom, rationality, and moral integrity of those who defer, only if the authority is constituted and renewed through discursive challenge. For this to happen, what we mean by "judgment" must be specified more closely than does Flathman. Minimally, the judgments must be explicit enough to be formulated within language and contain enough cognitive (as opposed to affective) content to allow for discursive challenge. In addition, the possibility for discursive challenge must be culturally permissible and institutionally available, conditions which imply deliberative democracy. Authority requires challenge, and well-constituted authority, "rational" authority requires a broad institutionalization of opportunities for challenge—multiple public spheres, not only within government but also in the institutions of the economy and society.

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[8] Dennis Thompson (1993, 376) makes a substantially similar point with his concept of "mediated corruption": The problem with the influence of money in Congress is not so much that members serve their own interests or those of their wealthy constituents; rather, it circumvents the influence of public deliberation and political competition, thus corrupting the democratic process. Thompson's argument draws implicitly on the more general conception of democratic authority I am proposing here.

Democratic authority, then, is generated neither by the authoritative status of expertise or beliefs as such nor by the authoritative status of rules and procedures; instead, it comes from a set of institutionalized protections and securities within which the generative force of discursive challenge is possible. More specifically, authority operates when the possibility of discursive justification exists and is occasionally exercised, but is not brought to bear on every authoritative decision, precisely because the critical background of attentive publics renews the authoritative status of the decision maker. Democratic authority can exist when an institutionalized possibility of challenge allows individuals to suspend judgment; when individuals act on the decisions of authorities without questioning simply because they know they could question and sometimes do; and when individuals can trust authorities because they know authorities will act with an eye to justifying their decisions even if they do not do so in most of the decisions they make.

FIGURE 1. Relationship between Democratic and Authoritative Decision Making



		Nature of the Issue	
		"Political"	"Settled"
Deliberative Resources of Citizens (time, expertise, attentiveness, security)	High (Decisions made by citizens)	1 Focused deliberation and voting (Norm of participation in contentious decisions of collective concern)	2 Extensive deliberation and voting (Norm of participation in all decisions of collective concern)
	Low (Decisions made by authorities)	3 Deferential authority (Norm of deference to authority and/or apathy)	4 Democratic authority (Norm of trust; authorities subject to challenge)

DELIBERATION AND CHALLENGE

Even in an ideal deliberative democracy, I have been arguing, most decisions affecting the life of individuals will be made authoritatively, without their participation. I have also suggested that this should concern us less if authority is constituted democratically, that is, if authority is generated by a context of deliberative challenge. Clearly, however, this remains something less than the normative core deliberative democracy requires, namely, decision making by means of deliberation and voting. So, one might ask, what remains of deliberative democracy? And what relation does deliberative decision making have to authoritative decision making, even if conceived within a context of challenge?

While I cannot do justice to the complexities of this issue here, I shall suggest a way of thinking about it by means of a simple spatial/temporal model that relates deliberative decision making to authority. I shall describe the model using economic terms which are, to be sure, clumsy and inappropriate for most kinds of political analyses. They have a particular bite here, however, since a central difficulty in conceiving deliberative democracy is the relative scarcity for any individual of "deliberative resources," by which I mean time, attentiveness to political matters (that is, political participation is only one of many goods), and expertise (cf. Dahl 1970, 40–56). By referring to deliberative resources as "scarce" I mean that for any individual these will be insufficient to permit deliberative participation in all the collective decisions that affect his or her life. Of course, such scarcity can be (and very often is) increased by the lack of political or economic security. Individuals may also lack psychological security owing to cultural marginalization or particular life experiences. For these reasons, I've added "security" to the list of scarce deliberative resources even though security in these senses is not necessarily scarce.

The *rows* in Figure 1 indicate that, for any given issue or sphere of decision making, an individual's deliberative resources may vary from "high" to "low." In an ideal deliberative democracy, every individual would be high in deliberative resources for some issues or spheres, but at any given time, owing to scarcity, they would be low in most others. Of course, the choices an individual makes about how to distribute these resources would be likely to vary over time as issues become more or less salient. In contrast, in most societies today, most individuals are low in deliberative resources on almost all issues and within almost all spheres. Assuming institutional supports, when deliberative resources are high, more decisions will be made by citizens through deliberative mechanisms and voting. When deliberative resources are low, more decisions will be made by authorities.

Because deliberative resources are scarce for any individual, an optimal distribution would be to allocate them to issues and spheres especially important for the individual, determined in part by distinctive interests and social locations. Importance also depends on whether an issue is relatively "political" or relatively "settled," indicated by the *columns* in Figure 1. By "political" I simply mean relatively contentious, when there exist sharp disagreements about matters of public concern. For any society, most decisions will be relatively noncontroversial, especially if they are made according to principles and routines that have been democratically decided and that—at least for the moment—operate in relatively "settled" ways and draw few challengers. For example, many routine government services are relatively settled. In making this distinction, I do not assume that politics is contained within the state; politics is possible wherever there is power. Nor do I assume that settled routines do not harbor injustices and latent conflicts. Indeed, if anything, every mode of settlement is likely to generate new injustices and conflicts.[9] But I am assuming that a democratic society would offer more opportunities for these to surface (that is, for "settled" issues to become "political") as well as more opportunities to settle issues in ways that are less likely to harbor injustices, and thus provide individuals with relatively more social and psychological security (Warren, n.d.). From the perspective of allocation of deliberative resources, the distinction indicates only that, for any individual at any given time, not every issue will be equally compelling. An optimal distribution of scarce deliberative resources, then, would be to those issues that are relatively "political" at a given time. This is where people ought to put their deliberative resources, and this is where they will have an interest in doing so.

This optimum is represented in Figure 1 by cells 1 and 4, that is, a deliberative democracy would be structured in such a way that individuals could allocate their deliberative resources to the issues and spheres they find relatively important, while leaving settled arenas of decision to authorities. An important element is to understand how settled issues might become unsettled and how political issues might be settled, so that the division does not represent ossified institutional structures (as, for example, does our current distinction between public and private) but, rather, movements of issues on and off collective agendas in ways that represent (rather than suppress or hyperpoliticize) emergent conflicts and relatively successful routinizations. This ideal is represented by the double-headed arrow between cells 1 and 4. Conceptually, the link between deliberation and challenge, detailed in preceding sections, suggests that authority is generated as issues are settled and disappears when it becomes abusive, insular, arrogant, or irrelevant. Appropriate institutional designs are, of course, less easy to conceive in general terms, but we have accumulated a valuable reservoir of experience with protected public spheres, guaranteed access, and structured discourse from which deliberative designs might profit (Sirianni forthcoming).

If movements between cells 1 and 4 represent an "optimal equilibrium," what of the other two cells? Cell 3, of course, is the worst case from a democratic perspective, a situation in which even politicized issues are resolved authoritatively. The neoconservative vision would land us here, where deference to authority would be complemented by political apathy. Cell 2 is more interesting, because it caricatures participatory democracy, a caricature often held up by opponents but too often embraced by advocates as well. We might refer to Cell 2 as an "SDS Utopia," a society in which all decisions are made through democratic participation. The broken arrow in Figure 1 suggests that such an arrangement is likely to be unstable for the reasons mentioned in the introduction to this article, and it is likely to degenerate into something like Cell 3. Individuals are likely to find decision making so burdensome and inefficient that most will withdraw into a cynical apathy. This will leave most decisions to an activist few who will, ironically, make decisions based on the authority they derive from a participatory process.

In sum, were democratic institutions to provide ideal allocations of deliberative resources, they would also embody the five kinds of relations between democracy and authority to which I referred in the introduction. By allocating deliberative resources to the spheres most salient, this model maximizes the *adversarial* relationship between democracy and authority, that is, the ways in which democracy contains, checks, and chastens authority. As a consequence, the *discursive* relationship between democracy and authority is enhanced, that is, the pressures increase for authorities to justify their decisions in terms of public reasons if called upon to do so. Because chastened and discursively attentive authorities are also more likely to decide with an eye to serving those who defer to their decisions, the interests between authorities and constituents are more likely to be aligned, thus providing a *structural* atmosphere conducive to trust. Likewise, to the extent that "democracy" means enhancing the legitimacy of political decisions, the authoritative background of commitments to rules and procedures becomes stronger, producing a *generatively reciprocal* relationship between democracy and authority. Finally, to the extent that authoritative decision making frees deliberative resources for those issues most relevant to individuals, authority will be *supportive* of deliberative participation.

CONCLUSION: PLURALIZING AND SPECIFYING AUTHORITY

What I am arguing will seem counterintuitive or even contradictory to those who see the increasing willingness of individuals to challenge the authority of institutions and officials as a general "crisis of authority." They no doubt will judge the model I am proposing not to be one of authority at all but another symptom of the crisis, namely, a reduction of authority to negotiation, which must inevitably transform social order into a chaotic pluralism of competing wills. But the perspective on authority I offer here allows a different assessment. The so-called crisis of authority today is replicating many times over the loss of (traditional) authority suffered by the Catholic Church when it excommunicated Galileo because it ultimately could not force empirical sciences to conform to theological dogma. The church found it could not continue its traditional conversion of authority over matters of salvation into authority over science and, indeed, over all other matters as well. What grew out of that crisis was not chaos (although there were, to be sure, turbulent periods) but new, more limited, and more differentiated kinds of authority, including the authority of science—which, of course, came to possess its own imperialistic ambitions.

Today, we are witnessing similar conversions of authority, only now in multiple spheres, which doubtless gives the impression of general crisis. Individuals are more willing than ever to ask what justifies particular social arrangements, configurations of power, or customs (Inglehart 1990, chapter 10). But to interpret these developments as a general crisis obscures the extent to which the challenges amount to demands that institutions justify their authority in terms of their central activities and goods.[10] Thus, the civil rights movement questioned the relevance of skin color as a criterion for the "authoritative allocation" of jobs, housing, and political status, given the norms of equal opportunity and citizenship. When students challenged the "relevance" of university education in the 1960s, they were challenging university authorities to provide the atmosphere of inquiry within which questions of right and wrong could be addressed in relation to the issues of the day (free speech, civil rights, and the Vietnam War), an atmosphere too often compromised by university entanglements in other spheres (such as defense contracting) as well as in broad patterns of racial marginalization. More recently, superiors in the workplace are challenged much more than they used to be when they attempt to convert organizational authority into a right of sexual intimacy.

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[9] There is a normative/ontological ambiguity here detailed with utmost sensitivity by William Connolly (1991): It is likely that every collective resolution will be less complete than the universe it seeks to comprehend, so that we must expect every mode of settlement to generate residues which will be incomprehensible within the terms of the settlement. These will serve, in Connolly's terms, as unsettling impulses which a democracy should strive to anticipate.

To be sure, authorities are increasingly challenged, but more often than not they are being asked to specify their authority in terms of the goods they ought to serve. This is a pluralization and specification of authority, not a general crisis. Established institutions are unsettled, but more open than not, just to the extent the domains of their authority are not justifiable. When differentiations and specifications are demarcated, justified, and defended successfully, institutions and their authorities are strengthened, not weakened. This mode of strengthening, however, requires the institutional protections and securities necessary to challenge, that is, deliberative public spheres complemented by deliberative decision making focused on political issues. Where and when such institutions can be secured, new forms of democratic authority are likely to emerge.

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[10] Compare Offe's argument (1985, 848–54) that the new social movements are neither irrational nor premodern but represent a "selective radicalization of values" by those who are closest to the "irrationalities of modern progress." More generally, this claim requires an account of modernization such as presented by Habermas (1984).

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A New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and the Politics of Human Rights

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While the writings of Hannah Arendt have received an extraordinary amount of scholarly attention, few commentators have seen her as a theorist concerned with questions of human rights. I argue that the problem of human rights was central to Arendt's political theory. While she does not elaborate a theory of human rights as such, and while she avoids the juridical approaches so common among human rights theorists and advocates, her conception of political action is intended to secure an elemental human dignity that is systematically jeopardized by the imperatives of national sovereignty.

> Human dignity needs a new guarantee which can be found only in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities (Arendt 1973, ix).

Hannah Arendt is perhaps the most widely studied political philosopher of the twentieth century. Yet, little attention is paid to her views on human rights. While this is strange, it is not inexplicable, for in her constructive works she studiously avoided the vocabulary of rights, preferring instead to speak of "freedom" or "praxis." In the terms made famous by Isaiah Berlin, Arendt was a theorist of "positive" rather than "negative" liberty, one for whom problems of political participation and civic agency occupied center stage, and for whom the juridical strategies for limiting state power typically favored by liberals were not central (Berlin 1969; Shapiro 1986). She also drew inspiration from classical models of the ancient *polis* that had scant concern for human rights, models that advanced a conception of republican citizenship and patriotism which left little room for any conception of the human as such. These models exercised a powerful hold on Arendt's political imagination, particularly in those philosophical works most commonly interpreted by academic political theorists, such as *The Human Condition, Between Past and Future*, and, to a lesser extent, *On Revolution*.

Yet, the problem of human rights—understanding their intellectual foundations, securing their respect—was central to everything Arendt wrote. It was the subtext of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* and the pretext of *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, probably the two books most widely known outside the circle of professional political philosophers. It motivated her critique of nuclear politics in her essays on the Cold War, her dissent from maximalist Zionism, and her opposition to the Vietnam War. In each of these instances she criticized forms of official propaganda and hubris that obscured palpable threats to the rights of civilians, refugees, national minorities, and disobedients, those groups most powerless before the imperatives of national sovereignty.[1] On a more practical level, a concern with human rights was the source of some of Arendt's most notable political involvements: as a worker for Youth Aliyah in the 1930s, in which capacity she personally transported Jewish refugee children to Palestine; as a supporter of Spanish refugee aid in the 1940s; and as an active member of PEN and Amnesty International (Young-Bruehl 1982).

While Arendt presented her political theory as an effort to restore an almost completely eclipsed public world, this effort was motivated in large part by the distinctively modern problems of displacement and degradation, what she called "worldlessness." In countering this worldlessness, she addressed a number of issues central to the problem of human rights: the incompatibility of national sovereignty with human dignity and civic responsibility; the need to rethink the ethical foundations of human rights at a time when liberal pieties about natural rights had lost all credibility; and the need for new forms of politics—international jurisprudence, regional and global forms of confederalism, unofficial forms of civic initiative—to afford political empowerment to ordinary citizens and ground a commitment to human dignity.

Arendt's lack of explicit attention to distinctively moral arguments of the kind to be found in more recent, standard classics of political philosophy, such as John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*, has led many to overlook her concern with human rights; and this gap in her writing might well constitute a limitation of her thinking. While she does write favorably of Kant, perhaps she should have done more to engage directly the concerns of moral philosophers in the Kantian tradition of analytic reasoning. But her refusal to do so had its reasons. She believed that human rights were not a problem of moral speculation or legal philosophy so much as a problem of *politics*, a matter of mobilizing new and effective forms of solidarity and concern. Her political theory hardly offers an exhaustive account of the moral and legal issues involved in human rights, but it contains an indispensable insight, one not found in those more prominent works of moral philosophy that focus more centrally on the elaboration of human rights. Namely, the problem of rightlessness that has plagued our world since 1914 can only be remedied by a reconstitution of political identities and the formation of new forms of community which

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[1] Many of these themes are taken up in Shklar 1993.

challenge the hegemony of the nation-state. In her distinctively *political* approach to the problem. Arendt makes a contribution, often overlooked, that remains unsurpassed.

TOTALITARIANISM AND MODERN WORLDLESSNESS

"Human dignity needs a new guarantee." It is no accident that Arendt should introduce her analysis of totalitarianism with this thought. For the *problem* of human rights—the extent to which human rights *is* a profound problem, requiring new understandings and new practices—is the central concern of *The Origins*. She offers a well-known morphology of the "elements" of totalitarianism, but this account is lodged in a much broader analysis of the circumstances that made totalitarian genocide possible. While Arendt emphatically rejects the idea that totalitarianism is the necessary outgrowth of modern humanism,[2] she views it as the terrifying apotheosis of certain tendencies of modern politics that render large numbers of people powerless and vulnerable to dangerous and often violent social and political forces.

This is the main theme of Part Two of *The Origins*, "Imperialism." Arendt's analysis of imperialism draws from Rosa Luxemburg, J.A. Hobson, and other turn-of-the-century theorists who argued that imperialism is a form of expansionist politics driven by domestic surpluses of capital. But Arendt extends this analysis in important ways. First, she focuses, in hindsight, less on the causes than on the consequences of imperialism, a series of geopolitical conflicts which set in motion the two world wars that produced totalitarianism in Germany and the Soviet Union (Arendt 1973, 267). Second, she treats imperialism as part of a dramatic transformation of European politics, creating kinds of human suffering experienced in only extreme form by the victims of totalitarianism. As she notes: "Perhaps it may even be that the true predicaments of our time will assume their authentic form—though not necessarily the cruelest—only when totalitarianism has become a thing of the past" (1973, 460).

The "true predicament" of our time ushered in by the age of imperialism is the "superfluity" of large numbers of ordinary people, "the masses." The masses, a recent historical formation, are superfluous in the sense that their active participation becomes increasingly dispensable in economic and political life. This dispensability is produced in part by the processes of capital accumulation, which result in continual expropriations, occupational and demographic shifts, and unemployment.[3] It is also created by the concentration of political power within bureaucratic structures and the ascendancy of "state employed administrators of violence," who become increasingly remote from ordinary citizens and from representative institutions, and who increasingly are indispensable to the operation of an imperial foreign policy (1973, 137). The result of such processes is the disempowerment and deracination of increasingly larger numbers of people. In such circumstances the ties of citizenship and class begin to lose their force, and nationalism becomes "a precious cement for binding together a centralized state and an atomized society" (1973, 231).

But this cement was to prove itself increasingly noxious, indeed fatal, to both peace and human security. While nationalism had been an important ingredient in the republican revolutions of the mid-nineteenth century, by the turn of this century it began to assume antirepublican, often protofascist, forms. The first taste of this was the Dreyfus affair, in which French nationalism was mobilized against the Jewish Alfred Dreyfus, cast as un-French, anti-French, Other. Against this anti-Semitic surge stood Clemenceau, one of the only "heroes" identified in *The Origins*, who articulated "the stern Jacobin concept of the nation based on human rights—that republican view of communal life which asserts that (in the words of Clemenceau) by infringing on the rights of one you infringe on the rights of all" (1973, 106). Clemenceau's appeal to universal principles wore thin at the end of the century; by the onset of the next its utter bankruptcy would clearly be demonstrated.

In countries such as France, an early nationalizer with a strong republican tradition, the ideology of nationalism was put toward increasingly antirepublican purposes, supporting centralized power, geopolitical intrigue, and a conception of "patriotism" with often authoritarian implications. In countries such as Germany, a later nationalizer with a weak republican tradition, this antirepublicanism was even more pronounced. And in Central Europe, yet more tribalistic, exclusivist forms of national identity appeared "as the nationalism of those people who had not participated in national emancipation and had not achieved the sovereignty of a nation-state" (1973, 227). The fact that these nationalisms defied existing state boundaries made them irredentist as well. As a consequence Europe became a tinder box of increasingly exclusivist, and increasingly competitive, nationalist claims. On August 4, 1914, the tinder box exploded, setting off "a chain reaction in which we have been caught ever since and which nobody seems to be able to stop" (1973, 267).

According to Arendt the First World War "shattered the facade of Europe's political system to lay bare its hidden frame—the sufferings of vast numbers of people "to whom the rules of the world around them had suddenly ceased to apply" (1973, 267). In one of most powerful chapters of *The Origins*, "The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man," Arendt argues that the war underscored the contradiction between the nation-state and the principle of human rights. In the name of the national interest the leaders of Europe had wreaked havoc upon their continent. The war produced millions of casualties and dislocated millions more. Effacing the distinction between combatant and civilian, it demonstrated that in the face of modern warfare, and the nationalistic imperatives that propel it, ordinary people had no safe haven.

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[2] See Voegelin (1953) and Arendt (1953a); see also Isaac (1992, 68–73, 102–104).

[3] Arendt, writing about work, comments on "the instrumentalization of the whole world and the earth, this limitless devaluation of everything given, this process of growing meaninglessness where every end is transformed into a means" (1958, 157).

While the postwar settlements—the Versailles Treaty, the League of Nations, the Minority Treaties—sought to heal some of the wounds of war, Arendt argues that these were hopeless efforts to solve the problem without addressing its fundamental cause, the principle of national sovereignty itself: "No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with more poignant irony than the discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on regarding as 'inalienable' those human rights which are enjoyed only by the citizens of the most prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation of the rightless themselves" (1973, 279). Despite their good intentions humanitarian reformers were doomed to failure as long as they refused to see that the principle of national sovereignty, by imperiously asserting the identity of nationality, citizenship, and state and denying any other principle of global or human responsibility and authority, was at bottom what made the sufferings of so many possible.[4]

Arendt writes with great passion, no doubt informed by her own experience as a refugee,[5] about the mass denationalizations of Central Europeans following the war, which produced a veritable epidemic of displaced and stateless peoples. She notes that national laws of asylum and naturalization exclude these peoples, that international law is unable to secure even the most basic rights for them, and indeed its principal enforcement organ—Interpol—operates by controlling, regulating, and policing "aliens" in the name of legality. The only substitute for a home that is offered by the regime of nation-states is, Arendt allows, the internment camp, a site of prolonged homelessness, an institutionalized limbo (1973, 284–86).[6] In this regard the First World War not simply precipitated but prefigured the Second World War; and the crimes against humanity committed by the totalitarian regimes were the most brutal, extreme examples of an indifference, and often hostility, to human rights that is inscribed in the very logic of national sovereignty.

According to Arendt these events demonstrate conclusively the emptiness and ineffectuality of the discourse of natural rights that heralded the modern republican nation-state. The plight of the refugees, and even more the sufferings of the victims of totalitarian genocide, make clear that "the Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable ... whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any sovereign state." Deprived of citizenship, the stateless were deprived of more than their home, property, and political status; they were subjected to "the most fundamental deprivation," the loss of "a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective" (1973, 293, 296). They were deprived, in short, of their basic human dignity, of their ability to function as moral and political agents, enjoying security and freedom among their fellows, experiencing the mutual recognition that only citizenship confers. According to Arendt such deprivations, and the miseries and barbarities they engendered, offer ironic, bitter confirmation of Edmund Burke's critique of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. The survivors of the death camps attest that "the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human was their greatest danger" (1973, 330). Shorn of law and convention, treated as a purely "natural" creature—a beast—man was left naked and shivering, a vulnerable, miserable creature, prey to hostile forces.

Arendt insists that human dignity needs a new guarantee because its old guarantee, the nineteenth-century, Kantian idea of a cosmopolis of peaceful republics respecting the natural rights of man, had been destroyed.[7] The faith in human moral agency had been shattered by the complicity of so many in the evils of the century and by the indifference of so many more to these evils. The confidence in the republican nation-state as the repository of the rights of man had been undermined by the experience, for three decades, of the most civilized nations on earth destroying cultures and peoples in the name of their sovereignty and then ignoring the plight of the suffering in the name of a concern with "their own."[8] The political world had now become *the world*, the earth itself rather than that small part of it known as Europe, and in many ways the relevant community had now become all humanity. In such circumstances the Kantian ideal had revealed itself as narrow and parochial despite itself, its universalist convictions undermined by its commitment to the principle of national sovereignty, a principle that supported not peaceful cosmopolitanism and moral respect but imperial expansion, geopolitical intrigue, enormous violence, and, perhaps most troubling of all, a pervasive indifference to human suffering outside the confines of the nation.[9]

Arendt reflected on the Nazi policy of genocide in a 1944 essay, "Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility," and wrote of "the terror of the idea of humanity." While the architects of modernity had associated a growing awareness of humanity with progress, civility, and peace, from the perspective of the mid-twentieth century such optimism was no longer possible. For the two world wars had ferociously demonstrated a truth that the reigning political ideologies had long denied, namely, "how great a burden mankind is for man" (1978, 234–35). The scientific power of humanity had issued in technologies of mass destruction and global annihilation. The economic power of humanity had produced a truly global economy, incorporating the entire species into an intricate, productive, and volatile web of interrelationships, governed by forces blind to problems of human security and dignity. The political power of humanity had produced a world of competitive nation-states concentrating human allegiances and mobilizing enormous human energies into causes that were all too often exclusivist and hostile. In the face of these terrific, terrifying feats of human initiative, what seemed most obvious, and most disturbing, was less the power than the *frailty* of humankind, the vulnerability of humans, who have created an enormously complex, interdependent world and now must learn to assume responsibility for living together in this world.

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[4] On this theme, see Falk (1981) and Hoffman (1981).

[5] See "We Refugees" (Arendt 1978).

[6] Reflecting sardonically on her own experience in a French internment camp, Arendt wrote: "Apparently nobody wants to know that contemporary history has created a new kind of human beings—the kind that are put into concentration camps by their foes and internment camps by their friends" (1978, 56).

[7] See Kant (1991).

[8] Dwight Macdonald wrote of World War II: "One of the many things I cannot get accustomed to in this war is the fact that the most ancient, beautiful buildings of Europe may be blasted to bits in a few hours. Rome, Paris, Assisi . . . who knows before they will join Warsaw, Bath, Coventry, Nuremburg, Frankfort, Kiev, Cologne, Palermo, Naples, Rotterdam, Cracow, London, and Berlin? It is like living in a house with a maniac who may rip up the pictures, burn the books, slash up the rugs and furniture at any moment" (Sumner 1996).

[9] On this indifference, see Bauman (1989).

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE HUMAN CONDITION

For Arendt, human rights are not natural. *Pace* Locke and Paine; they are not inscribed in the nature of human existence, discernible principles of reason that normal creatures cannot help but respect. *Pace* Smith and Hutcheson, they are not secured by a "moral sense" implanted in the human heart. *Pace* Kant, they are not necessitated by the conscious reasoning of all humans as free subjects. For Arendt, human rights are conventions, forms of recognition produced by human agreement, fragile artifacts of human living together. As conventions they require more than the ineffectual if well-intentioned lip service often paid to them by well-meaning liberals. But Arendt is not willing to go all the way with Burke. She acknowledges the "pragmatic soundness" of Burke's insistence that human existence as such confers no moral entitlements, that all such entitlements rely upon authoritative forms of recognition which can only be found in definite communities. She cannot agree, however, that one's moral status is determined *exclusively* by one's local habitus, wholly "the offspring of convention," for if this were the case there would be little ground on which to condemn the suffering and disempowerment of those stateless, homeless, marginal persons who fall between the cracks of national or other authoritative political identities and outside officially recognized categories of membership.[10] And there would be just as little basis for the defense of the principle of human dignity, an emphatically *universalist* principle, one that Arendt insists must—the imperative is ethical—find a new guarantee.[11]

Arendt does not explicitly develop a theory of human rights as such, but her political theory centers around the problems engendered by the failure of the rights of man to secure human dignity. She seeks, in other words, to *reframe* human rights. As Julia Kristeva puts it, she sees that we must maintain "the requirement of a human, trans-historical dignity, whose content nevertheless needs to be made more complex, beyond the eighteenth century's optimistic naivety" (1991, 153). By a trans-historical dignity, Kristeva means a dignity that applies to humans as such, one that is universally valid and not appropriate only for certain individuals or societies. Yet, such a dignity cannot rely upon naive claims about human nature of the sort contained in the natural rights arguments that the twentieth century has falsified and that Arendt, following Burke, has criticized. How does Arendt develop an account more nuanced and complex? The answer is contained in a place where few have found it, *The Human Condition*.

This book is about the boundary conditions of being human, conditions that frame human existence without absolutely determining it. It presents, in other words, a theory of human existence. Arendt seeks to retrieve the distinctively human capacity for creative, transfigurative action and to reclaim the practices of citizenship to which this capacity is related. This emphasis on citizenship is perfectly consistent with the Burkean argument of *The Origins*. In both cases what distinguishes humans is the capacity for membership and participation that is grounded in their autonomy and intersubjectivity. In both cases, when humans are stripped of such membership and participation, they are naked and shivering creatures, undignified, unfree, vulnerable, less than fully human.

While the upshot of *The Origins* is that some other foundation for human dignity is necessary, many interpreters have read *The Human Condition* as a book about the baseness of the merely human in comparison with the grandeur of the superhuman, virtuous, courageous citizen. George Kateb presents the most extreme version of this view, proposing that there is "a dark underside" to Arendt's conception of praxis, "a barely indicated sense that wherever the threat of death is missing, political action is not truly present." Without the risk of death, Kateb suggests, citizenship would lack the honor and greatness essential for Arendt (Kateb 1987, 612–13).[12] Credence is given to this interpretation by Arendt's notorious assertion that "the politically most pernicious doctrine of the modern age" is that "life is the highest good," a point elaborated at length in Arendt's famous chapter on labor in *The Human Condition*.[13] It might seem, then, that in her political philosophy Arendt articulated a profound animus toward the very idea of basic human rights or an elemental human dignity, preferring instead a kind of heroism appropriate only to an elite unconcerned with the mundane problems of human living and human suffering. While there are grounds for this interpretation, I would like to suggest an alternative reading. While Arendt does not present her constructive political theory as a theory of human rights as such, her account of *praxis* is intended to highlight atrophied potentials whose realization might alone secure human dignity for all.[14] Indeed, Arendt's account of these conditions can be read as an answer to the problem of human rights set out in *The Origins*.

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[10] See Burke (1970, 150).

[11] A similar point, drawn explicitly from Arendt, is made by Kristeva (1991, 151–54).

[12] For a similar view, see Jay (1978). For both Kateb and Jay, Arendtian action is disconnected from moral principles and thus inhospitable to the rights that are the achievement of liberal democracy. Jay explicitly links Arendt to the discourse of "political existentialism" also developed by Carl Schmitt and other protofascist writers.

[13] Kateb (1987, 613) cites this assertion from *On Revolution*.

[14] On this see Isaac (1992, 110–18).

For Arendt, the human condition is an inherently limited condition, since life is bounded by birth and death. She builds her argument on the twin concepts of natality and mortality. *Natality* corresponds to the experience of birth or beginning, which she connects with the possibility of human initiative or freedom. This capacity to begin is closely linked to the human capacity for speech, which allows us both to represent and to transfigure our common world, a point first made, of course, by Aristotle.[15] *Mortality* is the ultimate limit of human existence—finitude and eventual death. Mortality poses problems of subsistence and survival, to which work and preeminently labor are attempts at solution. But for Arendt there are no ultimate solutions to this problem. All human efforts to deal with the fact of mortality are provisional and, as far as human reason can comprehend, futile. In this sense "man is compelled to assent to a Being which he has never created and to which he is essentially alien" (1946, 37).

Influenced by the "existenz philosophy" of her teacher Karl Jaspers, Arendt goes only half way with Burke. She agrees that humans are fragile creatures. Beneath the drapery of human conventions she sees vulnerability and mortality, *but she also sees creativity and power.* For Burke the "super-added ideas" and practices of human communities are almost Providentially sustained havens for a heartless world.[16] Humans, naked and shivering, if they are fortunate find themselves clothed in such "decent drapery" and are thus redeemed; as the beneficiaries of this legacy they can take comfort from a wardrobe they took no part in furnishing. But Arendt takes a more Enlightened view; for her, human communities are themselves the products of human agreement, actualizations of the human capacity to infuse the world with meaning and imperfectly to shape it in accordance with this meaning, a process accomplished in concert with those others with whom one shares the world. Labor, work, and action all involve this effort to humanize the world, to make it our own. Each is productive but also limited. Labor secures subsistence, but it suffers from a Sisyphean futility. Work produces relatively imperishable creations, but these are only *relatively* imperishable. They are fragile artifacts, produced through a violence upon nature with often malignant consequences (a point also developed by the Frankfurt school). And action involves us in a seamless and boundless web of interrelationships; our deeds, enormously productive, often escape us, in surprising and often grotesque ways that we neither intend nor even imagine.

The Human Condition, then, presents us with the generic features of being human—human power and human limit. In the light of the terrible human catastrophe recounted in *The Origins*, it is clear why action is so central for Arendt. Action is the distinctive human capacity to reflect upon, communicate about, and actively shape our common human condition of vulnerability and power in ways that promote dignity and freedom. It is only in concert, on the basis of claims that are mutually recognized and agreed to, that human dignity can be secured and continually resecured in a recalcitrant world.[17] If we fail to act we will simply be acted upon. Given the forces at work in the modern world, such a course is unlikely to afford either security or freedom.

Action, then, represents a kind of civic initiative whereby humans resist degradation and assert their dignity. When we act we define ourselves *for* ourselves, and in so doing we inscribe the world as *our* world.[18] This sheds a different light on why Arendt laments the "politically pernicious doctrine" that life is the highest good. It is not because she devalues life but precisely because she values *living freely*—both terms are important here—that she places so much emphasis on the capacity to begin anew, the basis of courageous civic initiative. A careful reading of the chapter on labor in *The Human Condition* reveals that the "philosophy of life" Arendt deplores is not really a strong conviction about the dignity of the human personality or the sanctity of human life; it is the ethos of consumption that she associates with modern mass society, the idea that the essence of life is the appropriation of material objects, and that human productivity is the preeminent criterion of human well-being. It is this idea she resists. Yet, she is careful not to dismiss categorically the emphasis on basic material thriving that is the product of the Enlightenment. She describes it as politically rather than *humanly* pernicious. Why? Perhaps because she does not wish to deny completely the value of such an ethos but only to caution against its hegemony. The emphasis on basic human needs that has informed so much of modern moral philosophy has helped to advance the idea of an elemental, universal humanity, an idea Arendt does not reject but cannot embrace. For the irony is that the modern age, which proclaims the value of life above all else, is also the age of genocidal mass murder. This was surely not an irony lost on Arendt. I would suggest, then, that when she places action over life, she is not endorsing a mystique of heroic sacrifice or the existential confrontation with death but, rather, a conception of civic initiative that alone can affirm basic human rights and dignities. She wants to resist the enormous brutality and suffering characteristic of the twentieth century. She does so, however, not by appealing to a doctrine of natural rights before which men are passive recipients but by emphasizing the *activity* of human beings, who can only achieve their dignity by *doing something about it*. In a world filled with cruelty, mendacity, and callous indifference, such activity will surely often involve danger, and the person who acts will be a person of courage, willing to endure sacrifice and perhaps risk death in the name of a higher value. But the risk is endured in the name of a higher value—human dignity—and not out of an existential attraction to limit-situations.

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[15] This Arendtian point is developed beautifully in Havel (1992).

[16] See Burke's lament that "all the pleasing illusions . . . are to be dissolved by this new conquering empire of light and reason. All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off. All the superadded ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination . . . as necessary to cover the defects of our naked shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity in our own estimation, are to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, antiquated fashion" (1970, 171).

[17] This explains the importance of promising, consent, and dissent in Arendt's work (see 1958, 243–47; and "Civil Disobedience" in 1972, 83–102).

[18] A similar point is developed by Booth (1993).

What Arendt has in mind can perhaps be clarified by considering the actions of Vaclav Havel, who in his 1975 open "Letter to Dr. Gustav Husak" denounced the Czech communist regime for promoting "the principle of outward adaptation," whereby the citizen is offered all the benefits befitting "an obedient member of a consumer herd" in exchange for his political quiescence. "All the evidence suggests that the authorities are applying a method quite adequate for dealing with a creature whose only aim is self-preservation. Seeking the path of least resistance, they completely ignore the price that must be paid—the harsh assault on human integrity, the brutal castration of the humanity of men" (1986, 12). It could be said that Havel underestimates the moral significance of a regime which can offer relative security and prosperity to its people, and that his criticism implicates some classical or Nietzschean conception of heroic virtue. But, of course, Havel was at this time a persecuted dissident on behalf of *human rights*, and the regime he opposed, while it offered comfort in exchange for quiescence, offered no security for such rights, either to him or to the more ordinary Czechs whose comfort was utterly contingent on the unpredictable policies of an authoritarian regime. It alone ruled as Guardian, and the citizens were expected to submit like sheep. He denounces "a creature whose only aim is self-preservation" not out of a dismissiveness about security and civil liberty but in their very name. His point is that Czechs, in order to secure their basic liberties and rights, need to develop and sustain a commitment to these rights and to take initiative on their behalf.[19]

As I read Arendt's criticism of "life," she is making much the same point. I would suggest that when she writes of "life" she is thinking about all of those who sat idly by during the interwar years, living in security and comfort and indifferent to the impending political crisis and to the suffering and degradation it could cause. And when she writes of "praxis" she is thinking of those Danish resisters during World War II who at great risk to themselves refused to comply with Nazi efforts to deport the Jews.[20] Arendt does not disparage the desire to lead a normal life, but she does believe that in the dark times of the twentieth century one must have courage and be willing to take risks—one must *act*—in order to secure such a life. "Praxis," then, is preeminently a way of being that is essential to basic human dignity in late modernity.[21]

The theme of dignity is highlighted in Arendt's 1946 essay on existentialism, in which she invokes Kant's idea that "in every single individual humanity can be debased or exalted." In this spirit she recommends the philosophy of Jaspers, which "sounds the appeal to my freedom [which arises] through communication with others, who as my fellows and through the appeal to our common reason guarantee the universal." Jaspers retains Kant's cosmopolitan ideal, but instead of grounding it upon rational necessity he bases it on the *efforts* of feeling, thinking, speaking human beings. Furthermore, by maintaining, according to Arendt, that man inhabits "islands of freedom" in a "discordant" universe, Jaspers sees that human dignity can only be realized in partial, limited ways, in a world that we can never master. This is why the spaces of freedom and dignity (note the plural) are islands in a tumultuous sea and do not cover the entirety of the earth.

Isonomy—"neither to rule nor to be ruled"—is for Arendt the ideal form of politics because this arrangement corresponds to the generic qualities of humans as such, as beings who thrive and who suffer, capable of forming limited attachments in a world of many such attachments. Another way of saying this is that our world is what we make of it, that our rights and our dignity can only be assured by our own efforts and agreements. Arendt sees that our condition does not entail or necessitate human dignity; her argument in no way falls prey to the so-called naturalistic fallacy. She recognizes that our limited condition can bring forth one of two possibilities: Either we can work out our anxiety and vulnerability by seeking to demean and oppress others, or we can seek to develop arrangements that assure the security and freedom of all. She supports the latter because she sees that the former is nothing but a recipe for suffering and mutual recrimination, as the history of conflict in our century has shown. Isonomy is her ideal because it is true to the facts of our common human condition, because it refuses to privilege any special ethnos, class, or nation, and because, acknowledging the elemental humanity of all humans and the irreducible plurality of the human world, it allows matters to be settled "through words and persuasion and not through force and violence" (1958, 26–27).

While Arendt does not frame her discussion in terms of a theory of human rights, she does make clear what she considers to be the most significant *wrongs* of our century: mass murder, torture, displacement; the suppression or persecution of difference; the silencing of individuals; political disenfranchisement. What these wrongs share in common is the organization of human affairs through force and violence rather than through persuasion. To the extent that words are used they are spoken in a monologue, by a *dictator*, who treats those below as objects of rather than participants in political power. The clearest account of these wrongs is presented in *The Origins*. What, Arendt asks, does the loss of human rights suffered by "the rightless" mean? First, it means the loss of the homes, of the (of course, fragile) security of existence and the familiarity provided by "the entire social texture into which they were born." Second, it means "the loss of government protection," the complete deprivation of legal status and the civil liberties and political freedoms that are based upon one's legal standing. Finally, and most profoundly, it means the loss of one's very humanity, the lack of any recognition whatsoever, the reduction of human beings to disposable, dispensable *creatures*. "The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested," Arendt writes, "first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective.... This extremity ... is the situation of people deprived of human rights. They are deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action; not the right to think whatever they please, but of the right of opinion. Privileges in some cases, injustices in most, blessings and doom are meted out to them according to accident and without any relation whatsoever to what they do, did, or may do" (1973, 296). Totalitarianism represents the apotheosis of such rightlessness, where the deprivation of humanity is enacted through a policy of genocide.

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[19] A quite similar point is made in connection with the problem of Third World poverty by Sen (1994).

[20] Arendt writes that "one is tempted to recommend the story as required reading in political science for all students who wish to learn something about the enormous power potential inherent in nonviolent action and in resistance to an opponent possessing vastly superior means of violence" (1977, 171). For a discussion of the importance of resistance to totalitarianism as a model of praxis for Arendt, see Isaac (1992 and 1993a).

[21] Many commentators have failed to see the importance of these themes in Arendt's writing because of an unfortunate tendency to dehistoricize Arendt. See Isaac (1993b).

A perusal of Arendt's corpus can leave no doubt that her political theory represented a revolt against such wrongs, an effort to think through what it might take to guard against them. From this it is clear what values she sought to advance; the safety and bodily integrity of individuals; security of home and place from invasion and deportation; the ability to articulate one's concerns and to be heard, not simply to speak to oneself; the freedom to associate and to participate in public discourse. The failure of the rights of man, the loss of rights for so many millions of people, represented a failure to protect these things. A new guarantee of human dignity would be a way to validate them.

Arendt does not develop this theme in terms of an elaborated theory of human rights. She never lists the above values and calls for their protection. But it is wrong to conclude from this that she is hostile or indifferent toward human rights. Their very *loss* is what drives her theory. She is quite clear about this in *The Origins*. "We became aware of the existence of the right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one's actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized community," she writes, "only when millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global situation" (1973, 297–98). We—she includes herself—became aware of the right to have rights only *after* the decline of the rights of man. The right to have rights was an unspecified and thus unrecognized presupposition of the rights of man proclaimed in the eighteenth century. By treating one's basic humanity as springing immediately from the nature of man, the *philosophes* and their heirs failed to see just how fragile this status is, how much it relies upon forms of human artifice. The nation-state was the form of artifice that made it possible for them to think this human status natural. But the nation-state has now failed, and in the wake of world war it has become clear that the humanity of individuals needs a new guarantee. The question, Arendt avers, is whether "the right to have rights, or the right of every individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed by humanity itself." "It is by no means certain," she allows, "whether this is possible," but there is no doubt that she considers it desirable, indeed, imperative.

In *The Origins* Arendt uses the language of rights, the right to have rights, in order to speak about a new guarantee for human dignity. In some of her more philosophical works she develops a different vocabulary, of "praxis" or "public freedom," but she does so in order to confront the same problem—the need to redress the rightlessness prevalent in the late modern world. The theme of dignity remains constant, a reminder of the Kantian problem that grounds her political theorizing.

Does this make Arendt a theorist of human rights? No. But it does make her a theorist of the *politics* made necessary by a world that despoils human rights. The "right to have rights," she believes, can only be secured by politics, by the civic initiative of those vulnerable to the vagaries of world politics and those in solidarity with them. Perhaps the reason Arendt refuses to articulate her constructive political theory in terms of human rights is that she believes such rights have been specified often enough. What has been lacking is an understanding of how such rights might be rendered valid. Arendt's principal point is that such rights do not speak for themselves; nor do weighty declarations of intent speak for them. Such rights are mute, and invisible, unless spoken for, unless made actionable.[22] They cannot exist without a politics to back them up. Arendt's theory of politics—her conception of action, her emphasis on citizenship and the power that derives from concerted action—represents an effort to help back them up. It does so by emphasizing those generic features of human existence which make possible an elemental human dignity; which, paradoxically, can only be realized in partial communities, forms of national, ethnic, and other identity that are not all-encompassing; and which rest on political commitment and artifice rather than anything given in the human condition.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Arendt is fully aware of the paradoxical character of her argument. As she puts it in *The Origins*, it requires "new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power remains strictly limited." As heirs to Hobbes and Rousseau, we are accustomed to equating "validity" with "power" and to equating both with the principle of sovereignty. While such thinkers as Grotius, Locke, and Kant imagined the existence of valid principles of universal right, they, too, saw the state as the unproblematic vehicle of such principles; politically speaking, the only source of positive law, of validation, was the sovereign state. Arendt's paradoxical formulation seeks to shake us of this habit. She insists that, somehow, universal principles might have validity—might be *effective*, backed up, enforced, in a way in which they are not at present—amid a world of limited, bounded communities. In some of her more political writings she suggests how political institutions might validate such universal principles.

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[22] On this score there are, I believe, similarities between Arendt and Claude Lefort (1986), particularly regarding Lefort's notion of a "right to have rights," that is, the power to articulate rights claims. It is ironic that Lefort (1988, 55) misses this similarity in his essay on Arendt.

One such institution is constitutional government itself. A recurrent theme of Arendt's writing is the importance of limits in political life. While not a liberal, she shared the liberal view that constitutional limits on state power are indispensable to political freedom. This sentiment is developed in the conclusion of *The Origins*, where Arendt writes about how laws serve as "fences" establishing boundaries between men and protecting "essential freedoms" (1973, 465–66). It is also developed in her much later *On Revolution*, in which she contrasts the French Revolutionary naiveté about rights with the seriousness with which the Americans treated the "legal personality" of the individual, a seriousness demonstrated by the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution (1977a, 108). Perhaps Arendt's strongest statement of this theme appears in a 1953 criticism of McCarthyism, in which she vigorously defends the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. "Dissent belongs to this living matter [the republic] as much as consent does. The limitations on dissent are the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and no one else. If you try to 'make America more American' . . . you can only destroy it. Your methods, finally, are the methods of the police, and only of the police" (1953b, 599).

The protection of civil liberties afforded by a constitutional republic represents a crucial hedge against the kind of "rightlessness" Arendt fears. But in a world governed by the logic of national sovereignty Arendt believed such a hedge to be doubly limited. One crucial challenge to constitutionalism is provided by the logic of "national security," which functioned, especially during the Cold War, to create a climate of fear and to empower unaccountable and in some ways extraconstitutional police and military agencies, "national security managers" unconcerned with civil liberties. This is a major theme of one of Arendt's later collections of essays, *Crises of the Republic*, though it was first developed by Arendt in the 1950s. The second limit of constitutionalism is presented by the exclusionary character of even the most constitutionally oriented nation-state. The problem, in short, is that constitutionally based civil liberties are only valid for those who fall under the "jurisdiction" of the nation-state and are considered "full members" of it. The stateless, the refugee, and the citizen of dictatorships beyond the bounds of the constitutional state are thus removed from its protections.[23] While the constitutional republic was thus something of great value, it is not up to the task of remedying the crisis of human rights. Indeed, as a nation-state in a system of national sovereignties, it is part of the problem.

This is why Arendt saw more *global* institutions as being necessary. One such institution is an effective system of international jurisprudence capable of adjudicating human rights violations. This is a major concern of *Eichmann in Jerusalem*. Most commentators have focused on Arendt's treatment of Eichmann's "banality," but the last quarter of the essay deals in great detail with the legalities surrounding his trial. Arendt's argues that Eichmann's crime poses profound challenges to traditional standards of jurisprudence. Whereas the traditional categories for handling war crimes—"acts of state" and "on superior orders"—consider these crimes as deviations from the general proscription against murder assumed to be recognized among all civilized nations, the Nazi genocide presents the case of "a state founded upon criminal principles." The Nazi policy of extermination presents a kind of normalized criminality, with global aspirations, unanticipated by traditional jurisprudence. The postwar Nuremburg Charter and trials, which distinguished between "crimes against peace," "war crimes," and "crimes against humanity," marked a recognition of the need for a supranational conception of humanity and human rights. Genocide, Arendt avers, is "an attack upon human diversity as such, that is, upon a characteristic of the "human status" without which the very words 'mankind' and 'humanity' would be devoid of meaning." In the wake of genocide, she insists, it is necessary to find a new way of protecting this diversity, of giving some "validity" to humanity. She thus reproaches the Jerusalem court for charging Eichmann only with war crimes against the Jewish people and for not facing squarely the challenge posed by this new type of crime: "The supreme crime it [the court] was confronted with, the physical extermination of the Jewish people, was a crime against humanity, perpetrated upon the body of the Jewish people" (1977b, 255, 268–69).

Yet, Arendt sees that the Israelis were hardly unique in their narrow interpretation of the Nazi crimes. The Israeli trial, she maintains against its critics, was no different from the Successor trials held in Poland, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere in Europe to deal with crimes against nations. All of these trials, unfortunately, remained trapped in the framework of national sovereignty, exclusively focused on the crimes committed against their particular nationals. They thus passed over the chance to rethink the legal principles of human order and state sovereignty. That is, they used the trials to consolidate the nation-state rather than as an opportunity to rethink it.

In this light Arendt recommends the Genocide Convention adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948, which provided that "persons charged with genocide . . . shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the States in the territory of which the act was committed or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction." She argues that this convention, when interpreted in light of the crimes committed by the Nazis against the Jewish people, has radical implications. The most significant is the possibility that the territorial principle might be reformulated in such a way that it applied to Israel, a political community which, of course, was not in existence at the time of the Nazi genocide. Regarding this possibility, Arendt holds that "no State of Israel would ever have come into being if the Jewish people had not created and maintained its own in-between space throughout the long centuries of dispersion, that is, prior to the seizure of its old territory" (1977b, 262–63). The Jewish people, in other words, had until recently been a dispersed historical nation detached from any state or sovereignty. As such, they had been perennially vulnerable to persecution and unable confidently to claim the rights afforded to fully national citizens. Insofar as the Jewish people had lacked a state, they had lacked the recognition afforded to sovereign nations by international law. Thus, individual Jews lacked the security and freedom that could only be provided by membership in a recognized, sovereign nation. For jurisprudence to recognize, even retroactively, the crimes committed against the Jews, and to sanction adjudication of these crimes by Jewish authorities, would represent nothing less than "a new political principle," the principle that peoples might have authority in the absence of sovereignty and that their members might have recognizable rights in spite of their minority status within existing states. The principle of human rights, a principle of universal validity, would thus be sanctioned by authorities "rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities."

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[23] Both of these limits, together, were experienced by Arendt in a very personal way during the 1950s, when she feared that her husband, Heinrich Blucher, might be deported for his radicalism under the terms of the McCarran-Walters Security Act, which allowed for the expulsion of foreign-born and thus tainted "subversives." See Young-Bruehl (1978, 288). As Blucher wrote to Arendt: "It seems that one can now deprive someone of citizenship with a simple denunciation. . . . And how soon these 'Born American' people could become a Master Race" (ibid., p. 275).

Of course, this raises a thicket of practical problems regarding competing jurisdictions. To say that Israel, as the new political authority of the Jewish people, had jurisdiction over Eichmann for crimes committed against Jews is not easy to reconcile with a number of equally plausible claims, among them: (1) a number of nations, including Poles but also gypsies, equally without a state, could claim similar jurisdiction over Eichmann; and (2) an international body might claim jurisdiction, analogous to the Nuremberg Court, for crimes against humanity. Arendt does not explore these difficulties in any detail. But before one leaps too quickly to the conclusion that her suggestions are impractical, it is important to consider what they are designed to accomplish: the relaxation of the principle of sovereignty and a modification of the idea that there is any neat correspondence between territorial residence, communal membership, and legal responsibility.

The important principle she establishes is that individuals might have internationally recognized rights even when they are members of national minorities who lack any territorially based sovereignty. While the implementation of this principle does raise difficult questions, the institutions to which Arendt seems committed attempt to resolve them. In fact, the major constructive argument of *Eichmann* is not a defense of a redefinition of the territorial principle that would enable disenfranchised national minorities to adjudicate crimes committed against their people. It is the endorsement of a "permanent international criminal court" based upon the Nuremberg Principles, something also called for by Arendt's teacher Karl Jaspers (1977b, 270–73; see also Jaspers 1961). Such a court would have the power to hear human rights cases brought by aggrieved individuals and groups and to render verdicts in these cases. Such verdicts would have the force of reason behind them. They would stand as symbols of justice, and the court would serve as a kind of moral conscience of the world.[24] But it might also have a more potent political sanction if a more *federal* system of global politics could be constituted.

Arendt does not propose new forms of legal authority as mere adjuncts to existing national sovereignties. She offers them as *alternatives* to the exclusive claims of such sovereignties. Her position on this matter is spelled out most clearly in her "Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World." This essay, published in 1968, more than a decade after *The Human Condition*, demonstrates Arendt's continuous and consistent concern with the problems of human dignity delineated in *The Origins*. Arendt tells us that she seeks to rehabilitate the Kantian cosmopolitan ideal in a world in which "the most potent symbol of the unity of mankind is the remote possibility that atomic weapons used by one country . . . might ultimately come to be the end of all human life on earth." She argues that the common vulnerability of humans should lead to a new "global responsibility . . . a process of mutual understanding and progressing self-clarification on a gigantic scale" (1968, 83–84).[25]

How might such understanding come about? Arendt argues that it cannot be on the basis of "a universal agreement upon one religion, one philosophy, or form of government"; given the diversity of cultures in the world, such a unity could only be achieved by the force of imposition, at the cost of enormous bloodshed and cruelty. She thus rejects world government as an invidiously utopian ideal which ignores the real differences of nationality, culture, and political identity that constitute the world. Instead, she recommends the principle of federation, a principle consistent with both the diversity of communities and the need to relax the political energies and tensions bound up with national sovereignty. A federal arrangement would require "the renunciation, not of one's own tradition and national past, but of the binding authority which tradition and past have always claimed" (1968, 93). Arendt supports what Jurgen Habermas has more recently called a "post-traditional national identity," a political identity capable of renouncing any kind of chauvinism and reflexively acknowledging its own partiality in a world of many nations and communities (Habermas 1990, 1992; see also Tamir 1993, Kristeva 1994). She also calls for the establishment of new regional and international forms of cooperation that might override the centralizing tendencies of state forms and might encourage new forms of regional and international identity and moral responsibility. In such a world the verdicts of international tribunals might not appear as infringements of a national sovereignty that is treated as absolute but as statements of higher principles that are commonly acknowledged.

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[24] For a recent endorsement of this idea, based explicitly on the writings of Arendt, see Finkelkraut (1992).

[25] This sentiment was developed in a very influential way by Schell (1979), who explicitly credits the influence of Arendt.

In a world in which the principle of national sovereignty, and its corollary principle of justice (one nation, one army), gave way to other forms of collective security, such verdicts might even have the force of arms. And in such a world new forms of national and regional autonomy short of sovereignty might be imaginable.

Arendt had hoped such new forms might come into existence in the postwar Middle East. Her writings on this subject provide the clearest picture of how the practice of human rights might function amid new forms of international politics. For Arendt the greatest tragedy of the Arab-Jewish conflict that broke out into full-scale war in May 1948 was that each side confronted the other with claims "which are nationalistic because they make sense only in the closed framework of one's own people and history, and legalistic because they discount the concrete factors of the situation" (1978, 201). In the face of such absolutist claims, she insisted that the only way to save lives and preserve the integrity of the peoples involved was to establish a binational, confederal state, based on forms of local self-government and Jewish-Arab economic cooperation. Rejecting national sovereignty as a recipe for disaster, she envisioned a political community with multiple and overlapping levels of authority, in which national identities would be respected but in which they would not be the exclusive bases of political power and citizenship.[26]

Lest this vision of regional and global federation be viewed as too "idealistic," it is important to see that Arendt considered it *anti-Utopian* in at least two senses. For her, it was precisely the existence of profound differences and antagonisms between and among individuals, communities, nations, and states that made federation superior to world government. It is world government, a politics based upon a naive vision of global citizenship and unmediated human identity, that is idealistic.[27] It could never be effective, because it could never sustain a significant level of commitment and civic initiative in a world of deep and irremediable differences and antagonisms. These same differences and antagonisms, which had erupted in bloody conflict and demonstrated such callous inhumanity in our century, also made federation preferable to the laissez-faire principle of national sovereignty. Laissez-faire is simply a recipe for doing nothing, for allowing world politics to proceed as usual, while the millions who are refugees and national minorities remain displaced and disenfranchised, and the rest remain subjects to increasingly remote and irresponsible sovereign states. Federation, in other words, was for Arendt an arrangement made practically necessary by the failures of political responsibility in the twentieth century, a responsibility made imperative by the serious problems besetting us. Far from imagining an end to such problems, Arendt proposes federation as a way of managing them, of regulating national differences and of securing human rights in a world in which the need for such efforts has no terminus.

THE PRAXIS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Just as Arendt saw global federalism as a form of politics, a process of resolving differences, she also saw such institutions as themselves always relying upon more elementary forms of politics. Federalism is not a blueprint, much less a panacea. It is a possibility intimated by certain forms of existing politics, an always uncompleted project animated by vigorous political agencies. Arendt's political theory not only was driven by the distinctively modern problems of superfluity, displacement, and homelessness but also was inspired by contemporary forms of political action. The defense of Alfred Dreyfus spearheaded by Clemenceau and Jaures; the French and Danish resistance to the Nazis; the Ihud group of binationalist Zionists led by her friend Judah Magnes; the U.S. civil rights and antiwar movements; groups such as Amnesty International and PEN, all these efforts exemplify a politics of resistance to state actions that displace and degrade human beings in the name of oppressive ideologies. While they can be viewed as altruistic or humanitarian attempts to relieve human suffering, they are also forms of concerted action and political empowerment. The Danes who assisted Jews under the Nazi occupation, for example, were not simply acting out of altruistic concern for others. They were also acknowledging a connection with the Jews, the connection of a common subjection to Nazi power as well as a common humanity. And in acting on this acknowledgment they asserted their dignity in the face of oppression and danger. Thus, their humanitarianism, if you will, was transformed through their common opinions and their collective action into a *politics*.[28]

Such examples of political praxis illustrate two of the most important features of Arendt's vision of the politics of human dignity. The first is that the most important locus of such a politics is neither the nation-state nor the international covenant or tribunal. These are, of course, crucial loci of power. The nation-state is still the preeminent political actor on the world scene. Constitutional limitations on the exercise of state power, forms of federated authority, and international legal codes—each a way of placing a kind of constraint upon state sovereignty—are all necessary if the rights of minorities, refugees, and dissenters are to be secured. But the primary impetus for such rights will always come from elsewhere, from the praxis of citizens who insist upon these rights and who are prepared to back up this insistence through political means. The words of Albert Camus are apposite: "Little is to be expected from present-day governments, since these live and act according to a murderous code. Hope remains only in the most difficult task of all: to reconsider everything from the ground up, so as to shape a living society inside a dying society. Men must therefore, as individuals, draw up among themselves, within frontiers and across them, a new social contract, which will unite them according to more reasonable principles" (1991, 135–36).

Arendt's essays "Civil Disobedience" and *On Revolu-*

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[26] On this subject see Isaac (1992) and Barnouw (1990). For a more recent argument along these lines, see Heller and Nusseibeh (1991).

[27] Arendt writes: "Politics deals with men, nationals of many countries and heirs to many pasts" (1968, 81).

[28] See Arendt (1977a, 88–89) for an interesting discussion of the difference between the sentiments of compassion and pity and solidarity, the latter "a principle that can guide action."

tion take up this very theme of a new social contract. Both deal with the subject of resistance to moribund and oppressive power and treat this resistance as a prefiguration of a new politics centered upon voluntary associations and council forms rather than formal or official state institutions. The "lost treasure" of the revolutionary tradition is, for Arendt, the model of an associational politics that exists beneath and across frontiers, shaking up the boundaries of the political and articulating alternative forms of allegiance, accountability, and citizenship (see Isaac 1994). Echoing Camus, Arendt writes that if there exists an alternative to national sovereignty, then it is such an associational politics, which works according to "a completely different principle of organization, which begins from below, continues upward, and finally leads to a parliament." She quickly adds that the details of such a politics are less important than its civic *spirit*, a spirit that resists the deracinating tendencies of modern political life (1972, 231–33).[29] That such a politics runs against the principle of sovereignty is for Arendt one of its strengths. As many commentators have observed, there is a deep pathos to Arendt's treatment of revolution, which is for her a glorious, empowering, and yet evanescent phenomenon, like a fire that burns brightly for only a moment (see Miller 1979). Arendt recognized the paradox of rebellion in the modern world, namely, that powerful associational impulses would be coopted by more official forms of politics. Yet, this can be viewed as the great virtue of this kind of politics—that it challenges the status quo and calls attention to itself in ways which *demand* redress and incorporation. In other words, such forms of resistance invigorate formal politics and keep it true to the spirit of human dignity. Their vigilant insistence gives force to the support for human rights that is proclaimed, but often honored in the breach, by more authoritative domestic and international bodies.

The second important feature of Arendt's vision of the politics of human dignity is that there is no single community, or single category of citizenship, that can once and for all solve the problem of human rights in the late modern world. One arena of human rights praxis is clearly the state itself, and one kind of citizenship appropriate to it is clearly what we think of as "domestic" citizenship—membership in the nation state as an American, or Italian, or Croatian. But it should be clear that the idea of "domestic" is simply an adjunct of the idea of sovereignty itself; it denotes those matters contained within the boundaries of sovereign power and subject to it. As such it encourages domesticity where vigor is also needed. For there is no reason to imagine that relevant human rights issues, or relevant communities, correspond to the boundaries of nation-states. Local, regional, and global forms of citizenship are equally possible and equally real. One can speak about the rights of aborigines, for example, as a Mohawk, as a Canadian, as a North American, as a human. In each case different forms of organization would be appropriate; in each case one would speak to a different, though not necessarily mutually exclusive, audience. How human rights claims are articulated and mobilized can and will vary from case to case and from time to time, as political identities are transformed and new alliances forged.[30]

It would be equally mistaken to conflate ideas of community and citizenship with formal political organizations, be they states, nations, or confederations. In *On Revolution* Arendt writes about self-chosen "elites," groups of citizens distinguished by nothing but their deep interest and participation in specific public matters. She describes such elites as constituting, through their very own efforts, "elementary republics." In the Arendtian view it is possible to imagine a multiplicity of overlapping "republics," sometimes in tension with one another, sometimes in support of one another. The kinds of international legal institutions and federated state arrangements that she endorses would constitute ineffective security for human rights were they not authorized, empowered, and invigorated by a robust civil society of such "republics."

The Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, formed in 1990 as an outgrowth of links formed between East European dissidents and West European peace activists after the Helsinki Accords in 1975, is an interesting example of what Arendt might have envisioned.[31] As Mary Kaldor, a co-founder, describes the assembly, "it is not addressed to governments except in so far as they are asked to guarantee freedom of travel and freedom of assembly so that citizens' groups can meet and communicate. It is a strategy of dialogue, an attempt to change society through the actions of citizens rather than governments . . . in short, to create a new political culture. In such a situation, the behavior of governments either changes or becomes less and less relevant" (Kaldor 1989, 15). The assembly has been described as a loose association of citizens acting together in self-organized associations, movements, and initiatives across national boundaries. It is hardly indifferent to the policies of governments; petitioning, demonstrating, and fostering debate about state policies regarding human rights have been central to its activities. But the power that its members have been able to constitute is an important force in its own right; indeed, it is only because of this power, an organizational *and* an ethical power, that it is capable of supporting more directly "political" efforts, such as legislation, and of influencing the course of state action. According to Kaldor, "we don't represent anyone except the movements and institutions in which we are involved. In many cases, we represent no one but ourselves. And our power rests not on whom we represent but in what we do—in what we say, in our ideas, in our quest for truth, in the projects we undertake. It rests on our energy and commitment" (Kaldor 1991, 215).

Groups such as the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly and Amnesty International embody the kind of associational politics central to Arendt's conception of modern citizenship. They are forms of collective empowerment that might provide a new foundation for human dignity. They play an indispensable role in calling attention to human rights abuses, giving voice to the disenfranchised and persecuted, and empowering citizens to act in concert on behalf of the expansion of rights. They seek not only to alter state policies, for example, on matters such as minority and refugee rights, but also to offer their own, unofficial support for displaced or persecuted people. A group such as Spanish Refugee Aid, with which Arendt was involved, was no substitute for state policies hospitable to the rights of Spanish refugees, nor was it a substitute for diplomatic efforts to change a dictatorial regime; but the voluntary organization of relief efforts and forms of solidarity is itself an indispensable and preeminently political effort, without which more hospitable state policies would not be possible. Not a wholesale alternative to other, more inclusive or official, forms of political community, such endeavors themselves constitute vital forms of civic participation and empowerment. They can be viewed as "elementary republics" of citizens committed to human rights.

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[29] I have elaborated at length on the affinities and connections between Arendt and Camus in Isaac (1992, especially 105–76).

[30] My point here bears some similarity to the argument made by Laclau and Mouffe (1985). On the theme of complex identity formation, see Honig (1993, 1994).

[31] On these links see Skilling (1989) and Wainwright (1994).

Our world is in many ways different from the one Arendt described in her Preface to the first edition of *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Writing in 1951, with the recent experiences of world war and Holocaust seared into her memory, and another world conflict dangerously imminent, she noted that "this moment of anticipation is like the calm that settles after all hopes have died" (1973, vii). From her perspective the world, still reeling after the traumatic shocks of totalitarianism and mass destruction, seemed to be hurtling toward other, no less disturbing, forms of violence and human suffering.

In contrast, we are witnesses to the end of the Cold War. Our more optimistic contemporaries, invoking Hegel with apparent conviction, only yesterday proclaimed the end of history and the triumph of liberal democracy. Yet, few today are sanguine about the state of the world. As I write this essay millions of innocent civilians are starving in Rwanda and Kenya, the victims of brutal civil conflict. Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, and countless other national minorities clamor for human rights. In the heart of Europe, Sarajevo is under Serbian siege, and Bosnian Muslims suffer a brutal, murderous campaign of "ethnic cleansing."[32] German neo-Nazi youth regularly vandalize and burn refugee hostels, to the cheers of large crowds of sympathetic bystanders. Throughout France, Italy, and Germany there are increasingly audible calls to exclude "foreigners" in the name of "real citizens," "true" French, or Italians, or Germans who do not wish to share their country with the others. Across the Atlantic Ocean things are no different, as the Clinton administration recently turned back Haitian refugees fleeing a brutal dictatorship, just as its predecessors had done before with refugees displaced by economic trauma and civil war in El Salvador and Guatemala (see United Nations 1993, Zolberg 1989).

The *1992 Human Rights Watch World Report* notes that in the wake of the Cold War "respect for human rights faces a dangerous challenge in the rise of exclusionary ideologies . . . the quest for ethnic, linguistic or religious purity, pursued by growing numbers, lies behind much of today's bloodshed. By closing the community to diversity and stripping outsiders of essential rights, these dangerous visions of enforced conformity nourish a climate of often brutal intolerance" (1992, 1). Arendt, writing more than forty years ago, observed that "under the most diverse conditions and disparate circumstances, we watch the development of the same phenomena—homelessness on an unprecedented scale, rootlessness to an unprecedented depth" (1973, vii). Such a vision sounds grimly familiar.

While Arendt is not a theorist well known for her reflections on human rights, her writing is an indispensable resource for thinking about the threats to human dignity in the late modern world. As she recognized, human rights are not a given of human nature; they are the always tenuous results of a politics that seeks to establish them, a vigorous politics intent on constituting relatively secure spaces of human freedom and dignity. And as she saw, the nation-state, far from being the vehicle of the self-determination of individuals and peoples, is in many ways an obstacle to the dignity that individuals and communities seek. Those interested in human rights, who wish to provide a new guarantee for human dignity, have no alternative but to take responsibility upon themselves, to act *politically* as members of elementary republics, locally and globally, on behalf of a dignity that is in perpetual jeopardy in the world in which we live. As the *Human Rights Watch Report* makes chillingly clear, such a politics is hardly a matter of mere academic interest.

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[32] See Gutman (1993) and Rieff (1995).

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Family Matters: Aristotle's Appreciation of Women and the Plural Structure of Society

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Aristotle is no misogynist, but the way this charge is answered can skew the understanding of his political theory as a whole. Those who dismiss the charge of misogyny on grounds that Aristotle covertly advocates women's participation in civic affairs tend to obscure the leading thesis of the Politics, *namely, that polis and household differ in kind, not merely in number. I argue that Aristotle condones the exclusion of women from civic affairs because this practice conforms to the natural complementarity of the sexes and because it fortifies the naturally pluralistic structure of society. By securing these underpinnings, Aristotle frames a constitution that best supports women and men in their pursuit of human excellence.*

Courtesy is probably not the first criterion that comes to mind when one ponders the current scholarly debate over Aristotle's view of women. But a similar controversy, reported in Baldassare Castiglione's sixteenth-century dialogue, *The Courtier*, is judged on precisely this basis. Castiglione's interlocutors discuss the perfect courtier, in whom, they agree, all human excellences, moral and intellectual, are rightly ordered. Thus, they hold true courtesy to be the consummate or architectonic human virtue. But they clash over the possibility that this virtue might be possessed by a woman. The interlocutors do concur in their deference in such matters to the magisterial authority of the philosopher Aristotle (3.11–18). But this consensus settles nothing. For one of the interlocutors, Gasparo Pallavicino, claims that Aristotle's likening of male and female to form and matter implies that women are by nature inferior to men, while another, Giuliano de' Medici, denies the implication in question and holds that on Aristotle's reckoning women possess, if anything, a greater capacity for intellectual virtue and more constancy of character than men. This being the case, Giuliano infers that nothing prevents a woman from being the perfect courtier, or, consequently, the best human being.

Whatever else one might say of it, Giuliano's rendition of Aristotle is a model of tact. Yet this is not enough to establish his superiority to Gasparo in the decisive virtue of courtesy—at least not in the judgment of the noblewomen before whom the gentlemen have been conducting their debate (3.17, 32). Of course, the standards of Castiglione's court of Urbino are not the standards upheld in the court of current opinion. One might expect that Giuliano's proposal would meet with a much warmer welcome today. But the acceptance of Gasparo's reading remains remarkably widespread, though we must admit that its staying-power is fueled more by an unexamined suspicion of "dead Greeks" than by the lucidity of Gasparian exegesis. Thus, Horowitz (1976, 193–94, 206), Okin (1979, 82–83), Elshtain (1981, 44), Allen (1985, 83–126), and many others now share Gasparo's interpretation of Aristotle on women. Unlike Gasparo, however, they propose to bury Aristotle, not to praise him. The prospect of this internment has recently provoked another ensemble of scholars, no less friendly to the cause of women, who wish to resurrect Aristotle, or at least to rehabilitate important elements of his teaching concerning natural right. To this end, they adopt a reading of Aristotle that is both reminiscent of Giuliano de' Medici and more congenial to current opinion. Like Giuliano, they contend that Aristotle's remarks on form and matter in the generation of animals in no way commit him to the view that women are inferior to men. Thus, Salkever notes that "Aristotle's biology does *not* result in a theory of orthogenesis, or a kind of theodicy which bestows the blessings of the gods on a particular group of humans" (1986, 238). Nichols likewise cautions against too hasty a jump from Aristotle's zoological works to his view of women, observing that it is imperative that we also consider his political works, "which emphasize the difference between humans and other animals" (1987, 133). Levy consolidates this position, arguing trenchantly that "the biopolitical question is not what we give to procreation but what we get from it by way of natural equipment pertinent to ruling" (1990, 399). In regard to this equipment, Saxonhouse tends to minimize the existence of sexual differences, maintaining that according to Aristotle "the male is marked off from his wife less by a difference in nature than by a difference in appearance and speech and honors" (1985, 72). This reading prompts Nichols to ask, "Why, then, could political equality in Aristotle's sense not embrace females as well as males?" (1987, 133). Indeed, as the same author further reasons, "If ruling satisfies the male's need to exercise his potential for deliberation and choice, and if women need the same things from the political relationship as males do, then women too must rule in turn" (1992, 188). Similarly, Levy maintains that "by Aristotle's [own] standard, it is the baldest sort of injustice to exclude good women from politics while including bad men" (1990, 411). Swanson endorses this line of interpretation and concludes that Aristotle is "hinting that women might perform both domestic and political roles" (1992, 60–61). According to these scholars, then, it is mistaken to view Aristotle as an apologist for conventional opinion concerning the inferiority of women. Instead, they interpret him as an astute, though appropriately circumspect, critic of the customary exclusion of women from politics.

There is, to be sure, a certain rhetorical elegance in

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countering the charge of sexual injustice by arguing that in opposition to the conventions of his own time Aristotle actually supported women's political equality with men. The disenfranchisement of women constitutes prima facie evidence of sexual injustice—at least as judged by the conventions of our own time, which demand a strict uniformity in the application of standards of justice. So the removal of this putative blemish would go a long way toward refurbishing Aristotle's reputation and standing among our contemporaries. Such a result is certainly desirable but not desirable at all costs. I would suggest, in particular, that we cannot afford to concede that the currently prevailing conception of justice is adequate, even if doing so should appear to be a means for courting the good opinion of our contemporaries. For one thing, the perfect courtier (as we may learn from Castiglione) is not the servant of prevailing conventions. The virtue of courtesy amounts to something more than tact, to say nothing of flattery. Moreover, our conventional notions are utterly blind to the disparate requirements of political and domestic justice. According to Aristotle, domestic justice differs from political justice in requiring that office be assigned in recognition of sexual complementarity, not as a reward for superiority in individual excellence (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1134b15–18, 1160b32–61a3).[1] To reduce this fundamental pluralism in the canon of justice to a uniformity (as is now customary) is to subvert the natural differentiation of household and polis. Yet it is precisely this differentiation, as we shall see, that Aristotle finds most conducive to the rearing and education of human beings, both female and male. For the sake of the common good of education, the best constitution will reflect and reinforce the plural structure of society. The *politeia* and the educational endeavor it facilitates are compromised when the polis takes on the functions of the family, where it imposes a standard of political justice upon it, or where the polis is itself patterned along the lines of a household.

To give an accurate account of Aristotle's view of women, one must do so in a manner that illuminates rather than obscures the character of his most favored political constitution. It is also necessary to pay close attention to Aristotle's natural philosophy, especially his account of male and female. The political implications of Aristotle's biology may strike some as remote, but they are, as I shall show, unequivocal. Aristotle acknowledges that women and men are equal in substance, in the *ousia* of being human. Yet he also recognizes that the sexes are, by nature, functionally different and complementary. Sexual complementarity centers on procreation—a work, admittedly, in which particular women and men may elect not to participate. Nevertheless, the influence of sexual complementarity permeates the whole of our existence. Procreative complementarity naturally gives rise to certain anatomical and physiological differences between men and women that in turn result in identifiable differences in temperament. These temperamental differences are pedagogically significant. As a consequence, sexual differentiation must be taken into consideration in the design of the best constitution, which concerns itself with the education and not merely with the security of its members. Aristotle's appreciation of the procreative complementarity of man and woman thus manifests itself in his endorsement of a pluralistic, socially differentiated constitutional polity. By the same token, the philosopher's arguments in support of this pluralistic regime illuminate not only the inescapable shortcomings of governmental uniformity but also the undesirability of that particular violation of sexual complementarity known as *patriarchy*.[2]

CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND THE CRITIQUE OF PATRIARCHY

No fallacy concerning politics needs more urgently to be corrected than the notion that "there is no difference between a large household and a small city" (*Politics* 1252a12–13). At least, we may surmise, this is why Aristotle launches the *Politics* with an assault upon this misconception and targets it again in the critical appraisal of Plato's *Republic*, with which he initiates his own inquiry concerning political constitutions (1260b22–61a22). Although the political community is the most lordly and architectonic of human associations, the statesman is by no means entitled to supplant fathers, husbands, or slave-masters in the government of *their* proper subjects. Aristotle criticizes "those who think the same person a fit statesman and a king and a household head and a slave-master" (1252a7–9). Yet he distinguishes the statesmanly, royal, domestic, and despotic modes of rule on the basis of differences in the character of their appropriate subjects, not on the basis of any essential difference in the character of the rulers themselves (1259a37–b17, 1260a12–14). In fact, there is no difference in the character or excellence required of good rulers. All must possess *phronēsis*, the virtue of practical wisdom. But if the virtue of a civic ruler is essentially the same as the virtue of a domestic ruler, why object to extending the statesman's sway to the subjects of royal, domestic, or despotic government? Aristotle's objection to this extension only makes sense if the differentiation of household and civic authority is in itself conducive to the human good.

The differentiation of household and polis is indeed conducive to the human good, specifically, to the promotion of education. Aristotle's understanding of the collaboration of household and polis in education is noteworthy for its appreciation of the natural differentiation of society and for its critique of patriarchy.

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[1] Citations to Aristotle follow the conventional page, column, and line format established by Bekker. I have used the Greek text and critical apparatus prepared by the Oxford editors. All translations are my own.

[2] Owing to a certain equivocation in the social-scientific usage of the term *matriarchy*—it is sometimes used when *matrilineal* is meant—even the putatively *wertfrei* sense of the complementary term *patriarchy* is not without its ambiguities. I shall employ the term in its nontechnical and unequivocally pejorative sense and thus denote a specific dysfunctional pattern in paternal government, namely, the father's arrogation of a dominion unsubordinated to higher authority.

As is well known, Aristotle maintains that good laws are invaluable in support of education. The law is helpful because it has the compulsory force sometimes needed to ensure obedience (*Ethics* 1180a18–21). Thus it follows that the beneficial influence of education would be "strongest (*kratiston*) if the lawgiver were to attend to such matters as our nurture and occupations . . . and were to do so correctly" (1180a25–30). To do so correctly does seem to be the rub. For there are political communities that take an interest in education, Sparta being the celebrated example (*Politics* 1337a31–32; *Ethics* 1180a24–26). But the problem, as Aristotle sees it, is that *no* political community is capable of making the particular distinctions necessary to the effective delivery of a good education. In light of the need for such distinctions, one finds that "greater accuracy will result when care is private and directed to the particular case, for then each is more likely to meet with what is suitable" (*Ethics* 1180b11–13). In accordance with this appreciation of the importance of attention to the particular case, Aristotle now portrays as best (*arista*), not merely strongest (*kratiston*), that education which is attentive to individual needs while being at the same time directed by someone *nomothetikos*, someone "who possesses the legislative art" (1180b13–25). Aristotle's insistence upon this combination of fatherly care and nomothetic capacity raises the question, Is education best served when legislation is paternalistic or when fathers have become nomothetic? Aristotle leaves no doubt as to his own answer to this question. The nomothetic capacity needed by a good teacher is distinguished not so much by compulsory force (as is true of civic law) as by practical wisdom (*phronēsis*), the capacity for making good judgments in the particular case (1180b28). So the best combination of fatherly care and nomothetic capacity is achieved not when legislation is paternalistic (i.e., when the statesman intrudes into the domain of paternal authority) but rather, as Aristotle indicates, when fathers have acquired the virtue of being *nomothetikos*.

More, we note, is required for fathers to become nomothetic than merely that they *prevail* within their households. Of course, "paternal words and habits *do* prevail in households, just as laws and customs prevail in cities—and even more so, on account of the kinship and kindnesses and the natural predisposition to affection and obedience that is present" (*Ethics* 1180b3–7). But paternal authority does not follow simply from the father's natural capacity to command obedience. In Aristotle's view, the authority of paternal government derives from the indispensability of fathers in the pursuit of our common interest in virtue (1180a30–34). But this indispensability by no means authorizes paternal autonomy, or patriarchy. It is the call to virtue, not the paternal say-so, that has the prior claim to our obedience. So while the polis cannot supplant the paternal role in education, it is imperative that the *paterfamilias* be stirred from complacency in his own domestic sway to seek the virtue of *nomothetikē*. In this way, fathers will be the best equipped to "aid their own children and friends in the pursuit of virtue" (1180a31–34).

Owing to a failure to appreciate Aristotle's concern for the problem of patriarchal complacency, many readers take his praise of civic education in Sparta only at face value. Aristotle singles out the Spartans as deserving special honor for the fundamentally antipatriarchal insight that education "must be common instead of along private lines, which is the way each now cares for his own offspring in private and teaches whatever private study (*mathēsin idian*) appeals to him" (*Politics* 1337a22–26). If any political community practices what Aristotle preaches on this score, it would appear to be Sparta (1337a31–32; *Ethics* 1180a24–26). Nevertheless, we shall find that Aristotle's tribute to Spartan education is meant to be more protreptic than dispositive. In truth, Aristotle finds civic education in Sparta to be an unmitigated disaster. Though the Spartan statesmen intend to make courageous warriors of the youth by means of this education, "it in truth only makes them bestial and coarse" (*Politics* 1338b11–14, 32–36). Worst of all, the elders themselves do not even seek to find out (*exeuriskousin*) if their training actually fosters political courage (1338b16–17). Such aversion to inquiry is by no means innate to human beings. It, too, is a product of Spartan civic education. Rather than fostering virtue, then, civic training in Sparta turns out to be responsible for the induction of an intellectual bondage wholly counterproductive to the cause of education.

The shortcomings of civic-sponsored education as a response to the dangers of patriarchy are illuminated in the case of Sparta. As we have already noted, Aristotle observes that paternal speeches and habits have a more commanding strength than civic laws, owing to the natural affection and predisposition to obedience that exist in the household. The civic community does not have access to nearly as extensive an array of interior principles of motivation. In proportion to its impoverishment in this respect, civic compulsion is a blunt and violent instrument. The very methods upon which the civic community must rely to inculcate habits (*hexeis*) tend to subvert the interior psychic capacity by which these *hexeis* are transformed into genuine virtues. The Spartans present an advanced case of this dysfunction, as Aristotle indicates by linking their notorious *amathia* to the civic character of their education. The absurdly counterproductive results of Spartan civic education are extreme, but they are nevertheless typical. Aristotle, as always, has chosen his example well. The shortcomings of the "best case" illuminate the limits of the principle. Given his own sense of the shortcomings of civic education, Aristotle could hardly mean to endorse such a scheme when he speaks of the need to care for education "in common."

The defects of civic education should not detract from the utility of political support for education. The polis provides such support, however, not by supplanting paternal authority but by helping to elevate paternal government out of its primordial patriarchalism. The polis thus plays a critical role in helping the household to realize its own perfection as a community. Aristotle likens the primordial patriarchalism of paternal government to the ways of Homer's cave-dwelling cyclopes, each of whom "lives as he pleases, laying down the law to his children and bedmates" (*Ethics* 1180a24–29; *Politics* 1252b22–23; see Homer, *Odyssey* 9.114–15).[3] Cyclopean patriarchy thus represents the polar opposite to Spartan civic education. Between these extremes lies the golden mean: Aristotle's appreciation of the distinctive contributions to the common good made by household and polis. Aristotle's condemnation of cyclopean patriarchy indicates that it is the extreme most opposed to the golden mean. His guarded praise of Sparta implies no more than that it is the lesser of the two evils. We recall in this regard one of Aristotle's better known bits of practical advice: "One who would hit the mean must first avoid the extreme more opposed to it" (*Ethics* 1109a30–31). Just as Odysseus heeded Calypso's warning to steer toward Skylla in order to avoid Charybdis (*Odyssey* 12.108, 219; cf. *Ethics* 1109a32), so too in his discussion of education does Aristotle tack toward the Skylla of Spartan civic education in order to avoid the Charybdis of cyclopean patriarchy.

We are in a position now to see that Aristotle's celebration of Spartan civic education is deliberately rhetorical. By praising the Spartan pedagogy, Aristotle intends to neutralize his auditors' predilection for patriarchal autonomy, which assumes that "paternal speeches and customs" are adequately settled by an isolated and solitary fiat rather than being subject to the scrutiny of common discourse. Once the common interest in education has been firmly stated, Aristotle indicates that neither patriarchal domination nor civic indoctrination serves this interest particularly well. The household community and the polis make unique and complementary contributions to the common good of education. In the best *politeia*, therefore, the civic community would neither dominate nor absorb functions that are more fittingly performed by the household. Instead, the polis would serve to bring the household to its own perfection, reinforcing in this way the plural structure of society.[4] Aristotle likewise insists upon the noninterchangeability of household and polis, in opposition to the unitary vision of Plato's Socrates (*Politics* 1261a10–64b25; see Dobbs 1985). But to see in more detail how the polis might properly support the operations of the household, we must first consider Aristotle's account of the complementarity of man and wife.

ARISTOTLE'S CRITIQUE OF THE BARBARIC EQUATION OF WOMEN AND SLAVES

The hallmark of barbarism, Aristotle suggests, is the inability to distinguish between the nature of a female and that of a slave (*Politics* 1252b5–6). Mankind is by no means doomed to such barbarism, however, because there are by nature two equally primordial imperatives, each of which prompts the coupling (*synduazesthai*) of a distinct pair of beings. One of these imperatives is procreation, which Aristotle describes as a natural longing "to leave behind someone other of the same sort as oneself" (1252a30). It is for the sake of procreation, Aristotle says, that female and male are joined together. The second imperative is security—the preservation of self—which results in the bonding of the rudimentary partnership of ruler and ruled: the master and slave (1252a24–34). Because procreation means the leaving behind of someone other who is nevertheless *like* oneself, the coupling of male and female may be said to achieve fruition only when offspring attain maturity. So among human beings, the procreative partnership is ordered toward the rearing and education of children, as well as toward their begetting. In contrast to the self-centered imperative of security, the procreative imperative centers on the generation and rearing of an other. Indeed, the satisfaction of this imperative will sometimes require the sacrifice of one's own security.

Aristotle notes that wherever the tension between the two primordial imperatives is obscured, where the differentiation of the two partnerships directed toward them is violated—as by the barbarians who treat their women as slaves—one finds not masters and slaves but only slaves and slaves (*Politics* 1252b6–7). Barbarians are in a sense worse than beasts. They are worse, especially, in relation to sex and food (1253a32–37), which, not surprisingly, are the means naturally ordained to procreation and self-preservation. On the other hand, the man and woman who share unselfishly in the work of procreation—who do not misconstrue the spousal relationship as merely an alternative mode of seeking comfort and security—are naturally excepted from the structures of domination that haunt both partners in self-centered, security-seeking relationships. It is no coincidence, then, that the word for liberty (*eleutheriotēs*) is the same as the word for liberality or generosity. Freedom, as Aristotle understands it, entails the capacity to appreciate the noble, or *kalon*—that good which comes to light in distinction from the simply useful (see Dobbs 1994, 80–83). The mere opportunity of choosing whatever conduces to one's own security (to say nothing of less compelling ends) does not suffice to make a man or woman free. True freedom, in contrast to the essentially patriarchal prerogative of doing as one pleases, is thus rooted in the good order of the household. In light of this rightful freedom of man and wife, moreover, Aristotle portrays the spousal relationship as political. His use of this adjective in no way identifies the spousal relationship as a particular species of dominance relationship, as suggested by the modern saying, "The personal is political." *Political* is simply the term Aristotle employs to describe the manner in which free adults properly govern one another (1259a38–b1, 1277b7–9).

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[3] Compare Lindsay's observation that the cyclopes' way of life exhibits a tendency deeply ingrained in the democratic sensibility, whose "hostility to rule is linked to the prepolitical nature of its transpolitical good" (1992, 751–52). I infer that Aristotle's critique of cyclopean patriarchy is indispensable to the amelioration of democracy.

[4] It bears repeating that the household is no less a community (*koinōnia*) than the polis (see, e.g., *Politics* 1253a18). It is literally true that the household (*oikos*) is *oikeion* (i.e., something kindred or "my own"). But "my own" here means that to which I belong, not merely that which belongs to me. Therefore, private interest or passion poses as much a threat to the good order of the *oikos* as to the polis. Nevertheless, many readers are mistakenly inclined to differentiate Aristotle's household and polity as realms of private (*idion*) and public life. Arendt (1958) offers the standard formulation of this public-private dichotomy in the interpretation of Aristotle. Her analysis is neatly refuted by Salkever (1990, 169–74, 179–83).

The relationship between man and wife is political in that it properly involves persons who are *eleutheroi*. Nevertheless, this relationship is unlike the civic partnership in that the freedom of man and wife cannot be expressed in functional interchangeability (*Politics* 1259a38–b10). Within the household, the spouses' natural complementarity—the precise character of which we shall consider in a moment—has a greater bearing upon the rightful distribution of tasks and honors than does the consideration of their relative virtue as human beings (*Ethics* 1160b32–35). The freedom of fellow citizens, unlike that of man and wife, is not an expression of a biologically determined differentiation of function, but rather resembles the relationship between brothers close to one another in age. It would be held, quite rightly, to be an injustice if fellow citizens were not permitted to exchange roles (*Politics* 1332b12–29). Inevitably, then, considerations of individual equality become the central concern in questions of *political* justice (1280a11–25, 1282b14–23, 1302a24–31). But in the exercise of the art of household management, Aristotle maintains, the complementarity of man and woman rightly trumps their equality as individuals.

To illustrate his understanding of the husband's status in the household, Aristotle cites Amasis' parable of the footpan (*Politics* 1259b8–10; cf. Herodotus, *History* 2.172). Amasis, upon becoming king of the Egyptians, discovered that the populace held him in contempt because of his own common origins. Now, among Amasis' myriad belongings there was a golden footpan, in which he and his visitors washed their feet. One day Amasis had this footpan melted down and had the material reformed into a statue dedicated to a god. He then had the statue positioned where his subjects might meet with it as they went about their business. Encountering the statue with great frequency, the Egyptians began to show it great reverence. Learning of the people's reaction, Amasis made a parable of their experience; he declared that his own case was similar to what had happened to the footpan. Though low born, he was made their king. So the Egyptians should now respect him just as they had come to venerate the transformed footpan. For Aristotle, too, Amasis' footpan illustrates the principle that differentiation of function can rightly outweigh substantive equality. Amasis' footpan certainly differs from a sacred statue, yet the intrinsic value of the underlying golden substance remains the same; the worth of the gold in the footpan is equal to that of the gold in the sacred statue. Nevertheless, Aristotle regards the variation in the Egyptians' behavior as appropriate. Of course, this variation does not occur in response to the substantial equality of the objects in question. It occurs, instead, in response to the peculiarity of each object's function, which is signified above all by a "distinction in forms (*schēmasi*) and titles and honors" (1259b7–8). This distinction, which is merely temporary in the case of a mass of metal or a mass of fellow citizens, is permanent (*aei*) in the case of male and female. Amasis' parable thus helps to illuminate the propriety of the husband's permanent headship in a relationship that remains one of equality in freedom. The office of *oikonomikos* is not awarded to the husband because he is better than his wife—for she is substantially equal to him and is in many particular cases his moral and intellectual superior. It is awarded to him, instead, because it is an office somehow suited to the peculiar formation, and hence functional role, of the male sex. Because marital office is itself a matter of one's sex, man and wife do not rotate offices (i.e., reverse roles) in the manner of fellow citizens.

As already noted, it is in recognition of the spouses' freedom that the relationship of man and wife is described as political. But the unsuitability of role reversal in their relationship, in contrast to the relationship of fellow citizens, requires that a finer point be put on this description. Let us, following Aristotle, say that "the rule of husband and wife seems to be aristocratic" (*Ethics* 1160b31–33). This representation of the spousal relation both as political and as aristocratic in appearance is quite important and in no way exhibits any inconsistency on Aristotle's part. Man and wife are related politically in recognition of their freedom; but it is precisely in view of the conditions under which this freedom is safeguarded—the acknowledgment of sex complementarity—that we may say that their rule seems to be aristocratic in character. As Aristotle puts it, "A man rules worthily concerning just those things that require a man, but whatever is fitting for a woman he renders to his wife. If he lords it over all, the man turns his rule into an oligarchy, for he does so unworthily and not insofar as he is better. Yet sometimes, when the women are heiresses, it is they who do the ruling. These instances of rule do not come into being worthily but rather on account of wealth and power, which is the very thing that occurs in oligarchies" (1160b33–61a3). Notice that what *introduces* a dominance relation between the spouses is the violation of sex complementarity. The specific character of the dominance relationship into which the marital relationship degenerates is likened by Aristotle to an oligarchy. In the philosopher's schema of constitutional forms oligarchy represents aristocracy gone astray; so the correct rule of man and wife will, analogically, "seem to be aristocratic." If man and wife rightly defer to sex complementarity in the assignment and reception of household offices, patterns of dominance will not enter into their relationship. If spousal rule resembles an aristocracy, then, man and wife will remain free; and if man and wife remain free, their relationship is appropriately described as political.

Although Aristotle gives no indication whatever that women are inferior to men in capacity for achieving human virtue, he does maintain that it is the man who will assign household offices by *rendering* to his wife those offices that suit a woman. (The notion that the husband "delegates" certain tasks to his wife is quite mistaken. Aristotle's word *apodidōsin* conveys the suggestion that the man's division of tasks is not a matter of doling out authority that is properly his own but is rather a matter of rendering justice in acknowledging what is properly his wife's.) Making this initial division of offices is simply a part of the man's office as *oikonomikos*. We will in due course ask why this initial division is itself a task that "requires a man." But it is clear now that no household head rules justly whose division of offices fails to defer to the authority of the complementarity of the sexes. The proper exercise of *oikonomikē* is in no way to be confused with the arrogation of patriarchal autonomy, though it does presuppose a keen appreciation of the fundamental differences between men and women. We must turn now to Aristotle's biology to seek a deeper understanding of the differentiation of the sexes to which the proper exercise of household rule must defer. Along the way, we shall have to remove certain obstacles, left by a tradition of tendentious scholarship, that lie in our path.

ARISTOTLE'S BIOLOGY AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SEXUAL DIFFERENTIATION

Mankind, according to Aristotle, is essentially hylomorphic. Each man and woman is a unique composite of matter and form, body and soul. The human soul possesses an aptitude for nutrition and growth (*to threptikon*), for sensation (*to aisthētikon*), and for thoughtfulness (*to dianoētikon te kai nous*); nonhuman animal soul possesses only the first two aptitudes, the soul of plants only the first (*De Anima* 414a29–b18). In regard to the formulable essence of mankind, then, man and woman are one in species and have the same kind of soul (*Generation of Animals* 730b33–35; *Metaphysics* 1058a29–b24). Nevertheless, Aristotle represents the male's contribution to the generation of offspring as form and the female's contribution as matter. Is this portrayal symptomatic of a sexist tendency to belittle the female, as some maintain (e.g., Garside 1971, 536; Lange 1983, 12–13; Schott 1982)?[5] Well, no. As we shall see, Aristotle's analogy of male and female to form and matter is not proposed absolutely but is made rather in the manner of a rhetorical figure, a figure that serves to emphasize the equality of men and women in respect of the distinctively human soul.

Let us begin with what Aristotle himself describes as "the most important evidence" in support of his revolutionary ideas on the generation of animals (*Generation of Animals* 729b33–30a2). From a study of bird eggs, it is possible to determine that a pregnancy cannot be initiated unless the material provided in the female's egg is first mixed with the male's *sperma* (728a29–30, 730a14–15, 741a28–31, 757b15–16). The female clearly supplies the material out of which the offspring comes to be. It would be a mistake, however, to regard this material as inert. Aristotle recognizes the vitality inherent in the female's generative substance and so rejects the notion that her contribution amounts to the provision of some inanimate matter, like wood or stone, to be passively informed by an external force (741a6–25). On the contrary, we may say that the female contributes to a pregnancy a generative substance, or *sperma*, distinctly her own (716a7–13, 727a2–4, 728a26–27). What the female provides is not only matter out of which, but a life principle (*to threptikon*) by means of which, the offspring will grow. It is, however, the male *sperma* that provides the "principle of movement" (*archē tēs kinēseōs)* in a viable pregnancy by virtue of its torchlike capacity to ignite and to light the way for the dynamic processes of development inherent in the female's contribution to the pregnancy (724a30–35, 728a26–30, 740b29–36, 768a2–b15).[6] Apart from combination with the male's *sperma*, the vitality of the female generative substance remains merely threptic or vegetative (741a25–28; 757b15–19). But a complete animal embodies both soul principles, *to threptikon* and *to aisthētikon*. If the offspring's capacity for sensation were simply inherent in the movements of the female's generative contribution, females would be able to conceive on their own. Aristotle considers the possibility of autogenesis, but he finds no empirical evidence to support it (741a32–34). Procreation evidently requires quite different, yet equally indispensable, contributions from male and female. Since the female manifestly provides the material containing a threptic capacity, Aristotle infers that it is the male who communicates the capacity for sensitivity to the embryo.

In light of this argument, it is clear that Aristotle recognizes the female's contribution to form in the generation of offspring. Both *to threptikon* and *to aisthētikon* are principles of the animal soul, which Aristotle identifies as its form. So, strictly speaking, the female's role in generation is formal as well as material. The male is not the exclusive agent of form in the generation of offspring. Nevertheless, it is the male who communicates the distinguishing form of animality, that part of form which is most characteristic of animal qua animal. Consequently, just as *head* may represent the intact steer, *all hands* the complete bodies of a ship's complement of sailors, and *daily bread* all our material needs, so too may the unique contribution of the male principle in generation represent the entire form of an animal. Aristotle's use of this rhetorical figure (synecdoche is its technical name) serves a further purpose. More than anything else, the principle of intelligent thought is the distinctive characteristic of the human soul. But this principle is engendered in human beings in a manner profoundly different from the manner in which the capacities for nutrition and sensitivity are engendered. Of all the soul-principles, Aristotle holds that "*nous* alone enters from outside, and it alone is divine" (*Generation of Animals* 736b27–28). In other words, the form of soul distinctive of humanity derives from a source somehow transcending the generative contributions of both male and female. As a consequence, male and female may *both* be likened to matter (not inert matter, to be sure) in relation to that mysterious "outside" source, which may be likened (again by synecdoche) to form. I conclude that Aristotle's notorious analogy of the male and female principles in generation to form and matter in no way disparages women, for the logic underlying this analogy itself implies the equality of men and women in the case of the form that most distinguishes *human beings*.

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[5] See Morsink (1979) and Tress (1992) for valuable rejoinders to charges that sexist prejudice clouds Aristotle's scientific judgment. Both argue that Aristotle's scientific hypotheses are suggested not by a particular political ideology but rather by the vulnerabilities of the preformationist and pangenesist accounts of generation that prevailed at the time he composed the *Generation of Animals*. While granting the validity of this approach, my own strategy is directed by a greater interest in Aristotle's departure from the Platonic, as opposed to the Hippocratic, account of male and female. I would also suggest that while Aristotle was certainly interested in joining the scientific issues of his day, he regarded such controversies as preliminary to the articulation of his own philosophy of nature, which culminates in his account of the three soul principles in *De Anima*. It is the illumination of this culminating achievement, even more than the contrast provided by contemporaries, that is fundamental.

[6] Lest an unwarranted impatience with Aristotle's outmoded science obstruct our inquiry, let us pause to note that modern research confirms the broad outlines, if not the details, of Aristotle's embryology. The characteristics that Aristotle attributed to the female generative substance turn out to apply to the mammalian ovum, the very existence of which was not confirmed until 1827. For example, (1) the ovum does indeed contain the matter out of which the embryo is formed; (2) it also contains other nutritive material necessary to the sustenance of the offspring until such time as the embryo can root itself in the uterus; and (3) although the ovum is potentially a complete human being (possessing, as we know, sufficient genetic information for this purpose), the female cannot *initiate* the process of reproduction apart from the intervention of the male's sperm. In this sense, modern science corroborates Aristotle's contention that the male, who provides no nourishment to the embryo, is the cause of the first movement of its generation and that the female's generative potential, although ignited by the introduction of the male's sperm, is fueled by its own nutritive resources.

One may still ask, of course, precisely how it is that the female contributes nutritive soul and the male contributes sensitive soul to offspring. Aristotle's answer to this question is offered in terms of complex physiological processes. The details of this account are not as important to us as is its general thrust, which penetrates beyond the purely anatomical conception of sexual differentiation. Sex, on this account, is more than skin deep. Aristotle maintains that the generative substance (which he understands to be a distillation of the residue of the body's ultimate nourishment, blood) is more refined in the male than in the female, evidently because of the male's hotter metabolism (*Generation of Animals* 728a26–27, 765b15–17). By virtue of its greater degree of distillation, the male *sperma* possesses the unique capacity of setting into motion the processes that constitute a pregnancy (729b12–14, 730a14–17, 739b20–25). Ultimately, it is this physiological capacity—and not merely an anatomical difference—that distinguishes what it means to be male or female (766a30–33). Sexual differences, in Aristotle's account, are more deeply rooted (and more diversely ramified) than would be the case if it were merely true, as Plato's Socrates would have it, that "the male mounts and the female bears" (*Republic* 454d10–e1).

I would suggest that Aristotle's most commonly quoted and tendentiously interpreted statements concerning the differences between male and female are not provoked by misogyny, or a belief in the natural inferiority of women as human beings, but by his own contemplation of the surprising depth of the roots of sexual differentiation. We need to take a moment to consider these statements if we are to remove some of the prejudice that so often hinders the sober consideration of Aristotle's teaching concerning men and women. Perhaps the greatest impediment is posed by the misconstruction of Aristotle's remark that "the female is, as it were, a disabled male" (*to gar thēly hōsper arren esti pepērōmenon*, . . .). But let us not take this citation out of context. To grasp its true significance we must read the rest of the sentence: ". . . and her catamenia is *sperma*, though not pure *sperma*—there is only one thing that it does not have, the *archē* of soul" (*Generation of Animals* 737a28–29). In other words, the only "disability" Aristotle finds in the female is her inability to ignite a pregnancy. To say that females are incapacitated in this sense is to say little more than that females are not males. Yet merely to say this will not suffice as a statement of the distinction between males and females. After all, it is true of everything that it is not some other thing. The male and female pair, besides involving difference, is also the same in species. So one must affirm identity as well as difference in order to explain adequately the phenomenon of sexual differentiation. It is for this reason that Aristotle must describe the female in common terms with the male. The material basis of this commonality is already implicit in the finding that the female's contribution to a pregnancy necessarily contains *all* the parts of an animal—the male and the female—in potency (737a23–25). As we have seen, only the male *sperma* has the capacity to set the female residue into motion. As a consequence, the motion thus imparted to the resulting embryo is "the very motion that is active in the male *sperma*" (737a20–25). On this basis, one might expect every offspring to be born a male. This expectation is formulated in the notion that the developmental path leading to the generation of a male is typical, while the path leading to the generation of a female is, in some sense, a departure from type (*parekbebēke*, 767b7–8). This has given rise to the utterly fallacious allegation that Aristotle regards the female as a monstrosity, a "misbegotten male." Of course, it happens to be the case that roughly equivalent numbers of male and female offspring are born. Aristotle infers that this results because something besides the simple mingling of male and female *spermata* is necessary to generation. The parental contributions must also achieve in combination a certain measure of heat, or conception will be a failure (767a13–25). Within the range of viability, moreover, the movements at work in the male *sperma* will either predominate (*kratein*) as such (when the ratio or *symmetria* of temperatures of the parental *spermata* is most congenial) or relapse (*luesthai*) into secondary motions, including those resulting in the offspring's resemblance in sex and other characteristics to its mother (737a23–25, 767b15–68b15). Aristotle anticipates the Mendelian distinction between dominant and recessive genes with his own notions of "predominance" and "relapse." So his depiction of the female as a departure from type corresponds to what we might today describe as the phenotypic realization of a recessive genotype. No superiority or inferiority in essential human qualities is implied in such portrayals. Aristotle emphatically rejects the notion that there is anything monstrous in the birth of a female; the departure from type she represents is perfectly natural (767b7–10, 770b9–13, 775a15–16). Moreover, Aristotle observes, the good of the species as a whole is served by the presence of sexual differentiation. Without it, animal species could not be preserved.

Indeed, the preservation of species is the ultimate purpose for the sake of which procreation occurs. Aristotle holds it as a cosmological axiom that "the beautiful and the divine is the cause, always in accord with its own nature, of what is better (*tou beltionos*) in the things that allow of it" (*Generation of Animals* 731b25–27). The nature of mortal beings as such does not allow of a participation in the divine good of eternity. But mortals can partake in eternity as a species (*edei*, 731b35) via procreation. The male and female principles in mortal beings exist, then, as a divine gift for the sake of procreation. This is true of plants just as it is true of animals and of human beings, because plants have distinct male and female *parts* even if these parts typically do not have an existence separate from one another. In order to understand the significance of the *separate existence* of male and female, a further application of the cosmological axiom is necessary. This step must introduce a distinction between plants and animals. Aristotle thus reasons that "the male is separate from the female wherever possible and as far as possible because the principle of movement—which is what the male is for things that are generated—is better and more divine than the matter" (732a5–9). Does this imply that Aristotle regards men as more divine than women, as many readers suppose? By no means! He does note that in its capacity to initiate movement the male generative principle partakes in the divine nature of the prime mover. This obviously applies to the male principle in plants, too. But the claim of the cosmological axiom is that the divine is the cause of "something better." So the crucial question is this: What betterment unavailable to mere plants does the divinity bring about for the male principle as a consequence of its separation from the female principle? Now, animals differ from plants in the possession of *to aisthētikon*, that is, in the possession of a capacity for a life of sensitivity and awareness. Plants, which combine female and male, scarcely attain to even the most primitive manifestations of sensitivity (731a24–1b8). The separate existence of the sexes thus comports somehow with the possibility of the higher life form of *to aisthētikon*.[7] Conversely, when male and female animals are entwined in a sexual embrace they are hardly aware of anything else. At such times, Aristotle says, it is "as if the couple becomes a plant" (731b6–8). Sexual pleasure drives out the awareness of anything else: "the greater pleasure crowds out the other . . . so that there is no act (*energeia*) at all in accordance with it" (*Ethics* 1175b8–10; see also 1152b16–18 and 1153a20–23). That which occurs occasionally (and incompletely) in the case of animals constitutes the permanent and essential condition of the sexual principles existing inseparably in plants. But the divine brings about the separate existence of male and female in animals for the sake of a higher life, a life of sensitivity, in which women and men equally share.

Aristotle's biological account of the sexes in fact provides no excuse for misogyny or for claims that women are inferior to men as human beings. On the contrary, it establishes the fundamental complementarity of the sexes and adumbrates the higher life that the divine has vouchsafed to human beings—both males and females. The prospect of this life implies that both male and female are called to a higher work than that of procreation. Among human beings, the capacity for sensitivity is gathered up into a dianoetic soul and the possibility of a still higher life and function is introduced (*Generation of Animals* 731a30–b7). This fundamental call to thoughtfulness—and so to the virtues of practical and theoretical wisdom—extends every bit as much to women as to men. To understand how one might best respond to this distinctively human vocation, however, we must join Aristotle in observing the remarkable fact that the stamp of sexual complementarity impresses itself more plainly upon mankind than upon any other species. The temperamental differences characteristic of men and women (though rooted in one of the humblest of life functions, procreation) are more pronounced, Aristotle declares, precisely because of the perfection of mankind's nature (*History of Animals* 608b5–7). The supervention of perception and thought does not suppress but rather enhances the significance of a human being's sexual nature in the execution of his or her natural functioning.

Though our sexual characteristics are ordained to a purpose determined by our natural role in procreation, the influence of these characteristics pervades and imbues our ethical lives and even crosses the threshold of the life of the mind. The functional complementarity of the sexes naturally gives rise to temperamental differences that warrant different approaches to the realization of a common human telos. A human being is by no means "entombed" in his or her sexually distinct body. It would be quite wrongheaded—perhaps even monstrous—to efface one's sexual nature in the pursuit of some rarefied conception of human excellence. On the contrary, the natural enhancement of sexual identity in mankind requires that we become more perfectly men and women—not less so—as we become more perfect human beings. There is no androgynous path to virtue.

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[7] The separate existence of the sexes is, of course, no guarantee of this aptitude; the divine is a cause of betterment only insofar as things allow of it. I take it that Aristotle was acquainted with the phenomenon of unisexual plants. He was surely familiar with Herodotus' account (1.193) of the Egyptians' cultivation of the date palm. So if despite this he still says that nature mixes male and female in plants so that the two exist inseparably, I suspect that he is simply less concerned to explain the anomaly of why date palms cannot sense than he is to consider the significance of the general phenomenon that virtually all animals can. In natural philosophy, as in ethics, one must be content to illustrate the truth with reference to what is the case "generally and for the most part" (*hōs epi to poly*, *Ethics* 1094b16–95a4, 1142a11–18).

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SEX-LINKED DIVERGENCES IN TEMPERAMENT

Aristotle finds that the complementary procreative functions of male and female are accompanied by distinctive temperamental tendencies, the most important of which cluster around two dispositions: spiritedness (*thymos*) and nurturance (*hē tōn teknōn trophē*). Males tend to be more spirited than females in nearly all the species of animals, while females tend to be the more thoughtful (*phrontistikōtera*) concerning the feeding and rearing of offspring. The sex differential in these dispositions is more conspicuous among the higher animals than among the lower and is especially pronounced in the case of mankind, whose nature is most perfect or complete (*History of Animals* 608a33–b7). The ramifications of this differential pervade the whole of the ethical life of men and women. As a consequence, the human excellence that good men and women share is naturally inflected by gender. Aristotle argues that "a man would be reputed a coward if he were courageous in the manner of a courageous woman, and a woman too talkative if she were decorous in the manner of a good man, since the management of the household also is different in the case of a man and a woman, for it is the man's work to acquire and the woman's to keep a vigilant watch" (*Politics* 1277b20–25). The inflections of human excellence in men and women comport perfectly with their differing temperaments and household functions. Serenity and modesty will adorn the woman, who is naturally suited to the function of vigilant preservation rather than acquisition. But decorum in a man's conduct requires more enterprise. The male's performance of his acquisitive role will profit from a greater dose of daring and even audacity than would be prudent in the essentially defensive posture of the female. Aristotle's precise characterization of women's work as keeping a vigilant watch (*phylattein*) may well be meant to remind his auditors of Plato's *phylakes*, his philosophical and spirited guardians (see Zuckert 1983, 195). Aristotle would thus suggest that the tasks naturally assigned to women require a courage that is no less genuine than the courage one would expect of Plato's guardians. But if the feminine inflection of *courage* (the virtue commonly held to be the special province of a manly man) deserves this authentication, so too must the feminine inflections of all the other virtues, a fortiori. Although the particular acts that manifest virtue in a woman differ from those that manifest virtue in a man, a woman's virtue is of no lower rank than a man's.

Generally, the *definition* of virtue is the same for men and women. Courage, for example, may be defined as the habit of choosing the golden mean in the face of feelings of fear or of confidence. But familiarity with such definitions is not enough. Aristotle notes that the reliance upon such general definitions invites complacency and self-deception, which is why he blames those who would appear to put too much stock in them (*Politics* 1260a25). To know what virtue is really, one must develop an appreciation of the particulars, for the universal really exists only in the particular. The precise choice that constitutes the golden mean depends upon many such particulars; one of the most crucial of these is the character of the task with which one is principally charged by nature: acquiring or guarding. Because the man's office within the natural household differs from that of his wife, the particular deeds their common human excellence calls for will vary accordingly. The act in which the splendor of courage is manifest in a woman, if performed under the same circumstances by a man, might very well betray an excessive concern for security. It follows that "the same [action] is not moderation in the case of a woman and in the case of a man, nor [is the same action] courage or justice" (1260a21–22). Men are bolder by nature (but not more courageous) than excellent women, and women are more circumspect by nature (but not more decorous) than excellent men. We are thus brought back to Aristotle's rudimentary insight that men are more thymotic and women more thoughtful in respect to nurturance. So let us consider these dispositions in more detail.

As Aristotle explains it, spiritedness is "in every case the power of soul that the ruling element and the element of freedom presuppose, for *thymos* is apt for rule and will not accept defeat or second place" (*Politics* 1328a6–7). *Freedom* refers here not only to liberation from the rule of others but also to independence from the constraint of one's own appetites—especially, but not exclusively, the appetite for self-preservation. It is in this light that Aristotle describes spiritedness as *ekstatikos*, for it supports acts (e.g., the killing of a tyrant surrounded by armed bodyguards) that require such disregard of one's own safety as to justify our saying that the agent is literally "beside himself" (*Eudemian Ethics* 1229a22–25). Many have been known to undertake such acts to defend their friends and families. But such ecstatic disregard of one's own safety comes more naturally to a man than to a woman. Because the female carries and nurses the offspring, a mother's love of her own child is naturally interwoven with a concern for self-preservation. To save the child's life requires saving the mother's life as well. The male is in a sense more expendable than the female because his contribution to the generation of offspring is completed in a much shorter time. During the period of a female's single pregnancy, Aristotle points out, a single male is able to make many similar contributions elsewhere (*Metaphysics* 988a5–6). It is only natural that females, who are biologically less expendable than males, will also tend to be less venturesome than males. Aristotle attributes the latter difference to a divergence in the metabolism of men and women that accounts for the greater prominence of *thymos* in the male of the species.[8]

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[8] The correspondence between sex and temperament does not arise by coincidence. According to Aristotle, all such affections of the soul involve the body (*De Anima* 403a15–19; *Ethics* 1147a15–17).

The ethical implications of the greater prominence of the thymotic temper in the male can be further detailed. For example, the ecstasy of *thymos* induces a certain detachment not only from the concern for self-preservation but also from all the needs of the body. Moreover, by abstracting from the body, which is an ontological principle of individuation, *thymos* leads a person not only to ignore his own physical needs but also to expect that others should be similarly detached. Homer describes how Achilles, upon learning of the death of his friend Patroclus, is overwhelmed by the desire for vengeance. In his zeal to enter the fray, Achilles refuses to take food and would deny the same to his comrades. But Odysseus prevails upon Achilles to allow the men food so their strength will be sustained throughout the long battle that is sure to follow (*Iliad* 19.146–220). Here we see the thymotic temperament at work in Achilles' detachment from the needs of his own body, in his demand to generalize this detachment, and, even more, in Odysseus' restraint of Achilles' appetite for revenge. As this episode indicates, "readiness to strike a blow" is by no means evidence of a superior *thymos*. Aristotle evidently agrees (*History of Animals* 608b11–12). Odysseus' ability to oppose and restrain Achilles' *thymos* implies a spiritedness at least as great as Achilles' own. While *thymos* motivates the original thirst for vengeance, another manifestation of spiritedness (a *heteros thymos*, so to speak—see *Odyssey* 9.302) is required to overrule it. This is because *thymos* is *aētēton* (i.e., unbeatable; *Politics* 1328a7). Only the same or a greater *thymos* can overrule such a passion so that it may become amenable to the rule of reason.[9]

Spiritedness is superior to other appetites insofar as it "does hear reason somehow." But the problem is that it tends to be like hasty servants, who "rush away before they have heard all of what is said, and so mistake the order" (*Ethics* 1149a25–28). One must first bridle *thymos* if it is to hear reason speak its piece in full. The excellence of reason can make itself evident once *thymos* is bridled, but reason cannot do the bridling itself. For this, only *thymos* will suffice. Because in respect of *thymos* the male is by nature better or stronger (*kreitton*) than the female, "the male is more fit for leadership" (*Politics* 1259b1–3, 1254b13–14). Yet the husband rules the household not merely because he is "bossier," as Sparshott (1985, 184–87) would have it,[10] but because he is the household member best equipped to *overrule* bossiness, whether in himself or in others. In this way Aristotle not only implies that male headship is inevitable (a thesis most recently associated with the work of the anthropologist Steven Goldberg [1993]), he also makes the argument that male headship is good.

Aristotle can still acknowledge the possibility that a given female might be more spirited than a given male, but the key point is that "the male is more fit for leadership (*hēgemonikōteron*) than the female, at least if their union is not constituted contrary to nature" (*Politics* 1259b1–3). In other words, Aristotle's comparative analysis need not apply exhaustively to every possible pair of male and female. Rather, he is comparing only the male and female members of a pair naturally joined in the work of generation. This partnership of spouses is ordered toward procreation and must remain so if civilization is to emerge from barbarism, as we have seen. In the partnership of spouses, it is better (for reasons already discussed) for the male to take the lead—to stick his neck out, so to speak—ahead of the female. The male's more thymotic nature *relative to his natural mate* ensures that he will be the one better fit to lead their partnership. Likewise, the female proceeds in accord with nature when she rejects as a mate any male endowed with less *thymos* than herself. Aristotle disregards as unnatural such cases as the aggressive female and demure male

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Our language preserves this insight in the wealth of connotations associated with the word *heart*. Aristotle elaborates a physiological link between the anatomical and ethical senses that this word conveys. The heart, Aristotle observes, is the first organ to be formed in an embryo; it provides the vital heat whose measure determines whether the embryo is itself destined to be able to distill *gonē* and so to count as a male (*Generation of Animals* 766a30–b7). But heat is also identified as a defining characteristic of spiritedness or heart (*thymos*), which Aristotle diagnoses as "a seething of the heat surrounding the heart" (*Problems* 869a4–5; *Ethics* 1149a30). Terror—a disheartening experience that cannot be experienced at the same time as *thymos* (*Rhetoric* 1380a33–34)—is accompanied by a "cooling down of the region surrounding the heart" (*Problems* 902b38). Modern investigators point instead to the secretion of hormones; but their finding of a biochemical basis for the sexual differentiation of temperament reinforces the essential outlines of the work of their great predecessor. In controlled studies of males and females, researchers have found boys to be significantly more aggressive and competitive than girls and girls to be more nurturant than boys, notwithstanding the variation in these traits among members of the same sex (Hutt 1975, 108–26; Maccoby and Jacklin 1974, 352–54). Perhaps most telling of all, the distinctively female tendencies are muted, and the distinctively male tendencies more pronounced, in fetally androgenized girls (Hutt 1975, 73–75; Money and Ehrhardt 1972, 98–105).

[9] Aristotle regards *thymos* both as an urge seeking vengeance (*Ethics* 1149a30–32; *Rhetoric* 1378a30–b7, 1380a18–21) and as the faculty of soul capable of resisting all urges and appetites, including the urge for vengeance. The latter point is implicit in the aptness of *thymos* for freedom (*Politics* 1328a6–7). Freedom and responsibility depend upon the capacity of *thymos* to resist the promptings of appetite, for if we did not possess the psychic capacity to resist our appetites, why should we be blamed for yielding to them? The duality of *thymos* also implies that one's own thymotic appetite can never be stronger than one's own thymotic capacity for resisting the longings of appetite. But this is by no means to take the *achievement* of such control for granted. It would be nearer to the truth to describe this achievement as heroic. The archetype of thymotic self-control is the *anēr* Odysseus (*Odyssey* 1.1), whose very manliness Homer ultimately presents as a matter of restraining the desire for revenge (*Odyssey* 9.302, 20.9–21, 24.545; see Dobbs 1987, 504).

[10] Much of Sparshott's analysis is keen. But he errs fundamentally, in my view, because he fails to grasp the importance of the thymotic difference between men and women and because he denigrates the natural status of the *oikos*. Even if the *oikos* is best represented by the "family farm," it does not follow that the historical disappearance of the family farm diminishes the natural status of the household, any more than the disappearance of the polis would be regarded by Aristotle as evidence of its diminished natural status as compared with the imperial regimes that swallowed it up.

who happen to find one another sexually attractive. One can acknowledge that the eccentric exists without seeking to reconstruct the *politeia* in its image. The purposes of generation are best served when the male is sufficiently spirited to provide a margin of security for even an unusually venturesome female. As long as the marital community is constituted in accord with nature, then, the household will be monarchic, its one head being the husband (*Politics* 1255b19, 1259b1–3). As an expression of sex complementarity, the husband's status as household head exemplifies domestic justice. The husband's headship is not a reward for moral or intellectual excellence. As such, it is in no way inconsistent with his wife's being his moral and intellectual superior.

Aristotle alludes to such a case when he quotes Sophocles' Ajax: "Silence is a woman's ornament" (1260a30, quoting *Ajax* 293). As recent commentators have observed, the dramatic context of this line raises an important question concerning the philosopher's intention. Could Aristotle really have meant to endorse this sentiment, in view of the fact that it is uttered by a madman?[11] It is typical of the debate on Aristotle's view of women that some commentators believe Aristotle to be sincere and misogynistic in this passage, while others believe his citation to be ironic and covertly indicative of support for women's political equality with men. As an alternative to these interpretations, I would suggest that Aristotle alludes to the coupling of Ajax and Tecmessa as the apparently exceptional case (one in which the woman's superiority is disturbingly evident) that proves the rule of male leadership.

For this purpose, let us begin by noting the obvious: when Tecmessa is confronted with the madness of her husband, she finds herself powerless to do anything about it. The hopelessness of Tecmessa's plight is indicative of the limits of a wife's capacity to cope effectively with the psychological intensity and the physical consequences of a madman's rage. Her helplessness illuminates the essential shortcomings that make the leadership of the household something that literally "requires a man" (*Ethics* 1160b34). Ajax's fury is a measure of his spiritedness. Because Ajax has not learned to restrain this spirit, and because no woman to whom he could be naturally yoked would be sufficiently thymotic to restrain it, he must depend upon another man to do the job for him. Unfortunately, one of the few men who could undertake so daunting a challenge, Odysseus, is the very man who provoked Ajax in the first place. As a result, Ajax remains unrestrained and his story ends in tragedy. Apart from the moderation of *thymos*, the spirited male is destined to be a cause of great suffering. Sophocles' *Ajax*, as is typical of Greek tragedy, celebrates the human spirit in the midst of such suffering. The poet would thus reconcile us to a human situation in which the prospect of Ajax's suffering and all its collateral damage simply cannot be eradicated. So Aristotle's approving quotation of Sophocles is hardly misogynistic. Instead, it merely signifies that the philosopher in this case shares the poet's tragic vision. Neither believes that any change in the male's status as household head could bring about a better life for couples like Ajax and Tecmessa.

The woman does not rule as *oikonomikos* because she is by nature insufficiently spirited to overrule her husband and even her more spirited children. Of course, a woman's lesser endowment of *thymos* does not preclude her exercise of self-rule or, therefore, her acquisition of human virtue. Similarly, while a man's greater endowment of *thymos* establishes his claim to the monarchic status of *oikonomikos*, it by no means guarantees his acquisition of human virtue. On the contrary, spiritedness is in this respect alarmingly ambiguous. Daring, competitiveness, righteous indignation, and mastery of the needs of the body are readily exploited in an unjust cause and, what is hardly better, they may be squandered needlessly in a just cause. In many cases, there is considerable uncertainty about what it is that ought to be done. Because he is the more expendable of the partners in the procreative couple, the male is inclined by nature to take the lead in risky situations. The prominence of spiritedness in his soul prepares the male to put his life in jeopardy. But there remains a crucial difference between reckless behavior and genuine manliness. Moreover, untutored spiritedness is as ready to rally to the defense of appetites as it is to check them. Thus Aristotle notes that while *thymos* "is in every case the power of soul that the ruling element and the element of freedom presuppose," it is also *thymos* that "warps even the best men when they rule" (*Politics* 1287a31–32, 1328a6–7).

The protean quality of the thymotic temperament contrasts sharply with the fundamental soundness and equilibrium that is typical of the nurturant temperament. Just as the male is more thymotic than the female, so we have seen that "the female is more thoughtful concerning the feeding and rearing of offspring" (*History of Animals* 608b2). The biological value of such an orientation is obvious. But what is perhaps not so easily apprehended is the psychic balance and integrity that thoughtfulness concerning the feeding and nurture of offspring engenders in the female herself. In this light, Aristotle declares that "the female overall is more stable (*akinētoteron*) than the male" (*History of Animals*, 608b14–15). Nor is it difficult for us to see how the more nurturant female comes by this stability. To flourish, a child requires nourishment, personal affection, and a selfless attentiveness. A child needs these things consistently, day in and day out. The temperamental inclination, along with the anatomical equipment, necessary for the provision of these needs is naturally present in the female. Maternal thoughtfulness concerning the nurture and rearing of offspring manifests itself in certain natural longings and desires, the appropriateness of which is hardly, if ever, unsettled by contingent circumstances. Of course, maternal tendencies are not infallible. A woman may overindulge her little ones, smothering rather than mothering them. But my contention is that the maternal instinct is less likely than *thymos* to be misdirected and that even when it is misdirected the damage it causes is overshadowed by the damage inflicted by misdirected *thymos*. Civilization has more to fear from the wrath of Achilles than from the apron strings of Mrs. Portnoy.

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[11] Aristotle's quotation of Sophocles is not meant to put women in their place but, rather, to call attention to a difficulty concerning the nature of that place (Nichols 1983, 182; Saxonhouse 1982, 209). Far from endorsing misogyny, Aristotle's allusion to Ajax may well have been meant to remind his audience, as Nichols contends, that it is madness to disregard the good advice of a woman. But can it be right to dissociate Aristotle completely from the sentiment expressed by Ajax? It is worth recalling that Aristotle elsewhere and in his own name identifies talkativeness as a departure from graceful order in women (see *Politics* 1277b23).

The difference between the protean and morally ambiguous appetites that accompany the thymotic temperament and the stable and fundamentally sound appetites that accompany the nurturant temperament provides a basis for a systematic contrast between the sexes. It is this contrast that is implicit in Aristotle's otherwise perplexing remark that "the female has the deliberative capacity but it lacks authority" (*Politics* 1260a12–13). To appreciate this remark, we must first ask, In what, precisely, does the authority of the human deliberative capacity consist? Saxonhouse observes that Aristotle's term *akyron* would appear to permit two very different interpretations: "This want of authority in the woman's deliberative capacity [either] inheres in the soul itself or becomes manifest in groups of men who would scorn it coming from a woman" (1982, 208). Fortenbaugh seizes the first alternative, contending that this lack of authority is an *intra*personal phenomenon resulting from the woman's own emotions overruling her better judgment (1977, 138–39). In view of Aristotle's allusion to the madman Ajax in the course of the same passage, however, it is most unlikely that he means to argue that the psychic economy of women is any more turbulent than that of men. Moreover, Fortenbaugh's citation of Medea to illustrate the peculiar emotional disturbance of women proves nothing. Medea admits that her better judgment is overruled by a thymotic appetite for revenge, which is the very force that Aristotle says is more prominent in men than in women. What Medea holds in her heart, men have in spades. So if deliberation's lack of authority results from the influence of *thymos*, Aristotle is hardly justified in singling women out for special mention. In fact, there is not a shred of evidence to suggest that Aristotle held women in general to be any more susceptible than men to the destabilizing affect of passion upon deliberation.[12]

But is it any more satisfactory to maintain that the female's deliberative capacity is lacking in authority merely because men are loathe to listen to women? Such an explanation regards this lack of authority as an *inter*personal phenomenon and appeals to circumstances outside the female to explain why her deliberative capacity is *akyron*. Zuckert, for example, embraces this alternative, maintaining that "to say that the woman deliberates without authority, rule, or decisiveness (the alternative meanings of *kyrios*) is as much as to say that her reason does not rule because she does not rule" (1983, 194). Levy interprets the *akyron* passage similarly, holding that the issue is not what happens inside the wife but outside her, in her relationship with her husband: "The resistance to the wife's deliberation is in the irrational part of the husband's soul" (1990, 405). But here we must remember that Aristotle's description of the female deliberative capacity occurs in the context of a general statement concerning the manner in which the parts of the soul inhere in each of several types of human being. Aristotle says: "The parts of the soul inhere in everyone, but they inhere differently (*enhyparchei diapherontōs*). The slave does not have the deliberative capacity as a whole. The female has it, but it lacks authority; and though the child has it, it is immature" (*Politics* 1260a10–14). Because Aristotle means to indicate something about the *inherent disposition* of the parts of the soul, I infer that we cannot accept a purely extrinsic account as satisfactory. We are left to conclude that the lack of authority of the female's deliberative capacity is indeed an intrapersonal phenomenon, though it has nothing to do with her good judgment being overruled by irrational passions.

If we keep the temperamental differences between male and female in mind, we may discover a different basis upon which an intrapersonal account may be offered. According to Aristotle, deliberation is a prelude to choice. He suggests that the thing chosen can be understood as what we desire on the basis of deliberation; choice may be described, accordingly, as a kind of deliberate appetite (*Ethics* 1113a9–12). The role of deliberation in choice consists, then, in the ordering of desire. We have already noticed that the distinctively male temperament involves desires that are more protean—more ambiguous both morally and prudentially—than is the case with the female. Because of this, it is up to deliberation in the particular case to provide direction for these desires. The very unsettledness of the male appetite makes it a fit subject for the authoritative and lordly ordering operation of deliberation. But the relative stability and wholesomeness of the appetites naturally implanted in the female means that her desires stand in much less need of deliberate ordering. So the reason that the female's deliberative capacity is less lordly in its operation than the male's is simply that her desires are better ordered—one might even say more reasonable—to begin with. A woman's choices thus manifest what Aristotle calls intelligent appetition, *orexis dianoētikē*, as distinguished from appetitive intelligence (1139b4–5).

POLITICAL AND DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN EXCELLENCE

Spiritedness is the political passion par excellence. Political order, according to Aristotle, does not arise directly in response to human desire, nor is it merely an artifact of reason's calculation of the most expedient means to satisfy desire. On the contrary, the rise and fall of political constitutions can be best understood as a result of the spirited reactions of some to what they perceive to be the inequitable desires of others (*Politics* 1281a11–1b21, 1301b26–40; see also Zuckert 1988, 2–4). But the thymotic temperament is a two-edged sword. Spiritedness enables one to ignore the clamoring of appetite, but it can also cause one to turn a deaf ear to reason. It is responsible for the barbarism of cyclopean patriarchy, Ajax's curt and self-destructive dismissal of Tecmessa, and the warping of even the best men when they rule. Yet Aristotle acknowledges that *thymos* is *aēttēton* or unbeatable (*Politics* 1328a7). It follows, as we have seen, that only *thymos* can contend with *thymos*. So the presence of spiritedness in human communities is as indispensable as it is dangerous. Apart from the spirited passion for "getting even," the search for justice might never be initiated. But this passion must be governed. Simply to unleash the furies of vengeance would be disastrous. Because the family is not equipped to provide such government (at least not in the case of its most spirited male), it falls to the polis to adjudicate justice and thus to rein in vigilantism and private "score settling." This is a fundamental lesson that the Greek tragedians taught virtually as a matter of civic religion to the entire Athenian populace, and it is of no less currency to us today (see Euben 1982).

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[12] Others, like Fortenbaugh, fail to pay sufficient attention to the vulnerabilities of the male deliberative faculty to the irrational force of *thymos* (Garside 1971, 534–37; Horowitz 1976, 211; Smith 1983, 476–77). Whatever their other merits, these accounts consequently shed no light on the basis upon which Aristotle can single out the female deliberative faculty as peculiarly lacking in authority.

In its government of *thymos*, the political community ameliorates the problem of cyclopean patriarchy. In his account of the natural evolution of human communities, Aristotle indicates that the transition from the patriarchal rule of kings to the reciprocal rule of fellow citizens occurs as the political community comes to exist in its finality (*Politics* 1252b19–33). We may infer that the conversion of patriarch into citizen is an essential component of the work of politics. Of course, an exceptionally spirited female has the same need to temper her *thymos* as does a typical man. Such a woman might be inclined to be overbearing toward her children, for example. But the husband of such a woman, provided the two of them are not unnaturally yoked, will be even more thymotic than she is. He will be able to overrule and thus curb her spirit. So even unusually thymotic women can find all the therapy they need within a rightly ordered household. But whether the man of the house exercises his thymotic superiority in accordance with domestic justice or merely "lays down the law" cyclopes-fashion depends ultimately upon his success in learning to govern *his own* thymotically based patriarchal proclivities. This is a lesson that the man is not apt to learn within the naturally constituted household, owing to the undisputed dominance of his own *thymos* in that setting. But in political life (where one prevails by persuading other spirited males to share a common interest, which only *logos* can clarify) unbridled *thymos* can be a distinct liability (1253a14–15). Even the most competitive male may learn in politics that *thymos* must be restrained if *logos* is to be heard. Nothing like this occurs in the soul of the patriarch, who prevails by force and never submits his autonomous will to the authority of any higher good. Once again, Homer's cyclopes define the type. Each lays down the law to his own family, and literally counts for nothing to the others; there are no hearths within their individual caves, and among them there is no deliberative assembly (*Odyssey* 9.112, 273–78). Prior to the coming into being of the polis, the household exists in a primitive form; but it is only after the political community has come into existence that Aristotle describes the household as finished or perfected (cf. *oikia prōte, Politics* 1252b10 with *oikia de teleios*, 1253b4). Indeed, the household apart from the polis is a household only nominally (1253a18–25). Thus, by assisting more elementary human communities in the realization of their own natural perfection, the political community promotes the human good.

In this light it would appear absurd to view citizenship as some kind of prize granted exclusively to men in recognition of their supposed moral or intellectual superiority to women. Citizenship is more like a therapy than a trophy. Certainly, the polis has need of wise judges and assemblymen. But partriarchalism is itself an obstacle to the development of such wisdom. So the amelioration of patriarchy via civic activity serves political purposes, too. Of course, civic activity cannot work miracles. But Aristotle makes the most of its salutary influence by also requiring, in his best regime, that all men undergo the discipline of military training before coming of age to head their own households; as he repeatedly observes, one learns to rule by first learning to be ruled (*Politics* 1332b35–33a3, 1277b7–13). Moreover, the ages of marital consent are determined to promote marital harmony, which will be more enduring if man and wife reach the limits of their procreative capacities at approximately the same time (1334b37–35a29). The chief policy implication of this consideration, is to require men to postpone marriage. Specifically, Aristotle recommends that marriage should be postponed for the man until the age of 37 and for the woman until the age of 18, not only for the sake of procreation but also to provide for the woman's growth in excellence (1334b29–35a29). Just as the wife who enters marriage at this age will be more sensible than before, so her husband will be less irascible and better able to govern his own *thymos*. Thus, in the best polity, women have time *and* the political activity of men on their side in the battle to get the patriarch out of the household.

A civilized man will find repellent the barbaric practices in which women occupy the same rank as slaves. But even his respect for his wife's human equality in no way entails the necessity that she should play a role in politics. Yet, we tend today to overlook this and to protest the exclusion of women from politics as a matter of principle. The problem is that the principle in question derives from an unduly simplistic conception of justice—the abstract demand that what is good for the gander be good for the goose. The appeal of this principle diminishes, however, the more one learns about ganders and geese. On the basis of his own understanding of men and women, Aristotle countenances the historical restriction of citizenship to men. In itself, this restriction is not surprising. Citizenship was thus restricted in ancient times because the polis first arose as a partnership of male-dominated clans and villages (*Politics* 1252b20–21, 1280b40–81a1). But this restriction is also *fitting*, according to Aristotle's argument, because political activity serves to moderate the very *thymos* responsible for such patriarchal vestiges of primitive life. Aristotle consequently speaks only of the male human being, the *anēr*, as a citizen. He never speaks of women as citizens except once, when he is reporting the view of others who attempt to define citizenship by genealogy. But even in this purely analytical role the conception of woman as citizen ends in failure (1275b30–34). Sexism, of course, has nothing to do with the philosopher's terminology in this matter. Though Aristotle speaks only of the *anēr* as citizen, he just as consistently eschews sexually exclusive language when he speaks of *theōria*, the activity that constitutes a life distinctly superior to the political life. In references to the theoretical life, he speaks only of the *anthropos*, the human being (see, e.g., *Ethics* 1177b16–78b32).

It remains true that "*phronēsis* alone is the virtue peculiar to a ruler" (*Politics* 1277b25–26). Some have concluded on the basis of this passage that women must participate in the government of the polis if they are to cultivate the virtue of practical wisdom. But Aristotle does not imply this at all, for he says nothing that restricts the experience of ruling to civic office. To suppose that he does is to err in overlooking the ruling offices available within the household. Of course, those who would homogenize the natural modes of rule into a unitary conception of government will pronounce such blindness visionary. But we must remember that this unitary conception of government is at odds with Aristotle's pluralist understanding of the best *politeia*. It is in a regime that reflects and enhances the natural differentiation of society that Aristotle expects women and men to have the best chance of achieving the human good. Domestic offices must be preserved in their integrity; they must not be absorbed by an expansive polis. Certain of these domestic ruling offices are especially congenial to the human excellence of women. Women's more nurturing temperament equips them to rule in matters relating to the physical and emotional welfare of their own family. Moreover, it is a principle of domestic justice not of male largesse, that a husband render such matters to his wife's government (*Ethics*, 1160b33–35). The very earthiness of the domestic responsibilities entrusted to women defies (nay, mocks) the stateman's retreat to the abstract formulas of political ideology. Household office is indeed occupied with necessities; but this grappling with necessity renders indispensable, and so cannot help but exercise, an ability for governing the tension between higher and more urgent goods. The execution of a woman's domestic responsibilities demands an exercise of practical wisdom no less vigorous than the one demanded by her husband's offices in the city. The political community plays a supporting role in household matters, not by substituting its own authority for that of the domestic community, but by preparing men to defer to the authority of sex complementarity and so to submit, where fitting, to the rule of their wives. Where political activity has reoriented man's *thymos* toward a higher source of law than his own will, he will be better able to appreciate his wife as a partner in a common work, to learn from her, and to rejoice in her proper excellence (1162a25–27). Indeed, if women can achieve genuine human virtue (and can achieve it in the context of domestic life), the friendship between husband and wife can be of the very highest order, based upon virtue and not merely upon pleasure and utility. Friendship thus permeates the naturally perfected household. Thanks to its existence, the woman has no need to vie with her husband in order to get his attention. In politics, and in other competitive enterprises, one must compete to be regarded. But in a household ensconced within a civilized polity, the husband acknowledges that it is not his prerogative to "lay down the law." On the contrary, it is up to him to see that his wife shares in the exercise of rule. But if the woman were to attempt to rule *outside* the home, the strength of *thymos* and the lack of affinity of the males there would hinder the practical execution of her good counsel. Her opportunity to exercise *phronēsis* would be constrained by the natural social dynamics that favor male domination. Friendship, which exists in these settings only in a diluted form, will be too weak to attenuate these dynamics (*Politics* 1262b7–24). In such circumstances, a few of the most spirited women might attain a position within which their capacity for practical wisdom could come to fruition. But it would be ill advised for a general population of women to hang their aspirations for human excellence upon the prospect of success in politics or in other competitive struggles with men. Aristotle's best regime provides a criterion for the critique of political or cultural institutions that encourage such expectations. The *politeia* should not promise what nature will not permit it to deliver.

Finally, let us keep in mind Aristotle's observation that "although there are many forms of rulers and ruled, it is always the case that the better rule is that which is exercised over better subjects" (*Politics* 1254a24–26; see also 1315b5–6, 1333b27–28, 1334a27–29). In other words, the measure of loftiness of office is the character, not the number, of one's subjects. On this basis, we find that the woman exercises a most noble dominion. For in the matters appropriate to her natural temperament, she rules not only her children but herself and her husband. The government of the statesman has no better subjects.

CONCLUSION

In his various remarks on the sexes, Aristotle consistently seeks to illuminate what is perhaps the most fundamental truth about man and woman, namely, that the existence of each presupposes the community of both. The phenomenon of sex complementarity thus serves as both the foundation and the touchstone of Aristotle's appreciation of women. Above all, Aristotle's account of sex complementarity adumbrates the fundamental equality of men and women as human beings. Both men and women possess the dianoetic soul-principle, which distinguishes human beings from other animals, yet neither deserves special credit for its presence in the procreation of offspring.

Sex complementarity also involves certain temperamental differences between men and women. These differences exist for the sake of species preservation, but their integration in the human soul is such that they permeate mankind's higher callings as well. As a consequence, human excellence will be differently inflected in men and women. Women's virtue, then, is neither higher nor lower than a man's—just as the feminine form of an adjective is neither more nor less grammatical than the masculine form. In keeping with their complementary roles in procreation, men tend temperamentally to be more spirited than women. So the husband in a naturally constituted procreative partnership will be more hegemonic than his wife. But unbridled hegemony leads to the patriarchal dictatorship of the dominant male. Aristotle deplores this prospect. He likens the patriarchal dictator to Homer's barbarous cyclops, who "lays down the law to his offspring and bedmates." By contrast, the hallmark of civilization consists in the recognition that in freedom woman is the equal of man. This freedom is not a license to do as one pleases, which would merely replicate and perpetuate the patterns of domination typical of cyclopean barbarism. True freedom, Aristotle indicates, is coeval with the generosity or liberality of spirit that recognizes the work of procreation as an enterprise fundamentally different from the self-centered pursuits with which one is otherwise occupied. On the basis of Aristotle's analysis of the rudiments of human freedom and slavery, we may conclude that genuine liberty presupposes the good order of the household.

Far from being an enemy to the interests of women, Aristotle seeks to promote their genuine liberation by combating the patriarchal complacency that impedes the good order of the household. Citizenship plays an important role in this combat. Nothing in Aristotle's analysis suggests that participation in civic activities is a sign of moral or intellectual superiority. On the contrary, his endorsement of an all-male citizenry derives from an appreciation of the perils of the thymotic temperament and of the prospects for its amelioration through the uncyclopean activity of civic deliberation. Political participation is critical to the functioning of the civic community, to be sure, but it by no means constitutes the best life for a human being. Nevertheless, Aristotle bolsters the popular standing of the political life, venturing at times to camouflage the manifest failures of Spartan civic education in order to oppose the still worse faults of cyclopean patriarchy. It would be quite mistaken, then, to claim that a patriarchal desire to perpetuate sexual inequality motivates Aristotle's criticism of the scheme of civic unification proposed by Plato's Socrates. The truth is simpler. Aristotle seeks to discover the circumstances most conducive to the cultivation of human excellence and thus to the achievement of human happiness. These circumstances subsist, he finds, in a regime of constitutional pluralism, where the integrity of the household is preserved and the polis plays its indispensable supporting role. Such a regime would provide the firmest institutional foundation for the flourishing of excellence in, and hence for the increase of friendship between, men and women.

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The Ethical Individual: An Historical Alternative to Contemporary Conceptions of the Self

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In this article I offer an historically situated model of the self as an alternative to liberal, communitarian, and Foucauldian conceptions. Through the example of John Milton, I show that the conscience gave rise to a self that was jointly individual and ethical. By participating in public debates at the behest of his conscience, Milton recognized himself as an individual possessor of moral authority. Conscience thus liberated Milton from traditional identifications and beliefs as it bound him to act for his society. The self founded on conscience therefore differs from both communitarian and liberal variants. Moreover, whereas conscience in the Foucauldian account renders the self docile, it empowers the self in my account. I conclude that the self predicated on conscience challenges the divisions between private and public realms, self-regarding and prosocial actions, and self-creating and culturally determined persons.

Discerning hitherto hidden forms of domination has become a popular goal of academic investigations. Power, we now see, courses through spatial orientations, language, and bearings of the body. It does not reside solely or primarily in institutions, the traditionally recognized loci of authority. Coincident with this attention to the modes and dispersion of social control is widespread acknowledgment of the cultural components of identity, including the idea of personal identity itself. Joining these two issues, certain kinds of self-conception can be understood as a means of governance. This line of thinking, spawned by Michel Foucault, casts the supposedly self-possessing individual as a conflicted character, unknowingly serving societal goals as it "freely" governs itself (e.g., F. Barker 1984; Miller 1993; Tully 1988). Christian and liberal ideologies, most prominently, created a self with an alien administrator inside. Instead of lauding the modern individual as a being liberated from overtly oppressive regimes and mentalities, we lament the obedient subject produced by subtler mechanisms of control yet proud of its "self-determination."

The issues of identity and governance are also central to the debate between liberalism and communitarianism. The latter challenges the liberal notion of the rational and self-defining individual with the idea of the social construction of the self. Instead of an autonomous and self-interested being—the staple of liberal thought from John Locke to John Rawls—communitarians propose selves steeped in society, founded in history. With this purview, a modern self may, for instance, modify its individualism by recognizing its reliance on others, on a particular culture, and on the past. Along this line, Charles Taylor aims to revive the modern self by retrieving its moral ideal from the histories of philosophy and literature. Once retrieved, a conception of the moral individual will, he claims, counter egoism and "help us restore our practice" (1992, 23).

Foucault sees the modern individual as the product of new forms of social control but, like its predecessors, essentially a subject of systems of power. Western culture, in his view, is marked by continuity: It has always constituted selves by subjugation (1988, 16–49). Taylor, on the other hand, selects modernity as his primary horizon, as do liberal theorists implicitly. He focuses on an ideal—authenticity—that "decisively undermined socially derived identifications" and then works to reinsert the "inwardly generated" individual into society (1992, 47).[1] In other words, he begins with what he criticizes—a self that conceives of itself as a being apart from society—and then attempts to correct this conception. For Taylor, the boundary between modernity and its ancestors is especially salient.

I shall question the sufficiency of these theories by presenting a conception of self based on an analysis of a political pamphlet written by John Milton at a pivotal period in the history of modernity. This conception of a self predicated on conscience casts doubt on Foucault's claim of continuity in what he considers to be central mechanisms of social control and provides an historically grounded alternative to both liberal and communitarian theories of the self.[2] Seventeenth-century England, a point of transition between traditional and modern worlds, broadly defined, gave rise to a type of ethical individual that Milton exemplifies. Between the corporate identity formed by a traditionally organized society and the autonomous and self-creating individual of modernity—between institutional authority from above and individual authority from within—there was occasion for the conscientious self.

Unlike the self-absorbed beings quelled by technologies of power, this self was radically disruptive through the very media—confession and inner discipline—that, according to Foucault, produced docility. Correspondingly, my analysis of the effects of conscience signifi-

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[1] Taylor, of course, acknowledges earlier contributions to the modern self, explicating them in his monumental *Sources of the Self* (1989). This acknowledgment, however, only underscores the significance of his emphasis on authenticity instead of other ethics in the companion volume. It should be added that Taylor does not discuss the type of self explained here.

[2] Nederman (1992) also offers an historical model that unites elements of the two theories, even though it is more akin to communitarianism than liberalism, but it derives from the history of theory rather than the history of practice.

cantly differs from that of Foucault. In his view, the examination of conscience and its corollary, confession, simultaneously individualized subjects, extended power over the soul, and essentially eliminated any capacity to criticize social norms (1979, 170; idem 1990, chaps. 3–4). Like other techniques of power/knowledge, these methods of generating obedience were hidden and self-sustaining. The normalized subject "inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection" (1979, 202–3). Self-investigation and self-representation became means of self-subjection, and disciplinary power—mechanisms of normalization—became invisible. While "self-punishment and the voluntary expression of the self are bound together" throughout the history of Christianity, "in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the disciplines became general formulas of domination" (Foucault 1988, 42; cf. idem 1979, 137). The self, in Foucault's account, is created by self-mutilating discourse.[3] Committed to its own evisceration—the modern, mental kind—the individual is disturbingly self-absorbed, the society, free from disruption. A public self-disclosure such as Milton's, personally empowering and radical in intent, is difficult to understand in these terms.[4]

The conscientious self is also distinct from liberal and communitarian conceptions. Unlike the self of liberal theory who, in Michael J. Sandel's (1982) analysis, is antecedently individuated and rationally chooses ends, the individual founded on conscience was constituted over time through actions that were not always or fully a matter of choice. Instead of the isolated, self-interested, disembodied liberal individual, endowed with free will, we see a self compelled to engage in social practices for the good of the community against its own inclinations—a self, in short, forged through its culture, communitarian in terms of ontology and values.[5] Unlike the self conceptualized by communitarians, however, this self relied upon what have come to be seen as liberal ideals.

Although the conscientious self was formed by its context, it was not, to use Sandel's phrase, "radically situated," for the chaotic qualities of the revolution defied simple determinacies. The conception of self offered here allows for indeterminacies; the ideas attributed to conscience cannot always be neatly explained with reference to their context. In its own mind, the self founded on conscience was jointly individual and moral. To reconcile individual identity with moral obligation, as many theorists now aim to do, it is helpful to look to the history of ethical practices, to a point at which morality and the idea of the individual were not only not opposed but were positively fused.[6]

ILLUMINATING THEORY BY STUDYING PRACTICE

During the seventeenth century, England was ruptured by civil war, releasing an uncertainty associated with options. People doubted not only the officials and policies of the church and state but also the legitimacy of the institutions themselves. The world was, in many respects, "turned upside down."[7] A revolution of this magnitude can test and extend theories of the social construction of the self, for it offers a case in which the most evident "constructive" forces—those that had to some degree shaped England's inhabitants—were assaulted and irreparably damaged. In addition, this is an appropriate event through which to evaluate modern theories of the self, for it was an attempt to replace a monarchy with a representative government. When the traditional sources of knowledge, authority, and identity became uncertain and unstable and notions of the free individual attained some prominence, how were people identified to themselves and others? How, if at all, did established ideas operate when the powers that had ratified them were under siege?

I shall argue that the conscience—in one view, an invisible agent of social control that could damn and debilitate its possessor—could become the source of revolutionary actions and therewith a certain self. The conscience could become a personal center of knowledge and authority when the legitimacy of social institutions was seriously questioned.[8] Moreover, because conscience empowered its possessor to speak out, it contributed to the demise of institutional, as well as the rise of individual, authority. Thus, the self based upon conscience prompted and was prompted by extensive social dislocation. It contested the established social order and in doing so realized its capacity for self-governance. This self developed through particular practices that drew upon and gave meaning to the concept of conscience in a concrete historical context.[9]

In addition to its development through practices, one other characteristic of the individual predicated on conscience needs to be emphasized: This self was bound to the society from which it emerged. Because obeying conscience was a duty both to oneself and to one's country, self and society were essentially joined. In this respect, the conscientious individual was fundamentally different from the autonomous and egoistic version that plagues liberal theory and is attributed, largely, to seventeenth-century English political thought. Correspondingly, the ethical individualism that may be drawn from an examination of moral practices is antithetical to what has come to be called individualism.[10]

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[3] Some have found a positive model in Foucault's work. See, e.g., Coles 1992 and Hekman 1992.

[4] For other self-representations that demonstrate the radical potential of Protestant thought in England, see, e.g., the selections by Wentworth, Evans, and Cheevers in Graham et al. 1989.

[5] For a discussion of communitarian ontology and value communitarianism, see Frazer and Lacey 1993. Walzer (1990) dissects the theoretical and historical branches (and limitations) of the communitarian critique of liberalism. Although conscience was often associated with the soul or spirit, it was also discussed with language characteristic of the body. Phrases such as the "wound of conscience" suggest that it was akin, at least conceptually, to a physical being.

[6] For another method of overcoming this divide, see Crittendon 1992.

[7] The phrase "world turned upside down" was popularized by Hill (1975).

[8] Martin Luther's conception of conscience linked one's actions with one's identity (Baylor 1977). The seventeenth-century conception of conscience explained here secured that connection and added a sense of certainty with regard to one's beliefs. While Reformation thought, Calvinism in particular, contributed to the rational, liberal, individualized self, it is worth noting that Luther thought that the emotional component of the soul was as important as the rational (Baylor 1977, 209, 236; Weber 1958).

[9] Instead of positing a definition of conscience, I am attempting to uncover the meaning of conscience at a particular time. This meaning relies on earlier conceptions (Baylor 1977; Tentler 1977), but it is not, I think, strictly determined by them.

Attempts to understand the conscience, the self, and self-conception have often focused on what are typically considered to be theological, philosophical, or literary works because such writings may present more explicit discussions or fuller portraits than other kinds of texts (Greene 1991; Leites 1980; Taylor 1989). While these sources offer an understanding of a period's views, they often provide idealized formulations and are withdrawn to some degree from personal experiences. In other words, theoretical statements and imaginative literature do not necessarily represent the range of social thought or experience of a given time. Furthermore, such texts are usually dissociated, by their authors, from contingencies; they aim to stand at a remove from the fray of the moment.[11]

In contrast, the focus of my analysis—one of a series of pamphlets aiming to remedy an urgent social ill—is both a reflection upon actions by the actor himself and a political action in its own right.[12] Unlike the many seventeenth-century tracts that explicitly discussed conscience, Milton's pamphlet invokes it.[13] Because Milton explains past experiences and current dilemmas in this pamphlet, examining it through an interpretive lens exposes conscience as it was experienced. The exposure, of course, is limited, and the lens may not sharpen the image entirely, but such constraints, once acknowledged, advise caution, not withdrawal. My intent is that this explanation of identity and moral governance, based upon responses to an exigency, will complement studies based upon other types of sources, thus broadening our knowledge of the conscience while disclosing a conception of the self.[14]

The difficulties of attempting to understand another consciousness, and a consciousness of several hundred years ago, explain my focus on one author.[15] Because Milton questioned himself with rigor and answered himself in print, traces of his mind and its transformations may be perceived through a close examination of his thoughts, viewed in the context of his other actions over time. Because his political protest surprised him and because he sought to understand it, Milton provides an excellent example of a person who became self-authorizing and self-knowing through social action initiated by conscience. He is the model for a certain self that preceded and, I think, contributed to the modern individual, not because he later wrote a now-famous epic but because he wrote a few of the tens of thousands of tracts published around the time of the English Civil Wars. What distinguishes Milton from many other pamphleteers is his articulateness. This, combined with his persistent quest for self-knowledge, justifies the attention given to one of his works here.

In this study, Milton is meant to be neither entirely representative nor entirely anomalous relative to all others in seventeenth-century England. He is the basis for a conception of the self predicated on conscience, deduced from experiences at a certain point in history. He thus lends credence to this conception. A theory of the self based on the idea that persons are socially constructed and culturally situated should be able to demonstrate its validity with reference to practices. Without Milton or some other real person, the conception of a self that becomes individual through moral action could be just a fanciful dream. My analysis of Milton reveals not a moral ideal to which one could strive (although this, too, is a possibility) but a moral individual constituted by experiences. His case situates this conception of the self in the broad sweep of history. The change in consciousness instigated by his conscience helps us to understand the transition to modernity, for the type of self exemplified by Milton seems to participate in both the consciousness associated with a traditionally shaped identity and that of a modern individual. Although Milton is not necessarily the Everyman of seventeenth-century England, the fact that he was not a lone protester, along with the profound significance of conscience as an issue in the civil war, suggests that others who acted to reform England did so at the behest of their consciences and thereby recognized themselves as possessors of a new sort of authority. In other words, the explication of Milton offered here not only may add to social theory a conception of the self extrapolated from ethical actions but also may add to our history an understanding of actions that contributed to the development of modern political theory.

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[10] In the burgeoning literature on the subject, individualism usually means egoism. See, e.g., Fox-Genovese 1991; Gelpi 1989; Ketcham 1987. While Lukes 1973 is a helpful survey, it does not discuss the variant of individualism that I explain here.

[11] Even volumes of casuistry that clearly responded to contemporary dilemmas sought to exist above earthly contests.

[12] The conception of conscience explicated here is not, in my judgment, peculiar either to this pamphlet or to Milton. In principle, similar conclusions could be drawn from studies of other works. Related examples from some of Milton's other writings will be mentioned in the notes. In the body of the essay, however, I restrict my attention to a single text for two reasons: (1) The detailed textual analysis required for my argument would make the examination of multiple works impracticable in an article of this length, and (2) my primary aim is to develop a model of an ethical individual, not to demonstrate the prevalence of such individuals in a statistical sense.

[13] For a survey of discussions about conscience and casuistry, see Thomas 1993.

[14] Genre distinctions are to some degree arbitrary, and I certainly do not want to reify them. Ignoring them altogether, it can still be said that this sort of text has not been mined for a conception of the self and that it offers a helpful alternative to what has been discovered so far. While Walzer's (1965) exceptional study draws upon related material, it focuses on "the Calvinist conscience" and a collectively enforced "Puritan" discipline. The distinction between his work and mine will be discussed below.

[15] I realize that my language and method will seem anachronistic to some. However, I think it possible and potentially fruitful to attempt to understand the construction of a self and the meaning of its experiences with concepts and terms other than the omnivorous "discursive practices," which often precludes more than it illuminates. For a critical reading of "Milton's mind" approaches, see Armstrong and Tennenhouse 1992, chapter 1.

MILTON'S CONSCIENCE AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

Having identified himself as a poet, Milton was in Italy refining his talent when the controversy over church reform in England became particularly heated. He felt compelled to return to his country, leaving acquaintances who admired his poetry and studies preparatory to his cherished intent—writing an epic. Instead of poetry, Milton now wrote pamphlets arguing for a Presbyterian and against the prelatical order. Unlike the latter's claim to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, he reasoned, the former is firmly rooted in scripture, replicating the apostolic council drawn from all devout Christians. By adhering to ancient creed and the gospel instead of episcopal innovations, a Presbyterian church government would restore each Christian to "his right in the Church" (1959, 1:844). By imitating the papacy—emphasizing laws, elevating bishops, and forcing obedience—prelacy had not only corrupted the clergy but also created servile parishioners. Furthermore, it fomented schism in England, threatening to destroy the kingdom.

Milton thus joined the clamorous debate but after having written three tracts anonymously, he questioned the identity of the author. If he was a poet, why was he writing political prose? Why, moreover, had he relinquished "a calme and pleasing solitarynes fed with cherful and confident thoughts, to imbark in a troubl'd sea of noises and hoars disputes" (1959, 1:821)? In the fourth pamphlet, *The Reason of Church Government Urg'd against Prelaty*, Milton answers these questions. In the course of making an argument against the church hierarchy, he explains why he does so: "Concerning therefore this wayward subject against prelaty ... neither envy nor gall hath enterd me upon this controversy, but the enforcement of conscience only, and a preventive fear least the omitting of this duty should be against me when I would store up to my self the good provision of peacefull hours" (p. 806). Milton speaks publicly because of the "enforcement of conscience" and a "preventive fear," but who is this enforcer, and what or whom does Milton fear? He fears a voice in the future, condemning him for not having acted, and he quotes it, for it is, essentially, his authority: "Timorous and ingratefull ... God listen'd if he could heare thy voice amoung his zealous servants, but thou wert domb as a beast; from hence forward be that which thine own brutish silence hath made thee ... slothfull ... what before was thy sin, is now thy duty to be, abject, and worthlesse" (pp. 804–5). Whose voice is this? Who would condemn Milton for not having obeyed his conscience? Who authorizes his action?

The voice is Milton's own. He writes pamphlets because he anticipates what would happen if he did not; he fears self-hatred.[16] Milton foresees "what stories I should heare within my selfe, all my life after, of discourage and reproach.... These and such like lessons as these, I know would have been my Matins duly, and my Even-song" (1959, 1:804–5). Because his responses to his potential inaction replace ecclesiastical dictation, they must be revealed to readers so that they can know his alternative authority.[17] The individual's conscience has replaced the institution. While Protestant theology prepared this possibility, it did not effect its realization or anticipate the self obedient only to itself. Milton feels forced by his conscience to participate in public debates, but the enforcer is none other than Milton. Instead of God's wrath or the nation's scorn, the danger is self-condemnation, self-division, loss of self-reverence. Milton is compelled to write because he knows that he will not be able to affirm himself if he does not.[18] Self-regard is crucial. Obeying his conscience enables him to be coherent—in other words, to continue to regard himself favorably.

The actions effected by his conscience have, however, altered his consciousness—specifically, by altering his self-knowledge. In addition to deflecting him from his desired pursuit and his identity as poet, Milton's pamphleteering changes his self-conception positively as well, for he now sees himself as a moral authority. The process can be described as follows. Having acted against his desires in a manner that surprised him, Milton turned to look upon himself.[19] He saw a person who had spoken publicly and authoritatively although he had no official authority and had even been "Church-outed" (1959, 1:823). Therefore, he must, in himself, be authoritative.

The self founded on conscience is thus identified through practices not only by a scholarly observer who examines what remains of the action, the pamphlets, but also, upon reflection, by the self who performed it. The conception of this self follows from rather than precedes its experiences.[20] Milton's actions, initiated by his conscience, changed his self-knowledge. In *The Reason of Church Government*, he identifies his source of authority for writing prose, his conscience, as he identified himself, to himself and to readers, as a possessor of moral authority: The fourth antiprelatical tract was the first to which he affixed his name.

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[16] Along a similar line, Wilcox, studying devotional poetry, concludes that "an apparent conversation with God is often in fact an attempt to find a mediating language between parts of the self" (1990, 84).

[17] While it may seem as if I am naïvely and uncritically taking Milton at his word, this is not the case. There are reasons for accepting his explanation of his motives, for believing, in other words, that his appeal to conscience is not a self-interested stratagem to hide a lust for acclaim. In addition to the fact that he presented the first three antiprelatical tracts anonymously, the account expected from a self-interested person should be considered. Such a person, I think, would not think of appealing to him- or herself to dismiss the charge of self-interest. A concern other than the self, such as God or the nation, would seem to be "good" and un-self-interested in the mind of a self-serving schemer. One could, of course, still see Milton's reference to conscience as a clever, disingenuous play for the audience's psyche, since conscience was a catchword, but England was far from agreement on the value of conscience as the preeminent authority, so that that tactic would not, according to self-interest, be entirely sound. My acceptance of Milton's explanation of his political action does not entail a rejection of arguments about his adoption of literary and theological models in the pamphlets (Wittreich 1974) or his later enthusiasm for prose (Loewenstein 1990). In fact, my argument about his newly discovered authority supports these discussions about the self-consciousness of his later political writing.

[18] Arthur Barker offers another view: "The enthusiastic belief that the completion of England's reformation would bring with it the long-sought release of his poetical powers swept Milton into the ecclesiastical controversy" (1942, 17).

[19] This sort of reflection seems to differ from the confirmatory and critical types explained by Alejandro (1993, 96) because it entails both an acknowledgment and a transformation.

[20] Interestingly, the self-investigation itself becomes a subject of Milton's queries: "For if I be either by disposition, or what other cause too inquisitive, or suspitious of my self and mine own doings, who can help it?" (1959, 1:804). In some respects, the self-conception and sense of

Milton's identity as an ethical actor and his awareness of this identity developed through a notable component of his culture, conscience, and through responses to a critical social issue over time, much as a communitarian theory of the self might predict. Selves do not exist outside of cultivating contexts but are constituted by their actions, directed toward their conceptions of the good, within them. Conscience, Foucauldians would add, forced Milton to act against his inclinations. Mechanisms of social control subjugate personal desires. Yet Milton recognized his new identity as his own—his own as opposed to the church's or the state's. Conscience gave him a fairly liberal self-conception. Sensing a power within himself, he argued against moral uniformity and institutional encroachments on individual rights.[21]

Neither the liberal, nor the communitarian, nor the Foucauldian theory of the self completely describes Milton, for he wrote the antiprelatical tracts because he both possessed and was possessed by his conscience. It freed him from external powers, civil and divine, by providing an alternative source of authority and identity. It enabled him to possess himself and to be conscious of himself as self-possessing. While conscience thus liberated Milton, it also bound him, for it compelled him to participate in England's affairs. By urging the public enactment of its imperatives, conscience integrated Milton with society.[22]

Given this conception of conscience, *The Reason of Church Government* can be seen as both a self-authorized self-representation that affirms Milton and a self-defense against a possible, future, Milton—one who decided not to respond to his conscience. The pamphlet is a means both of continuing to possess himself—to remain a coherent individual—and of dispossessing or exorcising himself. His conscience holds him together by threatening to divide him.[23] It disciplines him, given his own definition of discipline: "She is that which with her musicall cords preserves and holds all the parts thereof together" (1959, 1:751). Holding the parts of the self together—avoiding the madness of incoherence—is the primary requirement of the individual founded on conscience.[24]

Admittedly, this self is not entirely free, for Milton is bound to his conscience, but this is, in some respects, liberating.[25] He is not only freed from civil and ecclesiastical laws but also freed for (or forced to accept) a new self-reverence, an altered consciousness, and future activism—a new self. Milton writes to preclude self-damnation, but his conscience is, ultimately, empowering. He continued to speak publicly, pronouncing both his own heresies and freedom for heresy.[26] Once he recognized himself as a moral authority, he continued to act as one, perhaps with even greater certainty of the validity of his ideas.[27]

Even though it forced its possessor to act for the good of society, conscience favored the individual at the expense of social stasis. Personal coherence was prior in importance to social order. This does not, however, mean that conscience was a private matter, for one quieted one's conscience by speaking out in the service of civic reform. In Michael Walzer's analysis of English Protestantism, the public or political and the personal are parallel but not inherently joined phenomena—the revolution a "duplicate of [the Puritans'] internal spiritual conflicts" (1965, 290). By linking self-conception with social action directly, however, the conscience and the self predicated on it were fundamentally and jointly personal and public.[28]

The "saints" discussed by Walzer differ from Milton in

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moral authority that follow from social protest are similar to MacIntyre's "internal goods" that "can only be identified and recognized by the experience of participating in the practice in question" (1984, 188–89). Political dissent, however, does not square with the obedience to rules and acceptance of authority requisite for a practice in MacIntyre's view.

[21] Milton's ideas about church reform are fairly transferable to the political and "private" realms. His writings on ecclesiastical, civil, and domestic liberty are consistent with one another. His argument against moral uniformity and for the liberty of conscience raises the issue of toleration, typically considered to be a liberal concern. Although a satisfactory discussion of conscience and toleration is beyond my scope here, it should be noted that my interpretation of conscience in Milton's thought suggests that his conception of toleration is more active than passive. Given his encouragements regarding public speech in *Areopagitica*—that it is almost ignoble to remain silent—toleration must be more than avoidance. In other words, one cannot simply allow those with whom one disagrees to exist. One should tolerate one's opponents by actually attending to their ideas. We are exhorted "to hear with patience and humility those, however they be miscall'd, that desire to live purely, in such a use of Gods Ordinances, as the best guidance of their conscience gives them, and to tolerat them, though in some disconformity to our selves" (1959, 2:561). Since the "survay of vice is . . . necessary to the constituting of human vertue," the "sad friends of Truth" may be enemies with one another—enemies willing to cooperate by listening (pp. 516, 549). See Kishlansky (1981) for a similar conception of active toleration.

[22] This integration with society was not normalization, for it occurred through criticizing the previously established and now fractured society in an attempt to change it.

[23] Milton's conscience is thus different from the contemporary divided conscience described by Walzer (1994, 97). It is not one of one's multiple selves: It contains one's selves over time, and it is prior to others in importance. Milton is self-divided—he wishes to write poetry and is compelled to act politically—but the conscience, the source of the latter, also resolves the more threatening potential schism of the self, that which would result in self-division. In this respect, Milton's conscience is not itself divided. Rather, it holds the parts of the self together.

[24] While the implications of conscience for madness lie beyond the reach of this essay, self-division and dissociation from the collectivity could occasion what we would call mental illness. See McDonald 1981 and, for a view somewhat different from my own, Sawday 1990.

[25] As Stanley Fish has noted, Milton presents a freedom defined by constraint in *De doctrina christiana* 1.27 and *Paradise Lost* 8.610–11 (personal correspondence).

[26] *The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, clearly heretical, was shortly followed by *Areopagitica*, his famous tract against censorship (Milton 1959, vol. 2).

[27] Webber, examining all five antiprelatical tracts (written from 1641 to 1642), sees "a development of self-consciousness or self-confidence that culminates in the last two of the series" (1968, 185).

[28] Attempts to associate conscience with one realm only may be imposing a twentieth-century understanding on a seventeenth-century phenomenon. The title of Morrill, Slack, and Woolf (1993)—*Public Duty and Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England*—attests to

several other respects, all of which are instructive. The English saints were born in exile, cutting their teeth on Calvinism and social structural innovation in Geneva a century before Milton's political protest. Although sainthood blurred the distinction between public and private, the relevant collectivity was the congregation of the elect. This meant that all were ruled, body and soul, by a collective and impersonal discipline. Consequently, a sense of self conformed to the communal ideology.[29] These characteristics continued to mark the Puritans after their return to England and throughout the revolution. Like the self exemplified by Milton, the new personality that Walzer discerns in the saints was not forged by tradition and was therefore inclined toward what Walzer calls radical politics. Milton, however, was not a Calvinist and would have bridled at the collective discipline of the saints in addition to their low regard for literary pursuits.[30] Furthermore, Milton's conscience—the foundation of his new moral identity—begins to stir when he is out of England, not because separation allows him to think freely (as was the case with the exiled congregations) but because he considered himself to be an Englishman. Milton seems to represent a step between the saints, who were formed by the discipline of a collectivity as they examined their individual souls, and their liberal counterparts, the self-controlling individuals who expose themselves to the state (and, more recently, to Foucault).[31] He fuses the discipline associated with Protestantism (the moral collectivity in his case is England) with the individual authority associated with liberalism without falling prey to either godly conformity or self-interest. This middle ground needs to be distinguished from these alternatives.

While it is clear that Milton did not consider himself to be subject to the king (he later justified deposing an unlawful ruler and served as an official in the commonwealth), the claim he is self-authorizing, rather than governed by God, requires further scrutiny, because Milton believed that he followed God's will.[32] In addition, it is necessary to explain why the self founded on conscience is distinct from the self-interested being of the possessive individualism associated with seventeenth-century political thought.[33] These two propositions can be addressed together.

Milton thinks that it is God's will and not his own interest that guides him, because he knows himself. This explanation may sound circular, but it is sensible if one considers distinctions between God's will and self-will, conscientious action and worldly ambition, and self-knowledge and "un-self-knowing" ideas. Milton draws these distinctions in explaining his authority for *The Reason of Church Government* and in discrediting the prelates.[34] He knows that he serves God through prose and that he would prefer to serve God through poetry. He also knows what would be self-serving, namely, satisfying private desires as he thinks the prelates do. Because he knows what would be self-interested and that it differs from what he does, he believes that his actions are willed by God. By knowing himself and the various ways he could act, Milton knows how he does act.

Two purposes are served by the distinction between doing God's will and doing one's own and the division of the former into actions to which one is favorably inclined and those which one would rather avoid. First, the analyses verify the purity of Milton's motive and thus uphold the tract's moral authority. Second, they indicate his self-knowledge, which supports both his argument and my own. By revealing his "inward prompting" to write poetry, specifically "something so written to aftertimes, as they should not willingly let it die" (1959, 1:810), Milton shows that his prose is not self-interested. By considering the counterfactual case, he demonstrates self-knowledge and further deflects the charge that he is pleasing himself:

> If I hunted after praise by the ostentation of wit and learning, I should not write thus out of mine own season, when I have neither yet compleated to my minde the full circle of my private studies . . . or were I ready to my wishes, it were a folly to commit any thing elaborately compos'd to the carelesse and interrupted listening of these tumultuous times. Next if I were wise only to mine own ends, I would certainly take such a subject as of it self might catch applause, whereas this hath all the disadvantages on the contrary, and such a subject as the publishing whereof might be delayd at pleasure, and time enough to pencill it over with all the curious touches of art, even to the perfection of a faultlesse picture, whenas in this argument the not deferring is of great moment to the good speeding, that if solidity have leisure to doe her office, art cannot have much.
>
> Lastly, I should not chuse this manner of writing wherein knowing my self inferior to my self, led by the genial power of nature to another task, I have the use, as I may account it, but of my left hand. (pp. 807–8)

Because his pamphleteering is not motivated by "some self-pleasing humor of vainglory" (p. 806)—because it is not in accordance with his will to write poetry—it must be in accordance with God's.

As stated, however, the opposition does not really correspond with the types of Milton's writing, for it conflates poetry, his preferred way of pleasing God, with self-service. Therefore, he must explain that as a poet, too, "there ought no regard be sooner had, then to Gods glory, by the honour and instruction of my country" (1959, 1:810). Milton understands the concept of self-interest as it is later illustrated by Thomas Hobbes: To

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the strength of the dichotomy even though some of its contributions question the divide.

[29] For a sense of this, see Cohen 1986.

[30] This is not to suggest that all of the so-called Puritans were Calvinists.

[31] Walzer describes the relationship between the Puritans and Lockean selves, marking them as important nodes. His language in *The Revolution of the Saints*, however, suggests that Milton represents a distinctive moment too—a culmination of something from the saints: "And one day a lay intellectual like Milton" (p. 147), "Calvinist thinking . . . culminated eventually . . . in the radical views of Milton" (p. 185), "the position at which Milton finally arrived" (p. 196).

[32] See *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* for Milton's argument on tyrannicide (1959, vol. 3).

[33] Macpherson (1962) is primarily responsible for the connection.

[34] Milton also uses these distinctions in *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* to question the supposed authority of civil and ecclesiastical officials and in *Eikonoklastes* to refute Charles I's claim of conscience in *Eikon Basilike* (1959, vol. 3).

be self-interested is to act without positive regard for God and country, to act as if one is fundamentally separated from others. The self-serving individual fits the liberal conception of the self. It does not, however, match Milton's self-conception. He therefore needs, for his self-regard, the caveat about his poetry's end. Discussing poetry, however, also serves another purpose—revealing the possession that sets him apart from others.

Milton writes the present pamphlet to preclude actually hearing the chastising voice that he has transcribed from the future, but the tract also offers the opportunity to let readers hear what he has said to himself about his future work. Unlike the voice he has quoted, his thoughts about his poetic ability and the epic are not from an unrealized time. Oddly perhaps, he knows more about himself and what he has not written than he does about himself and what he is writing because the former have been considered for a longer time. Milton knows his ability better than his conscience, and self-knowledge is important for his argument. Disclosing his poetic inclinations also exhibits an authority aside from his conscience, for "these abilities, wheresoever they be found, are the inspired gift of God rarely bestow'd ... and are of power beside the office of a pulpit, to imbreed and cherish in a great people the seeds of vertu, and publick civility" (1959, 1:816). While this passage suggests that poetic talent can be traced to God, Milton also aligns himself with "the greatest and choycest wits of *Athens, Rome*, or modern *Italy*, and those Hebrews of old," adding that "being a Christian" is "over and above" his predecessors' endowments (p. 812). Literary ability is a legitimate source of authority apart from religion, and it is an authority that Milton wants to invoke.[35]

Conscience, on the other hand, seems to be firmly linked with God in Milton's mind: it is God's "Secretary" (1959, 1:822). Because conscience enabled an individual to act in the place of an institution, however, we must ask whether conscience enabled a person to act in the place of God. Although Milton did not consider himself to be supplanting God, his identification of conscience with his own voice strongly suggests that his own self was identified with God. The revelation of conscience, apparently of knowledge from God, is actually self-recognition. Furthermore, the peculiarity of Milton's beliefs—of what conscience transmitted—indicates that his God was not the same as the one widely accepted during his lifetime. Even granting the diversity of Christian deities in seventeenth-century England, Milton's remains an outlier. *De doctrina christiana*, written most likely between 1655 and 1665 but not discovered until 1823, was one of the few works that he did not publish during his lifetime, which suggests that he recognized the novelty of its theology. Indeed, an anonymous riposte to the account of godliness in his divorce tracts had called it "wilde, mad, and frantik divinite" (Parker 1940, 36). Upon seeing the first of these pamphlets, Bishop Hall "supposed some great wit meant to try his skill in the maintenance of this so wild, and improbable a paradoxe" (p. 79). Given his heresies and his identification of conscience with himself, it is reasonable to suggest that Milton finds God in whatever of moral import comes to him from within himself. Milton's conscience was a source of both his self-regard and his beliefs, neither of which can be reduced to self-interest or God.

Conscience is thus revelatory in two ways.[36] It conveys the particular moral knowledge that constitutes Milton's identity, and it reveals Milton to himself as a possessor of moral authority: It provides him with moral knowledge and authorizes him to pronounce it. At a time of societal uncertainty, it was Milton's certainty and also his explanation for his certainty. Conscience seems to account for the indeterminacies of the age, at least in the minds of those who invoked it. In the absence of secure social moorings, a person's identity could be centered by conscience, but because conscience bound individuals to themselves, they could be adrift from others. Due to the relative peculiarity of his ideas, Milton was separated, to a significant degree, from the traditional beliefs and identifications of his culture. Combined with the new self-conception effected by his conscience, this distinction led him to recognize himself as a definite individual, a step in the direction of liberal thought. What defined him as an individual, however, was his morality, which was sharply focused, in his perspective, by his attempts to serve his country's needs. The incipient liberal self emerges with clearly communitarian concerns in a manner explained by the communitarians. Elements of both of these theories are evident in Milton's self-conception and the type of self that he represents.

In addition to holding the self together in the midst of societal uncertainty, thereby separating it from traditional social ties, conscience binds the parts of the self over time. While conscience changes its possessor's consciousness by initiating action that results in an altered self-conception, the self thus revealed is not entirely new. Because it brings an awareness of time not only following but also prior to its revelatory command, conscience serves a temporal function. It is a means of recognizing both a voice from the future and one's identity from the past. Conscience first engenders self-consciousness through action (becoming aware of oneself as an actor) and then urges self-knowledge (figuring out who the agent is). Milton is struck by consciousness of his conscience, and then of himself as an individual possessor of moral authority, when his conscience compels him to respond to a social conflict. Yet the command issued by Milton's conscience does not completely disengage him from his previous self. In this respect, he seems less to acquire information than to become aware of something that had been unarticulated.[37] The enforcement of conscience makes Milton turn away, temporarily, from his poetry. It does not, however, lead him to deny the self that he already knew. His conscience makes him conscious of himself as a person who has been moral from the past to the present, and this permanently changes his consciousness and self-conception. He continues to regard himself as a poet, begins to articulate his identity as a moral authority, and will be guided, henceforth, by both of these conceptions.

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[35] For an argument that poets like Milton "made the seriousness of their works depend on the seriousness of their own centered and self-knowing selves," see Helgerson 1983, 45.

[36] In my account, *revelation* and *reason* are socially defined. What is called revelatory or reasonable will be determined by the cultural context. For an analysis of revelation and reason in *The Reason of Church Government*, see Fish 1972.

[37] I make a similar argument regarding the Lady in Milton's masque in McCready 1993.

The past and present conceptions of his self are also directly connected, for the identity Milton had previously articulated, that of author, specifies how he should enact the commands of conscience: His social action will be writing. Since, in his mind, circumstances are not suitable for composing poetry, he writes prose. In addition to providing constancy from past to present, his conscience also sustains his constancy into the future. By anticipating a future self, conscience guides the present one. Milton's condemning voice from the future ensures that he will behave in a manner consistent with the ethical way in which he has behaved. The conscience thus produces coherence of the self over time. It brings cognizance of oneself as a temporal being and holds the parts of the self together diachronically and synchronically.

In *The Reason of Church Government*, Milton relates how he came to know his identity as poet. In writing this piece, he figures out who writes the antiprelatical tracts and why, and the answers are identified with one another—himself and his conscience. Milton's revelation through conscience transforms him, but the transformation is self-recognition.[38] Although conscience thus induces self-recognition, it also inhibits deliberate self-alteration. It helps to produce one characteristic of the liberal self—a sense of individual identity and authority—but prevents another—the capacity to choose ends and to conceive of oneself as choosing ends—from developing.

Although Milton was his own authority, he was not able to change himself. In fact, those who are able deliberately to do so draw his ire. As the contrast between his pamphlets and his intended poetry shows, Milton opposes himself by writing political prose. He does so because he opposes those who are making his country suffer. In contrast to himself and those "whose vertue is of an unchangeable grain," the prelates are self-serving and ultimately self-fashioning because they can dissemble to suit "the prevailing opinion of the age" (1959, 1:794). An opposition more crucial than that within Milton is that between people like Milton, who are self-knowing and willed by God, and the prelates, who are un-self-knowing, self-willed, and ambitious. Like the liberal self, self-willed people prefer themselves above others and act to advance their own interests. They may seem to be free and may think themselves to be free because they can change, but in Milton's mind, they are enslaved to the fluctuations of the world. Similarly, it could be argued that they know themselves doubly: They know what they desire and how to appear to an observer to get it. Milton, however, claims that they lack self-knowledge and knowledge of God, which is linked with self-knowledge through the conscience.

These distinctions serve both to question the prelates and to qualify Milton. His self-knowledge, exposed, argues for acceptance of his ideas concerning church government, for a person worthy of shaping discipline must be "a true knower of himselfe" (1959, 1:753).

> [Discipline] is so hard to be of mans making that we may see even in the guidance of a civill state to worldly happinesse, it is not for every learned, or every wise man, though many of them consult in common, to invent or frame a discipline, but if it be at all the worke of man, it must be of such a one as is a true knower of himselfe, and himselfe in whom contemplation and practice, wit, prudence, fortitude, and eloquence must be rarely met, both to comprehend the hidden causes of things, and span in his thoughts all the various effects that passion or complexion can worke in mans nature; and hereto must his hand be at defiance with gaine, and his heart in all vertues heroick. (ibid.)

Milton relates how he has sought "to comprehend the hidden causes" of his urges to write both poetry and prose. He explains his talent and tries to explain his conscience—to "say successfully that which in this exigent behoovs me" (pp. 806–7). Because he knows himself, he has "the right . . . to meddle in these matters" (p. 823)—to design a discipline that will affect others. Because he has asked "how shall a man know to do himselfe this right, how to performe this honourable duty of estimation and respect towards his own soul and body" and has answered and apprehended "his owne spirituall gifts," he is "ordain'd . . . to such offices of discipline in the Church" (pp. 842–43). Milton validates his contribution to the debate on church discipline by exhibiting self-knowledge and "self-pious regard" (p. 842). He authorizes himself.

Thus, the self-representation that William R. Parker finds "startling in its irrelevance" (1968, 210) is, in fact, closely linked with the stated topic, church government, for it manifests a self-reverencing individual, the sort of person that the church Milton advocates would foster through discipline. A properly constituted church would allow all to "bear an inward reverence toward their own persons" (Milton 1959, 1:841). By placing clerics above all others, the current church "causes the rest to have an unworthy and abject opinion of themselves" (p. 843). This perverts righteousness, for after love of God, "the first principle of all godly and vertuous actions in men, this pious and just honouring of our selves is the second, and may be thought as the radical moisture and fountain head, whence every laudable and worthy enterprize issues forth" (p. 841). While this "self-pious regard cannot be assunder" (p. 842) from the love of God, the self is the final judge. "Nor can he [that holds himself in reverence and due esteem] fear so much the offense and reproach of others, as he dreads and would blush at the reflection of his own severe and modest eye upon himselfe, if it should see him doing or imagining that which is sinfull though in deepest secrecy" (ibid.). In scorning the self-willed prelates, Milton rejects one form of self-authorization, namely, that associated with what has come to be known as possessive individualism. Yet he readily relies on another form of self-authorization, one that allows a person to possess him- or herself as an individual through concern for society.

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[38] For an alternative view of Milton's transformation, see Stevens 1988.

Given his endorsement of a brand of individualism, Milton questions and explains the need for formal authority.

> What is there in the world can measure men but discipline? Our word ruling imports no lesse. Doctrine indeed is the measure, or at least the reason of the measure, tis true; but unlesse the measure be apply'd to that which it is to measure, how can it actually doe its proper worke? Whether therefore discipline be all one with doctrine, or the particular application thereof to this or that person, we all agree that doctrine must be such only as is commanded; or whether it be something really differing from doctrine, yet was it only of Gods appointment as being the most adequate measure of the Church and her children, which is here the office of a great Evangelist and the reed given him from heaven. (1959, 1:760–61)

A properly constituted church would measure those who cannot do so themselves; it would rule those who do not possess authority. It would provide knowledge to those who do not know that which is most needful to be known, who do not know and revere themselves. A church should have the "power to examine our spirituall knowledge, and to demand from us in Gods behalfe a service intirely reasonable" (pp. 747–48). Since a legitimate church does not exist, Milton is disciplined and guided to self-knowledge by his conscience. In the presence of the prelatical church, Milton prefers "a blamelesse silence before the sacred office of speaking" an oath of allegiance (p. 823). In the absence of a reformed church, he possesses the sacred and speaks as an individual: Milton measures himself. "Spirituall knowledge" comes from his conscience, and worship—the "service intirely reasonable"—is what he must do to be able to affirm himself.

Milton expects the reader to recognize the legitimacy of his appeal to conscience as well as its consequences for church reform. An individual's conscience is presented as if it is, and should be, a power respected by both its possessor and others. Self-conception is important not only for Milton but for all. But because Milton is self-knowing, he deserves "the office of a great evangelist"—one who has taken from the "mysterious book of Revelation" (1959, 1:803). He has "the reed given him from heaven" to write about discipline in the body at large (p. 761), and he calls for a church that would enable all people to know and esteem themselves. Ideally, an individual would most fear that "something unholy from within his own heart should dishonour and profane in himselfe that Priestly unction and Clergy-right whereto Christ hath entitl'd him" (p. 681). Under the church government advocated by Milton, self-conception—"a wise and tru valuation" of oneself (p. 844)—would be preeminent.

THE MORAL SELF IN POLITICAL THEORY

Milton's case demonstrates that conscience was deeply implicated in the development of a self in early modern England. That conscience marks a shift in authority from institutions to individuals is nothing new. Interpretations of this shift, however, have tended to emphasize the separation of self from society, focusing either on individual salvation and its detrimental consequences for communal solidarity or on state power (secured through internalized control) and its debilitating effects on the individual.[39] Similarly, conceptions of the self in contemporary political theory have relied on a clear distinction between self and society. Either the self chooses freely and is therefore independent, in some sense, from collectivities or society exists prior to individual beings and therefore largely determines their identities. My analysis of conscience, however, has shown that it both detached the individual person from, and attached him to, the social order. A conscience liberated its possessor from external identifications and enabled a more independent self-recognition, but it did so through actions for the community. The conceptual distinction between self and society, which I have maintained in my discussion, is not upheld by an examination of practices.

In the case analyzed here, what was identified as conscience contributed to changes in Milton's behavior, consciousness, and self-conception. Differentiated from discredited institutions, Milton acted to reestablish an order for his society and thereby forged his identity as an individual. The central point of my argument, however, is that this individual identity was inherently joined with the welfare of the community: The self founded on conscience was practically united with its society. When the traditional centers of knowledge and authority were no longer certain, conscience stirred. It instigated action and provided an authority that superseded other powers, thereby distinguishing individuals, to themselves and others, from their previously prescribed roles.

In a world turned upside down, Milton was forced to turn within. Conscience replaced church and state, providing moral knowledge, discipline, and constancy. It formed as well as informed him because its knowledge and authority were internally conceived and individually possessed and were understood by Milton as such. Self-investigation and self-identification were impelled not only by apprehending forces and voices within himself but also by a related consequence of conscience—the duty to act in accordance with its dictates. After following the commands of conscience, Milton questioned his behavior. In *The Reason of Church Government*, he answered by citing conscience and by representing himself as a moral agent. Action deriving from conscience was self-discovery, particularly if it countered the actor's inclinations.

This raises a question: What were the consequences of not dutifully enacting the directives of conscience? Neither God, who was apparently behind the conscience, nor an institution, which typically administered his word, imposed sanctions. The penalty for disobeying conscience would be disowning oneself. Obeying the conscience was obeying oneself—maintaining oneself as a coherent, self-reverencing, person. Authorization by the conscience was self-authorization, and action initiated by the conscience was self-representation. The duty to act—to speak to and for one's country—joined self and society because failure to respond to the conscience would turn one against oneself. Denying the conscience would be denying one's identity, while speaking for one's society was speaking for oneself. The conscience thus reformulated and reinforced social identity through the duty to give voice to the voice within, the duty to represent oneself in public action. In other words, social identity derived from self-knowledge and social engagement rather than being socially imposed and personally unquestioned. We witness a step away from a traditional world toward a modern one.

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[39] Max Weber is primarily responsible for the focus on individual salvation, Foucault for the focus on state power. While Weber's reading has been contested, it is still an accepted standard in discussions of religion and the individual. See, e.g., Luhmann 1986.

Conscience prompted Milton to determine his identity, which suggested to him that he had a part in determining it and that it was determined. His effort to ascertain his identity was itself a move toward determining it. More directly, he determined it because he acted without official jurisdiction. Pondering his actions and asserting his new identity, Milton helped to constitute himself. While his conscience freed him from institutional authority, Milton was not divinely free. Unlike Milton's God who, as Stephen M. Fallon has shown, "is free to act or not" (1988, 488), Milton could not choose not to act. He was unable to dismiss the voices within himself. Similarly, he could not fashion himself for self-advancement. Milton was empowered by his conscience, but he was not empowered to change it. He could not essentially alter his identity.

Milton, it seems, presents us with a problem. He seems to defy categorization as a liberal or communitarian self, although his example offers characteristics of both. Like the individual of liberalism, Milton attends to himself. He preserves his coherence above all else. He accepts the power that he senses within him as his authority and thus thinks that it should be respected by all. The demands of Milton's self—personal coherence or obedience to his own authority—are mirrored in his proposals for government. He champions what seem to be liberal ideals: individual authority, a high degree of personal autonomy, and self-reverence. He posits the individual as the central concern for a person and a social order. For instance, the church should discipline only those who do not discipline themselves, or, in other words, those who do not properly esteem themselves. Correspondingly, its mission is to foster an affirmative self-regard.

Instead of the traditional identifications of Anglican or subject, self-esteem and conscience define Milton. Accordingly, he sets the bounds of governmental interference in terms of the individual. Milton thus represents, in two ways, a moment in the development of liberalism.[40] The self-sufficient individual, so recognized, should rule.[41] Yet, as my analysis has shown, Milton's individualism, as seen through both his example (himself) and his pronouncements, does not promote the individual to the exclusion or detriment of the community. In fact, he seems to depict the self described by communitarians. Even though Milton is obligated above all to himself, this self, he realizes, is embedded in a communal context. He returns to England because he is an Englishman—just as he intends to write and does write his epic in English to "adorn ... my native tongue," "to be an interpreter & relater of the best and sagest things among mine own citizens throughout this Iland in the mother dialect" (pp. 811–12).

Although he certainly had a sense of himself as poet prior to his overtly political activity, Milton becomes, in my account, individuated through the latter. He is individuated through practices over time within a particular context; the change in his consciousness follows social action, and Milton is aware of the conditions that occasioned this transformation. Like the communitarian self, Milton does not choose his ends. Rather, they follow from his morality, which is not, I have argued, entirely under his control even though it is peculiar to him. His conscience and culture are contingencies, and he is sufficiently premodern not to want to break from them. Milton's end, social reformation, is also compatible with communitarianism. Indeed, communitarians cite the individual constitutively attached to his or her community as the one most disadvantaged by liberal theory. Further aligning Milton with the communitarian self, his identity as an individual does not seem separable from the ends to which he is devoted.[42] He reveals himself along with his ideas—the self-representation supports his proposal regarding church government—for the two are essentially linked by his conscience.

The bounds of the self, drawn by conscience, are binding. The duties of the self to itself cannot be denied: Neither self-condemnation nor a rejection of moral measures is possible. Milton is quite a pace from the idea of therapeutic liberation, but he is not fully governed by its predecessors either. He revises the confessional tradition as he rebukes the confessors.[43] Moral dilemmas for Milton provoke public pronouncements to redress social problems, not secretive admissions. The self-representation in *The Reason of Church Government*, which bears signs of the confessional (probing one's motivation and actions), does not subject Milton to another. Even though he is not entirely free, for he cannot silence the voice within without obeying it, his case runs contrary to the claim that the deployment of confessional practices delineated and thus debilitated the individual.[44] When Foucault states that the "truthful confession was inscribed at the heart of the procedures of individualization by power" (1990, 59), we can think of Milton's individualization through a confession but by what power?[45] Certainly, the power of his conscience and his experience of it, as well as his identification of this force as conscience, derive from an institutionalized religious tradition and its diffuse power. To suggest otherwise would be ridiculous. But it would be equally ridiculous to claim that all power is necessarily harmful. To be specific, it is difficult to claim that Milton's conscience harmed him without also claiming that there was a viable alternative—that given his context, his experiences could have been better by some measure. Milton confessed, but his self-representation countered a central aim of the confessional tradition, namely, to create penitents and force them to conform to a standard model. His confession is his authorization against established authority. His case refutes the argument for an omnipotent, centralized church.

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[40] Milton is the only person who receives a subheading in the chapter on early bourgeois liberalism in Arblaster 1984. For a liberal reading of seventeenth-century England, see Haller 1955.

[41] It is worth noting that Milton has been appropriated by proponents of other variants of individualism. His status with the English Romantics, for instance, is unparalleled. See, e.g., Brisman 1973.

[42] For a discussion of the connection between Milton's welfare and the status of his ideas about society, see Hill 1980.

[43] For a discussion of Milton's transformation of the confessional tradition, see McCready 1992.

[44] Absolute freedom of the self, however, is a senseless notion, for an existence over time entails limits, and freedom requires a basis for making a choice if it is to be more than random change.

[45] Universalizing Foucault's ideas can lead to surprising conclusions. Barker sees in Milton the makings of a subject with a new "depoliticized privacy" (1984, 11).

In contrast to the paralyzed self-examiner that Foucault and his successors have exposed—a self forced to evaluate itself continually and thus unable to look outward to assess either the social structure or the functioning of powers within it—the self exemplified by Milton turns inward in response to actions intended to effect social reform that were themselves responses to the voice within. It identifies its own power and recognizes it as authoritative in the course of questioning accepted authorities. Instead of weakening the self, confession and discipline in this case empower it. The individual, while self-disciplining, is neither incapacitated nor molded to a single model. Furthermore, solipsism is not a threat for the conscientious self, and this self is not inimical to positive social cohesion. The way in which conscience held the parts of the self together can be criticized, but it can also be lauded with reserve. It serves a freedom; it allows for an individual distinguishable from society yet devoted to it.

The conception of self explicated here, centered on conscience and exemplified by Milton, enables us to overcome several enduring and related divides. The public and personal are joined rather than dissociated, society is inherent in rather than opposed to the individual self, and the ethical is fused with instead of separated from the individual. Moreover, the morality of this self is not limited to an accepted standard from an external source, even though it is identifiable within certain cultural bounds. While shaped by its context, the conscientious self aims to transform it. The strife leading to the civil wars charged the conscience anew. The contingency of impending chaos could "produce" ethical individuals, could instigate a change in consciousness.[46]

Milton is neither radically situated nor radically free. Self-discipline and self-determination are linked with one another and are paired with social change. Obeying his conscience, Milton seeks freedom from institutional authority for all who can be responsible for it. One could say that Milton sounds like a liberal self and looks like a communitarian self, but the two are not so separate in his case—for the free and authoritative individual, in his view, will feel obligated to participate in society for its betterment.[47] Liberal and communitarian conceptions of the self may merge when freedom is sought for a collectivity as a social good. Instead of seeing Milton as inventing or inheriting his identity, we can say, following Walzer (1987), that he interprets it. He gives meaning to his situated identity and thus, to some degree, determines it.

The concept of the individual self will not be readily discarded, nor is it clear that it should be.[48] At this point, the concerted goal of diverse projects seems to be a reconciliation of the idea of the individual with the idea of culture, society, or the other—a reconciliation that is meant, I think, to be both theoretical and practical (if such a distinction is relevant) and also to be liberating. An effort of this sort may consider itself to be a radical critique (Foucault 1979, 1990), a retrieval of a forgotten or muted ideal (Taylor 1992), or an interpretation of conditions in order to transform them (Walzer 1987). Instead of rejecting the idea of a self because it is socially constructed, many of these attempts promote a particular conception that challenges those that are by a variety of criteria less desirable, in particular, those that endorse atomism and egoism and cannot provide a positive ethic. Aware of our contingent character, we can (the presumption is) try to adjust it.

Broadly speaking, an ethical self is sought—a self cognizant of its dependence on its community and cognizant of its own morality. If Taylor's approach (i.e., to retrieve from the history of ideas an ideal conception of the self as a means to restore our practices) makes sense, then examining ethical actions and identity at a point just prior to the problem—the self-centered individual of modernity—should also help us to revise our self-conception to include a practiced morality. In other words, the history not only of ideals but also of ethical experiences and actions should contribute to our self-interpretation. Milton, I have argued, exemplifies one type of ethical individual. His case shows not only that individualism can be inherently linked with ethics but also that in the history of social thought, this individualism preceded the variants that have been targeted in early modern political theory and in bourgeois practices. Conscience provided continuity or constancy of the self—a solid connection with its situated past—along with revelations contributing to its continued, and to a degree indeterminate, development. It disciplined its possessor, but to the extent to which it was identified with him as opposed to other authorities, it thereby liberated him. Conscience held the parts of Milton together, enabling him, in turn, to act freely to serve his country.

This examination of the practices that shaped a particular individual at a significant point in the history of modernity suggests that the theoretical divide between liberalism and communitarianism regarding the self may not be insuperable. If we can draw from the history of identity and governance a conception of self that fits neither the liberal nor the communitarian model completely yet incorporates valuable features of both, it should be possible to think past the dichotomies and develop alternative ways of thinking about ourselves individually and collectively, ways that recognize and encourage freedom and obligation. My investigation of Milton demonstrates that ethical practices can forge a self who acts in the service of social regeneration. This analysis does not purport to offer a simple solution to any problem, and it does not aim to valorize Milton or propose a return to seventeenth-century norms. It uncovers a conception of the self that relies on the history of the self as it was constituted through ethical and political practices, and suggests that an interpretation of this conception may be helpful for both political theory and for attempts to fuse freedom, ethics, and the individual.

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[46] Not all were affected as Milton was. Some remained uncertain or looked for constancy in other places. See Donagan 1983.

[47] *Areopagitica* (Milton 1959, vol. 2) supports *The Reason of Church Government* on this point.

[48] Interestingly, there have been no real-life efforts to quash the notion of author among those who proclaim its death. To my knowledge, no one has, for instance, disavowed authorship of his or her work.

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Global Political Order, Economic Change, and Armed Conflict: Coevolving Systems and the Use of Force

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Several recent explanations for major-power war focus on purported cycles in global economic activity or in global political order. I shall argue that a better understanding of interrelationships among the economic long wave, the global leadership cycle, and armed conflict can be gained if we (1) expand the study of interstate conflict beyond the limited domain of great power or systemic wars and (2) treat the long wave and the leadership cycle as quasi-independent and interrelated *processes, each contributing to the conflict dynamics of the interstate system. Theoretical foundations for these two recommendations are drawn from the core works in this field. A model based on this new approach is developed and tested empirically along with four formal representations of the core frameworks. Poisson regression is employed using data on interstate disputes (1816–1976) to test resulting hypotheses. Analysis shows that broadening the explanatory domains of existing frameworks is valid and that the "coevolving systems" model is measurably superior to all tested competitors. I conclude that these two global processes are best viewed as coevolving systems and that future studies of systemic conflict should take this approach.*

During the past decade many systemic explanations of major power war have concentrated on the association of long-term, repeated cycles in the international system and the coincidence of particular subperiods in these cycles with the onset of great wars. Perhaps the most interesting division between scholars in this area is that some emphasize repeated patterns of rise and decline in *global economic activity* (Goldstein 1988), while others concentrate their attentions on repeated patterns in the creation and destruction of *global political order* (Gilpin 1981; Modelski 1987; Wallerstein 1983). The appearance and disappearance of a single, predominant state, or "hegemon," is the particular focus of this latter group. Much of this work has been corroborated by impressive empirical results—findings that deservedly raise interest in further study while also providing a concrete foundation for such research.

The most central concern shared by members of these interdependent schools is great-power war, that is, that subset of all interstate wars involving at least one great power on each contending side (Levy 1985). Some scholars restrict their attention even further by focusing on systemic wars, those which implicate all great powers in an armed struggle of cataclysmic proportions and which effect radical changes in global economic and political order (Thompson 1988).

I argue that a better understanding of interrelationships among the economic long wave, the world leadership cycle, and armed conflict can be gained if we adopt two conceptual shifts in this research tradition: (1) Exclusive focus on great-power or systemic wars should be abandoned, and lower-level conflicts involving any and all system members should also be examined; (2) the priority given by different scholars to the long wave *or* the world leadership cycle as generative mechanisms should be rejected. In its place, I offer an approach that views these two repeating patterns as quasi-independent and *interrelated* processes, each contributing to the conflict dynamics of the interstate system. I offer simple reasons for these two recommendations, then present fuller arguments and empirical results in their support.

Put most simply, I believe that all forms of interstate armed conflict should be considered by these schools because the conflict-generating processes they describe (global economic fluctuations, the establishment or disintegration of global economic order) are themselves systemwide. To be sure, the very size of great-power economies and armed forces likely give them a more central role in this story, but it remains only part of the story. Nor would I deny that large wars deserve special attention, whether for their long-term historical consequences or for their pure destructiveness. I argue only that further theoretical development within this research tradition will require either that great powers be delineated as logically distinct from other states, or that these systemic, conflict-generating processes be specified as affecting all members of the interstate system. I contend that the long wave and world leadership cycles affect the general conflict behavior of all states. To establish this point, I will show that the causal mechanisms put forward by these scholars are not unique to great powers. I will also present the first empirical evidence that the long wave and world leadership cycles are associated with the incidence of armed conflict among all system members, not the great powers alone.

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Next, I contend that the long wave and world leadership/hegemony cycles be viewed as interlinked *coevolving systems*. My motivation here is simply to make explicit an argument that I believe is made implicitly by every major scholar in these schools. As I will show, each work central to this study discusses, in some fashion, repeated patterns of global economic expansion and stagnation (i.e., the long wave), as well as rhythmic consistencies in the creation and dissolution of global political order (i.e., the hegemony or world leadership cycle). Moreover, each central work makes independent reference to both patterns in broader discussions regarding the genesis of armed conflict and its consequences. In the end, however, the heart of each work beats in single rhythm. By this I mean that in each work the author chooses either specific aspects of the economic long wave or global political dominance in laying his/her theoretical foundation. Specifically, each author looks to only one of these two processes when setting the phase dates for all purported cycles and their subperiods. I will present a model that makes explicit use of both the long wave and the world leadership cycle in generating predictions regarding armed interstate conflict. Thus, while the inspiration for a combined model is not new to this research tradition, its specification and its empirical testing are.

OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY

The purpose of this study is to determine whether the two conceptual shifts I recommend enhance the explanatory power of this research tradition. I propose to make this assessment by using Lakatos's criterion of "excess empirical content."[1] First, I will see whether existing frameworks can be used to "explain" (statistically) the variation in the occurrence of all armed interstate conflict, regardless of its intensity or participation by great powers. If successful, the long wave, the leadership cycle, or both will be shown to have a broader explanatory domain than their authors have claimed to date. Second, I will present a model that views the long wave and world leadership cycle as separate but interlinked processes. This model of coevolving systems will be tested in the same manner as the others and must demonstrate significantly superior fit to patterns of armed conflict in order to substantiate my second claim. On the basis of these empirical results, I will argue in the conclusion for future work viewing global political order and the world economy as interrelated, coevolving systems.

My general approach, then, is to broaden and synthesize. I begin with no single framework from which I derive hypotheses deductively. While not simply inductive in design, my study tests existing frameworks on their own terms to learn their strengths and weaknesses and compares their performance against the integrated approach I advocate. My approach, like that described by Joshua Goldstein, may be considered "adductive" (1988, 13). That is, I integrate ideas that are consistent with one another while also conforming (by accepted statistical standards) to the data. In short, to borrow terms from Dina Zinnes (1976), I am working toward an integrative rather than additive form of knowledge accumulation. I consider the systematic and reproducible exploration of our observations, when theoretically informed, to be valuable in its own right in the knowledge-building process.

I shall offer nothing like a comprehensive theory of war or armed interstate conflict. The processes and outcomes I examine here operate at the system level only. And I believe that no complete theory of international conflict can rely solely on the systemic level of analysis, because systems do not choose to go to war, national leaders do. As Boswell and Sweat have argued recently, "States, not systems, initiate wars, and the proposition is incomplete until the connections between systemic conditions and the actions of states are elaborated" (1991, 131).

Nevertheless, a study such as this can provide important input toward the building of more comprehensive theory. For if there are systemic conditions that strongly affect the likelihood of armed conflict, then identifying and describing those conditions will help specify the context within which such decisions are made. While the use of armed force always involves human decision, decisions themselves are always shaped by the environment in which they are taken. Any one decision maker can make very different choices when faced with different opportunities and constraints. Therefore, the definition of key aspects of the decision space is as important to explaining the final action as are the perceptions and decision processes that were involved. Hence, while offering no overarching theory here, I believe the ideas and empirical results presented may contribute to the building of such theory.

FOUR CORE FRAMEWORKS IN THE STUDY OF CYCLES AND CONFLICT

Different scholars have placed different emphases on the role played by political and economic subsystems in the generation of interstate conflict. Some accord preeminence to the global economy, viewing it as a powerful, even determining force in world affairs. For these scholars, the continual expansion of the global economy and phases of its growth and geographic extension are considered the driving engine of state building, hegemony, and major war (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1979; Wallerstein 1983). Others consider world politics to be completely autonomous from other systemic processes. For these people, economic long waves (or swings in prices, trade, and production) may only reflect the rise and decline of the hegemon, its preferences for economic order, and its ability to impose such order (Gilpin 1981). Politics, for scholars like Gilpin, may be influenced by economic change but is never driven by it. Between these two poles, we find views that accord primacy to neither the political nor the economic sphere but see them interacting in observable, cyclical patterns (Goldstein 1988, 1991a) or treat them as loosely related within a still larger world social system (Modelski 1987).[2] The claims (sometimes compatible, sometimes conflicting) made by these different schools regarding key systemic processes and their connection to interstate conflict merit closer consideration.

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[1] The key point of Lakatos's work for me is that knowledge cannot progress without frequent confrontation between theory and systematic observation. For fuller description, see Lakatos 1970. I thank Joseph Grieco for urging me to emphasize this approach.

War and Long Waves in the Global Economy

The growth, spread, and ascendance of capitalism is taken by Immanuel Wallerstein to be the main engine of global political as well as economic life (1983, 100–101; see Berry 1991, 61). Hopkins and Wallerstein's more recent work concentrates on conflict and treats global war as central to the reproduction of the world system during the last five centuries (see Boswell and Sweat 1991, 128–29). More specifically, war is seen by Wallerstein as the means whereby an emerging hegemon secures its position of economic advantage. Perhaps it is too strong to label Wallerstein's explanation for war as "economic determinism," but economic processes of capitalist expansion and accumulation do, in his view, drive the process. Conflict is created in the struggle to establish hegemony and it is encouraged by its decay. Hopkins and Wallerstein identify four phases in their cycle of hegemony. The most conflict-ridden period is that of hegemonic *ascent*, when international order is lowest and contenders vie for supremacy. A lower level of armed conflict is expected during the hegemonic *victory* and *maturity* phases. Finally, higher conflict returns during the hegemon's *decline* period, as potential successors challenge its position (Thompson 1988, 72).

Joshua Goldstein also fixes primary attention on the rhythms of global economic expansion and contraction. Compared to Wallerstein, the connection between economic phases and armed conflict here is more direct. Hegemony does not play a direct part in Goldstein's theory of the long wave. Rather, the level of major-power conflict is found to coincide with upswing phases in the global economy over the past five centuries, while downswing phases are found to be relatively "peaceful." It is also important to note that Goldstein is not an economic determinist. War and the economic long wave move together over time, with certain aspects of the upswing (such as production) preceding major war, while other aspects of the upswing (prices) follow war and are almost certainly caused by it (Goldstein 1988, chapter 12; idem 1991a). In a more refined base-dating scheme than is found in his 1988 book, Goldstein (1991a) offers a four-phase portrait of the long wave in the global economy. These phases are labeled *expansion*, *war*, *stagnation*, and *rebirth*. The first two of these correspond rather faithfully to the up-phase presented in Goldstein (1988, 67) while the latter two map closely onto the previously delineated down-phase. As before, rising severity of conflict in the system is associated with the up-phase periods in this new scheme, while the two periods occurring during the down-phase of the global economy are quieter, relatively speaking, with regard to great-power war.

War and Global Political Order

Like Wallerstein and Goldstein, George Modelski and William Thompson employ the systemic level of analysis. Their main focus, however, is not on the global economy but on the rhythms associated with the construction and erosion of global political order, a repeated pattern they refer to as the *world leadership cycle*. Like Wallerstein, global war is seen by Modelski and Thompson as the result of a repeated process whereby a *world leader* is first produced, then manages the international system, then sees its position erode and international disorder return. While economic changes are discussed—most importantly the creation and diffusion of leading technological sectors—these authors identify cycle phases most directly by the preponderance of seapower held by the system leader. Modelski and Thompson label these four repeating phases *world power*, *delegitimation*, *deconcentration*, and *global war*. The intervals for five complete cycles are dated precisely by Modelski for the period 1495–2030 (1987, 40). Each period within a cycle is seen as generating different levels of interstate armed conflict. Conflict is at low ebb during the world power phase, rising markedly as the leader's position is challenged during the delegitimation period. Relative quiescence returns during deconcentration, though the jockeying for position among contending powers does not leave this time free of strife. Finally, the period of peak conflict arrives as challengers vie directly for the top position, culminating in global war (Modelski and Thompson 1987).

Robert Gilpin also sees processes surrounding hegemonic rise and decline as the key to understanding global war. Gilpin (1981) differs markedly from all other scholars discussed here in that he sees these rhythms as timeless, outside history, and tied in no central way to the birth, spread, or evolution of global capitalism. Gilpin's perspective also denies evolutionary change in the international system. Thus he distinguishes himself (in somewhat different ways) from Goldstein, Wallerstein, and Modelski and Thompson, all of whom discuss the emergence of new patterns of interaction over time. Nevertheless, many aspects of Gilpin's explanation of global war are shared by the authors just discussed. The most important similarity is that Gilpin considers the recurrent production of hegemony to be central to global political life. The significance of the global economy is less clear in this work. One has a sense, in reading Gilpin, that economics matters, that rhythms in the global economy—even international economic order—echo the reverberations of hegemonic rise and decline.

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[2] Even these scholars rely only on one process or the other in setting their "base dating schemes," which are the mainspring of their respective theories. Goldstein discusses hegemony at several points in his seminal 1988 book (esp. chap. 13), yet the dates specified for upswings and downswings in the long wave and the pretheory offered in chapter 12 refer only to patterns in production, prices, and wages. Modelski and Thompson's work defining the world leadership cycle has incorporated ever greater concern with patterns in the global economy. Thompson's most recent work even concentrates on cycles of innovation and shifts from country to country in leading technological sectors (Thompson 1992). Still, in identifying periods of system leadership, near-exclusive reliance has been placed thus far on concentration in sea power as an indicator of one state's ability to project power globally (Modelski and Thompson 1988, 14).

But for Gilpin, politics is the mainspring of the system. Gilpin does not identify specific phases surrounding the rise and decline of the hegemon. Rather, he discusses contrasting periods when a hegemon is either established in the international system or absent from it.[3] The association Gilpin claims between hegemony and major war is also consistent with arguments offered by Modelski and Thompson as well as Wallerstein. Global war is seen by Gilpin as a mechanism whereby a hegemon is produced. Ascendance of a new world leader brings a peaceful period, followed by contentious jockeying for position as the hegemon's relative capability declines inevitably. The system returns periodically to a primordial state resembling anarchy until large-scale war throws up a new hegemon.

INTEGRATING EXISTING CLAIMS AND FINDINGS: A MODEL OF COEVOLVING SYSTEMS

All these writers share the idea that global economic expansion and the creation of systemic political order generate intense conflict among the major powers. For all, global war germinates during the period of maximum disorder, as rivalries between would-be hegemons intensify. Titanic struggle ensues, and a new world leader emerges to reestablish political order to the system. This new order, economic exhaustion from warfare, or both combine to create a period of quiescence. In a specified time, the leader's relative position declines, challenges to the established order increase, and discord predominates at the end of the cycle. These same scholars differ, however, on three major points: (1) the relative importance of global *political versus economic subsystems*, (2) the *dating of the phases* they identify in the cycle, and (3) predictions regarding the *level of conflict* within particular phases of their respective cycles. These very differences provide the foundation for the model I propose.

Hegemony, the Long Wave, and Phase Dates

At the core of each writer's argument and empirical claims are their phase dates. These reveal the relative emphasis each scholar places on the global political or economic subsystem and provide the basis on which predictions regarding armed conflict are made. For Wallerstein, dates for the phases within the cycle of hegemony are based on economic dominance by one state in three areas: production, commerce, and finance (Wallerstein 1983). Preeminence is achieved in each of these areas in the sequence just given and wanes in the same order. When held simultaneously in all three areas by one state, hegemony is in full flower. Modelski and Thompson's phase dates are influenced by relative holdings of military capability among the great powers. Specifically, they identify times when one state maintained a bluewater navy larger than the navies of all other great powers combined (Modelski and Thompson 1988). Goldstein, in his best-known work (1988) as well as a later refinement (1991a), sets phase dates exclusively on the basis of economic fluctuations. Gilpin (1981) is far less explicit about a basis for the periods of hegemony he identifies but provides identifiable dates nonetheless. Phase dates offered by each author for the time horizon 1815–1976 are shown in Table 1.

There are interesting confluences as well as divergences in the rhythms implied by the dates given for these cycles and their subperiods. Wallerstein, basing his dates on the development and dissolution of dominance by one state in world production, commerce, and finance, offers dates that are very similar to Modelski and Thompson's periods (based on seapower) for the nineteenth century, yet the two series diverge for the twentieth. Goldstein's periods—based not on the preeminence of any single power but on world production, prices, and wages—move through time at roughly twice the speed of the hegemony-based measures.[4] None of these authors, however, has ever claimed more than a loose correspondence between these patterns. Goldstein has stated most clearly the belief that the two are independent: "There is no fixed number of [economic] long waves that make up a cycle of hegemony. Rather, there is a longer-term cycle, the rise and fall of hegemony, which does not appear strongly linked to long waves in a causal sense" (1991a, 305).

Given these views—and the correspondence each scholar has found between their hypothesized cycle and great-power war—it would seem we are left with three choices: (1) to believe that armed conflict is associated with long waves but not with hegemony, (2) to believe armed conflict is associated with the world leadership cycle but not with global economic fluctuations, or (3) to explore the possibility that *both* cycles may contribute in different ways to the generation of armed conflict. The tests and results I report in this study will allow the reader to consider all three possibilities. My own preference, based on my reading of the core works discussed here, is for the third. For this reason, the model I present below takes into account, at any given moment, the state of the international system with respect to both the world leadership cycle and the economic long wave.

Cycle Phases and Great-Power Conflict

The next step toward specification of a new model is to review the hypothesized connections found in the core

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[3] Despite his important differences with the other scholars, however, it is interesting to note that beginning and ending dates given by Gilpin for British and American hegemonies are identical to the dates once offered by Wallerstein (see Boswell and Sweat 1991, 126–27).

[4] A point well known to members of these schools. Goldstein's dates, for much of the period under study, are closest to the economic cycles known as Kondratieff waves. Modelski (1987) notes that the duration of one leadership cycle corresponds roughly to two Kondratieff waves. Wallerstein and his followers also note the incidence of "A phases" (global economic growth) and "B phases" (economic stagnation) within their cycle of hegemony (Bousquet 1980). Empirically, shorter periods will make it more difficult for a model to "fit" the observations for two reasons: (1) a "short-period" model has more opportunities to predict incorrectly the occurrence or the direction of a shift in the level of conflict, and (2) there are fewer annual observations per period to identify the true parameter sharply. Thus (speaking purely from a statistical viewpoint), the Goldstein model faces the greatest number of obstacles, and the Gilpin model, the fewest.

TABLE 1. Cycle Phase Beginning Dates

Framework	Cycle Phases 1	2	3	4
Goldstein (Long Wave)	*Stagnation*	*Rebirth*	*Expansion*	*War*
	1816	1831	1849	1861
	1873	1885	1894	1911
	1921	1934	1941	1969
Wallerstein (Cycle of Hegemony)	*Victory*	*Maturity*	*Decline*	*Ascent*
	1816	1850	1873	1897
	1913	1945	1967	—
Modelski & Thompson (Leadership Cycle)	*World Power*	*Delegitimation*	*Deconcentration*	*Global War*
	1816	1850	1874	1915
	1946	1974	—	—
Gilpin (Hegemony)	*U.K. Hegemony*		*U.S. Hegemony*	
	1815–73		1945–67	

works between different cycle phases and great-power conflict. As stated, this connection marks another important point of divergence among the claims made in those works.

Goldstein views the severity of great-power war (measured in battle deaths suffered by the great powers) as following a pattern that is directly coincident with the four phases of the long wave he delineates (i.e., lowest severity during the stagnation period, rising as the global economy expands). Modelski and Thompson posit that high-conflict periods occur during the "delegitimation" and "global war" phases (periods 2 and 4 in their model) while these are interrupted in the alternating, relatively peaceful periods of world power and deconcentration. For Wallerstein, hegemonic maturity is the time of least conflict, while armed strife rises during the hegemon's decline period. Conflict is then highest during the great struggles accompanying the hegemon's ascent and finally drops again during the victory phase. Again, Gilpin's framework is the most simple and straightforward, claiming only that conflict is suppressed by the dominance of a hegemon and rises when no hegemon is present in the system. These claimed connections between cycle phases and the level of conflict are summarized in Table 2.

Differences between scholars regarding the predicted association between phase periods and the level of conflict in the system now complicate the picture further. Viewing tables 1 and 2 together, we will observe times during which any two cycles coincide in high-conflict phases, other periods during which both are in a low-conflict conjunction, and still others when any two cycles make opposite predictions about the level of conflict. These differences permit head-to-head tests of the empirical fit of these four models to observed data, the results of which are reported. More importantly, the differences in hypothesized connections between cycle phases and the level of conflict also provide a building block for the model I present here.

A Model of Coevolving Systems and Conflict

I propose here a system-level model that views the incidence of armed conflict as influenced by the combination of the economic long wave and world leadership cycles. While these processes themselves may well be interrelated in ways yet to be specified, I contend that each makes its own contribution to the generation or suppression of armed conflict, in keeping with the particular phase each cycle is in at a particular time. In

TABLE 2. Claims Regarding Cycle Phases and the Level of Conflict

Framework	Cycle Phases 1	2	3	4
Goldstein	*Stagnation*	*Rebirth*	*Expansion*	*War*
	Exhaustion, Low Conflict	New Ambition, Higher Conflict	Increased Clashes, Still Higher Conflict	Peak Conflict
Wallerstein	*Victory*	*Maturity*	*Decline*	*Ascent*
	Scattered Conflict to Consolidate Position	Maximum Order, Lowest Conflict	New Challenges, Competitiveness	Highest Competition and Conflict
Modelski & Thompson	*World Power*	*Delegitimation*	*Deconcentration*	*Global War*
	Maximum Order, Lowest Conflict	Numerous Challenges, Higher Conflict	Gird for Major Challenge, Low Conflict	Highest Competition and Conflict
Gilpin	*U.K. Hegemony*	*Interregnum*	*U.S. Hegemony*	
	Low Conflict	High Conflict	Low Conflict	

Note: Cell entries describe predicted level of conflict.

other words, this model predicts that the amount of conflict we observe in the system will be high, low, or in between in correspondence with the particular coincidence of different cycle phases.

The inspiration for such an approach is found easily in the more recent writings of some core scholars. Goldstein contemplated what he called *two-dimensional cycle time* (referring to long waves and hegemony) toward the end of his major study (1988, 357–60). In his more recent work, George Modelski has argued that these two cycles be viewed separately (see Berry 1991, 164). And Modelski and Thompson (1995) are now completing research concerning leading economic sectors and global power in which they treat the economy and global political order as independent, coevolving systems. None, however, has yet offered a full framework reflecting these ideas.

Taking additional steps in this direction, the model I offer here integrates the long wave as defined by Goldstein and the world leadership cycle identified by Modelski and Thompson. Among the four core models, I chose to focus my attention on these two because Goldstein provides the clearest picture of economic fluctuations associated with the long wave, while Modelski and Thompson's offer the most lucid description of systemic political order and its association with armed strife. Their claims surrounding the leadership cycle have also been tested empirically much more often than Wallerstein's or Gilpin's specification.

The model itself is very simple and may be considered as an initial attempt to relate systemic conflict to both the world leadership cycle and the long wave. Essentially, the model predicts that systemic conflict will be lowest during those times which coincide with the most peaceful periods of both the long wave and leadership cycle. This would occur during times that fall in the period Goldstein identifies as the stagnation phase of the long wave and Modelski and Thompson designate as the period of world power in the leadership cycle (e.g., 1816–30 within the time horizon of this study). From this base (and referring again to tables 1 and 2), the predicted level of conflict in the system would rise in 1831, as the system entered rebirth in the long wave, and rise again in 1849 with the advent of expansion and yet again in 1850 as the leadership cycle moved into the delegitimation phase. Simply put, the relative level of system conflict at any moment in time is predicted by the model through reference to the reigning phases of the long wave and world leadership cycle and the hypothesized connection between specific phases and armed clashes. A formal representation of this argument appears below.

Systemwide Processes, Systemwide Conflict, and the Focus on Great-Power War

I have noted that all four frameworks describe systemic processes yet limit their knowledge claims to major-power or systemic war. I contend that the exclusive focus on war among major powers is misplaced on theoretical as well as empirical grounds. It is my contention that the rhythms of economic expansion and contraction and the repeated construction and destruction of international order will affect the likelihood that *any* state will become involved in armed conflicts both small and large.

The rationale for this claim is found within arguments already contained in the four core frameworks. If great powers are discouraged from taking armed action for any reason by the presence of a predominant state (as claimed by Gilpin and Modelski and Thompson), then why would middle powers and small states not be similarly deterred? By the same token, it is reasonable to expect that conflicts engendered by a power vacuum at the center could begin among minor as well as major powers (as has occurred more than once in the Balkans) or sweep small states into their vortex (as was the case in World War II).

At the same time, all causal linkages between the long wave and conflict that are contemplated by Goldstein (1988, 261–64) could apply to middle and small powers as well as they do to great powers.[5] In his book, Goldstein considers three possibilities. Periods of economic expansion could engender a form of psychological hubris, itself generative of aggressive behavior. But Lasswell saw this as a general phenomenon, not limited to major powers (quoted in Goldstein 1988, 264). Next (invoking the lateral-pressure argument of Nazli Choucri and Robert North), Goldstein posits that economic needs and growth in capabilities associated with economic expansion could result in clashes as nations move beyond their territorial confines to satisfy those material needs. Yet Choucri and North, in their delineation of the lateral-pressure process, openly claim that this phenomenon is experienced by all nations, not great powers alone (1975, chapter 1).

Finally, Goldstein considers whether a simple "cost of war" consideration might link production fluctuations to great-power war. That is, big wars can occur only when the "treasuries are full." This argument might limit our attention to great powers alone in the context of Goldstein's study but not necessarily in general. I reason as follows. The dependent variable in Goldstein's empirical tests is either the severity or intensity of war in the system (both measures involve great-power battle deaths). Counted at the level of the full system, it makes sense that the largest annual death counts would likely come at times when the largest powers are at war with each other. With the research problem so defined, it is reasonable to focus attention on the major powers. But a "small" conflict (i.e., when viewed from the systemic perspective) may be large from the perspective of the nations engaged. The 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, for example, were not large in comparison to the systemic wars of this century or last, yet were very costly to the protagonists. Small and medium powers might also be more likely to resort to arms when their treasuries are full and abstain during tight economic times. It is, therefore, plausible that a "cost of war" argument applies generally and only *appears* to be relevant to major powers alone due to a limiting choice of the war indicator (i.e., systemwide war severity and intensity).

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[5] Goldstein has not yet committed to a particular explanation on this point but considers several possible linkages in order to spur further research and discussion. I offer no resolution of this important question but point out only that all candidate explanations for this connection could apply to all states, not just the major powers.

In sum, there is no argument to be found in any of the core works that limits any possible explanatory or causal connections between armed conflict and the world leadership cycle or the long wave to the major powers alone. Moreover, some candidate explanations found in core works can be logically extended to all states, while other candidate explanations (when traced to their original authors) were intended to apply to all system members, not only the great powers. Thus the model I put forward here will view all states as part of the global system and attempt to account for the behavior of all system members. The model will also make predictions about all forms of interstate armed conflict, not great-power or systemic war alone.

STUDY DESIGN

Two tasks remain before us: (1) to test empirically whether any of the four existing frameworks can be extended to explain (statistically) the level of conflict throughout the system and (2) to determine whether a model that takes account of both the world leadership cycle and the economic long wave is empirically superior to existing frameworks. Completion of these tasks requires acquisition of data, empirical criteria for model performance, formal representation of the four existing frameworks, specification of a new model, and choice of estimation technique. I discuss these preliminaries now in turn.

Data: Armed Conflict and Cycle Phases

As they exercise diplomacy, nations employ armed force in a number of ways, war being simply the most extreme. Indeed, as many have argued, we will not develop an adequate understanding of war until we can specify conditions under which no war results, as well as those which lead to war (Most and Starr 1989). Information gathered by members of the Correlates of War project allows us to move in that direction.

Militarized Interstate Disputes. The data on militarized interstate disputes consider not only war but any and all occurrences in which armed force was threatened or employed by one state in the international system against another state.[6] The version of the data set I employed recorded information on some 960 such disputes between the years 1816 and 1976. From this large number of incidents, we find that approximately 8% ended in "wars," as defined by the Correlates of War project. Thus I include in this study a large number of events in which armed force was called upon by at least one actor, but the confrontation was resolved short of war.[7] Armed incidents short of war include threats, mobilizations, and incursions. While use of this data set limits my empirical tests to the span between 1816 and 1976, it does allow me to view the full range of aggressive behavior covered by my argument, and it has comprehensive coverage of all members of the system. I used these data to construct an annual series counting the number of such events initiated in a given year. There are, therefore, 161 annual observations in my data set, and each observation represents the simple number of armed disputes initiated during that year by one or more system members against other members.

Cycle Phases: Hegemony, World Leadership, and the Long Wave. Each of the four core frameworks—as well as the model I put forward—divide time into particular phases. We can view the phases specified in any of these models as *categories*. The year 1850, for example, could be categorized in Goldstein's expansion phase, the maturity phase of Wallerstein, the delegitimation phase of Modelski and Thompson, and as falling within the period of British hegemony in the Gilpin model (see Table 1). Following this simple logic, the years 1816–1976 were so categorized for each of the five models to be tested.

Recall now that the claims made by each scholar concerned the level of conflict in the system during each phase *relative to* the level of conflict during other phases in their model (see Table 2). To assess these claims, we must determine two things: (1) Is there any measurable shift in the level of conflict between the phases of a particular model (if not, a connection between armed conflict and cycle phases must be questioned)? and (2) Is the level of conflict in the system during one phase higher, lower, or about the same as during other phases, following the pattern hypothesized by the author of that model? If we find a measurable shift in the level of conflict between the purported phases and the direction of that shift matches that hypothesized by the model, we can say that the model is consistent with the data.[8]

Control: The Null Model as a Standard of Performance

By far the most common null model used in our field is that of randomness (i.e., the value of any single observation on the dependent variable is best predicted by the mean of the distribution). In this study, the common null model would simply claim that the annual occurrence of armed conflict was distributed randomly with respect to time. The occurrence of such events with respect to particular phases in any putative cycle would show no statistically significant association. But I believe a more stringent standard than the common null model is warranted for two reasons.

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[6] As defined by the Correlates of War project, a militarized interstate dispute is an incident in which one or more members of the interstate system employ armed force against another system member or *threaten* another through deployment, mobilization, or by a verbal statement of their intention to use force. These data on militarized interstate disputes are described and examined at length in Gochman and Maoz 1984.

[7] In an earlier study, I found that Goldstein's cycles and Doran and Parson's (1980) critical periods were associated with the likelihood that an armed dispute would end in war (Pollins 1989). I plan to return to this question, informed by results from this study, at a future time.

[8] This approach parallels the logic of ANOVA. For there to be a measurable difference between, say, group A and group B (read phase 1 and phase 2) is to say that the within-group variance is significantly less than the between-group variance. Hence, the groups (phases) themselves are meaningful as categories. Evidence in support of the hypothesis explaining group differences is found when the direction of difference between these groups matches theoretical expectations. Econometricians have used this same dummy-variable approach with time-series data to test hypotheses concerning seasonality (Gujarati 1995, 517–19).

First, the various cycles we will examine are time-dependent processes, virtually by definition. It is also reasonable to assume that the incidence of armed disputes is autocorrelated over time, since high levels of hostility between nations can lead to repeated disputes or spill over into disputes involving neighbors or allies. If we ignore these considerations—as the common null model would do—we may find an association between our dependent and independent variables that is nothing more than autocorrelation in the processes. To assess whether the different phases claimed by the various theories have meaning beyond simple time-dependence, we need a "null" model that takes time-dependence into account directly.

Second, because I have chosen to model the annual frequency of armed disputes initiated by any system member, it is reasonable to expect that the number of such events will be related to the number of member states in the international system. Regardless of any systematic cause that may be operating, we can expect that a global political system with many members will have a total number of disputes that is higher than a system with few members.[9] For these reasons, the null model I have constructed explains the annual number of armed disputes as a function of the number of disputes that occurred in the previous year, and the number of states in the international system.[10] These two variables will also serve as control variables in the five theoretical models I will test, so I will report the performance of those alternative specifications having taken account of autocorrelation and system size.

The Four Core Models

If the phases of a particular cycle are indeed related to armed conflict, then there will be a significant difference in the average annual number of disputes between those phases. Moreover, the estimated number of disputes within phases should conform to the scholar's claim that particular periods are associated with high conflict while others experience low conflict. These questions may be tested directly using a form of regression analysis and the following template[11]:

$$D_t = \beta_1\text{Phase } 1 + \beta_2\text{Phase } 2 + \beta_3\text{Phase } 3 + \beta_4\text{Phase } 4 + \beta_5 D_{t-1} + \beta_6\text{Members}_t + \epsilon_t,$$

where

D_t = observed number of disputes begun in year t

β_k = estimated parameter for the kth variable

Phase n = the nth period in the purported cycle

D_{t-1} = lagged endogenous term

Members_t = number of members in the interstate system in year t

ϵ_t = stochastic, or error term.

Once estimates are obtained, the Goldstein, Wallerstein, and Modelski and Thompson frameworks can be evaluated quite easily. In each case, we expect the estimated parameters for the different phases to be significantly different from each other and for the values of those individual parameters to reflect claims regarding the relative belligerence or quiescence of that period. For example, the period claimed by respective authors to experience the highest conflict should have an associated parameter (β_k) larger than all others, while that phase hypothesized to be associated with the least conflict should have the smallest parameter.

This same basic approach can be used to test the Gilpin framework. Here, the model takes the following form:

$$D_t = \beta_1 + \beta_2\text{ UK Hegemony} + \beta_3\text{ US Hegemony} + \beta_4 D_{t-1} + \beta_5\text{Members}_t + \epsilon_t,$$

where

D_t = observed number of disputes begun in year t

β_k = estimated parameter for the kth variable

UK Hegemony = categorical variable coded 1 in those years falling within the period of British hegemony (as designated by Gilpin)

US Hegemony = categorical variable coded 1 in those years falling within the period of American hegemony (as designated by Gilpin)

D_{t-1} = lagged endogenous term

Members_t = number of members in the interstate system in year t

ϵ_t = stochastic, or error term.

If hegemony indeed suppresses conflict, then we would expect the UK and US Hegemony terms to be measurably less than the intercept.[12] British and American hegemonies have been specified separately in this model to test whether conflict behavior under these two hegemonies differs.[13]

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[9] The number of members in the interstate system changes significantly during the period of this study. From a low of 23 in 1816, the system gradually expands to 150 members by 1976. The simple number of interaction opportunities, therefore, is much higher at the end of the period than at the beginning. Failure to control for this fact could bias the parameter estimates for other terms in the model.

[10] Time dependence tests indicated that no second-order process was present, hence I chose to include only a first-order lagged endogenous variable in the null model.

[11] Regression is preferred to ANOVA because it permits estimation of parameters for the phase categories while controlling for null model variables that are continuous in nature. A separate intercept term is unnecessary, because it correlates perfectly with the four-phase variables in the template. In fact, those phase variables effectively unpack the intercept from the null model. In the null model I have specified, the intercept estimates the average number of annual disputes given the number of states in the system and the lagged endogenous term. This template asks whether the value of that same intercept changes significantly as we move from one cycle phase to another. Measurable shifts in this unpacked intercept are evidence that the phases are indeed correlated with changes in the average level of conflict in the system.

[12] The reason for this is straightforward. Like the other models tested in this study, the intercept indicates the "average" annual number of armed disputes begun. In this case, I control for the presence or absence of a hegemon and (like the other models) time dependence

A Model of Coevolving Systems and Conflict

Looking again at tables 1 and 2, with special attention to the Goldstein and Modelski and Thompson frameworks, it becomes clear that their expectation regarding system conflict in a particular year sometimes coincides and sometimes differs. The year 1855, for example, is predicted by both frameworks to be a time of relatively high conflict, while 1890 is expected by both to be a relatively quiescent time. In contrast, 1925 is predicted by Goldstein to be associated with little conflict, while the Modelski and Thompson framework expects great bellicosity in the system. In the model presented here, therefore, we will find years in which the predicted effects of the two cycles coincide and thus reinforce the conflict-generating or conflict-inhibiting forces of each other. Periods of unusually high or unusually low conflict should result. In other years, they will work against each other, generating medium levels of violence in the system.

Specifically, I model these expectations in the following way: The four periods specified by each of the two frameworks can be rank-ordered according to the level of armed conflict claimed to be associated with it. By summing the two rank-order values in a given year, that year can be coded according to the cumulative effect the two cycles are claimed to have. The year 1915, for example, is coded 8 because it falls within the periods of highest expected conflict within both frameworks. Similarly, 1820 receives a score of 2 because this year falls within periods of lowest conflict with regard to both the economic long wave and the world leadership cycle. A middling score of 5 is assigned to 1899 because it occurred during the expansion period in Goldstein (rank order = 3), and the deconcentration period in Modelski and Thompson (rank order = 2). All years 1816–1976 are thus coded, yielding seven possible conflict phases.[14]

The estimating equation thus takes the following form:

$$D_t = \beta_1\mathrm{CR2} + \beta_2\mathrm{CR3} + \beta_3\mathrm{CR4} + \beta_4\mathrm{CR5} + \beta_5\mathrm{CR6} + \beta_6\mathrm{CR7} + \beta_7\mathrm{CR8} + \beta_8 D_{t-1} + \beta_9\mathrm{Members}_t + \epsilon_t,$$

where

D_t = observed number of disputes begun in year t
β_k = estimated parameter for the kth variable
CRn = the cumulative rank score adding the values assigned to phases of the long wave and the world leadership cycle
D_{t-1} = lagged endogenous term
$\mathrm{Members}_t$ = number of members in the interstate system in year t
ϵ_t = stochastic, or error term.

Given this specification, we expect the parameters associated with the seven cumulative rank variables (CRn) to become measurably larger as we move from CR2 through CR8. That is, the cumulative effect on the observed number of disputes should be progressively larger as we move through years of lowest expected conflict to highest.

This particular model is a very simple representation of the hypothesized combined effects of the world leadership cycle and the long wave on interstate armed conflict. Implicitly, it assumes that the contribution made by each process to the generation or suppression of conflict are coequal, regardless of phase. This is probably an oversimplification of reality, but current theory permits nothing more elaborate than this. I deliberately chose a model that takes only the smallest step beyond the frontiers of theory as currently articulated in the core works. A better specification of the interrelationship between these processes awaits further theoretical development. Due to its simplicity, this model should be considered only an exploratory effort, one that opens a new line of research, rather than closes the book on a developed controversy.[15] As with the other models to be tested, the lagged endogenous term and the system size variable act as controls in this estimation.

Estimation Technique

Each of the six models just specified predicts to the annual frequency of armed disputes begun in the interstate system. My estimating equations, therefore, are in the family known as *event count* models. In any equation, the distribution of observations on my dependent variable will more closely resemble the Poisson distribution than the normal distribution, so I employ an appropriate maximum likelihood regression technique to take account of this fact (King 1988, 1989a, 1989b). Results from several Poisson regressions will be discussed.

Empirical Criteria

Testing these models involves more specific criteria than simply comparing fit to a null model that assumes a random process or judging whether estimated parameters are significantly different from zero. Essentially, there are three empirical concerns in this study. I wish to discern (1) whether the five theoretical models explain

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and system size. If hegemony indeed suppresses conflict as Gilpin contends, then the parameters estimated for the UK and U.S. terms will be significantly smaller than the value of the intercept, thus shifting the "average" annual number of conflicts downward.

[13] Gilpin has argued that hegemonic leaders and the systems they dominated likely differed in important ways and that scholars should look more closely to discern their similarities and differences (1981, 37–38). This particular model of Gilpin's ideas responds to that call in one small but important way.

[14] Again, the phase categories (seven in this model) simply unpack the intercept term specified in the null model and act as shift parameters.

[15] One major alternative, even at this exploratory stage, would be to incorporate phase categories of the long wave and world leadership cycles as separate terms in a linear additive equation. Such a model would claim that the two processes were essentially independent of one another, and I do not believe this is the case. Nevertheless, I did obtain estimates for the linear additive version, and its overall performance was slightly weaker than the combined model presented here. Interested researchers can obtain full results of those regressions from me on request.

significantly more variance in the dependent variable than the null model I have specified, (2) whether the parameters estimated for the phase models are significantly different from each other (thus indicating a measurable shift in the frequency of conflict-laden events from one period to another), and (3) whether the phase parameters in a particular model shift in the hypothesized direction.

Competitive comparison of empirical fit between pairs of models is accomplished using the log-likelihood ratio test.[16] Given that the dependent variable is identical across all six models tested, statistical comparison of the log-likelihood values produced by any pair of models tells us whether one model explains significantly more of the observed variance than the competing model. A different test can determine whether the parameter associated with one phase in a cycle is significantly different from the parameter estimated for another phase in that cycle.[17] And the value of each estimated parameter for the phases of a particular cycle will indicate whether the phases are associated with the *relative* levels of armed conflict predicted by the model being tested.[18]

Summary of Hypotheses

Each of the five theoretical models put forward is expected to explain significantly more of the variation in annual frequency of armed disputes begun than my constructed null model. Thus, the log-likelihood value for each of these models will be compared to the log-likelihood value of that null model. In addition, it is expected that the phase parameters estimated for each model will be significantly different from each other (indicating a genuine shift in conflict behavior in the system between phases of the cycle). Finally, the relative size of different phase parameters are hypothesized to conform to the claims attributed to their respective authors (see Table 2).

Parameter estimation and a full comparison of the results for these five models as well as the constructed null alternative will answer several questions. Do any of the core frameworks help us understand the dynamics of armed conflict beyond the great-power system? Do any of these models outperform the others when applied to all system members and all forms of armed conflict? It is to these questions that I now turn.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Again, the dependent variable in this study is the number of armed disputes begun in a particular year. I have assembled annual data for the years 1816–1976, yielding a total of 161 observations. The inclusion of a lagged endogenous term in all models results in 160 included observations in these estimates. The estimates themselves are presented in the appendix.

Close comparison of the performance of these models adds much more to the findings, for had this study focused exclusively on any one of these frameworks, positive findings would have been reported (see Figure 1). Figure 1 displays the results of pairwise log-likelihood ratio tests for the six models.[19] Three patterns in these results are most striking. First, all five theoretical models demonstrate their superiority to the null model put forward. Even after controlling for lagged endogenous effects and system size, the different phases claimed by these various scholars add statistically to our explanatory power ($p < .05$ for the Wallerstein model, $p < .005$ for all others). There is strong evidence that the dynamics described by these scholars do indeed affect the system as a whole and are related to a variety of forms of armed conflict. Second, speaking empirically, *none* of the four existing frameworks is clearly superior to all the others. The log-likelihood values for the Gilpin and Goldstein models were too similar to allow us to find greater fit with the data for either specification in regard to the other. And while the Wallerstein framework was inferior to the others at least at the level of $p < .05$, none of the four existing frameworks distinguished itself by producing a lower log-likelihood value than all others. Third, and most important, the model of coevolving systems is shown to be significantly superior in terms of fit compared to all four existing frameworks. By taking the long wave and the world leadership cycle as combined contributors to the generation and suppression of conflict, I find that a significantly better fit is obtained. Using the term coined by the late Imre Lakatos, the model of coevolving systems demonstrates excess empirical content compared to its four predecessors.[20]

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[16] This test is described succinctly in Kennedy 1992, 68–69.

[17] The simple difference between two phase parameters ($\beta_j - \beta_k$) itself becomes the point estimate of the *change* in the average annual number of armed disputes as the system moves from phase j to phase k. The variance of that estimated change is given by $\{\mathrm{VAR}(\beta_j) + \mathrm{VAR}(\beta_k) - \mathrm{COV}(\beta_j\beta_k)\}$. The square root of the variance is, of course, the standard error of the change parameter. This change parameter, divided by its standard error, yields a t-statistic that is used to determine whether the difference between the two parameters is significant statistically. I thank Gary King for bringing this test to my attention. The estimated variance-covariance matrices used in these computations are available on request.

[18] Note that it does not matter whether a particular cycle phase parameter is significantly different from zero or not, as long as its size is significantly different from other phase parameters and its value is larger or smaller than those other model parameters as hypothesized by the model being tested.

[19] Using the log-likelihood ratio test, all models proved to be statistically significant against the "naive" null model, which used the mean number of annual disputes as its predictor. Another gauge of statistical "fit" is the proportional reduction in the log-likelihood function. For the five models tested, this ranged from 36% (Wallerstein) to 41% (coevolving systems). Against the constructed null model, this same statistic revealed only modest improvements of 1% to 8% (the same two models marked the low and high end of performance). As discussed in the text, it matters more that the five theoretical models exhibit meaningful phase parameters with respect to the "sophisticated" null model (described in the text and shown in Table 5) based on the number of members in the system and the lagged endogenous term.

[20] Several robustness tests were also undertaken. First, to bridge this study directly to the core works, all five models were tested using *great power war severity* (battle deaths) as the dependent variable. As the distribution of this dependent variable is also truncated at zero, battle deaths were treated as "events," and the Poisson regression model was again used. Using the same criteria shown in Table 5, the coevolving systems model exhibited significantly greater explanatory power than any alternative. Second, keeping with the great-power focus of the core works, annual observations of *great power war under way* were used as the dependent variable, and logit estimates for all five models were

FIGURE 1. Pair-Wise Contest of the Explanatory Power of Six Models: Annual Number of Total Armed Disputes, 1816–1976

Model B

Model A	Null	W	M&T	Gp	Gs
Wallerstein	.05				
Modelski & Thompson	★	.05			
Gilpin	★	★	.01		
Goldstein	★	★	.05	D	
Co-evolving Systems	★	★	★	★	★

Key: Read across for "wins," read down for "losses."
W: Wallerstein Model
M&T: Modelski and Thompson Model
Gp: Gilpin Model
Gs: Goldstein Model
★ = Row Model A is Superior to Column Model B at $p < .005$
.05 = Row Model A is Superior to Column Model B at $p < .05$
.01 = Row Model A is Superior to Column Model B at $p < .01$
D = Draw. Row Model A cannot be distinguished statistically from Column Model B in explanatory power.
Note: Log-likelihood ratio test; extreme differences in performance indicated by ★.

Results pertaining to the hypothesized dynamics of these cycles are less straightforward. Generally, I do find that the frequency of armed conflict found within the phases claimed by various models does conform to expectations. But there are important exceptions to this broad finding, and examination of specific models on this criterion is warranted. Figure 2 displays the point estimates for the phase parameters for each model and notes where adjoining phase parameters are significantly different from each other.

Results for the Goldstein model are impressive, coming very close to supporting all hypothesized relationships ($\beta_1 < \beta_2 < \beta_3 < \beta_4$). The point estimates show this to be true, and statistically β_1 is indeed significantly less than β_2, which in turn is less than β_3, exactly as hypothesized. The difference between β_3 and β_4, however, is not large enough to conclude that their true values are distinct. In all, these results strongly suggest that the phases of the economic long wave are associated with measurable changes in the annual frequency of armed disputes between states.

The model that includes Gilpin's specified periods of hegemony also yields strong results in predicting the frequency of armed disputes. We can be confident that the overall model outperforms the constructed null alternative, and parameters associated with British hegemony and American hegemony lie in the hypothesized direction with relation to the intercept and are significantly different from the intercept. In plainer terms, these results indicate that both the British and the American periods were associated with significantly less new conflict than times when no hegemon was present in the system. It is also worth noting that the two hegemony parameters in this model are discernably different from each other, lending credence to Gilpin's argument that different hegemonies should be treated as such and compared to each other. In all, the claims made by the Gilpin model are borne out when applied to all forms of armed disputes for the entire system. These results indicate that the global political order—and specifically, the presence of a hegemon—should be a consideration in system-level models explaining armed conflict.

The Wallerstein model also demonstrates conflict dynamics associated with the four phases, and the ascent period, as hypothesized, is indeed the most conflict-laden. The preceding periods, however, exhibit progressively *descending* rather than fluctuating frequencies of conflict, and the victory phase cannot be distinguished empirically from the period of maturity. Still, when compared to the null model, Wallerstein's cycle of hegemony proved to increase significantly the fit to the data examined here. This extends his ideas to forms of conflict short of major war and shows that the significance of this cycle is not limited to the major-power subsystem.

The Modelski and Thompson framework exhibits two distinct conflict periods, rather than four. Relatively low frequencies occur during the world power and delegitimation periods, and a markedly higher number of annual incidents occur during deconcentration and global war. As expected, the fourth period does indeed experience the highest incidence of armed disputes.[21] As with the other two frameworks, sufficient dynamics are found to indicate that this model is a significant improvement over a null model based on system size and autocorrelation in the dependent variable. Overall results are somewhat mixed but sufficiently strong to warrant continued attention to the world leadership cycle as we continue to develop our understanding about the incidence of armed conflict in the system.

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obtained (given that the dependent variable is binary). By the very same criteria, the coevolving systems model again outperformed all alternatives. Third, the annual observations of armed disputes used in this study was partitioned into four domains: (1) total disputes (the dependent variable used in this study), (2) disputes involving a major power as either initiator or target, (3) disputes initiated by a major power, and (4) disputes involving major powers on both sides (the domain most in keeping with the core works). Thus each of the four domains is a perfect subset of its predecessor. By the criteria set in Table 5, the coevolving systems model significantly outperformed the alternatives in each of the four Dispute domains. Finally, the years 1914–18 and 1939–45 were removed from the sample to see whether World Wars I and II might be driving the results. Here, the coevolving systems model showed significantly more explanatory power ($p < .005$) than any of the alternatives in two domains: total disputes and disputes involving major powers on both sides. In the remaining two domains, the coevolving systems model always yielded a higher log-likelihood, but failed to show an improvement greater than $p < .05$ in the following cases: against the Wallerstein model in disputes involving a major power as either initiator or target, against disputes initiated by a major power, and against the Modelski and Thompson model in disputes initiated by a major power. Overall, I conclude that the results discussed in the main text are not sensitive to specification of the dependent variable, to the domain of conflict chosen, or to the inclusion of World Wars I and II. Results from all auxiliary regressions are available on request.

[21] This pattern might suggest that the "single cobweb" dynamic described by Modelski and Thompson (1987) is a more accurate representation of the relationship of conflict to the world leadership cycle than their preferred "double cobweb." When integrated into the coevolving system model I present here, however, the double cobweb hypothesis proved superior. For this reason and because Modelski and Thompson prefer this specification, it is the one I chose.

FIGURE 2. Phase Parameter Estimates for Five Models, 1816–1976



Dynamics are clearly discerned in the coevolving systems model. Each of the seven stages—measuring the combined contributions of the long wave and the leadership cycle to the annual frequency of new armed conflict—can be distinguished from neighboring stages. It was hypothesized that stages 2–8 would witness ever higher frequencies. While this is found to be generally true, two exceptions at stages 5 and 7 were found to diverge from this pattern.[22] I draw no strong conclusions from these two deviations. It is possible that the strength

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[22] Years coded as stage 5 in my framework include 1894–1910 (long wave was in expansion phase, ordinal conflict value = 3, while the world leadership cycle was in the delegitimation phase, ordinal conflict value = 2). In addition, 1921–33 were coded 5 as these years were in stagnation phase in the long wave and the global war phase in the Modelski and Thompson framework. Finally, 1969–73 were also coded

FIGURE 3. Substantive Significance Annual Number of New Disputes Predicted by Two Models



Note: Assumes 10 disputes begun in year t − 1 and 170 system members.

of the conflict-generating and damping effects of the long wave and world leadership cycles are conditioned by each other. Further theory regarding their possible interrelationships and a new model would be necessary to test this. Undoubtedly, if the line of research I am suggesting proves fruitful, future work will find that the form of interaction between these cycles is more subtle and complex than the specification I offer here. At this point, I believe it is noteworthy for the broader research community exploring systemic cycles that a simple and general specification that combines the two cycles was found to be associated with increasing annual frequency of conflict in the system and that this coevolving systems model outperformed all tested alternatives empirically.

Discussion

The statistical evidence indicates clearly that the incidence of armed conflict in the system is related to both the creation and disintegration of global political order, as well as to expansion and contraction in the world economy. But it is important that we consider not only the statistical significance but also the *substantive* significance of these findings. These models and their estimated parameters allow us to engage in *what if* predictions, the purpose of which is not to forecast but to explore the sensitivity of the international system to different conditions.

Toward that end, I calculated the number of new armed disputes predicted during specific cycle phases for the two most statistically successful models in this study.[23] Using the estimated parameters from the Goldstein and the coevolving systems models, I held the value of the two control variables constant and computed the predicted number of disputes during each defined phase by substituting appropriate values of 0 and 1—like switches—on the different phase variables. For this exercise, I assumed that 10 new disputes had begun in the previous year (a middling number for the latter part of the period examined in this study) and that there were 170 states in the system (roughly the number we find in the world today). Under these conditions, we can then compute the expected number of new conflicts predicted during each of the four phases of the long wave and the seven stages of the coevolving systems model. The results are displayed in Figure 3.

The substantive significance of these two models is apparent in that figure. As the long wave moves through its four phases, the expected annual number of new armed conflicts moves from 10 to 15. In our time, incidents such as Bosnia, the U.S. threat to invade Haiti, and the ultimatum issued by the People's Republic of Korea regarding nuclear inspections are examples of the events modeled here. The burden placed on the international system by even five new such events in one year gives pause. Yet, other things being equal, it is just this difference that the results reported here indicate is associated with phases in the long wave. The combined effects of that wave and the world leadership cycle, represented by the coevolving systems model, are even more striking. The sensitivity of new incidents of armed conflict to different phase-pairs (combined conflict ranks 2–8) is marked. Given 10 new disputes in year t − 1 and 170 system members, a year occurring during the stag-

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at this level, being in the war period of the long wave and the world power phase of the leadership cycle. Years coded as stage 7 include 1861–72 (war period of the long wave, deconcentration period of the leadership cycle). Similarly, the years 1974–76 occurred during the same phase-pair: war and deconcentration. In all, 35 years over the entire 161-year span of this study were coded as stage 5, while 15 years occurred under stage 7 conditions. I doubt that these deviations are due to sampling problems. Had the seven stages been *equally* distributed across the 161-year span of this study, exactly 46 years would have occurred during stages 5 and 7. In fact, 50 years fell within these two spans.

[23] This involves little more than using the regression equation and associated estimates to generate predicted values for Y (typically referred to as "Y-hat"). In Poisson regression, that value is designated λ, and measures the natural log of the number of predicted events. Thus, to compute the actual number of predicted events, one simply computes e^{λ} (King 1989b).

nation phase in the long wave, and the world power phase the leadership cycle is predicted to witness fewer new events. The high-conflict end of these two cycles, however, appears to be a particularly dangerous combination, as 33 new events are predicted by this model under these controlled conditions.

Again, this exercise is not a forecast but an indication of the differences in the frequency of new armed conflicts expected during different phase periods of the long wave and the world leadership cycle. I conclude that these differences are substantively significant and that phase shifts in global political order and economic activity are indeed important to our understanding of the genesis of interstate armed conflict.

CONCLUSION

While the existence of cycles is likely to remain a point of scholarly debate (as it should), the *association* between these purported cycles and important events in the life of the international system finds increasing empirical support.[24] This study's findings are two. First, based on theoretical arguments found in the core works and new empirical evidence presented here, I have shown that the explanatory domain of hegemony, world leadership cycle, and long wave studies may be fruitfully extended beyond the realm of the great powers to include all states in their investigations of armed conflict. The arguments and knowledge claims of each of the core frameworks were shown to have measurable promise in explaining various levels of conflict for minor and middle as well as great powers. Second, a new model that builds on these frameworks was shown to be superior empirically. The coevolving systems model takes separate account of the contributions to armed conflict made by the long wave and the world leadership cycle, and its success (despite its crude simplicity) points to a new and promising research direction. The improvement in empirical performance shown by this model against existing frameworks was not marginal but significant and occurred under a variety of circumstances and assumptions pertaining to the level of conflict and the nations included.

By the criterion of "excess empirical content," both of these points stand. They suggest that great powers not be given privileged status in our studies of conflict and that global political order and the economic long wave be examined in tandem. In my view, these are the chief lessons for students of interstate conflict that emerge from this study. Changes in global political structure and economic life should be viewed as distinct but interrelated processes; as global orders whose individual dynamics and mutual interactions exert weighty forces on the interstate system. By themselves, these forces do not *cause* armed strife between nations, but they do contribute centrally to the shaping of past history, as well as the contemporary array of international opportunities and constraints—all of which affect the decision calculus of national leaders who decide whether and when to resort to the sword.

The research reported here began with the question of whether cyclic change in the world economy or the continual reformation of global political order was most closely associated with the onset of armed discord among nations. That the ideas of scholars as diverse as Wallerstein, Gilpin, Goldstein, and Modelski and Thompson all proved to have an important measure of validity was a surprise and suggested that integration of their consistent claims was the best approach. That different starting points, assumptions, and phase-dating schemes offered by these authors bore different fruit indicated that both the consistencies and the divergences in the different cycles held a new key to understanding. Indeed, that appears to be the case, and identifying the reasons for these different rhythms is now an important research task. For these reasons, I conclude that the long wave, hegemony, and the world leadership cycle are best viewed as coevolving systems. Indeed, it is the world economy and global political order in combination that shape underlying conditions for conflict. Thus, future researchers should find the study of their coevolution to be fertile territory.

APPENDIX

Maximum likelihood parameter estimates and standard errors for each model discussed in the text appear in Table A-1.

TABLE A-1. Poisson Regression Results: Annual Observations of Total Armed Disputes Initiated in the System (Results from Full-Period Estimates, 1816–1976, N = 160)

Model and Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-ratio	p
Null^{ab}				
Constant	.861	.066	12.965	<.001
D_{t-1}	.071	.009	7.854	<.001
Members$_t$	.006	.001	4.562	<.001
Goldstein^{ac}				
Stagnation	.645	.100	6.421	<.001
Rebirth	.857	.096	8.913	<.001
Expansion	1.068	.085	12.520	<.001
War	1.100	.105	10.490	<.001
D_{t-1}	.061	.009	6.567	<.001
Members$_t$	.006	.001	4.209	<.001

[a] Gradient converged, function converged, B-vector converged.
[b] Log-likelihood = −377.589, chi-squared = 212.79, G-squared = 232.98.
[c] Log-likelihood = −368.5692, chi-squared = 196.88, G-squared = 214.94.

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[24] This is not to ignore an important, continuing debate over the very existence of such cycles. For purposes of this study, it suffices that certain scholars claim discovery of repeated patterns in hegemony, world leadership, and global economic conditions. For now, I accept the "minimal" definition of cycle employed by Doran and Parsons as "a period of time during which something becomes established, reaches a peak, and declines" (1980, 947). A good, scholarly exchange concerning the existence of cycles can be found between Beck (1991) and Goldstein (1991b).

TABLE A-1. continued

Model and Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-ratio	p
Gilpin[a,d]				
Constant	1.084	.083	13.134	<.001
UK Hegemony	−.415	.100	−4.163	<.001
US Hegemony	.086	.080	1.065	.287
D_{t-1}	.066	.009	7.308	<.001
Members_t	.005	.001	3.291	.001
Wallerstein[a,e]				
Victory	.800	.075	10.680	<.001
Maturity	.783	.101	7.766	<.001
Decline	.583	.129	4.529	<.001
Ascent	.988	.116	8.551	<.001
D_{t-1}	.068	.009	7.431	<.001
Members_t	.008	.002	5.065	<.001
Modelski and Thompson[a,f]				
World Power	.611	.104	5.893	<.001
Delegitimation	.666	.114	5.822	<.001
Deconcentration	.871	.083	10.530	<.001
Global War	.938	.087	10.810	<.001
D_{t-1}	.063	.009	6.950	<.001
Members_t	.009	.002	5.824	<.001
Coevolving systems[g]				
CR2	−.023	.238	−.097	.92305
CR3	.557	.119	4.670	.00000
CR4	.939	.109	8.630	.00000
CR5	.749	.111	6.777	.00000
CR6	1.198	.094	12.689	.00000
CR7	.853	.122	7.019	.00000
CR8	1.464	.141	10.364	.00000
D_{t-1}	.044	.010	4.310	.00002
Members_t	.009	.002	5.700	.00000

[a] Gradient converged, function converged, B-vector converged.

[d] Log-likelihood = −367.2468, chi-squared = 196.02, G-squared = 212.29.

[e] Log-likelihood = −372.9709, chi-squared = 203.54, G-squared = 223.74.

[f] Log-likelihood = −370.5699, chi-squared = 199.31, G-squared = 218.94.

[g] Gradient has converged. Log-likelihood = −348.3109, chi-squared = 157.11, G-squared = 174.42.

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Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step

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Rational choice analyses of international cooperation have slighted the effect of state preference formation and the influence of cultural forces in that process. This article addresses these gaps by developing an explanation that specifies how organizational cultures *of bureaucracies shape state aims and international outcomes. This approach is evaluated in a set of least likely cases—decisions on the use of force in war—where the conventional wisdom expects external material, not internal cultural, concerns to dominate. Before World War II, countries agreed to limit the use of three types of warfare, but during that conflict mutual restraint was maintained in only one. I show how this variation is best understood as a product of state preference dynamics, shaped largely by the collective beliefs and customs of military services. This result suggests ways to rethink the use of the preferences-interaction model and the role of cultural factors in that framework.*

International cooperation is more like a tango than a shuffle; its complexities make it difficult to follow. One perspective, rational choice/game theory, has offered a powerful simplifying guide: the "cooperation two-step." One step involves the formation of preferences of actors, the second, interaction among actors that leads to an outcome. Although this framework has offered many insights and shaped much of the study of cooperation, its application has been prone to two types of problems. First, in recent years, the dominant approach to cooperation has neglected preference formation (Jervis 1988) and focused on the interaction of actors attempting to maximize exogenously given preferences. Understanding where preferences come from and how and when they change has received less attention. Second, because the two-step framework is rooted in a rational choice tradition, analysts of cooperation have tended to pay less attention to its cultural determinants. Yet, what is clear is that cultural accounts and the rationalist two-step need not be mutually exclusive, as suggested in different ways by Johnson (1993) and Greif (1994). The implicit claim here is that cultural influence is important and can be usefully studied via traditional social science methodology. (There are, of course, a variety of other insightful ways to think about cultural phenomena.)

This paper highlights both preferences and culture as critical for understanding international cooperation. I offer a domestic-level cultural explanation of preferences that contrasts to the common view that state desires are functionally determined or definitively constrained by the international system. Specifically, I argue that the organizational cultures of government bureaucracies produce information, plans, and capabilities which can constitute state preferences in ways that need not efficiently correspond to international circumstances. Furthermore, I illustrate how preference dynamics, in addition to interaction, can be central to variations in international conflict and cooperation. I examine the importance of culturally shaped preferences in an issue area—the use of force in war—in which the conventional wisdom expects them to be least influential. When national security and survival are at stake, analysts tend to posit interests, emphasize strategic interaction, and discount bureaucratic influence.[1] Furthermore, cultural influences that may clash with efficient strategic response should fade into the background in the quest for national survival.

Within the category of war, few modern clashes have been as encompassing or intense as World War II, yet states tried to cooperate in limiting the use of certain means of warfare. In the interwar period, lengthy negotiations were aimed at curtailing the development, and especially use in battle, of three stigmatized types: (1) submarine attacks against merchant ships, (2) aerial bombing of nonmilitary targets, and (3) chemical warfare. All three were considered to have both tactical and strategic military utility. During the war, no outside power could act as a referee to control the scale of fighting. The stakes involved "unconditional surrender," and defeat would entail the political, if not literal, extinction of the government. To avoid that outcome, entire industrialized societies devoted themselves to war-making. The cast of characters also did not bode well for limitation, since one of the central decision makers, Hitler, seemed psychotic and incapable of respecting any limitation on force. Yet, during the conflict, different outcomes of restraint and escalation occurred. Submarine warfare was used almost immediately. Strategic bombing was restrained at first and then employed extensively. But chemical weapons, despite expectations and preparations, were never used. How can these variations be deciphered? Why did states choose to cooperate in restraint in some circumstances but not others?

The dominant model of international cooperation would look for answers in factors of strategic interaction (such as time horizons, number of players, communication, and information asymmetries). Furthermore, in such security-threatening circumstances, a unitary na-

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[1] Many of the seminal strategic interaction studies have focused on decisions on the use of force, either in international crisis or war (for example, Axelrod 1984; Fearon 1995; Jervis 1978; Morrow 1989; Powell 1990; Schelling 1960; Wagner 1991). On interests and bureaucratic influence, see text and notes below.

tional concern is generally assumed to be most influenced by international forces, especially the balance of power. Yet, while interaction dynamics were relevant in World War II, changes in state preferences appear to be the pivotal source of the variation in cooperation—both when it occurred and *when it did not.* I argue that preference formation was primarily driven by a domestic social and bureaucratic influence, namely, organizational culture, not the balance of power. The cultures of military services, oriented around specific modes of battle, become particularly influential in war, and in World War II these decisively shaped (sometimes by changing, at other times by reinforcing existing) national preferences on the use of force. These preference dynamics were, in turn, central to understanding why cooperation endured in some cases but not others.

This argument suggests that the conventional approach to international cooperation be supplemented in several ways. First, preference formation deserves more analytical and empirical attention than it has been given to date. Second, many, but by no means all, analysts have portrayed security policy preferences as largely a product of the dynamics of survival under anarchy (e.g., Lipson 1985; Mearsheimer 1994/95; Powell 1991), but this has obscured the role of internal determinants, especially in the very unlikely area of the use of force. Here, an explanation based on bureaucratic orientation and influence is offered that differs considerably from existing organizational and bureaucratic models in that it highlights cultural forces. Furthermore, it specifies *when* and *how* they will be relevant to state calculations. The aim is not to diminish extant rational choice work but to develop the important overlap between cultural and rational analysis; this is done by illustrating the utility of focusing on collective beliefs and habits in the context of a standard "economic" two-step framework of preferences and interaction.

A necessary starting point is a review of the literature, its treatment of preferences, and its relevance for understanding the cooperation of restraint in World War II. The logic of two alternative approaches to preference formation—organizational culture and realism—are then developed, followed by a discussion of the research design and findings of a test of their relative explanatory power. Finally, the implications of the argument are examined.

THE COOPERATION TWO-STEP

The implicit conceptualization of cooperation as a two-step process is widespread (for example, Moravcsik 1992; Morrow 1988; Snidal 1986).[2] As Gordon Tullock (1962) argued years ago, this model suggests that both a science of preferences and a science of interaction are necessary for explaining behavior. Yet, most recent work on cooperation has emphasized interaction considerations. Studies have focused on the number of players, the discount rate, and a variety of transactions concerns (such as signalling, information, commitment, monitoring, and sanctioning).[3] This focus follows the classic economic/game theory model that views preferences as exogenous; they are taken as given, and the analysis begins at that point. Preferences, of course, are still a necessary analytical foundation in that they produce the pay-off matrix that decides what game is being played and whether actors' interests are compatible (Oye 1986), but their origins and evolution are generally left unexplored.[4] Thus, the model implicitly pushes preferences to the background by focusing on the second step of interaction while assuming the first. As Stigler (1977) and Becker (1976, 5) have emphasized, this is often an intentional analytic move to avoid the ad hoc attribution of anomalies, changes in behavior, and so forth, to shifting preferences. But in the study of international cooperation, a bias in the opposite direction is apparent: Variations in cooperation are inevitably seen as a product of changing strategic circumstances. What is also needed is an appreciation for and explanation of preferences.[5]

The problems that can arise in neglecting preference formation are evident in the escalation and restraint of World War II. An explanation that focuses exclusively on interaction while assuming preferences would lead to false conclusions about what mattered in producing the different results in submarine, aerial, and chemical warfare. Both interaction and preferences affected outcomes, but to understand the *variation* in cooperation, preference dynamics provide crucial leverage. This is so because the most prominent interaction elements of state relations—for example, the number of players, the "shadow of the future," and the ability to make commitments and signal—were similar across the three types of warfare, but the degree of cooperation differed. Yet, the *preferences* of states, that is, the relative desirability of different outcomes linked to the use (and restraint) of force, varied.[6] On the brink of conflict leaders agreed in each of the three areas that cooperation was desirable. During the war, however, states explicitly weighed the desirability of such different outcomes as mutual restraint, one's own unilateral escalation, the opponent's unilateral escalation, and mutual escalation. In a dynamic sense, states generally viewed these as likely to stabilize in one of two outcomes—mutual restraint or mutual escalation.[7] Thus, a key question is *why* preferences changed, favoring escalation, or persisted, supporting restraint.

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[2] Another common formulation distinguishes between preferences and "constraints," that is circumstances (see, for example, Frieden 1995, Levy 1990). The latter is similar to what I call below strategic interaction or circumstances thereof.

[3] For example, Schelling (1960) sees actors' ability to make credible commitments with one another as central to cooperation. Axelrod (1984) features the shadow of the future or discount rate. Oye (1986) adds to this the number of players, and Martin (1992) singles out the institutional context of bargaining. Rarely does preference formation receive central analytic attention.

[4] There are, of course, exceptions; see, for example, Adler 1992, Snyder 1991, Van Evera 1986.

[5] Some might argue that it makes sense to assume fixed preferences because some state interests are stable over long periods or are relatively straightforward. Examples of enduring state interests are survival, wealth, and power. But the problem is that these may not be a good guide to desires on specific issues. Many situations are complex, and what can be assumed about preferences is not clear. Consider the mandate of one of the most fundamental goals attributed to states, survival. Political regimes are eliminated without having exhausted their military potential, which illustrates that even so basic an interest as survival need not indicate the preferences a state will have in a particular circumstance, when trade-offs between the desire to protect the population and maintain political autonomy are often considered. In World War II, states certainly maintained interests in survival and security, but these did not translate into consistent preferences on cooperation, as will be seen below.

In highlighting preferences, I do not mean to overlook the central insight of the cooperation two-step: Cooperation involves both preference formation *and* interaction. There was a critical interaction component to cooperation in World War II, because in almost every instance one state's continuing restraint was contingent on the other side's behavior. Nations were not entirely immune to reciprocity. When one side escalated, the other usually followed suit. This basic interactive component of restraint is not captured by an exclusive focus on preferences. But reciprocity was also largely consistent across the three means of warfare, while outcomes varied. Thus, we must turn to preference formation to understand the differences in cooperation in stigmatized warfare in World War II.

THE SOURCES OF STATE PREFERENCES: TWO APPROACHES

In the study of international cooperation, Tullock's "science" of preferences is relatively underdeveloped, particularly involving serious threats to state security.[8] If preference formation is considered in such high-threat environments, it is typically seen as a function of the international system.[9] In comparison, factors internal to states are considered less relevant. When a nation's existence is at stake, interest group politics, class disputes, and bureaucratic battles are expected to be put on hold as countries unite to protect their well-being. Deviations from the national interest produced by organizations or other such forces will be corrected by the intervention of state leaders who pay more attention to security strategy due to the unavoidable external challenge. The central theme is that states inevitably will behave more like unitary actors responding to international circumstances in an effort to maximize relative gains (Grieco 1990; Keohane 1989; Lowi 1969; Mearsheimer 1994/95; Miller 1992; Posen 1984; Powell 1991; Verba 1961; Wolfers 1962).

Several authors have questioned the systemic bias of the study of international cooperation. They argue that domestic factors may be germane to understanding outcomes, particularly in terms of influence on preference formation (Gowa 1986; Haggard and Simmons 1987; Jervis 1988; Milner 1992; Putnam 1988). Such questioning, of course, should not suggest that only domestic-level approaches speak to preference formation and strategy selection. Many systemic-level theories do this, too. These arguments, however, correctly highlight that domestic-level analyses represent a *potentially* significant alternative or necessary complement to the dominant systemic explanations. But what is clearly required is conceptual and empirical work on the ability of different approaches to account for cooperation *and* its absence.

This article explores two approaches to explaining preferences on the use of force in World War II. The first, and the one I argue is most persuasive, is organizational culture, a perspective that has received little attention in international relations. The second is based on the prevalent "realist" understanding of state aims and behavior in security affairs.[10] These two are useful for comparison because they represent different analytical foci, have direct application to the issue at hand, and often provide opposite predictions.

Organizational Culture

The organizational culture approach asserts that the beliefs and customs embedded in national bureaucracies can determine national aims. Military organizational cultures deserve attention in understanding restraint in war because of the central role the armed forces play in national decisions on the use of force. This cultural view of preference formation emphasizes ideational more than material forces and the internal, rather than external, setting. In the last decade, culture has emerged as a central concept in organizational research, primarily in the field of business management. Analysts dissatisfied with formal structural analysis (which posits that similarly organized businesses will behave similarly) turned to the concept of *organizational culture*, defined as collectively held assumptions, ideas, and beliefs that prescribe how a group should adapt to its external environment and manage its internal structure (for example, Ouchi and Wilkins 1985; Pedersen and Sorenson 1989; Schein 1985). In recent years there has been a renewed interest in culture in security affairs.[11] Applied to military bureaucracies, culture is important because it shapes organizational cognition, capabilities, and aims in ways that contradict the expectations of noncultural organizational approaches. In turn, organizational predilection, in certain conditions, can determine state preferences. Two issues, then, are particularly central: (1) the influence of organizational culture on bureaucratic orientation and (2) how bureaucratic priorities shape national preferences and policy.

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[6] There is a subtle analytical difference between preferences over outcomes and preferences over strategy (Powell 1994, 318). The former refers to the relative desirability to an actor of alternative consequences from a situation, whereas the latter concerns the desirability to an actor of alternative strategies in light of preferences over outcomes and understandings of the other player. The difference is relevant because preferences over outcomes are typically not incorporated into strategic interaction analysis, whereas preferences over strategies can be. In World War II, cooperation (restraint) was both a desired outcome and at times a strategy in the larger "game" of war.

[7] As states recognized at the time (partially due to the norms involved, any escalation in these three forms of warfare would be met with retaliatory escalation. Therefore, since first-use advantages were generally not considered overly significant, it was understood that any unilateral use would quickly result in mutual escalation, and that was the outcome to be evaluated.

[8] In international political economy, the preferences of states have received greater attention. For different conceptualizations, see Frieden 1991, Goldstein 1993, Katzenstein 1978, Lake 1988, Milner 1988, Rogowski 1989. Often the focus in these works is on the preferences of groups within nations, such as firms, factors, or sectors.

[9] This is true across a range of schools. For example, a stress on systemic power and advantage is found in Waltz (1979); Keohane (1989) emphasizes systemic institutions; Wendt (1992) highlights the social knowledge and meanings that are collectively held internationally; the epistemic community literature has a transnational aspect (Haas 1992); and Oye (1992) suggests interaction itself conditions state desires. Recent exceptions in security affairs include Snyder (1991) and Kupchan (1994).

[10] Given the historical focus on stigmatized weapons, a third proposition that might be considered is the role of norms and international institutions related to the legitimacy of different types of warfare. Due to space, this is not considered here. For detailed consideration of this proposition, see Legro (1995a, 1995b).

Culture and Organizational Priorities. Organizational culture can shape organizational priorities and behavior in ways that contradict the expectations of traditional noncultural organizational perspectives based on (1) formal structure or (2) functional purpose. Let me address, first, the difference between a cultural view and one based on structure and, second, differences between cultural and functional perspectives.

One influential view of organizations is based on structure. The assumption of structural organization theory is that similar units within the context of similar structures should exhibit similar behavior. In the literature on militaries and the use of force, the theory predicts that militaries, as similar organizations seeking to maximize autonomy and size and reduce uncertainty, will display common characteristics; they will prefer offensive strategies and resist civilian intervention (Allison 1971; Posen 1984, 1991; Sigal 1988; Snyder 1984; Van Evera 1984, 1986).[12] Escalation is expected because restraint conflicts with the very nature of autonomy-seeking, offense-oriented, war-winning military organizations. While research has indicated that militaries do not always desire war, after the decision for war has been made, professional soldiers value operational autonomy. Once a war is under way, militaries are inclined to use all means at their disposal. Gradualism and restraint can cost lives and are inconsistent with such hallowed principles as concentration of force and the goal of total victory (Betts 1977). The proposition which follows from this logic is that militaries are likely to foster escalation in any usable means of warfare. From a structural organizational perspective, there is little reason to expect any dampening effect on escalation due to organizational influence. Restraint is an anomaly.[13] But World War II and other conflicts belie this expectation; restraint—aided by the patronage of military organizations—did occur. In contrast to the structural approach, a cultural view anticipates that organizations with similar formal structure may have very different understandings, interests, and behavior. Similarly, a cultural view anticipates that the prevailing beliefs in a military can lead to a bias for *either* escalation or restraint.

A functional view of organizations (one compatible with the realist position outlined below) recognizes that organizations come into being for specific purposes. Accordingly, this view expects that organizations will pursue those purposes in a functional manner in light of environmental circumstances. Thus, military organizations can be expected to use available information and resources to produce as much "security" as possible, adapting to circumstances as they change. In contrast, a cultural view would emphasize the way organizational traits and orientations result *not* from functional adaptation to the security environment but instead reflect a set of internal collective beliefs and habits that may have little to do with formal purpose or environmental conditions.

Culture shapes organizations in both cognitive and material ways. Cognitively, culture acts as a heuristic for collective perception and calculation, in much the same way a theoretical paradigm can shape intellectual thought (Kuhn 1970) or a schema individual thinking (Khong 1992). Culturally shaped agents tend to discount the environmental data and facts that contradict the existing orthodoxy. Even functional demands to make corrections in order to survive may go unheeded by organizations. Thus, approaches which anticipate that organizations rationally adapt to external circumstances will not be able to explain this shortfall.[14] The number of large companies that have failed to conform to market forces are legion. And militaries do not consistently adopt war-fighting strategies suited to a given strategic circumstance.[15] For example, despite organizational efforts (such as military exercises and maneuvers) to test the effectiveness of their ways of war, cultural biases tend to produce conclusions that reinforce, not critically assess, existing beliefs. These biases are reminiscent of the cognitive and motivational distortions discussed in the psychological literature (Jervis 1976; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985; Khong 1992). The difference is that cultural biases are not only based in the information processing capacity or emotions of individuals but also, and most important, in collective understandings.

Culture also has material consequences. Most apparent, it affects the capabilities to which organizations choose to allocate resources. Collective beliefs dictate which enterprises are inherently better and should receive support. Organizations will channel resources to methods suited to culture, which subsequently appear more feasible than those that are incompatible with culture and are deprived of funding and attention.[16] Thus, culture is a determinant of resource decisions that in later periods tend to reinforce the viability of cultural assumptions regardless of their fit with situational "strategic" circumstances. That is, given a particular set of capabilities, a state's choice may seem "rational" even if the expected results are marginal. But what may be more interesting is why that state came to be limited by such capabilities when other tools could have been easily developed.

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[11] For an overview see Johnston (1995a). Organizational culture, or related concepts, also has been used in the literature on bureaucracy. For example, see Halperin (1974) on "essence," Rhodes (1994) on "ideas," and Wilson (1989).

[12] For an excellent analysis on the way organizational tendencies need not lead to offensive doctrines due to cultural influence, see Kier (n.d.).

[13] Van Evera (1984, chapter 7) presents a detailed case on how the organizational dynamics of militaries favor escalation. Attesting to this expectation are the discussion and examples on organization theory given in Posen (1991, 16–19).

[14] Some theorists suggest that even though organizational cultures or routines may seemingly be inefficient in the short run, they may still be rational. For example, Krasner (1972) suggests that seemingly dysfunctional routines may still make sense given the huge costs involved in reorienting bureaucracies. Kreps (1990) argues that corporate cultures can be very functional in facilitating communication and coordination within organizations. Despite the insights of these explanations, they cannot explain why organizations maintain doctrines that result in massive failures, particularly when information is available that foreshadows such shortcomings and when the costs of adaptation are not prohibitive.

[15] One well-known case of this was the persistence of the cavalry into the twentieth century despite the clear demands of the modern battlefield (Katzenbach 1958). Travers (1987) gives example from World War I and Krepinevich (1986) from Vietnam.

Some organizations may be particularly prone to cultural influence. Bureaucracies, for example, often have intangible goals that only become concrete in specific situations or interpretations and usually objective criteria to assess progress are lacking (Wilson 1989). This uncertainty adds to the likelihood that these organizations will focus their efforts around modes or methods of output rather than actual goals. The methods over time take on a symbolic value of their own that may endure even when the demands of efficiency suggest the need for change. Individuals become socialized into, and acquire material interests (such as career advancement) in, certain modes of "doing business." In militaries these modes are styles of fighting war. In effect, collective beliefs about means become the end. And this orientation around beliefs about means leads to an insensitivity to functional adaptation to the environment.

If cultures do not derive from function or environmental pressures, where do they come from and how do they change? While these are large questions that generally lie outside the scope of this study, they deserve attention because of the implication that culture is spurious to some other "cause." My work, however, indicates that organizational culture is not the product of some monocausal force but instead is shaped by many factors, including technology, domestic and international environments, individuals, and accident. Furthermore, these components may themselves interact, allowing for a plethora of aggregate possibilities. The analytical value of focusing on culture is that it can be an autonomous force not easily reducible to the many factors constituting it. To draw an analogy, if we are interested in the *effect* of a hurricane, we need not always be concerned with the complex atmospheric conditions that give rise to it. The hurricane itself stands out as an identifiable, potent phenomenon that becomes greater than the sum of its parts.

What this study does have to do, however, is demonstrate that culture is not simply spurious to environmental factors such as those emphasized by the alternative explanation of preferences—realism—discussed below. The bulk of my research indicates that culture is often resilient to external pressures to change, that is, organizational cultures do not functionally adapt, even when the costs and benefits suggest it would make sense to do so. My point is not that militaries never think about results or what the enemy might do; rather, specific organizational orientations shape the valuation of both other actors and potential outcomes to such a degree (and often in conflict with "objective" external circumstances) that it is useful to think of this as an internal cultural occurrence.

What I am arguing here is a tendency, not an absolute. Militaries do adapt, adjust, and even "learn" (e.g., see Rosen 1991; Zisk 1993). This is especially true in stark cases of rapid changes (i.e., "shocks") that dramatically disconfirm the plausibility of existing cultural orientation (see the case of U.S. submarine policy below). Nonetheless, military cultures seem relatively durable, and adaptation is often episodic. There is enough evidence from World War II and other periods in history that militaries do not consistently "learn" (even after losing "battle after battle," such as the United States in Vietnam) to prevent explaining behavior by focusing on adaptation to objective circumstances (Keegan 1993). Thus, despite the possibility of cultural change and the associated difficulties with explaining it, the basic contention of the organizational culture approach is that culture often persists even when in conflict with environmental circumstances.

Organizational Salience and State Preferences. The remaining issue to be explained is how organizational propensity shapes state desires. This has been a weak point in traditional organization theory applied to foreign policy (Art 1973; Krasner 1972). Governments consist of multiple agencies, and the question is which bureaucracies will matter and when. The brief answer offered here is that a bureaucracy's influence varies with its *organizational salience*, which consists of at least three dimensions: (1) the extent to which it has monopoly power on expertise, (2) the complexity of the issue, and (3) the period available for action. First, when one organization has all the expertise and no competitors, there is less pressure to change, and organizational biases are not checked. Second, the intricacy of an issue affects the degree to which specialist knowledge is required for decisions. The more complex the issue, the less senior authorities can oversee the operations, and the more organizational preferences will be felt. Third, the time frame for decision making can also have an effect. When decision-making cycles are short, there is little time for adjusting prearranged menus. They must be cooked and dished out as planned. All these traits suggest that the military will have a high salience in choices on the use of force in war. Militaries are key players in such situations because they generally have a monopoly on expertise, military operations are complex and not easily understood by nonspecialists, and the time for altering prearranged plans is limited. Although civilians may have authority to make final choices, often contrary to their wishes and intervention, military preferences can prevail in the midst of war due to the organizational salience of the armed forces. This view of when military organizations matter is in direct contrast to the dominant thinking on this issue, which posits that when threats to the state are significant, civilian leaders will intervene to correct the organizational biases of the armed forces (see Posen 1984).

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[16] This is the "competency trap," in which experience with, and sunk costs in, certain technology or means make them seem better even if others are actually superior (Levitt and March 1988).

In sum, organizational culture is important because it shapes organizational identity, priorities, perception, and capabilities in ways unexpected by noncultural approaches. Those means compatible with the dominant war-fighting culture will be developed and advocated by the military, those that are not will suffer neglect.[17] Especially in war, military orientations can affect national preferences because of increased organizational salience. Thus, even as the cultural tendencies of subnational organizations remain fairly consistent, their heightened influence in war may lead to change in national preferences (if such preferences are not compatible with culture). Because cultures are embedded in particular military services, we should expect national preferences to vary across issues areas and over time according to the culture and organizational salience of the relevant service.

PROPOSITION 1: *States are likely to prefer restraint in a particular combat type when its use is antithetical to the war-fighting culture of their military bureaucracy. Where the organizational cultures of state military bureaucracies are compatible with use, states are more likely to favor escalation.*

Realism

The strategic rationality of realism seems particularly well suited as an alternative to organizational culture for understanding the use of force in a conflict that threatens survival.[18] This perspective is well known, and only a brief review is provided here. Most generally, realism expects that states will prefer whatever alternative best serves their political and territorial viability in a given situation "under anarchy." As Waltz (1979, 134) states, "the appropriate state action is calculated according to the situation in which the state finds itself." Based on a primary state interest of achieving security, preferences on any particular issue are expected as a rule to fit the objective constraints and incentives of the situation.[19] For realists, *situation* does not refer to class structure, international norms, or the domestic political aims of politicians but to opportunities for relative advantage based on the international distribution of capabilities among states.

Most generally, realism has explained cooperation through balance-of-power theory, which asserts that the tendency of nations toward conflict is only contained by the penalties (such as monetary or physical) that might be incurred by taking on a stronger opponent or coalition. In this view, the primary incentive for states to cooperate is to counter, or "balance" against, a state aspiring to hegemony (Waltz 1979). Realism's logic is, however, applicable to other issues and forms of cooperation than simply the macro-machinations of alliances (Glaser 1994/95). For example, Posen (1984) uses realist reasoning to explain state preferences on military doctrine. And in a study specifically addressing cooperation, Grieco (1990) adopts realism to account for why states do and do not adopt nontariff barriers in trading. For both authors, states' efforts are shaped around the aim of securing their position based on the external constraints and opportunities of relative power.

What would realism anticipate about the likelihood of states showing restraint even as they try to destroy one another? For realists, states are assumed to be concerned with survival and security and will pursue whatever strategy—restraint or escalation—best serves those interests. In the case of war between two states over unconditional surrender, leaders should be particularly concerned about gaining advantages that will aid victory or survival. From this perspective, preferences should follow from opportunities offered by the balance of power. Through the use of peacetime exercises—and the intervention of civilian leaders when militaries are recalcitrant—strategies that take maximum advantage of the given situation should result. With regard to the use of stigmatized weapons, states should prefer outcomes and strategies that make them better off, relative to their adversaries, than they would be otherwise. The balance of forces, tempered by geography and technology, should play a significant role in this calculus. The only deviation from this logic relates to realism's emphasis on regime survival at the expense of all other objectives. Realism anticipates that a state whose existence is imminently threatened will adopt any means that prolong its survival.[20]

PROPOSITION 2: *States are likely to desire restraint when the relative security penalties of use outweigh the gains based on the external balance of capabilities. States should prefer escalation when the situation offers advantage over their adversaries or to confront an imminent threat to survival.*

ASSESSING THE PROPOSITIONS

Cooperation in war is the product of two or more states opting for restraint. To understand their choices, the unit of analysis of this study is national decision making. This focus is appropriate for two reasons. First, although two countries are needed for restraint, escalation occurs by the decision of a single country. Second, a national-level focus is useful for examining preference formation in choices that determine cooperation.

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[17] Culture here refers to the beliefs held within a specific military organization. They may or may not relate to wider societal culture or to the beliefs held within a different military organization.

[18] I follow the lead of other analysts in my presentation of realism. As with Posen (1984) and Grieco (1990), my portrayal relies on neorealism but pulls it in the direction of classical realism. For recent discussions of realism and cooperation, see Baldwin (1993) and Glaser (1994/95).

[19] That is, as these are defined by the balance of power. It is important to note that realism is distinct from a rational actor approach and does have something to add on the formation of preferences. A generic rational actor approach does not specify the sources of utilities that determine preferences. It simply assumes that states will weigh costs and benefits, no matter how they are derived, and select the option that yields the largest net gain. Realism relies on "rational" state action but makes much more specific predictions about what drives utilities. Realism expects state preferences to respond primarily to constraints and opportunities shaped by the balance of power. For example, see the discussion of "National Preferences and International Pressures" in Waltz (1993, 61–70).

[20] Waltz (1979, 91–92). For an excellent discussion of this idea, see Stein (1990, 87–112).

Case Selection

Within the World War II context, submarines, strategic bombing, and chemical warfare deserve the spotlight because they were the three types of combat, quite distinct from others, that states considered for limitation. These three also are relevant to the aim of assessing the different propositions of organizational culture and realism. In relation to organizational culture, the fit between military beliefs and restraint differed for the three types of warfare both within and among countries. In terms of realism, the balance of external advantage changed between and sometimes within cases. The choice of cases from the same war has the strong advantage of permitting controls for a number of factors. For example, the personalities, the causes of the conflict, the stakes at risk, and the general international setting are the same for all three types of warfare. Within the three categories, a total of eight cases are investigated. In submarine warfare, Germany, Britain, and the United States are examined. In strategic bombing, the focus is on Germany and Britain. In chemical warfare, the analysis considers Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union. The countries selected were either the central actors in a particular means of warfare or present anomalous situations.[21] All offer intriguing issues.

Method

The comparative case method is well suited for studying such complex phenomena as cooperation in war where theories are neither well articulated nor substantiated and the number of cases is small (George 1979; George and McKeown 1985; Tilly 1984). Two types of comparisons are most relevant: why some means of warfare were restricted while others were used and why different countries opted for either the restraint or use of a specific type of combat. The task is to assess which perspective best explains restraint by examining which of the approaches most accurately captures the shaping of preferences on limitation and escalation.

Measuring Variables

To do this, operational measures of causes and outcomes are required. The two independent variables are represented in the competing propositions derived above. Organizational culture is assessed according to the ideas and beliefs about how to wage war that characterized a particular military bureaucracy. A measure of this culture is developed by reviewing available internal correspondence, planning documents, regulations, exercises, and the memoirs of individual members. These multiple sources provide a composite picture of the hierarchy of legitimate beliefs within an organization. Cultural explanations are often accused of post-hoc tautological explanation: A certain cultural belief can always be found after the fact that explains a given action. Obviously, the definition of culture cannot be based on the effects attributed to culture. Fortunately, organizational cultures, especially military ones, are often quite tangible and can be assessed independent of outcomes. Thus, my organizational cultural approach is neither circular nor "nonfalsifiable." As seen below, the case of U.S. submarine warfare policy illustrates that an organizational culture explanation of restraint can be refuted. Table 1 gives a brief summary of the nature of the different cultures and the predictions they entail for restraint or escalation. I elaborate on these below.

The realist proposition is gauged by the opportunities and constraints that confronted states, particularly with regard to relative advantage in escalation. In view of state aims, did the balance of power in a situation offer a country relative gains or losses in escalating? In some instances, this is a counterfactual exercise in that it identifies an objective situation, one to which a state may not have "correctly" (according to realist logic) adapted. In those cases, I show that, by standards of reasonable judgment, states should have had different preferences given the situation (if realist predictions are accurate). I do this by pointing to available but neglected evidence, to internal arguments about the nature of the situation, to nonrational strategic calculations by states, and to comparisons with judgments made by that state or other states in similar situations. This analysis is not simply one of hindsight. The claim is that, given the information available, states could have known their situation. Table 2 provides a condensed summary of my coding of the balance of advantage, and more information is provided below in the findings.

The dependent variable, outcome, refers to the preferences states had for cooperation (or noncooperation) when facing boundaries on the use of force that were recognized as such by the involved parties. This is assessed by the internal discussions of the wartime leadership regarding its preferred outcome. Although these decision-making bodies were not a unitary actor, they were often small groups that debated and generally reached consensus on desired ends. There is every reason to believe these discussions reflect actual preferences. This means that the preferences identified are not simply "revealed" by behavior but, instead, can be assessed independently.[22] In practice, there was a relatively close correspondence between preferences and action *except* in those cases in which states preferred mutual restraint but switched to use in response to the

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[21] These cases are, of course, also useful for examining the two propositions derived from realism and organizational culture. For example, the cases of U.S. strategic bombing (including dropping the atomic bomb) and the use of chemical warfare against Japan are excluded because Japan could not retaliate against the United States in those means of warfare, thus substantially changing the nature of the "realist" calculation.

[22] The exception here is the Soviet case; due to gaps in the evidence available on internal discussions, I rely to a certain degree on revealed preferences.

TABLE 1. Organizational Culture: Predictions

Combat Type	Country	Prediction	Abridged Coding Rationale
Submarine warfare	Germany	Use	The German Navy accorded submarine warfare a central place in strategy, and the ethos of its U-boat force was based on its unrestricted trade offensive in World War I.
Submarine warfare	Britain	Restraint	The Royal Navy was dominated by a belief in the supremacy of the battleship; the underwater boat was considered a second-class tool of combat. During the interwar period, even when Britain's main expected adversary was Japan, a nation vulnerable to a submarine campaign, the Royal Navy never considered an anticommerce submarine strategy.
Submarine warfare	United States	Restraint	The U.S. Navy was "battleship-bound" in its thinking during the interwar period. It gave little thought to an unrestricted submarine campaign against Japan, its main expected opponent, despite Japan's vulnerability.
Strategic bombing	Britain	Use	The Royal Air Force developed around the "faith" of the efficacy of strategic bombing, particularly to undermine civilian morale, a doctrine incompatible with restricted bombing rules.
Strategic bombing	Germany	Restraint	Although strategic bombing was considered, a battle-support mentality largely dominated the Luftwaffe, whose primary role was seen as contributing to the land and sea campaign. This combat ideology was better suited to restraint.
Chemical warfare	Britain	Restraint	The British Army was a tradition-governed, antitechnology force that was generally hostile to chemical warfare, particularly given its institutional experience in World War I. Chemical warfare was more compatible with the RAF's strategic bombing thinking, but the Army was in charge of chemical warfare development; the RAF developed its own biases for fire-bombing and high explosives (even though gas was considered a complement, not competitor, to those munitions).
Chemical warfare	Germany	Restraint	The German Army's culture favored the efficacy of the mobile offensive. Chemical warfare was perceived as largely incompatible with such a campaign.
Chemical warfare	Soviet Union	Restraint	Like the Wehrmacht, the Red Army was dominated by a faith in the offensive. Chemical warfare was seen primarily as a defensive weapon.

Note: If the dominant war-fighting culture of the military favored escalation, the case is designated "use"; if the culture was antithetical to the employment of a type of combat, the case is coded "restraint."

other side's first use.[23] Such cases are coded as "restraint" if the state indicated a preference for nonuse. Table 3 provides a summary.

Evidence

The historical evidence assessed is of two types. First, given the broad nature of the enterprise, I have relied on a range of excellent secondary works about the countries and matters of concern. Despite this wealth of material, some of the phenomena, particularly the role of organizational culture, have not been adequately covered in the literature. Therefore, I have also examined archival sources.[24]

COOPERATION IN WAR: FINDINGS

At the beginning of World War II, states vowed to cooperate in restraint in submarine warfare, strategic bombing, and chemical warfare. These pledges represented the preferences of the nations and, for various reasons, the states involved seemed committed to adhering to the limitations. Leaders' expectations of likely restraint in the three areas, both optimistic and pessimistic, were similar.[25] Yet, once hostilities started, these desires varied, leading to differences in restraint and escalation across the three types of warfare. Why? Both

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[23] A second source of divergence between preferences and action was inadvertence. For an analysis of the sources of inadvertent escalation, see Legro (1994).

[24] This was conducted in Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. Despite this effort, gaps remain. Either evidence has been destroyed, never existed, or was not found by me. The most substantial shortfall is that Soviet documents on chemical warfare policy remain largely unavailable, despite recent political changes. Nonetheless, a good deal of material on Soviet policy has been uncovered in the German, British, and U.S. archives. Because of the intrinsic interest of that history, the case merits attention.

[25] Thus, for example, it was not the case that countries expected restraint in chemical warfare but not in submarine warfare. In fact, by the discussions and actions of the interwar period, especially the late 1930s, it appeared that the prohibition against unrestricted submarine warfare was more durable than restraints on chemical warfare (Legro 1995b).

TABLE 2. Realism: Predictions

Combat Type	Country	Prediction	Abridged Coding Rationale
Submarine warfare	Germany	Restraint	In the first six weeks of war, the period critical for decisions on submarine restrictions, one of Germany's central strategic objectives was pacifying the United Kingdom. Hitler recognized unrestricted warfare would antagonize the British. While Germany did have an advantage in such warfare (Britain was dependent on sea commerce), it had far too few U-boats (26 versus an estimated 300 needed for victory) to have a decisive effect on Britain's trade. Thus, as the Foreign Ministry argued, restraint made geopolitical sense.
Submarine warfare	Britain	Restraint	As an island nation dependent on commerce and protected by a surface fleet, Britain was asymmetrically vulnerable to an unrestricted antitrade submarine campaign; a limited war was to Britain's advantage.
Submarine warfare	United States	Use	The U.S. rival in the Pacific was Japan, an island nation that was more vulnerable than the United States to unrestricted submarine warfare.
Strategic bombing	Britain	Restraint	Britain, with its more concentrated population and industry and smaller air force, was more vulnerable to an unrestricted bombing campaign than was Germany. This was especially true during the crucial period after Germany occupied France and the Low Countries.
Strategic bombing	Germany	Use	Because Britain was more vulnerable from the air, strategic bombing might have provided Germany considerable gains, particularly when it had secured its position in Western Europe and Hitler realized no political accommodation with Britain was possible.
Chemical warfare	Britain	Use	Particularly after the D-Day invasion, Britain had superior ability to conduct chemical warfare. According to realist logic, British preference should have switched to use, but it did not.
Chemical warfare	Germany	Use	In the first part of the war, Germany was believed to have advantages in both the quantity and quality of its chemical warfare capability. In the latter part of the war Germany maintained restraint in several situations, particularly the D-Day invasion, in which gas use might have made a significant contribution. In these circumstances, if not in Hitler's last-ditch defense, realism anticipates use.
Chemical warfare	Soviet Union	Restraint	The Soviet Union was at a disadvantage in both chemical warfare technology and preparations for most of the war. Soviet restraint in the face of imminent defeat in 1941, when the use of chemical warfare would have certainly slowed the German onslaught, is nonetheless puzzling from a realist perspective.

Note: If the strategic situation indicated a country could gain relative advantage through unrestricted warfare, the case is designated "use"; if it would lose relatively by escalating, the case is coded "restraint."

realism and organizational culture provide a prima facie account for the variations in preferences evident in World War II. When assessed against actual events, however, the organizational culture perspective offers a better account. In this paper it is not possible to present the full evidence that supports the argument (see Legro 1995a). I can, however, summarize the results, provide a brief synopsis of the cases, and illustrate the dynamics of organizational culture and realism by discussing one case in some detail.

An Overview

The aggregate findings are presented in the form of 2 × 2 panels collectively displayed in Figure 1. The placement of cases in the boxes follows from the propositions and outcomes. On the vertical axis, each panel depicts the prediction of the theory (either USE or RESTRAINT) for each case. For realism, if a country's position indicated that relative advantage could be gained from escalation, it was placed in the USE category. If the situation was one of disadvantage, the case was placed in the RESTRAINT category. For organizational culture, if the military's preferred way of war did not favor using the means under consideration, it was placed in the RESTRAINT category. If the opposite was true, the case was placed under USE. On the horizontal axis, the preference outcome (mutual USE or mutual RESTRAINT) is given. To distinguish between the effects of preference shifts and strategic interaction on actual policy choice, cases in

TABLE 3. Outcomes

Combat Type	Country	Preference	Abridged Coding Rationale
Submarine warfare	Germany	Use	In the first six weeks of war, preferences shifted from limitation to a no-holds-barred submarine war.
Submarine warfare	Britain	Restraint	Restraint in submarine warfare was preferred, even though the restrictions were eventually dropped after Germany abandoned restraint.
Submarine warfare	United States	Use	The United States desired unlimited submarine warfare from the beginning of the conflict.
Strategic bombing	Britain	Use	A preference for limitation in the air war shifted to a priority on unrestricted strategic bombing in spring and summer 1940.
Strategic bombing	Germany	Restraint	A mutually limited air campaign was preferred until Germany turned to unrestricted bombing in Europe in response to Britain's escalation.
Chemical warfare	Britain	Restraint	Mutual restraint in chemical warfare was preferred throughout the war when confronting actual situations. (Leaders, however, indicated a contingent preference for unilateral use in the event of a German invasion.)
Chemical warfare	Germany	Restraint	Mutual restraint in chemical warfare was preferred throughout the war.
Chemical warfare	Soviet Union	Restraint	The Soviet Union desired restraint throughout the conflict.

Note: The case is designated restraint if a country desired mutual limitation in a means of warfare (even if it eventually used a certain means, but only in response to the other side's first use). The case is considered use if a country preferred, or came to prefer, unilateral escalation.

which countries preferred restraint but escalated in response to the other side's use were coded as RESTRAINT.

To the extent a particular perspective provides a good account of decisions, the cases line up in the northwest (USE-USE) and southeast (RESTRAINT-RESTRAINT) boxes. This implies that a theory would expect a national preference for escalation, and escalation was indeed preferred. Similarly, restraint is predicted, and the outcome was indeed restraint. In most cases, the ultimate strategy choices of states mirrored their preferences. A comparison of the two panels in Figure 1 indicates the explanatory power of organizational culture in these cases. In almost every area, organizational beliefs and desires became national policy. In contrast, the predictions of realism are much more uneven. Often when states were in a position to gain relative advantage by escalating, they favored restraint. Likewise, when nations faced relative losses if escalation occurred, they led the way across the Rubicon.

Case Briefs

A short summary of how the two propositions relate to the outcomes in each case gives depth to the tables. The summaries are not meant to be definitive, and all the issues involved cannot be fully addressed, but they provide at least a flavor of the analysis.

German Submarine Warfare. German preferences for restraint at the beginning of the war quickly shifted to use in the first six weeks. Realism would predict restraint in this situation. Hitler prohibited unrestricted submarine warfare because one of his top strategic priorities was not to provoke Britain and other countries, such as the United States, into a conflict he hoped could be avoided. Unrestricted U-boat attacks in World War I had brought the United States into the war, a change in the balance of power that led to Germany's defeat. Submarine warfare did offer *tactical* military advantages against Britain, which was dependent on sea trade, but Germany had only 26 ocean-going U-boats. Karl Dönitz, commander of the force, argued that 300 would be needed for decisive results. Nonetheless, against the advice of the Foreign Ministry, which argued that escalation was strategically irrational, Germany turned to unrestricted submarine warfare before a decision had been reached on whether Britain could be placated.[26]

This switch is fully anticipated by organizational culture. In the German Navy the U-boat force held a respected position and legacy quite different from that of submarine forces in other countries (e.g., Britain and the United States). Furthermore, this force was distinguished by a collective belief in the utility of unrestricted warfare on commerce. Driven by this culture, naval officials promoted a skewed calculation of the relative tactical *naval* advantage to be derived through unrestricted submarine warfare. Because of the Navy's monopoly role in terms of agenda setting, evaluation, and implementation in sea warfare, organizational information and advice convinced Hitler to authorize unrestricted submarine warfare (despite the insufficient military results expected), thus displacing the political aim of not antagonizing Britain.

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[26] Memorandum No. 256, from State Secretary Weizsäcker to the Foreign Minister, 14 October 1939, and Memorandum No. 270 by Weizsäcker, 17 October 1939, *Documents on German Foreign Policy Series D (1937–1945), Vol. VIII, The War Years, September 4, 1939–March 18, 1940* (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1954).

FIGURE 1. Predictions vs. Outcomes in World War II

		Outcome	
		Use	Restraint
Realist Prediction	Use	USW	GSB* BCW GCW
	Restraint	BSB GSW	BSW* SCW

		Outcome	
		Use	Restraint
Org. Cult. Prediction	Use	GSW BSB	
	Restraint	USW	GCW BSW* GSB* SCW BCW

Cases: GSW = German Submarine Warfare; BSW = British Submarine Warfare; USW = U.S. Submarine Warfare; BSB = British Strategic Bombing; GSB = German Strategic Bombing; BCW = British Chemical Warfare; GCW = German Chemical Warfare; SCW = Soviet Chemical Warfare.

* Cases where the country escalated in response to the other side's earlier defection.

British Submarine Warfare. In World War II, Britain desired limitations on submarine warfare, an outcome anticipated by both realism and organizational culture. Realism expects a preference for restraint in this case because Britain was an island nation and more vulnerable to such warfare than Germany. Organizational culture also expects restraint. The British Navy was dominated by an ethos that considered the battleship the pivotal element in the large clashes of fleets which were expected to decide war at sea. The submarine was seen as a strictly ancillary tool, and warfare on commerce, especially the unrestricted type, was paid little heed.

The influence of organizational culture vis-à-vis realism in this case, however, is evident in several situations in which submarine warfare was ignored even though strategic circumstances indicated it would be more efficient than battleship combat. In the interwar period, when Japan—also an island nation vulnerable to a submarine campaign aimed at commerce—was judged Britain's most likely naval foe, the Royal Navy never seriously considered unrestricted underwater warfare, even though its battleships were inadequate for protecting British interests in the Pacific. During the war, even after Germany had escalated, Britain maintained restraint in situations (e.g., Germany's iron-ore trade with Norway and Sweden and the Axis shipment of supplies across the Mediterranean) in which unrestricted warfare could have provided strategic gains.

U.S. Submarine Warfare. Although mutual restraint in submarine warfare was preferred for most of the interwar period, U.S. preferences changed to favoring unrestricted submarine warfare on the first day of war. Realism persuasively explains this outcome. Japan, like Britain, was asymmetrically vulnerable to an unlimited campaign against its commerce. The United States would gain more than Japan by abandoning cooperation. Realism's emphasis on external circumstances nicely captures the switch in U.S. preferences on the day Japan initiated war with its Pearl Harbor attack.

In contrast, an organizational culture approach would expect restraint. The U.S. Navy, like the Royal Navy, was "battleship-bound" in its thinking during the interwar period. It gave little thought to unrestricted submarine warfare on commerce against Japan, the main expected opponent, despite Japan's vulnerability. The reason culture gave way in this case appears to be tied to the effect of the Pearl Harbor attack on the viability of the battleship culture. With a large portion of the U.S. battleship fleet already sent to the Atlantic to deal with the European war, the Japanese assault destroyed much of the remaining Pacific fleet based in Hawaii. Without battleships, the battleship mentality could not be sustained. The result was a turn to one of the few options remaining—unrestricted submarine warfare.

German Strategic Bombing. Germany's leaders discussed the possibility of attacking Britain's civilian population, but until Britain escalated in the spring and summer of 1940, they preferred mutual restraint. This desire, however, clashed with the strategic opportunities available to Germany. As both combatants believed, Britain was more vulnerable to unrestricted bombing than Germany due to its concentration of population and industry. In addition, Germany had superior strategic position for a bombing campaign after its invasion of France and the Low Countries. Hitler, of course, hoped that Britain would make peace at that time, but *even after it was clear Britain would fight on*, Germany maintained restraint.[27]

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[27] In both this and the German submarine case, the geostrategic situation indicated that "use" could have provided Germany with military advantages. The different coding on the cases in terms of what realism would predict, however, must depend on the overall political-military situation when the decisions were made (or not made but should have been). Thus, Germany is coded as restraint under realism in the submarine case because of its strategic aim of pacifying Britain and its small number of submarines at the time the decision for escalation was made. In contrast, German strategic bombing is coded as use because of the advantages Germany had in number of aircraft, demographic/industrial concentration, and geography, and the fact that even though it was clear Britain could not be pacified in summer 1940 (thus, this political aim could not override possible military advantages), Germany maintained restraint.

Organizational culture in this case anticipates restraint. The Luftwaffe, influenced by Germany's continental tradition of warfare and a variety of circumstantial factors, was more focused on contributing to the ground campaign than on achieving victory by undermining enemy morale with an unrestricted bombing offensive. To be sure, strategic bombing was seriously considered in the interwar period in Germany, and it had its advocates during the war. But in the 1930s, the Luftwaffe successively shifted closer to a land campaign support role, and it had insufficient capabilities and plans for the type of strategic air offensive that Britain (as discussed below) had planned to conduct and to confront. This underlying organizational orientation biased Germany in favor of restraint.

British Chemical Warfare. Britain preferred restraint in chemical warfare throughout the war in actual choice situations (even though chemical weapons were considered effective).[28] Certainly, by the end of the war, realism would have predicted that escalation would have occurred, but it did not. This result is, however, anticipated by organizational culture. Relative to other means, the British Army ignored chemical warfare development because of the institutional legacy (excessive civilian involvement) of World War I use that alienated many officers, an emphasis on regimental tradition that was hostile to technological solutions, and the lack of a definitive mission, which inhibited planning for the use of chemical weapons that were dependent on specific geographical and climatological conditions. Gas use was more compatible with Royal Air Force (RAF) thinking, yet chemical warfare development was in the hands of the Army, and it received little attention or advocacy in the Air Ministry. The RAF recognized a potential role for chemical warfare, but when it appeared that gas development would cut into funding for its preferred tools, i.e., bombing with high explosives and incendiaries, it was willing to forgo the option (even though the choice was not one between more and less effective weapons, since gas and other munitions were seen as complimentary). Churchill was very interested in using chemical warfare, but military organizational predilection resisted change, and no consensus for a shift in national preferences was reached.

German Chemical Warfare. Germany preferred restraint throughout the war. This orientation fits uneasily with realist expectations. Germany's chemical warfare industry, supplies, and war-fighting potential were superior to Britain's at the beginning of the war. Furthermore, even later in the conflict, when Britain's chemical warfare potential had improved, the Wehrmacht could have used chemical weapons in certain situations—most important, the D-Day invasion—for considerable strategic advantage. Surprisingly, a preference for first use of chemical warfare did not emerge even as Allied troops crossed into Germany and the survival of the Third Reich was at imminent risk. Organizational culture, however, anticipates restraint. German military beliefs centered around a faith in fast, decisive maneuver and encirclement, which came to be known as blitzkrieg, to reach victory. Chemical warfare was considered best suited for defense, a conception that not did not fit easily with the military's way of thinking. This led Germany to a lack of appreciation for its relative strengths in this area, a neglect toward preparations, and an overall hesitancy to turn to this weapon. A preference for restraint was the result.

Soviet Chemical Warfare. From the historical record available, the Soviet Union also consistently desired restraint in chemical warfare, even when Russia was invaded by Germany and pushed to its very breaking limits at the outskirts of Moscow. Realism captures part of this puzzle. Although Soviet preparations were significant, Red Army troops were caught off guard by the surprise German invasion. The resulting disorganization precluded the possibility of any advantage from initiating chemical warfare. Yet, once the USSR had recovered sufficiently to mount a defense, it is not clear why chemical warfare was not used. After all, persistent poison gas was well suited to Stalin's "scorched earth" strategy, and Soviet survival was at imminent risk. Organizational culture provides a more consistent account. The Red Army was weaned on a philosophy of maneuver and offense, with which chemical warfare was only awkwardly compatible. Thus, like defensive operations as a whole, chemical warfare was neglected and underdeveloped. And the Soviet Union maintained a preference for restraint, despite the incentives to do otherwise.

An Illustrative Case: British Strategic Bombing

A more in-depth case provides an abbreviated view of several dynamics through which organizational culture was so influential. British strategic bombing is a good focus because of its prominent role in realist analyses (e.g., Quester 1966; Posen 1984). Yet, rather than being a difficult case for organizational culture to explain, it illustrates both how cultures shape organizations and how organizational tendencies—depending on changes in their *salience*—can lead to changes in national preferences.

In the interwar period, Britain perceived that unrestricted bombing was not in its interests, particularly when Germany appeared as the main challenger. The British population and vital centers (ports, industry, and so forth) were more densely located than was the case in the Third Reich.[29] Of all cities in Europe, London was regarded as one of the most vulnerable to air attack. In 1934 Churchill called the British capital "a tremendous fat cow, a valuable fat cow tied up to attract the beasts of prey" (Spaight 1947, 31). At the beginning of war, Britain, seeing itself as inferior in strategic air capabilities, was delighted to exchange pledges with Germany that neither side would be the first to initiate the bombing of cities and civilians. As long as the RAF's strength was inferior to that of the Luftwaffe, England would not be the first to "take the gloves off."[30]

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[28] In 1940, however, Britain indicated a preference for first use of chemical warfare in the event that Germany invaded the British Isles. This contingent preference is not compatible with either organizational culture or a relative-advantage realist view. It does fit a realist expectation of the use of any means available to inhibit or defer political extinction. Of course, whether Britain actually would have escalated during a German invasion is questionable.

[29] The British were particularly concerned about the potential threat from German occupation of the Low Countries. Committee for Imperial Defence (CID) Chiefs of Staff (COS) Sub-committee, "The Potential Air Menace to this Country from Germany," 12 June 1934, CAB 53/24, Public Record Office, Kew, England (all documents cited as CAB can be found in the Cabinet Papers located at the Public Record Office); COS 786, 24 October 1938, as cited in RAF Narrative, *The R.A.F. in the Bomber Offensive Against Germany: Vol. I. Pre-War*

Realism appears vindicated by Britain's preferences based on relative advantage, but this, of course, is not the end of the story. In May 1940, Germany threatened to overrun the Low Countries and France. At the time, Germany was still perceived to have vast superiority in the air. Churchill, recognizing this asymmetry three days before he became prime minister, reflected the consensus in a Cabinet meeting, noting that "it would be very dangerous and undesirable to take the initiative in opening unrestricted air warfare at a time when we possessed only a quarter of the striking power of the German Air Force ... [this] might result in the wholesale indiscriminate bombing of this country."[31] Britain understood that any unilateral escalation on its part would be met in kind by German action. Nonetheless, only eight days later, it was Britain (led by Churchill), not the Luftwaffe, that took the lead in breaking the "no homelands" barrier when it attacked the Ruhr on May 15–16, 1940.[32]

Why was Britain so willing to escalate the air war given its emphasis on avoiding unrestricted bombing and the acknowledged asymmetry in forces favoring Germany? Realism would focus on the German invasion of the Low Countries and France, confronting Britain with the possible collapse of its most important ally and destruction of the British Army forces on the continent. From this perspective, a change in external circumstances led to an adaptive change in preferences by Britain: The RAF was permitted to carry out the plans that civilians had overseen and approved in the prewar period—the strategic bombing of industrial targets—to confront the invasion. But this argument ignores three key dynamics that do not fit realist logic: (1) the RAF's prewar strategy was not sensibly assessed against external circumstances as realism would expect (until too late in the interwar period); (2) a preference for escalation conflicted with strategic rationality in that Britain's leaders believed RAF strategic bombing *was not suited* to fighting Germany and would have costs they considered extremely significant; and (3) Britain critically misinterpreted the external situation at that time by misinterpreting German strategy. All of these deviations from strategic rationality were central to preferences and are best understood as organizational culture effects.

First, while strategic bombing appeared to make sense to Britain as a complement to a naval blockade of Germany in overall strategy, the efficacy of such a plan was accepted uncritically for most of the interwar period. Its feasibility, until too late, was based on excessively optimistic assumptions, which were allowed to stand because they were culturally compatible. While the decision to bomb in May 1940 was consistent with the prewar "Western Air" (WA) plans, the plans themselves were produced by the RAF and therefore guided by its strategic bombing orthodoxy. Most of these options were ill-suited to one of the main expected conflict scenarios, namely, a German invasion across the western borders (Webster and Frankland 1961; Terraine 1985). The failure to adapt plans to circumstances does not fit realist expectations.

Second, during the actual invasion, although the RAF argued for the utility of strategic bombing, British leaders were very hesitant to allow it because they wished to avoid the expected German counterescalation and also because many believed, including the British Army, the French allies, and Churchill himself, that *strategic bombing would have little effect on the battlefield* and that direct support of the armies was the needed response.[33] But the RAF lacked the aircraft, skills, and plans to carry out the mission, and its limited efforts at ground support were unsuccessful (Terraine 1985; Tress 1988). Even in light of its limited options, however, Britain made a decision difficult to understand through strategic logic; escalation became the preferred outcome even though it implied significant costs (the dreaded counterattacks) with few benefits (i.e., escalation would not affect the German invasion or save the British Army in France).

Finally, some British leaders reasoned that there was no use in holding back because Germany was expected to escalate the air war anyway, and strategic attacks might relieve the pressure on the battlefield by provoking assaults on Britain. Both of these claims, however, were largely based on the British assumption that the Luftwaffe had a doctrine of strategic bombing similar to that of the RAF (Terraine 1985). This was not accurate. While the German air force did pay attention to strategic bombing, as Murray (1985) has highlighted, it did not dominate the Luftwaffe's thinking as it did in the RAF. German air planning and operations consistently listed the hierarchy of aims as (1) destruction of enemy air power, (2) support of the Army and Navy, and (3) tasks which might be considered strategic bombing. In the 1930s, the Luftwaffe successively shifted closer to a land campaign support role, and it had insufficient capabilities and plans for the type of strategic air offensive that

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Evolution of Bomber Command (Air History Branch, Air Ministry), p. 256, AIR 41/39 (all documents cited below as AIR are found in the Air Ministry Papers located at the Public Record Office, Kew, England).

[30] War Cabinet, "Air Policy: Memorandum for Communication to the French High Command," 21 October 1939, AIR 14/194, lists factors governing air policy, beginning with "the Allied inferiority vis-à-vis Germany in existing air strengths. From this it follows that for the present the initiative is with Germany; our nation must be conditioned by her action." The "Allies" at this point were Britain and France.

[31] Minutes of the War Cabinet (W.M.) (40) 114, Conclusions, Minute 1, 7 May 1940, CAB 65/13.

[32] Here I focus on the first major limitation, no "homelands," in World War II strategic bombing. A second was the "no capital cities" limitation, which Britain transgressed in August 1940. Although strategic rationality played a role in that decision, organizational culture was also central.

[33] WM (40) 114, Conclusions, Minute 1, 7 May 1940, CAB 65/13; Tress (1988, 69–70, 164); and Terraine (1985, 137).

Britain expected.[34] Thus, the events of spring 1940 raise two questions. Why were the options of British leaders so limited, and why were German air strategy and capabilities so misunderstood?

As suggested above, an important part of the answer to these questions can be found in the organizational culture of the RAF. Virtually from the end of World War I, the RAF was founded and developed according to a philosophy of offensive strategic bombing. The central tenets of this philosophy were that the best way either to prevent or to win a war would be to launch a massive assault on the enemy's sources of power. This included both depriving the enemy of the physical means to fight and breaking its morale to continue the battle. Sir Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), had no doubt about which was more important: "The moral effect of bombing stands undoubtedly to the material effect in a proportion of 20 to 1" (Jones 1987, 34; Webster and Frankland 1961, 46 and 55). Tactical support of land forces was considered a waste of resources in the RAF mind-set. Trenchard claimed his pilots would be misused if they were to serve merely as "tactical chauffeurs" for the other services (Powers 1976, 167).

This culture, well suited to unrestricted warfare, was engraved on the RAF's personality in a number of ways. One was the selection of personnel. Trenchard was known to have kept on only those officers who agreed with him (Higham 1966). Perhaps more important, institutions were founded that propagated the bomber offensive philosophy, including an air force staff college, a cadet college, and technical training schools. The prominence of the bomber creed should not suggest that there were no dissenters. Cultures are rarely monolithic and often have several sets of beliefs. The RAF had its fighter strategy advocates, and it is not surprising to find that one of the most earnest was Hugh Dowding, Chief of Fighter Command. But the existence of subcultures does not preclude the existence of a dominant orthodoxy with significant disciplinary power. Air Marshal Lord Sholto Douglas, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff in the prewar period, considered his advancement in the RAF as sheer luck: "Anyone who pressed, as I did, the claims of fighters could not escape the charge of heresy" (Douglas 1966, 57; Tress 1988, 49).

The RAF's culture shaped its development. Perhaps this was most evident in the capabilities it acquired. The airmen focused their efforts on planes and equipment designed to support the independent strategic bomber offensive, such as heavy bombers ill-suited for either supporting the Army or precision bombing. Little attention was given to instruments used in close air support or precision attacks.[35]

A second area of cultural influence concerns the RAF's "learning" during the interwar period regarding optimal strategy. The experience of World War I, the lessons of which emphasized air superiority by fighter aircraft, had little effect on the bombing-oriented culture (Murray 1992). Furthermore, the airmen uncritically interpreted the events of local wars in the interwar years as confirming the utility of strategic bombing, despite contrary or ambiguous evidence. For example, the experience the British gained using bombers to "police the empire," such as in Iraq in the early 1920s, was taken as proof that the bomber offensive would work in Europe as well, despite the fact that the RAF's opponents in its policing encounters lacked air and ground defenses that European opponents would certainly possess (Webster and Frankland 1961, 60). Even after the German display of the utility of tactical support of ground forces in the Spanish Civil War, the Air Staff refused to recognize the value of the close air support mission (Hallion 1989, 110; Murray 1980, 48). The peacetime exercises, intended as objective measures of effectiveness, did not correct the situation and were often biased to support the validity of the strategic offensive mentality.

> In 1930, for instance, Blue Force used a policy of direct attack on the enemy capital while Red Force concentrated on a counter-force campaign. The umpires calculated Blue to have lost 150 bombers, having begun with only 138! A Blue staff officer admitted that their effort would have collapsed on the fourth day of the exercise, had the umpires not ruled that the Blue raids on Red cities would have caused a moral collapse on the third night (Smith 1984, 72).

Maneuvers that indicated the "relative impotence rather than power of bombing" were given short shrift.[36] Strategic bombing plans remained the touchstone of RAF thinking.[37] Little attention was paid to tactical support. After a 1939 exercise, one air officer noted that pilots were incapable of carrying out a mission supporting ground forces (Murray 1980, 48).

Another area of cultural influence was threat analysis. The RAF tended to attribute to Germany the same bomber-offensive doctrine it held and then use that view to support its own doctrine (Wark 1985). This, of course, led to false notions about Luftwaffe strategy. Even in spring 1940, despite evidence from the Spanish Civil War and the Nazi campaign in Poland of the previous fall, many still believed that only a small part of the Luftwaffe was trained and intended for support of the German army. Those who had different views of the threat were discouraged from voicing them. Intelligence assessments during the Battle of France which suggested that the bombing campaign was working when it was not also reflected cultural biases (Hinsley 1979; Webster and Frankland 1961).

British bombing is a key case distinguishing the relative power of internal-cultural and external-strategic determinants of strategic policy. For most of the interwar period, the RAF's outlook was largely shaped and developed according to Trenchard's philosophy of strategic offensive bombing. Yet, in 1937, a civilian committee led by Thomas Inskip intervened to impose a fighter-based defense scheme on the RAF. The committee believed that Britain's vulnerability and inferior air power, in light of the growing threat of war (and the cost of the bomber offensive) made a defensive scheme an absolute necessity. RAF policy was apparently turned on its head by civilian dominance (Posen 1984). If the story stopped here, it would certainly illustrate the power of realist over organizational culture factors. But it continues. Within a year of the outbreak of war, the type of unrestricted bomber offensive that Trenchard had envisioned twenty years earlier was implemented. This occurred despite the fact that the external conditions which had prompted increased attention to the defensive scheme in the first place persisted. Britain still perceived itself as extremely vulnerable to air attack and vastly inferior to Germany in air power.

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[34] See "Weisungen des Oberfehlshabers der Luftwaffe für die Führung des Operationen in der erste Zeit eines Krieges," 18 November 1935, as reprinted in Völker (1968, 445–49); "Aufmarsch- und Kampfanweisungen der Luftwaffe: Weisungen für den Einsatz gegen Osten," Mai 1939, RL 2 II/21, BA-MA; and Führer War Directive #16, "Preparations for a Landing Operation Against England," 16 July 1940.

[35] One squadron leader protested that the Air Ministry thought dive bombing was a thing of the past. See Minute by Squadron Leader Trgl. to W./Commander Op., 20 October 1938, AIR 14/181.

[36] This refers to trials in 1938–1939. See RAF Narrative, *Volume I*, p. 34, AIR 41/39.

[37] CINC BC, "Readiness for War Report," 10 March 1939, AIR 14/298, suggests WA.5 (which would include attacks on the Ruhr that exceeded Britain's notion of restraint) was the central scheme for planning.

RAF culture, in fact, had not dramatically changed. Development of bomber offensive capabilities was not as rapid as it might have been otherwise, but the strategy was not displaced. In fact, what did *not* happen is, again, just as telling as what did. The RAF did *not* shift to an overall fighter-dominated scheme that extended the massive air defense umbrella, used to defend Britain, across the channel to protect the Allied forces on the Continent. Nor did the RAF move to a different type of offensive posture, such as the battlefield-support strategy that emerged in Germany. Instead, the bomber offensive remained the central orthodoxy.

Why did the RAF's culture carry less sway on national choices (i.e., the turn to fighter defenses) in peace yet have a large influence on preferences in war? Here, the concept of *organizational salience* is insightful. While the military remains the exclusive expert in both peace and war, its influence is more significant during combat, when military affairs (and not, for example, budgets) are the main national concern. In such situations, soldiers often have a say in the highest level decisions of state, and this was true in Britain. In addition, during peace there is often more time to make decisions and change culturally biased plans (even if there is less incentive to do so from a strategic viewpoint, as Posen [1984] notes). Whereas British leaders could to a certain extent redirect resources to fighter command in 1937, there was no way to create a ground attack force instantly in 1940 to take on the German onslaught. Thus, due to the variation in organizational salience, civilian desires were more influential in 1937 than in 1940.

In this case, realism helps explain both Britain's turn to air defense and its restraint in strategic bombing in the first eight months of the war by focusing on Britain's expectation of relative disadvantage from all-out strategic bombing. But realism cannot explain why Britain escalated in 1940 when the same asymmetry in forces still prevailed. This decision makes most sense from an organizational culture perspective on Britain's strategic choices.[38] RAF culture, emphasizing victory through independent air operations intended to break the enemy's will-power, deemed escalation desirable. The strategic bombing mind-set biased evaluations of effective strategy, expectations of enemy actions, and the capabilities, skills, and plans Britain had available. Thus, when it came time to call the RAF into action, escalation was hard to avoid. Germany's invasion of France coincided with escalation, but it cannot be seen as the main cause of it. In this case, Britain's launching of the unrestricted strategic bomber offensive was more a matter of timing than relative-advantage choice.

IMPLICATIONS

Useful directions for research in the study of international relations are suggested in three areas: preference formation in cooperation, the sources of foreign policy preferences, and the role of culture in political analysis. Regarding the first, the importance of preference formation and change to cooperation is underscored by the events of World War II. To argue that preferences matter is hardly controversial, but to suggest the appropriateness of focusing on preferences sets my argument apart from two major schools in the study of international relations. One is the predominant extant work on international cooperation that concentrates on interaction. Such analyses have produced significant insights into why and when states collaborate, but their silence on preference dynamics needs to be addressed. Of course, the import of taking preferences as given depends on the theory or model and the purposes for which it is constructed. For example, assuming preferences in formal models that aim to illuminate the logic of interaction rather than empirically test that logic has provided important results, as demonstrated in such work as Robert Powell's (e.g., 1990, 1991). Not surprisingly, Powell suggests that, rather than focus on assumptions about preferences, "careful specifications of the constraints that define the strategic environment will prove the more fruitful and insightful course in future debates" (Grieco, Powell, and Snidal 1993, 737).

The strategic environment, however, cannot be considered the whole story of actual instances of cooperation. To compliment Powell's course, a parallel track is needed that does not debate assumptions over, but pays theoretical and empirical attention to, preferences. Again, I am not suggesting that the differences in use of the three types of warfare is one of "autonomous" preferences: Interaction, as the cooperation two-step suggests, was also critical as seen in the reciprocity of Britain's unrestricted submarine warfare and Germany's unlimited strategic bombing. The broader implication is that there is a need to move beyond static coordination, prisoner's dilemma, or zero-sum games to a richer variety of symmetrical and asymmetrical situations—and most importantly, a consideration of when and why such "games" change.

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[38] This case alone does not allow the differentiation of an organizational culture explanation from that of traditional organization theory because both predict use. Where the cultural element is clear, however, is in comparison with Germany. The Luftwaffe had a similar structure and incentives for autonomy, resources, etc. Yet, its air culture was more closely linked to the land campaign that was compatible with restraint. Militaries do not generically favor escalation, as traditional theory expects; the beliefs that characterize similar bureaucracies lead to different orientations on restraint and escalation.

My argument is also distinct from the second major school, which suggests that we need to concentrate our efforts on the construction of the identities of states (Bloom 1990; Katzenstein n.d.; Nau 1993; Wendt 1992, 1994). Certainly, how states see themselves and their roles can affect both their preferences and actions. Nonetheless, the identities and basic interests of states can remain constant for long periods. Thus, a focus on preferences is useful for exploring why state desires in different issue areas change even as their basic identities remain relatively stable. In short, cooperation in World War II indicates that interaction and identity dynamics must be supplemented by a better understanding of preference formation and change. This requires addressing such issues as the stability of preferences, the sources of preferences, and different ways to think about preferences and interaction that fill in and go beyond the cooperation "two-step."[39]

Preference formation is a complex topic, and making sense of the many possible sources of national desires requires alternative approaches and empirical research. This essay has highlighted organizational culture, which shaped preferences in several areas. One is state interpretations of the international situation. The internal beliefs of military organizations molded the way that states understood situations and how they viewed the desirability of different outcomes. Such views were not simply derivative of international conditions. In many instances, cultural preference conflicted with what realism would expect given the external situation.[40] For example, Britain's air strategy calculations were based on culturally driven conclusions about German strategy and bombing effectiveness that did not match the available evidence. Realists might argue that these deviations simply represent random miscalculation or a failure to grasp accurately the logic of the prevailing balance. But when such behavior is regular across a range of cases ideally suited to realism's logic, such a response holds little water.

Culture also determined the response repertoire available to states. The preparations militaries made in peacetime had a decisive effect on the choices nations made in war. Leaders often faced an *option funnel*, that is, the variety of policy possibilities was actually limited to the central plan in which organizations had invested themselves. The weapons, plans, and skills developed according to cultural penchant often decided what national leaders would do even before they considered a situation. For example, Britain turned to strategic bombing in May 1940 when leaders would have preferred a restricted battlefield support air strategy, but the RAF lacked capabilities for such a mission. This culture-capabilities connection, of course, does not always determine outcomes. The U.S. Navy, after all, shifted rapidly to an unrestricted submarine campaign that it hardly considered during the interwar period. As one commentator has noted, however, it was an "accident of history" that the existing U.S. submarine force could be used for such a strategy—and about one-third of the captains who had trained under the battleship orthodoxy had to be replaced because they simply could not adjust to the new way of thinking (Blair 1975; Rosen 1991).

Another display of organizational influence was in the relative civilian/military imprint on preferences. Realism expects military counsel to be offered but political leaders, unaffected by bureaucratic culture and pressured by imminent threats, should ultimately favor options in line with objective strategic needs (Posen 1984). It was apparent in World War II, however, that civilians did try to alter organizational tendencies but not infrequently either were thwarted or, in the process, changed their own preferences in line with those of the military.[41] States learned to want what their armed services had already desired and done.

While organizational culture provides the better overall explanation of the cooperation examined here, realism also offers insights. As it anticipates, leaders set goals, weighed alternative courses of action, and calculated whether benefits outweighed costs. In making choices, ends and means, as they were understood, were often efficiently joined as states sought out relative advantage. At issue is what was considered as an option, what defined costs and benefits, what means were available for implementing choices, and what standard was used in learning from past action or experience. On these crucial issues, states appeared to take their cues more from the internal interpretive world of culture than from the conditions of the external environment, such as the balance of power. This, however, need not always be the case. Depending on the organizational salience of militaries, culture's role may be less. And when cultural orientation clashes dramatically with material feasibility, cultures are more likely to adapt, as in the case of U.S. submarine warfare.

These findings add to the growing body of research that questions the top-down orthodoxy of international relations theory since World War II. Explanations of state security strategies have reflected a significant, probably dominant, concern with systemic determinants that are "outside" states. Many theorists give priority to international constraints, believing that these do the lion's share of explanation, and only move on to other levels to clear up the details that cannot be explained systemically. Deterrence theorists focus on the balance of power and resolve. Regime theorists emphasize systemic agreements and norms. Constructivists point to systemic social interaction. The organizational culture approach, however, suggests that structures and cultures internal to states can be just as constraining, that bottom-up approaches at times can carry the bulk of explanation. Thus, those concerned with whether deterrence succeeds or fails, whether international agreements will be sustained, and whether systemic collective meanings will endure may need to reconsider the way that societal and subsocietal collective beliefs and habits guide the orientation of state knowledge, preferences, and choices undergirding international phenomena.

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[39] Ironically, both constructivists and strategic interaction analysts face a similar challenge—how to conceptualize and validate models where preferences are endogenous to intervention while avoiding analytic pitfalls. For examples of each see Finnemore (n.d.) and Oye (1992).

[40] While international circumstances did sometimes play a role in the formation of culture (as in the U.S. submarine case), they were not the only formative source. Furthermore, even when international circumstances changed, and the costs of adaptation were not prohibitive, cultures tended to endure.

[41] The former applies to British chemical warfare and Churchill; the latter to German submarine policy and Hitler.

The challenge of how to weight the relative importance of internal and external approaches is once again apparent. Traditionally, in security affairs and decisions on the use of military force that affect national survival, systemic approaches (particularly realism) have been given pride of place. In contrast, in economic policy, analysts often view domestic interest groups, classes, and sectors as more central. Clearly, the findings here transcend such a division. Furthermore, organizational culture is not only relevant to military bureaucracies or security issues. Although organizational cultures have received relatively little attention in the study of economic policy, some work suggests that they can be important in that area as well (Bachman 1991; Johnson 1982).

The explanatory ability of organizational culture in these cases, however, should not suggest that either culture, organizational influence, or some combination thereof is the most important "domestic" source of preferences. Nor should it suggest that domestic explanations are always, or even *usually*, more powerful than international systemic ones. The conditions under which the forces in one arena matter more than another, or how the two interact, are clearly an open question. The common refrain that synthetic domestic-international approaches are needed certainly is true. One response to this gap has been the development of the two-level game approach (Evans 1993; Putnam 1988). While this perspective has offered new insights, it replicates the posited preference bias noted above, which assumes actor desires; the innovation is to add different arenas in which state actors strategically attempt to maximize their utility.[42] Explanations are also necessary to account for the preference and knowledge structures that undergird interaction.

Culture is one important conceptual vehicle for addressing this gap. In international relations theory, culture has generally been poorly applied (Johnston 1995a) or simply relegated to analytical backwaters as a "soft" variable that can only explain marginal residual variance.[43] Yet, in the "hard" issue area of security affairs and armed conflict, we have seen that one form of culture was quite potent in shaping outcomes. The influence of organizational culture in World War II suggests the applicability of culture for other theories that focus narrowly on "formal" structure—such as the distribution of international capabilities, the political structures of states, or the flow chart of organizations—and ignore the "informal" structure of collective beliefs and customs. Formal structure is often inadequate for understanding preferences and behavior. This is true for structural approaches related both to external international position (realism) and internal bureaucratic arrangement (structural organization theory). Structural organization theory, for example, asserts that similar formal structures should have similar preferences and act in a similar manner. Yet, military advocacy of escalation in World War II, as the traditional model expects, was not a uniform response. Organizations favored restraint in certain areas and not in others. These different orientations are best explained by referring to the collective beliefs and customs that characterized and directed the different military services, rather than some generic tendency shared by all military organizations.

Several prominent approaches to international relations based on formal structure might benefit from paying attention to the informal structure of culture. Much of the work on democracies, for example, posits that "republican" regimes will have similar preferences and behavior due to common constitutional structures; e.g., democracies (generically) are less prone to fight one another. A cultural view would suggest that within similar democratic regimes different hierarchies of beliefs can take shape which can lead to different (1) internal norms on cooperation and compromise, (2) perceptions about how others' norms are different from one's own, and, ultimately, (3) external behavior.[44] For example, a topic worthy of attention is whether norms on cooperation and compromise are really the same in democracies such as the United States, Japan, and Russia and whether officials in those countries perceive them to be the same. A cultural approach suggests caution in assuming that policies of countries need be similar because they have a common political regime type.[45] At the international level, many explanations generally assume that similar power structures will lead to similar behavior. For example, hegemonic stability theory posits that hegemons will seek an open trading system. The cultural analysis posited here, however, would expect different types of behavior depending on the beliefs and customs that differentiate hegemons. As Ruggie (1982) has noted, despite the similar power structure of Dutch, British, and U.S. hegemony, the nature of the respective international systems differs due to the different collective beliefs that defined the purposes of the hegemons.

My argument is not that structure is unimportant, while culture clears up all puzzles. Rather, it is the combination of culture and structure that matters. Culture's key contribution is to explain how differences in the collective beliefs and norms that characterize structures can lead to different understandings and behavior even while formal structure is similar. Nonetheless, certain measures of formal structural design may be necessary to account for why some cultures are more uniform and influential. As discussed above, the influence of bureaucratic cultures on national policy will vary with their organizational salience. For example, organizations with a functional monopoly (a formal structural trait) are more likely to shape policy than when multiple points of view are available to policymakers. In World War II, the military's organizational monopoly meant that, with no competitors in expertise, military preferences played a large role in decisions on the use of force in terms of advice as well as the types of plans and capabilities developed. Likewise, in other areas in which bureaucracies or societal groups have similar salience, the collective beliefs that characterize them as an entity may be influential. The fact that culture was significant in circumstances of armed conflict, in which material capabilities and strategic action are so critical, suggests that it may be even more relevant in other international relations issues.

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[42] This is not to suggest that posited preference approaches do not offer insights, but that these should not become orthodoxy.

[43] This is beginning to change with the recent work of Berger (n.d.), Johnston (1995b), Kier (n.d.), Kupchan (1994), Rosen (1995), and others.

[44] To the extent it is independent of formal constitutional structure, the so-called normative explanation for the democratic peace speaks to this point. Of course, if it is independent of the formal structure of regime type, then one might ask why it is the "democratic" peace. See Maoz and Russett (1993) and Russett (1993).

[45] This idea is also relevant for the literature on "strong" and "weak" states; for example, Katzenstein (1978), Krasner (1978), and Evangelista (1988).

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Attitudes toward Individual Responsibility and Political Reform in the Former Soviet Union

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Based upon a survey of the USSR in December 1989, Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) found that respondents with higher education were less inclined than those with lower education to support individual, versus state, responsibility, and that supporters of individual responsibility were slightly less likely than those favoring state responsibility to support political change. A recent critique challenged this analysis, arguing that higher education is always associated with support for individual responsibility and that preference for individual responsibility is always positively associated with support for political reform, and reported findings to that effect. This analysis resolves these discrepant findings and clarifies why they occurred. A replication using data from 40 societies demonstrates that the relationship between education and locus of responsibility is not universal; indeed, it appears in only a few countries. Moreover, large differences in sampling and measurement procedures and extraordinary changes over time in the real world contributed to the differences between our findings and those of our critics.

In late 1989, the waning days of the former Soviet Union, Ellen Mickiewicz and I conducted one of that country's earliest national in-person opinion surveys. Our article (Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992) reported our findings on attitudes toward political change and support for individual versus state responsibility for the social welfare of the citizenry. Among these were the following:

1. Compared to the less well educated, better-educated respondents were more likely to support political change but slightly less likely to support individual responsibility for social welfare, i.e., education was positively related to support for political change (tau_b = .17) but slightly *negatively* related to support for individual responsibility for social welfare (tau_c = −.15). We suggested that the better educated might have a greater ideological commitment to socialism (p. 867).
2. Supporters of political democratization were slightly more likely than opponents to prefer *state* responsibility. Since this negative relationship was weak (tau_c = −.10), we speculated that attitudes toward democratization and responsibility for social welfare might be unrelated. We saw no evidence that support for democratization was necessarily accompanied by a desire for "downsizing" the apparatus of government as it related to the state's responsibility for social welfare.

Recently, Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1994) published a "reassessment" of our findings, stating that it was "crucial to compare their findings with those obtained from other data so as to prevent preliminary conclusions from becoming accepted as 'received wisdom' before they have been verified" (p. 399). They challenged most of our findings but focused particularly on the two just described. Using samples of European Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania to represent the former Soviet Union, they reported the following:

1. Education was *positively* related to individual locus of responsibility (r = .19 for 1991; r = .15 for 1992) as well as to support for political reform.
2. Support for political reform was *positively* and strongly related to support for individual responsibility (r = .43 for 1991; r = .45 for 1992).

The Miller group pronounced their own findings accurate and ours incorrect. They rejected our contextual interpretation of the negative relationship between education and individualism, which took into account Soviet political history. Rather, they claimed *universal* status for the positive relationship they had found. Citing their data from the three republics mentioned above; U.S. National Election Study (NES) data for 1990 and 1992; a finding by Duch (1993), who used a measure they said referred to a different concept from ours (1994, 402); and a finding from the Soviet Interview Project study of Soviet emigrants, which used yet different measures (Silver 1987), Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger claimed "overwhelming evidence" for a positive relationship between education and individualism that was "consistent across time and cross-culturally" (1994, 402). On this basis, they depicted our findings as inconsistent not only with theirs but also with all other known data and theory on the topic. In their conclusion, they noted that major changes occurred in the Soviet Union between our study and theirs, but they did not consider how these changes might have affected the findings or mention any other significant differences between the studies. Rather, they confined their efforts to explaining the discrepancies to imputed problems with our question on locus of responsibility (although they never mentioned or criticized its wording). Apparently, they thought that the dissolution of the Soviet Union plus entirely different sampling and measurement procedures were less likely sources of the differences than faulty or careless research procedures on our part. Focusing on

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our measure of locus of responsibility, they surmised that the most likely sources of the discrepancies were "problems of translation, question clarity, or data entry errors" (1994, 409).

In the course of this analysis, I review many ways in which the Miller group's study differed from ours: the *questions* used to measure locus of responsibility and support for political reform, the characteristics of the *samples*, and the *political and economic context* at the time of each survey. Given chaotic political and economic change, different findings should not be surprising. Nevertheless, a comparison of these studies yields a host of cautions to which researchers in general and cross-cultural researchers in particular should be alert in comparing findings from different surveys.

First, using the 1990–91 World Values Survey data from 40 societies, I show that Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger are wrong in assuming that people with higher education are always more likely to prefer an individual locus of responsibility, that is, that the relationship between education and preferred individual locus of responsibility is always positive. In most societies, there is no relationship at all between these variables. Moreover, there is no relationship in one republic in which the Miller group sampled, a marginal relationship in another, no relationship in three other Soviet successor states, and no relationship in the United States, for which they presented data to support the claim to cross-cultural consistency.

Second, although Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger argue that the relationship between preferred locus of responsibility and support for democratic political reform is always strongly positive, "internal replication" within the Finifter-Mickiewicz data set shows that this relationship varies by republic and also by education and place of residence.

Third, with neither relationship universally consistent, there is no particular reason to think that the Miller group's findings are more valid or reliable than ours. Nevertheless, I pursue the question of why their findings were so different from ours, focusing on three methodological and contextual differences between the two studies that can account for the discrepancies:

1. A review of the questions used in each study shows that Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger used very different measurement for *both* locus of responsibility and support for political reform.
2. They also had a very different sampling frame (with fewer republics) and possibly different representation of locations (urban vs. rural) within republics. Reanalyses of the Finifter-Mickiewicz data set by republic and by education and city size are used to show how these differences could lead to discrepant findings.
3. The times at which the data collections were carried out are reviewed, and I suggest how differences in the political and economic contexts might have led to different relationships.

In summary, the Miller group is wrong in claiming that their findings are universally valid. Moreover, their sampling and measurement procedures and the context of their study were so different from ours that similar findings could hardly have been expected. I close by comparing our respective conclusions with those of other analysts and with some comments about other difficulties of research in this area.

EDUCATION AND SUPPORT FOR STATE VERSUS INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY

The Miller group claims that our finding of a negative relationship between education and individual locus of responsibility is invalid because the true relationship is positive; that is, better-educated people are always more likely than less well educated to prefer an individual locus of responsibility. To test this claim, I examined this relationship in all 40 societies included in the 1990–91 World Values Survey and with republic-level data from the Finifter-Mickiewicz survey.

The World Values Survey interview included a question very like the one Mickiewicz and I used. We had asked:

> Q22a. Below are some widespread but contradictory statements relating to problems of the development of our society. Which would you be most likely to agree with?
>
> The state and government should be mainly responsible for the success and well-being of people;
> *or*
> People should look out for themselves, decide for themselves what to do for success in life.

In V252 of the World Values Survey, respondents were asked to place themselves on a 1 to 10 scale, with 10 and 1 described respectively as,

> The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for; and
> Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves.

This wording is very close to ours; both questions refer to "responsibility" of the "state." That the World Values Survey question refers to "individuals" and ours to "people" seems relatively unimportant given the questions' overall similarity. V252 seems on its face to be an excellent indicator of locus of responsibility, and its strong similarity to ours makes it a very appropriate question with which to replicate the original Finifter-Mickiewicz analysis.

Moreover, among the 40 societies included in the 1990–91 World Values Survey were five former Soviet republics, and a separate survey was conducted in Moscow. Data were collected from March 1990 to January 1991, just between our field work in November–December 1989 and the Miller group's in summer 1991. There is also a sample for the United States, the country used by Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger as their evidence for cross-cultural consistency.

Table 1 presents correlations between two measures of education and locus of responsibility (V252) for all 40 societies. These findings show clearly that Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger are incorrect in contending that the relationship between education and individual locus of responsibility is positive "across time and cross-culturally."

TABLE 1. Correlations between Education and Locus of Responsibility in 40 Societies

	Age at Completion of Education			Educational Level			
Society	Tau_c	*r*	*p*	Tau_c	*r*	*p*	N
	Education and Locus of Responsibility Not Significantly Related						
Belarus	.03	.05	NS	—	—	—	1,105
Estonia	.03	.03	NS	.05	.06	NS	1,008
Latvia	.03	.02	NS	.03	.02	NS	903
Lithuania	−.01	−.02	NS	−.01	−.02	NS	1,000
USA[a]	.01	.04	NS	—	—	—	1,839
Argentina	.04	.05	NS	—	—	—	1,002
Belgium[a]	.05	.08	NS	—	—	—	2,792
Canada[a]	−.04	−.01	NS	—	—	—	1,730
Chile	.03	.02	NS	—	—	—	1,500
China[a]	.03	.04	NS	—	—	—	1,000
Iceland	−.01	.01	NS	—	—	—	702
India	.01	.01	NS	.04	.03	NS	2,500
Ireland	.03	.06	NS	—	—	—	1,000
Mexico	.00	−.00	NS	—	—	—	1,531
Netherlands[a]	.01	.03	NS	—	—	—	1,017
Nigeria	.02	−.03	NS	−.00	−.05	NS	929
Northern Ireland	.03	.08	NS	—	—	—	304
Norway	−.02	−.00	NS	−.03	−.03	NS	1,239
Portugal[a]	−.05	−.05	NS	—	—	—	1,185
South Korea	—	—	—	−.05	−.03	NS	1,251
Spain[a]	.02	.02	NS	—	—	—	4,147
Sweden	.02	.03	NS	−.02	.00	NS	1,047
West Germany[a]	−.00	.01	NS	—	—	—	2,101
	Mixed Results						
Russia[a]	.04	.05	.05	—	—	—	1,961
Moscow	.06	.06	NS	—	—	—	1,102
Austria	.02	.02	NS	.06	.07	<.05	1,460
Denmark	−.02	−.02	NS	−.07	−.09	<.05	1,030
Turkey	.07	.08	<.05	.03	.06	NS	1,030
	Higher Education Related to Preference for Individual Responsibility						
Brazil	.04	.08	<.01	.07	.08	<.01	1,782
Britain[a]	.06	.06	<.05	—	—	—	1,484
Bulgaria	.10	.14	<.01	—	—	—	1,034
Czechoslovakia	.11	.15	<.01	—	—	—	1,396
East Germany	.04	.07	.01	—	—	—	1,336
France	.05	.09	<.05	—	—	—	1,002
Finland	.20	.29	<.01	.19	.26	<.01	588
Hungary	.10	.13	<.01	—	—	—	999
Italy[a]	.03	.06	<.01	—	—	—	2,010
Japan	.08	.09	<.01	—	—	—	1,011
Poland	.11	.14	<.01	.14	.19	<.01	938
South Africa	.20	.33	<.01	.19	.33	<.01	2,736

Source: World Values Survey, 1990–91, data collection coordinated by Ronald Inglehart. For a summary of sampling procedures, see Abramson and Inglehart 1995, 97–101. In the original data for V252, individual responsibility is coded low and state responsibility high. However, both we and the Miller group coded in the opposite way. To avoid recoding but also lessen confusion by keeping the direction of the World Values Survey relationships consistent with the prior discussion, I have reversed the signs of all the World Values Survey correlations. Calculations were performed in SPSS for Windows, V. 5.0.1, and Osiris. Probability values are for two-tailed tests. All countries except South Korea had "age finished school" (V356) but only some also had educational level (V375).

[a] Sample weights (V402) were available and applied in these countries. Application of weights caused some Ns to increase and others to decrease. The last column gives actual (unweighted) Ns.

In 23 of the 40 societies, there is *no relationship at all.* Results are mixed in four countries. In Austria, Denmark, and Turkey one indicator of education yields nonsignificant results, and the other produces significant but very weak results; in Denmark, the relationships are negative. Russia has a very small positive relationship, but the correlation for the separate Moscow sample is nonsignificant. Since the results in this mixed group are inconsistent and all correlations are very small, a fair interpretation would probably add these societies to the group in which education and locus of responsibility are not related.

Twelve countries register significant positive relationships between education and support for individual responsibility. In 6 of these 12 countries, the correlation is below .10 so that despite statistical significance, less than 1% of the variance in locus of responsibility is explained by education. In only a few places are relationships comparable to the Miller group's .15 for their combined sample of European Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, and none of these stronger relationships is in the former Soviet republics or the United States, which constitute the Miller group's evidence for their thesis. Rather, the significant positive correlations are concentrated in a different but distinct group of countries characterized by strong communist or socialist influence or a strongly class-based party system.

Moreover, given the low to nonexistent correlations in the former Soviet republics of Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, there is no support for the Miller group's notion that education is always positively related to individualism even if the scope of application is limited to the former Soviet Union. And since their evidence for "cross-cultural consistency" is confined to the data they report for the United States, the absence of a correlation in the U.S. sample of the World Values Survey is equally pertinent. Since there are few negative relationships, there is also no confirmation for the negative relationship Mickiewicz and I found. However, we claimed no universal status for our finding; indeed, our interpretation of it was contextually dependent on the situation in the Soviet Union in late 1989.

Given these results, we may conclude that education and locus of responsibility are usually not related but that education may sometimes have a weak to moderate effect on support for state responsibility under particular economic and political conditions, notably where class conflict or socialist ideology is strong.[1]

Even if the positive relationship posited by the Miller group *had* been found elsewhere with some frequency, this would not be a basis for insisting that nothing else should have been found in our research. Comparative research is replete with instances of relationships varying by country. For the former Soviet Union, Slider, Magun, and Gimpel'son report wide variation among republics in the correlations between education and opinions on privatization, from −.15 to +.27 (1991, 257). Gibson and Duch (1993) found that although "one of the best predictors of tolerance in Western studies is education," education was *not* related to tolerance in samples of either Moscow or the European USSR. And Duch (1994) found age completely unrelated to support for democracy in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak republics, although his prior research had found it to be very important in the former Soviet Union (Duch 1993).

LOCUS OF RESPONSIBILITY AND SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL REFORM

The Miller group also challenge our finding of a small but significant negative relationship ($tau_c = -.10$, gamma = −.12) between locus of responsibility and support for political reform. Based on their strong positive correlations of .43 and .45 for 1991 and 1992 between variables similarly named, they argue that these variables are always positively related. However, in addition to the differences with our survey, other Soviet and post-Soviet data also cast doubt on the Miller group's strong positive relationship between locus of responsibility and support for political reform. In an extremely large survey in Russia (N = 33,869) in November–December 1993, Hough found *negative* relationships between support for transition to a market economy and some indicators of support for democracy and concluded that "the opponents of economic reform gave stronger support to concrete aspects of democracy than did those who favored a quick transition" (1994, 17).[2] Duch found no relationship between attitudes toward social guarantees and support for democratic reform and concluded that in this respect his data agreed with ours (1993, 602). Slider, Magun, and Gimpel'son suggest that economic and political attitudes are not much related by noting that "results [on attitudes toward privatization] for Moscow and Leningrad, two of the strongest centers of political radicalism, were virtually identical to results from other Russian cities that have proven to be much less radical politically" (1991, 274). McIntosh and her colleagues, using data from Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, conclude that "while there is some relationship between support for the free market and support for democracy, there are a large proportion of people with mixed views [who] tend to be enthusiastic about democracy but skeptical of the market" (1994, 505–6).[3]

Moreover, there are many differences between our study and that of the Miller group that could have contributed to the different findings. Among the most important of these are different measures of both locus of responsibility and support for political change, differences in the geographic areas sampled, and differences in the time periods in which the surveys were carried out. Any of these differences in the parameters of the research might have led to different findings; all of them together obviously increased the probability that differences would occur. Yet Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger ignored these factors in their "reassessment" of our research.

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[1] For a more extensive analysis of the World Values Survey replications see Finifter (1994). I also examined the relationship between education and locus of responsibility separately in each of the seven republics sampled in the Finifter-Mickiewicz survey. In this test, all correlations remain negative but are significant only in Russia ($r = -.16$; $p \leq .001$) and Uzbekistan ($r = -.17$; $p = .02$). While this replication is not based on independent data, it does treat separately republics in which interviews were conducted in different languages. The similarity of the correlations suggests that language problems did not play a role in our findings, as the Miller group implies they did.

[2] This is in the same direction as our relationship. Nevertheless, it is also possible that opponents of marketization favored a strong Parliament (one of Hough's indicators of support for democracy) more than supporters did because it provided an institutional base from which they could block economic change or at least express their opposition rather than because they supported democracy per se.

[3] The proportion with mixed views ranges from 35% in Bulgaria to 47% in Poland (Figure 3).

Differences in Measurement

Mickiewicz and I discussed the construction of our measures in some detail (1992, 859–62). As we reported, we had actually expected to form one overall scale of attitudes toward political and social change but found that the question on individual and state responsibility (Q22a) was negatively related to each of the other items, with gammas ranging from −.03 to −.19. The remaining items were all positively related to each other, with relationships ranging from .18 to .76. Since the negative correlations were modest, we concluded "that support for many aspects of change and political democracy is unrelated to the posture toward collective versus individual responsibility for the social welfare of citizens" (p. 860). We reported that factor analysis confirmed Q22a as orthogonal to the other items; on the factor that it dominated, all the other items had negative loadings (p. 861). We suggested that the 70-year Soviet history of indoctrination into collectivist values limited the extent to which Soviet citizens were prepared to accept individual responsibility, even though their history of political repression had led them to be much more enthusiastic about many aspects of political reform. Although many Western observers expected support for individualism and political reform to appear as one coherent attitudinal package, the economic hardships faced by ordinary Soviet citizens might lead many to think that political reform should be accompanied by continuation of state responsibility for social welfare.

Replications or "reassessments" of prior studies are all to the good. But public opinion scholars know that very large differences in results can be caused by minimal changes in question wording (see, e.g., Abramson and Ostrom 1991; Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldenick 1978; Lockerbie and Borrelli 1990; and Mueller 1994).[4] Therefore, replications or "reassessments" of public opinion research usually contain an explicit discussion of differences in measurement when dissimilar questions or measurement procedures are used. Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger, however, do not report any of our question wordings, although they imply that their measures were comparable to ours. I present the questions used in each study in Table 2. Comparable questions are displayed directly across from each other, and I note where the items are not similar in the two studies. As Table 2 shows, the measurement differences are rather dramatic.

Conceptually, both research teams define locus of responsibility similarly: Who has overall responsibility for general well-being—the state or individuals? Mickiewicz and I used the straightforward measure of locus of responsibility reported above and shown as the first item on the left side of Table 2. The Miller group uses two measures: an item on work guarantees shown as the first item on the right side of Table 2, and an index composed of that question and the three others that follow it in the table. Our measure refers to "the state" as an abstract concept, and invoked the concept of "responsibility" in a general way as "responsibility for success and well-being." However, even though the Miller group also called their measure "locus of responsibility" and define this in terms of the *general* well-being of the citizenry, a review of their questions shows that they had no clear indicator of this concept.

The Miller group's single question on whether government should provide guaranteed work and a high standard of living was used in key analyses in their paper, in particular those presented in their tables 1 and 2. However, far from acknowledging the much narrower focus of this question, they refer to it in the broader terms in which we—and they—had defined locus of responsibility.[5] But because of its specificity, this question is much less suitable for replicating or "reassessing" the Finifter-Mickiewicz study than the World Values Survey question I used above.

Since the discussion in both papers is about the general concept of "locus of responsibility," a very important issue for theoretical purposes is whether a government work guarantee is the same as governmental assumption of overall responsibility for well-being. The similar item in the U.S. National Election Studies, from which their Soviet question is derived and which was used in their analysis for the United States, is called the "guaranteed standard of living/job scale" or the "job assurance scale"—considerably less expansive interpretations (American National Election Studies 1988; idem 1990, xlviii; idem 1992, 2:655). The Miller group points out that the *distributions* for this item and our locus of responsibility question have "a great deal of similarity," but similar distributions do not mean that the items

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[4] Carnaghan reports that data from the Estonian Market and Opinion Research Center "purporting to show rapid change in attitudes . . . seem instead to suggest that results are more sensitive to the wording of the question than to the time the question was asked" (1991, 11).

[5] Their main text does not even refer to the actual wording of the work-guarantees question but rather cites it vaguely as a measure of "responsibility for well-being," or "the question on locus of responsibility." In a note to their Table 1, in which this is the actual question used, they did not give the question wording but, rather, stated that "the survey question scale . . . ranged from 1 = state responsibility to 5 = individual responsibility for economic well-being." As their wording given in my Table 2 shows, this description misrepresents the actual response choices. The titles of their tables 1 and 2 also obscure the actual wording. Their Table 1 is titled "State or Individual Should Be Responsible for Job and Standard of Living," even though the words *state*, *individual*, *responsible*, and *job* do not appear in their question. Their Table 2 is titled "Percentage Saying the Individual Should Be Responsible for Well-Being," different from the wording they used for the title of Table 1, still further removed from the actual question wording, and clearly suggesting a question or measure with much broader wording; yet it reported data for the very same question. Indeed, their text suggests that the percentages in Table 2 come from a broader index of "locus of responsibility." *Before* presenting Table 2, they (1) say that the reader should be "rightfully skeptical" of their results in Table 1 because only a single-item indicator (the work-guarantee question) is presented; (2) state that their surveys contain "several questions designed to measure the concept of locus of responsibility. Therefore, we . . . are not limited to a single item" (p. 401); (3) describe their four-item index, give its alpha reliability, and refer to an endnote with question wordings; and (4) state that Table 2 reports correlations of .19 and .15 between the multiitem *index* and education and repeat these figures inside that table as if they summarized the percentages it presents. Despite all these suggestions, however, a footnote to Table 2 reports that the data are based on the "question presented in Table 1." But no question wording is given in Table 1; one finds only the erroneous response alternatives just described. Readers of their paper may be quite misled about the Miller group's measure and its comparability with our question.

TABLE 2. Questions Used in Original and "Reassessment" Studies

Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992	Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1994
"Locus of Responsibility"	*"Locus of Responsibility"*
Q22. Below are some widespread but contradictory statements relating to problems of the development of our society. Which would you be most likely to agree with? a. The state and government should be mainly responsible for the success and well-being of people; *or* People should look out for themselves, decide for themselves what to do for success in life.	1. Some people say the government of Russia [Ukraine, Lithuania] should guarantee everyone work and a high standard of living, others argue that every person should look after himself. On this card is a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 signifies that the government guarantees everyone work and 5 that every person should look after himself. Which position corresponds to your view?
[Item about equality of incomes is included in measure of "support for political change" in question 22b. below]	2. There should be a mechanism regulating income such that no one earns very much more than others. (*agree/disagree*)
[no item about private vs. collective property]	3. Speaking only of Russia [Ukraine, Lithuania], what type of property would be best: private property, collective property or only state property?
[no item about group evaluations]	4. Some people think that certain groups in society have too much influence on life and politics in Russia [Ukraine, Lithuania] and that other groups don't have as much as they deserve. Do you think "Businessmen" have too much, too little or the right amount of influence?
"Support for Political Change" [Continuation of Q.22]	*"Support for Reform"*
b. The state should provide an opportunity for everyone to earn as much as he can, even if it leads to essential differences in people's standard of living and income; *or* The state should do everything to reduce differences in people's standard of living and income, even if they won't try to work harder and earn more.	[Comparable item is item 2 in "locus of responsibility" index]
c. Strikes, spontaneous demonstrations, political meetings and other forms of social protest are completely acceptable methods of mass conduct and an effective means for solving social problems; *or* These forms of protest are undesirable for society, they should be avoided in favor of more peaceful, traditional and organized methods of solving social conflicts.	[no item about acceptable forms of political participation]
d. To improve things in our country people should be given the opportunity to say what they want, even if it can lead to public disorder; *or* Keeping the peace in society should be the main effort, even if it requires limiting freedom of expression.	1. It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they become disruptive. (*agree/disagree*)
Q18. Some people think that to solve our most pressing problems it is necessary to make decisive and rapid changes, since any delay threatens to make things worse; Others, on the other hand, think that changes should be cautious and slow, since you can never be sure that they won't cause more harm than good. Which of these points of view are you more likely to agree with?	3. Political reform in this country is moving too rapidly. (*agree/disagree*)
Q29. In the coming elections for local soviets, should we elect deputies from among several candidates, as we mostly did in the spring elections? Or is it better to avoid the conflicts these elections generated and go back to the old system of voting?	[no item about competitive elections]
[no item about Stalin]	2. These days Stalin is not given adequate credit for building socialism. (*agree/disagree*)
[no item rating Communist Party]	Rating of Communist Party: Now we would like to get your feelings toward certain groups using a five-point scale, where 5 indicates a very positive view and 1 a very negative view. You may use any number between 1 and 5 to tell me how favorable or unfavorable your feelings are for each group. If you have difficulty answering, just tell me and we will go on to the next one.

measure the same thing.[6] In the old Soviet Union, regulation of work was one of the most salient aspects of the totalitarian control system. The work requirement—at jobs defined by the *state*—could be breached only by "parasites," who could be prosecuted under the law. If "guaranteed work" in some ways epitomizes the politicoeconomic structure of that system, this could explain both why opposition to it would be highly correlated with support for political change in the Miller group's data and why the best educated, the strongest champions of political reform, would oppose it.

In some parts of their analysis, the Miller group uses a multiitem index also called "locus of responsibility." However, items 2, 3, and 4 of this index (see my Table 2) have no obvious relationship to this concept. Item 4 on access to political life sounds somewhat like "trust in government," but in referring only to "businessmen," it might also tap attitudes toward business, feelings of efficacy or relative deprivation.[7] The relationship of the private property item to locus of responsibility is also unclear.

However, given that a major point of the Miller group's critique is that they found a *positive* relationship between support for political reform and locus of responsibility while we found a *negative* one, the most inappropriate aspect of their measurement procedures is the inclusion of their item 2 on income equality in their measure of *locus of responsibility*, since this question has content similar to our Q22b, included in our measure of *support for political change*. Thus, one reason why the Miller group finds a positive relationship between these variables, in contrast to our negative one, is that they put into two separate measures positively correlated items that we had included in the same scale. To have used a question similar to one that was part of our political change scale in their scale of locus of responsibility renders highly problematic—and probably quite meaningless—any comparison of the relationships between these variables in the two studies.[8]

There is also little comparability between the measures of support for political change or reform. Ours includes items on political protest, free speech, speed of political change, and free elections, as well as the income differences item that the Miller group includes in locus of responsibility. Even were they not purporting to construct a scale similar to ours, it is unclear why they would include their Stalin item (which bears no resemblance to anything of ours) as an indicator of support for political change; the wording conflates attitudes toward the former political system, Stalin, socialism, and Stalin's commitment to socialism. The Communist Party rating is also totally unlike anything we used. These measurement differences are critical: It makes little sense for the Miller group to argue that their findings on political reform and locus of responsibility contradict ours when they use such fundamentally different measures.

Curiously, the Miller group's data actually include other questions that are much more similar to ours but which they apparently chose not to use. Reisinger, Miller, Hesli, and Maher (1994), in an article published in the *British Journal of Political Science* at about the same time and based on the same data, construct an "Index of Democratic Values" that is a much closer match to our measure of "Support for Political Change" than is the "political reform" measure used in the Miller group's *American Political Science Review* paper. The "Index of Democratic Values" contains items on party competition (similar to ours on free elections), opposition to the government (similar to ours on protest), and freedom of speech (related to ours on free speech), but *none* of these is included in the "political reform" index that the Miller group used for their comparison with our analysis. In the *British Journal of Political Science* article, the Stalin item is used by itself to measure "view of Stalin," and the Communist Party item does not appear at all. If the Stalin and Communist Party items did not warrant inclusion in their "Index of Democratic Values," and since they are so totally dissimilar to our items, it is not clear why Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger included them in the measure they say they tried to match with ours, while omitting the several much more closely related items.

An additional difficulty with the Miller group's items is their use of an "agree-disagree" format for some questions in both measures. Since, in all cases, *agree* represents either an antireform or antiindividualism position, *acquiescence response set* could be responsible for part of their large positive correlation between locus of responsibility and support for political reform. Acquiescence response set is a known problem in Soviet public opinion research (Bahry and Silver 1987), and other analyses by the Miller group suggest that their data may contain significant bias of this type. In Reisinger et al. (1994), based on the same data, the authors find both that "Lithuanians seem to have values less supportive of democracy" and that "democratic values are more prevalent in Lithuania" (pp. 207, 211). Since the questions involved in these analyses use agree-disagree format, acquiescence response set may have led to these contradictory findings. This point is discussed in greater detail in Finifter (1994).

That their current analysis (Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli 1996) uses yet a new political reform scale, different from both of their earlier ones, confuses the situation still further.

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[6] Nor does it make much sense for them to attempt to validate their own measure by noting its distributional similarity to ours and then claim ours to be invalid.

[7] It is not clear how this item would be coded in terms of "locus of responsibility." Did they code those who think "businessmen" have too much influence on politics as preferring more "state responsibility" or more "individual responsibility?" They do not say. Neither possibility is persuasive because the content of the item does not relate to "locus of responsibility."

[8] Since all the items in our political change scale are positively correlated, if we remove the income equality item from the political change scale and include it in our measure of locus of responsibility, the correlation between the two scales becomes positive ($+.05$, $p = .02$). In six republics, r ranges from .01 to .14 but a still substantial negative r of $-.16$ in Georgia keeps the overall positive correlation low. This is not a particularly meaningful exercise since the two items in this reconstructed locus of responsibility scale are unrelated. Still, it makes the rather obvious point that where one puts items as between two scales affects their relationship. Had we changed the placement of this item, as the Miller group did, we too would have produced a positive relationship.

Differences in Sample: Geographic and Demographic

The Significance of Geographic Differences. Mickiewicz and I sampled in seven republics containing 88% of the Soviet population and designed our sample to represent the entire population (Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992, 870). Our weighting procedures for this purpose were described in our article. Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger sampled in three republics of the former Soviet Union: Lithuania, with only slightly more than 1% of the population of the former Soviet Union; Ukraine, about 18% of the population; and Russia. Russia alone contained approximately 51% of the Soviet Union's population, but the Miller group sampled only in European (western) Russia, omitting from representation all of Asian Russia, over a third of the republic's population. They thus sampled an area covering approximately 54% of the Soviet population, whose similarity to the rest is not immediately apparent. In a prior publication, the Miller group discussed the problems of using European Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania to represent the entire Soviet Union and reported that they weighted their sample to correct for disproportionalities in sample sizes in the three republics relative to each other (Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli 1993, 279). Given the areas sampled, however, such weights cannot simulate a representative sample of the total Soviet population. So even if their samples in each area were perfectly adequate to represent that area, in total they remain with a sample of the nonexistent country of "Western Russia-Ukraine-Lithuania." If people in other parts of the former Soviet Union are demographically or attitudinally dissimilar, their sample would not do a very good job in representing the country as a whole, despite their claim to "reassess" a survey with a much more comprehensive sample of the entire country.

An "internal replication" by republic in the Finifter-Mickiewicz data (Table 3) suggests that differences between our sample and that of the Miller group caused some of the differences in findings.[9] Table 3 shows that both the size and direction of the correlations between locus of responsibility and support for political change vary markedly by republic. The *strongest negative* correlations (which contributed heavily to our overall result) are in Belorussia, Georgia, and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan also has a negative relationship, but it is smaller. *None* of these republics was sampled by the Miller group. In Estonia and Ukraine, republics that could be considered "matched" with their samples in Lithuania and Ukraine, there are positive relationships, as they found, although ours are weak and insignificant. In other words, our data differ *most* from the Miller group's in republics where the Miller group *did not sample*. But when we analyze the data for our *total* sample, the very small positive relationships in Estonia and Ukraine are overpowered by the large negative relationships in other republics. This indicates that the geography of the samples did, in fact, play a role in the divergent results of the two studies.

TABLE 3. Relationship between Support for Political Change and Locus of Responsibility, by Republic

	Tau_c	*r*	Gamma	p^a	N^b
Belorussia	−.24	−.20	−.29	<.01	177
Georgia	−.22	−.21	−.36	<.01	185
Uzbekistan	−.15	−.15	−.18	.04	183
RSFSR	−.09	−.08	−.11	.02	930
Kazakhstan	−.07	−.06	−.09	NS	248
Estonia	.03	.03	.03	NS	256
Ukraine	.04	.04	.05	NS	254

Source: Data are from a national survey of the Soviet Union, December 1989. See Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992 for a complete description of the sample and procedures. Relationships are calculated using the ungrouped index of support for political change. *Taus* are the most appropriate measure. *Gammas* are presented for comparison with data provided in Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992; *r* is presented for comparability with Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1994. Calculations were performed in SPSS for Windows, V.5.0.1.

[a] Two-tailed test.

[b] Ns reflect missing data on the individual questions.

Since our sample was designed to represent the entire Soviet Union, of the republics in which we have a positive relationship, Estonia was weighted to comprise only 2.8% of the total (as representative of the Baltics), and Ukraine 19.6%, for a total of 22.4%. However, since the Miller group weighted their data in proportion to the population of the three republics they sampled, Lithuania and Ukraine represent approximately 28% of the cases in their weighted sample. Thus, the republics in our data that do show a hint of a positive relationship (Estonia and Ukraine) are appropriately less heavily weighted in our total sample than the matched republics (Lithuania and Ukraine) are in the Miller group's sample.[10] The overweighting of Lithuania and Ukraine in the Miller group's sample as compared to ours is a simple and necessary consequence of the fact that they sampled in only one other republic, whereas we sampled in five other republics in addition to Estonia and Ukraine. This matters because while the Miller group did not present correlations between locus of responsibility and political reform by republic, they did discuss the distinctiveness of Lithuanian attitudes (1994, 406). Lithuanians are more likely than Ukrainians or Russians to prefer an individualistic locus of responsibility (their tables 1 and 3) and are *much* more in favor of rapid political reform (their tables 4 and 5). Lithuania is also distinctive even among the Baltic nations in having a relatively small proportion of Russian residents. We would not expect that Lithuanians, in the throes of a political, economic, and social revolt against the Soviet Union and already having declared independence, would share common attitudinal structures with citizens of Russia and Ukraine. Residents of Ukraine are much less distinctive than Lithuania but also tend toward more individualism than residents of Russia (their Table 1). Given distinctive attitudes, the necessarily greater weighting of Lithuania and Ukraine in their sample as compared to ours might have pushed their correlation in a more positive direction, compounding the even more severe problem of nonrepresentativeness of their sample with respect to the Soviet Union as a whole, which arises from its being conducted in only three republics. Had Mickiewicz and I not sampled in Belorussia, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan, our total correlation would have been less negative and closer to the Miller group's finding; but this result would also have been less representative of the USSR.[11]

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[9] The World Values Survey does not contain questions on political reform similar enough to ours or the Miller group's to enable a meaningful replication with those data.

[10] Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger do not report weighting in their paper. However, in personal communication with editor Powell, they stated that their sample was weighted and that this information was mistakenly omitted from their paper. Of their previous publications, the most detailed report on weighting appears in Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli (1993, 279–81), where they report weights of 1.0 for Lithuania, 14.1 for Ukraine, and 26.4 for Russia. These weights appear to be based on the size of the total Russian population, rather than on the Russian population west of the Urals, where they sampled. Thus, the more urban European Russia is weighted even more heavily than it should have been. Had their sample weights correctly reflected the actual population of European Russia, the weights given to Lithuania and Ukraine would have been even higher. While this would have exacerbated the problems due to sampling in only three republics, it might have lessened the problems due to overrepresentation of the more urban European Russia, discussed below. This Hobson's choice highlights the difficulties attaching to claims to represent a much larger population when samples have been drawn only from distinct geographic or cultural areas of the total.

Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger also incorrectly reported our findings on nationality. We noted important republic differences in support for political change and locus of responsibility. For example, Central Asian ethnicity was the *most* important predictor of support for political change, and Georgian nationality had a significant effect on locus of responsibility. We argued that "ethnicity was among the most important factors in considering support for the kinds of changes initiated by the Gorbachev administration" and that "the ethnic and sociodemographic differences we observed as the Soviet Union was collapsing create serious problems for democratizing reform in the newly independent successor states. These divisions are an inevitable part of the legacy of the former Soviet republics and may well be magnified under conditions of extreme economic and political uncertainty" (Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992, 862, 870). Inexplicably, the Miller group claimed that we found "significant similarity in the political and economic attitudes expressed by different ethnic subgroups across various republics of the former Soviet Union" (1994, 399).

The Miller group's inattentiveness to the significance of republic differences also surfaces in their challenge to our analysis of minority ethnic status. We reported that the attitudes of Russians living in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine tended to be closer to the attitudes of those republics' titular nationalities than to those of Russians living in Russia. The Miller group states that their data "fail to support" this finding, because they found that Russians living in *Lithuania* were not attitudinally similar to *Lithuanians* (1994, 407). But on the basis of findings about large communities of Russians living in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, one would hardly want to generalize to Russians living in Lithuania. Russians there were a very small and threatened minority. Lithuania had formally declared its independence from the Soviet Union over two years before the Miller group's data were collected, and, as I noted above, they themselves showed Lithuanian political attitudes to be extremely distinctive. Under these circumstances, it is quite unlikely that Russians in Lithuania would be sufficiently well integrated to be much influenced by the distinctive attitudes of Lithuanians; this is an inappropriate test of the type of contextual effect we discussed. Finifter (1994) contains an expanded discussion of these issues.

The Significance of Demographic Differences. Analogously, appropriate representation of major social and demographic groups also affects the validity of findings; this is why sample data are frequently weighted on these characteristics. We assessed the validity of our sample by comparing it with the Soviet population on several different characteristics (Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992, 872, Table A-1). We have a substantial number of rural dwellers (38% of the sample), and 19% of respondents did not complete a secondary education. The Miller group provides no comparisons of their sample and any real population and very little information about its demographic characteristics. For example, even though much of their analysis concerns the effect of education, no distribution is given for educational levels. However, they report elsewhere that their 1990 sample "systematically undersampled" rural dwellers (Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli 1993, 281). Any such biases in their later samples might have affected the findings, since *education and place of residence are related to attitudes toward political change and affect the strength and direction of relationships between support for political change and locus of responsibility*. Moreover, because their weights are based on the *total* Russian population and do not reflect the fact that they sampled only in European Russia, not only are Lithuania and Ukraine overweighted but so is the Russian *urban* population. The significance of this in further distorting their results with respect to the total population of the former Soviet Union lies in the distinctiveness of attitudes of well-educated people living in urban areas, to which I now turn.

Using the Finifter-Mickiewicz data, I created four groups by dichotomizing residence (rural-urban) and education (noncomplete vs. complete university). For each group, Table 4 presents mean values for political change and locus of responsibility, correlations between these variables, and unstandardized regression coefficients.[12] These data show that:

1. Nonuniversity graduates living in rural areas are the most *resistant* to political change but the most *supportive* of individual initiative; the correlation be-

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[11] Had we interviewed only in Russia, Ukraine, and Estonia and weighted for this three-republic group as the Miller group did for their three-country sample, weights would have reflected Russia's population size as 73.4% of our total, Ukraine's 25.8%, and Estonia's .8%. Thus Russia's negative correlation would still have dominated the others.

[12] Correlations are for the uncollapsed scale of support for political change, thus differing slightly from those presented in the cross-tabulation in Table 5.

TABLE 4. Political Change and Locus of Responsibility, by Place of Residence and Educational Level

Educational Level and Place of Residence	Mean, Political Change[a]	Mean, Locus of Responsibility[b]	Tau_c and r, Political Change by Locus of Responsibility		Unstandardized Regression Coefficient (se)[c]
Nonuniversity graduate rural (N = 554)[d]	.85	2.10	−.10	−.09	−.04 (.018)
Nonuniversity graduate urban (N = 823)	1.72	2.03	−.10	−.08	−.04 (.016)
University graduate, rural (N = 111)	1.53	1.92	−.20	−.08	−.08 (.04)
University graduate, urban (N = 293)	2.31	1.63	+.15	+.13	+.06 (.025)

Source: Data are from a national survey of the Soviet Union, December 1989. See Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992 for a complete description of the sample and procedures.

[a] Range = −5 to +5.

[b] 1 = state, 3 = individual.

[c] With locus of responsibility as the dependent variable. All are significant at $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed test). Calculations were performed in SPSS for Windows, V.5.0.1.

[d] The *N*s given are the weighted numbers of cases for this analysis. The actual *N*s are larger, but the real total sample size of 2,520 was reduced to 2,006 in the weighting procedure, so as to yield conservative estimates of statistical significance (see Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992 for further detail).

tween the two attitudes in this group is moderately negative.

2. Although nonuniversity graduates living in cities have moderately high levels of support for political change *and* individual responsibility, the correlation between these attitudes is *negative*.
3. University graduates living in rural areas are moderately low on *both* support for political change and individualism; nevertheless, this group has the highest *negative* correlation between these attitudes.
4. Urban university graduates are more supportive of political change than any other group, but they are least in favor of individual responsibility; despite these apparently conflicting trends, there is a *positive* correlation between these two variables in this group.

The higher correlations between locus of responsibility and support for political change in the university-educated groups suggest that education leads to stronger attitudinal consistency but in *opposite directions* in rural and urban areas, that is, *the attitude structures are different*. Rural university graduates exhibit in an even stronger way the negative correlation in our total sample: support for political reform is related to support for *state* responsibility for social well-being. Nongraduates in both rural and urban areas also exhibit this pattern, but not as strongly. In contrast, *among urban university graduates, support for political reform is positively associated with favoring individual responsibility*, precisely the direction of relationship reported by the Miller group for their total sample. The social and geographic localization of the negative and positive correlations suggests an explanation for the different correlations and also for the differences between our total results and those of the Miller group.

During rapid economic and political change, the *poorly educated* and, in general, *residents of rural areas* where economic opportunity is limited, are most vulnerable. People in such distressed circumstances would be hesitant about their support for economic and political change (see Przeworski's [1993] discussion of the effect of unemployment in decreasing support for reform). If they are willing to change some things, they might be unwilling to change others. The resulting intermediate positions could increase the likelihood of negative correlations between attitudes toward political change and locus of responsibility. Rather than thinking of these correlations as suggesting conflicting or inconsistent ideologies, it may be more useful to think of them as indicating different types of intermediate positions on pervasive political and economic changes, occurring all at the same time and experienced holistically. Many scholars suggest that hesitance about economic and political change is, in fact, commonly expressed in this way. Actual events seem consistent with the findings of Table 4: Support for Communist candidates has been much stronger in small towns and rural areas where the economic situation has been most disastrous and support for political change is weakest, even though rural dwellers are, on the whole, relatively individualistic.[13]

Only for well-educated urban dwellers is the correlation between support for political change and individual locus of responsibility positive, the pattern the Miller group argues is universal. The ideological connection between these variables may be fortified by this group's cultural milieu—the greater availability of mass media, higher likelihood of travel, contact with Westerners, exposure to fashionable ideas, and, perhaps most important, confidence that their advantaged socioeconomic position will protect them from the worst consequences of the collapse of government services, thereby making a

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[13] I also note that a negative correlation does *not* mean that *most* people have "inconsistent" attitudes. In our original analysis, despite the negative total correlation, less than half the sample chose "state" responsibility and favored political change or "individual" responsibility and opposed it (Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992, Table 3). Whether "opposite" patterns occur among an absolute majority depends on the strength of the negative correlation and the variable distributions. I discuss this further below.

TABLE 5. Locus of Responsibility by Support for Political Change, Among Urban University Graduates

Preferred Locus of Responsibility	Support for Political Change				Row Total
	−5 through 0	1	2–3	4–5	
State	79.3%	73.7%	65.8%	62.7%	68.7%
Individuals	20.7	26.3	34.2	37.3	31.3
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Column *N*	(58)	(51)	(90)	(94)	(293)[a]
Column Total	19.9%	17.5	30.7	32.0	100.0%

Source: Data are from a national survey of the Soviet Union, December 1989. See Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992 for a complete description of the sample and procedures. Kendall's $\text{Tau}_c = .13$; $\text{Gamma} = .20$; Pearson's $R = .12$, $p = <.05$ (two-tailed test). Calculations were performed in SPSS for Windows, V.5.0.1.
[a]Weighted *N* (actual *N* is 363).

belief in individual responsibility something that they can realistically afford.

Table 4 suggests clearly that surveys that overrepresent well-educated urban dwellers may produce results that are disproportionately influenced by this group's distinctive attitudes and unrepresentative of the total population. If respondents' educational levels or place of residence differ substantially between our sample and that of the Miller group, the substantive results would differ due only to the differing sample compositions. Since the Miller group provides no data on educational or residential characteristics of their sample, one cannot know the extent to which this problem affects their results. However, both the known difficulties of sampling in rural areas of the former Soviet Union and the overrepresentation of the more urban European Russia in their weighted sample suggest it as an additional possible source of the differences in results.

Table 4 also shows that a positive correlation does not necessarily mean that individuals support *both* political reform and individual responsibility, as the Miller group assumes in saying that "being a political reformist . . . does imply an abandonment of the socialist system in favor of increased individual responsibility even when it comes to the social welfare of citizens" (pp. 409–10). On the contrary, of the four groups, urban university graduates are *most supportive of political reform but least favorable to individual responsibility*, despite their *positive* correlation between these variables. The positive correlation means only that advocates of political reform are *more likely* than opponents to favor individual responsibility, not that a majority necessarily supports it. This is seen in Table 5.

While 69% of urban university graduates favors state control, 63% favors political change (scores 2–5), which seem to be opposite tendencies. The correlation between the variables is nonetheless positive: As support for reform increases, a larger proportion of respondents favors individual responsibility. However, *this proportion is never more than a minority, even in the most proreform group*. Thus, despite having reproduced the Miller group's positive correlation between support for political reform and individual locus of control in this group, the data belie their assumption that a positive correlation necessarily means that advocates of political reform support individualism (which, in any event, is dependent on extremity of question wording).[14]

Differences over Time in Political and Economic Context

Finally, the Miller group's study took place at a time when political and economic conditions were significantly different from those prevailing during ours. Evaluating data from different time periods, Bahry argues that the relationship between education and liberalism changed over time (1993, 544). While earlier data are from émigré samples and later data from limited geographic areas, making comparisons uncertain, only in a 1991 sample of European Russia and Ukraine is there really a clear relationship between education and more individualistic attitudes. A turning point occurring at about this time would be consistent with the different relationships between education and locus of responsibility found in our survey and that of the Miller group.

Conditions changed dramatically after our data collection in late 1989. Significant reforms had begun under Gorbachev, but their final shape and implications were ambiguous, and there was still important opposition to marketization and significantly reduced state programs. The Soviet Union was changing, but it still existed. Moreover, in many ways it was still much as it had been in the past. Interestingly, our data are consistent with findings from earlier periods that the better educated were more supportive of Soviet values than the less well educated.[15]

By the time of the Miller group's first survey, "shortly before the August 1991 coup attempt," the economy had deteriorated drastically, and economic reforms had been introduced that defined more clearly the movement toward privatization.[16] Before their 1992 data were collected, the Soviet Union had dissolved, the economy was in chaos, famine was feared, and social welfare had deteriorated so much that life expectancy began to decline. Nelson, Babaeva, and Babaev cite early 1992 Moscow surveys indicating drastic declines in satisfaction with conditions of life and Yeltsin's economic policies (1992, 281). As we know, these threats to the fabric of life increased demands for state support programs and votes for Communist Party candidates.

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[14] That is, how much people "favor" or "oppose" something depends on just what they are asked. Thus assessments of distributions should reflect the actual meaning of the questions. For most purposes, *relative*, rather than absolute, positions of groups are most meaningful. This analysis also demonstrates the pitfalls of using group correlations as indicators of individual attitude structure, a point also made in the "attitudinal consistency" literature.

[15] Bahry (1993) discusses these findings, most of which are based on Inkeles and Bauer's (1959) classic study *The Soviet Citizen*, and replicates them using a different part of the data collected in that project.

It is possible that the relationship between education and support for collective solutions might have reversed with the downward spiral in economic conditions. Deteriorating economic conditions had their worst effects on the poor and less well educated. Many surveys from this time show that social class had powerful effects on economic attitudes. The upper levels were much more likely to anticipate personal benefit from marketization and thus to support it most strongly, while the disadvantaged were much more likely to fear unemployment and support antimarket forces (Evans 1994; McIntosh et al., 1994; Mihalisko 1993; Nelson, Babaeva, and Babaev 1992). In 1989, when our data were collected, the better educated might have been *ideologically* more sympathetic than the less well educated to some aspects of socialism, including state responsibility for social welfare. But by 1992 the poor and poorly educated, suffering most from the economic transition, were much more likely to demand greater state support, not for ideological reasons but for personal security and survival.

Whitefield and Evans's (1994) interpretation of public opinion, in which attitudes change as part of a learning process in which people respond to political and economic conditions, fits this scenario. In their view, the 1993 Russian elections confirm that "commitment to the market and democracy in postcommunist societies will be highly contingent on the public's evaluation of the actual performance of these principles in the transition process" (p. 40). Russian public opinion in recent years is depicted as going through several stages: "In the first stage of the transition, the crisis in the old system gave rise to utopian expectations about market and democratic solutions. . . . However, with the accumulation of experience of transition, voters were increasingly able to identify their interests in changed circumstances and to vote accordingly. . . . Given the difficulties of the market transition, voters learned to support continued or augmented state intervention" (p. 39). If the less well educated were especially susceptible to the early euphoria (or more desperate to try anything), this could be why, in 1989, they were slightly more supportive of individualistic solutions than the better educated, who were more securely anchored in socialist ideology. As the economic situation deteriorated, however, the less well off learned that the extent of deprivation under privatization was much greater than they had expected and surpassed the well educated in support for state solutions, as is found in the Miller group's 1991–92 data.

With respect to the relationship between locus of responsibility and support for political reform, the increased influence of Western reform efforts and vogue of these ideas might have led attitudes to crystallize in the way Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger found. As economic conditions deteriorated, perhaps those who suffered the most deprivation and who most needed state support identified political reform as the cause of their dire economic problems, thus becoming increasingly opposed to both political and economic change, while the opposite may have occurred for those who perceived themselves as benefiting from the economic changes or who traveled in social or political milieus where both ideas were very fashionable. This scenario could produce the higher positive correlations between locus of responsibility and political reform found by the Miller group. However, empirical support for the idea that the relationship would necessarily change in direction under these conditions is less clear. First, the data in Table 4 for university graduates living in rural areas show that even the pattern of relatively low support for both individual responsibility and political reform can yield a negative correlation between these variables. Second, some of the evidence contradicting the Miller group's positive correlation in fact comes from the later period, e.g., Hough's (1994) Russian survey carried out in late 1993, even after the Miller group's study. Thus, the Miller group's findings may be due as much or more to the measurement and sampling problems previously discussed than to attitude changes that necessarily would yield a positive correlation between the variables.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Based on a small negative correlation ($\text{tau}_c = -.10$) between individual locus of responsibility and support for political change and the frequency distributions of these variables, Mickiewicz and I argued that the fact that "many advocates of change continue to support the socialist view that the state . . . is responsible for the well-being of the citizenry, suggests that contrary to much popular belief in the West, there has not been a wholesale abandonment of socialist principles. . . . What many Soviet citizens pressing for change may want is a more efficient and productive state, rather than a state shorn of social obligations. The Communist Party, as the engine of that obligated state, was rejected, but not the obligation itself; the institution failed, but not the norm" (p. 861).

The Miller group, citing correlations of .43 and .45 between locus of responsibility and political reform for 1991 and 1992, claimed to "resoundingly disconfirm the Finifter and Mickiewicz conclusion that two independent dimensions underlie these attitudes. Our data reveal a strong positive correlation between support for political reform and preference for individualism. . . . Individuals who preferred political reforms of a democratic nature also favored a decreased role for the state as a guarantor of economic well-being. Being a political reformist, therefore, does imply an abandonment of the socialist system in favor of increased individual responsibility even when it comes to the social welfare of citizens" (1994, 408, 409–10).

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[16] This period and some details of the legislation are reviewed in Nelson, Babaeva, and Babaev (1992).

But the Miller group never showed a cross-tabulation of these variables; they reported only measures of association. And as I have demonstrated, a positive correlation between reformist attitudes and individual locus of responsibility does not mean that most people with high scores on one variable will also have high scores on the other. Estimating the influence of one variable on another is not the same as describing the frequency of particular responses in a sample. Rose and Mishler provide another example of this when they point out that despite *strong positive correlations* between ratings of the economic and political systems in surveys of five former Soviet bloc countries, "there is . . . a degree of cognitive dissonance between political and economic evaluations. . . . In most countries of Eastern Europe *the median citizen is in favour of the new political system and against the new economic regime*" (1994, 177).

The Miller group's conclusion that "being a political reformist . . . does imply an abandonment of the socialist system" also conflicts with most studies of public opinion in the former Soviet bloc, which usually find widespread commitment to political democracy coexisting with strong support for social guarantees. On the basis of these findings, most analysts have concluded, as Mickiewicz and I did, that the eventual shape of the political systems of these countries is much more likely to resemble egalitarian social democracy, democratic socialism, or "market socialism" than the more individualistic capitalistic democracy found in the United States. Evans (1994), for example, despite finding a positive association between support for democracy and marketization in several East European countries, states that "we find dramatically more pro-interventionist views among East Europeans than among even the most left-wing of the Western populations. Support for the market is clearly qualified by an expectation of state intervention."[17] More important, the evidence of the real world, in particular the increasing electoral success of Communists and quasi-Communists, suggests that political reform does not imply abandoning an important role for the state as the guarantor of social and economic well-being.

Lending further support to the idea of political and economic reform as multidimensional, an analysis of the public statements and tactics of various contenders for power in the Soviet Union from 1985–91 reveals rational strategies designed to cope with a multidimensional issue space (Anderson and Grofman 1995). Some strategies were intended to hold the disparate reform elements together: By advocating that all reform issues be treated as a unitary package, Gorbachev tried to reduce the issue space to a single dimension on which he could represent a central compromise position; Yeltsin and his supporters avoided discussion of the substantive issues in favor of advocacy of procedural reforms such as referenda and competitive elections; and the *neformaly* reform groups attempted to form a coalition of minorities. Attempting to forestall reform, the *nomenklatura's* strategy was to divide their opponents by disaggregating the issues and focusing on them one at a time, since the various reform groups could not assemble a majority coalition on any one issue. If this analysis is correct, Gorbachev's fall may be interpreted as resulting at least partially from his inability to reduce the issue space to a single dimension for more than a brief period, precisely because its multidimensionality defied such a simplified resolution over the longer run. In addition to this analysis, Anderson and Grofman note that the Finifter-Mickiewicz suggestion of the multidimensionality of reform is further supported by interviews with important Soviet politicians of the period, in which the politicians report that they were unable to arrive at mutually satisfactory agreements for the coordination of reform efforts.

CONCLUSION

In sum, Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger's two major claims are incorrect: Education is *not* universally related to preference for individual locus of responsibility and the relationship between locus of responsibility and support for democratic reform is also variable. Therefore, they had no valid basis for challenging our findings merely because their findings differed. They were wrong about the world at large, and they wrongly assumed that our findings for late 1989 ought to have matched theirs for 1991–92, in which significantly different conditions prevailed. Given the caveats I have discussed about measurement and sampling issues, and the several studies with different results, the direction of their findings may or may not be right for the later period.

Science proceeds by comparing results of different studies. But instead of seeking prematurely for universal generalizations, we need more *systematic* replication and understanding of how political contexts affect public opinion. The Miller group's data differed greatly from ours in measures, sample, and time period. Even "reassessments" require more control over (or at least recognition of) what varies. But even with careful efforts, during great economic and political change, attitudes and relationships may be unstable, and many findings may not be very robust.[18]

The fragility of correlations under these conditions is illustrated dramatically in the differing findings of Duch (1993) and Gibson (1995) *using the same data set.* Using a 1990 Soviet sample (N = ~1,500), Duch reported that "preferences for democracy and free markets are highly intercorrelated" (p. 601) and that education and support for free-market culture were significantly positively related, and he contrasted these findings with ours (p. 602). Duch's findings were then used by the Miller group as key evidence that our results were wrong. However, using a subset of the *same sample* Duch had used, Gibson reports substantially different findings. Gibson used data from approximately 600 of the Russian and Ukrainian respondents interviewed in 1990, who were reinterviewed in 1992.[19] In this group, Gibson found economic and political attitudes *unrelated* in 1990 (he specifically notes the difference with Duch) and that "level of education is insignificantly related to economic and political attitudes" for *both* 1990 and 1992 (1995, 20, Table 4, figures 3–4). Moreover, he also reports that for both Russia and Ukraine, individuals' attitudes toward marketization in 1990 are unrelated to their attitudes toward marketization in 1992.[20]

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[17] Evans (1994) also suggests that the strength of the relationship between support for democracy and marketization in a country may depend on its stage of development. While he finds these attitudes positively related in several Eastern European countries, he points to studies showing weak or no relationships in more developed societies and suggests: "If the transition to democracy and the market in Eastern Europe is in any way comparable with the patterns observed in the West, the association identified between support for democracy and market experience in Eastern Europe may simply be an effect of the *stage* in the transition. Over time this link may weaken and disappear" (p. 6).

[18] Both Anderson 1995 and Fleron 1996 provide useful discussions of question construction problems in surveys in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Fleron specifically cautions against excessive faith in survey responses to questions that ask about political or economic systems with which respondents have little or no familiarity. When such unfamiliarity is coupled with near-chaotic change in their real world, attitudes may be especially volatile.

Gibson also notes, however, that correlations between support for marketization and democracy increased substantially between 1990 and 1992, from .26 to .52 in Russia, and .08 to .58 in Ukraine, and he argues that attitudes crystallized between the two time periods (1995, 18–19). As with the changing relationship between education and locus of responsibility, a progressive attitudinal crystallization could explain our much lower correlation between support for democracy and government social welfare guarantees (indeed, a negative −.10) in late 1989 and intermediate values (.43 and .45 for 1991 and 1992) in the Miller group's data (although this scenario would not be supported by Hough's [1994] data). Even so, Gibson also notes that the relationship between economic and political attitudes is not as strong as one might expect even in 1992; that the understanding of the market, even among its supporters, is "far more benign and controlled" (1995, 22) than its understanding in the West; and that it seems much more likely that democratization is taking root than that this is occurring with marketization (p. 23).

Many other scholars have also noted that "marketization" is understood very differently in Central and Eastern Europe than in the United States, and it is not always clear that we are referencing the same ideas. Whitefield and Evans point out that Russian "voters' current preferences appear to have become distinctly egalitarian, against marketization and privatization as it has been pursued, and in favor of state intervention in the economy. These preferences coexist, however, with continued *normative* commitment to markets and democracy in principle" (1994, 41). Similarly, McIntosh and her colleagues report that "many who support a free market economy in principle as the 'right thing' for their country want more government intervention and control than is typical of a laissez-faire model of capitalism" (1994, 500). More research to clarify the meanings these ideas have in the mass publics of the post-Soviet countries would be useful.

This duality between normative and practical concerns suggests yet another real terminological and measurement problem, for it means that expressed attitudes are highly dependent not only on the political and economic context of each survey and the specific questions that are asked but, in particular, on whether these questions refer to ideals or to attitudes connected more closely to evaluations of daily life conditions. If basic norms or ideals are invoked, the extent of support for marketization or government guarantees of social welfare, and relationships involving these variables, may appear quite different than if questions lead people to think more about the present conditions of daily life. If researchers do not share respondents' understanding of questions, interpretations may suffer. Boris Yeltsin aptly expressed such terminological problems when he said: "When I am constantly asked during my trips—are you for socialism or capitalism—I say: I am in favor of Russians living better—materially, spiritually, and culturally. . . . As for a name, people will think one up."[21] Until they do, and a consensus develops about its meaning, the likelihood of conflicting interpretations of public opinion is high even without the variety of methodological and contextual issues and problems that produced the discrepant findings discussed in this paper.

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[19] Gibson reports reinterviews among 56% of Russian respondents and 46% of Ukrainian respondents (1995, Appendix A). He also discusses demographic and attitudinal differences among panel respondents and others who could not be reinterviewed; in general, these are not very large.

[20] Since Gibson used slightly different measures in the two years (although all his measures use multiple items), it is also possible that this apparent attitudinal instability actually reflects a multidimensionality of attitudes toward marketization.

[21] Radio address, June 1, 1991, cited in Dobson and Grant 1992.

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Understanding Political Change in Post-Soviet Societies: A Further Commentary on Finifter and Mickiewicz

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Modernization theory suggests that in the post–World War II period increased education promoted public support for democratic principles and an individual opportunities society in the former Soviet Union. Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992), however, based on a 1989 survey in the Soviet Union, found that the less well educated were more supportive of individual locus of control than were the better educated. Examining survey data collected in the former USSR during 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1995, we find consistent reconfirmation of the modernization theory, despite a major decline in support for an opportunities society that occurs between 1992 and 1995. This recent increase in preference for socialism is explained by rising nationalism, growing nostalgia for communists, and disillusionment with certain aspects of the market economy, particularly the perceived growth of social inequality.

At the end of the 1980s scholars were challenged to explain the dramatic political changes occurring in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The rapid disintegration of the USSR raised a host of questions about why the collapse occurred and what political and economic arrangements would eventually replace the old order.

Among the theoretical arguments offered in explanation for the rapid changes prior to the availability of data was a theory of modernization effects.[1] This theory suggested that while the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s implied sudden and rapid social and political change, the underlying explanations for the change were more long term and gradual. For example, as the years passed and Soviets became better educated and more aware of other cultures, they began to demand more rights, more individual opportunities, and greater self-determination for both the individual and the various ethnic populations of the USSR.[2]

While there are no reliable, longitudinal public-opinion data available for testing these hypothesized dynamics—although the earlier Soviet Interview Project data appear to support the modernization argument (Millar 1987)—the theory suggested that certain relationships should be evident in the data that various Soviet and Western scholars were starting to collect at the end of 1980s and at the outset of the 1990s. In particular, if the theory is an accurate description of the change taking place in the former Soviet Union, we should expect these data to reveal that younger, better-educated, and urban Soviets were relatively more opposed to socialism and more favorable toward an "opportunities" society at the beginning of the reform era.[3] By comparison, older, less well educated and rural residents were expected to be relatively more supportive of socialism and state control of the means of production (hence the guarantor of work) and broader well-being. Moreover, we would expect the former group to be less supportive of the Communists (as the rulers of the socialist state) and more pro-reform (at that time "pro-reform" implied less support of authoritarian government and positive support for a market economy). Again, the opposite would be predicted for the older, less well educated and rural groups.

Given the substantive importance of these hypothesized relationships for understanding the collapse of the

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[1] Some versions of the modernization theory emphasize macroeconomic modernization (see Janos 1992) while others stress change in education and social values (see Lapidus 1989; Hahn 1991; Duch 1993; Evans and Whitefield 1993). Our use is much closer to that of the latter authors.

[2] Movement toward reform in the former Soviet Union no doubt occurred as an interaction between the policy actions initiated by elites and the dissent expressed by the public, once the elites allowed the public to express its dissatisfaction on core issues. Reformist elites came to realize that they could no longer achieve their own (personal and state) goals such as economic growth via policies designed for a rural, uneducated society given that the Soviet society of the 1980s was no longer predominantly rural or uneducated. Under these circumstances, economic efficiency and growth could not come about without a reduction of central control. The public played a role in this change, not by lobbying or pressuring the leaders, but simply by not functioning well. The reformist elites' decision to provide more freedom matched the desire of the better-educated segment of society for increased opportunities for personal advancement.

[3] We have adapted the terminology used by McIntosh and MacIver (1992) to define the relationship between the citizen and the state. During the transition from authoritarian socialism to democracy the preferred role of the state is extremely important. There is a good deal of tension between those who want the security and stability presumedly offered by reliance on the state even at the expense of individual freedom and opportunity, and those who want individual freedom and opportunities even though it entails some uncertainty and risk. The conceptual continuum thus ranges from those who prefer a "state guaranteed" society at one end to those who favor an "individual opportunities" society at the other end. Our measurement instrument captures this continuum as closely to the conceptual distinction as possible, although we use a reference to "the government" as guarantor of well-being rather than the state because our past research experience suggests that the "state" is an amorphous term that confuses some people.

Soviet Union, as well as the implications for the future politics of the newly emerging independent states, we were quite surprised by the reported results of the 1989 study conducted by Ada Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz (1992). Their results clearly contradicted the modernization theory and the hypotheses stated above. The most striking of these contradictions included their finding that the better educated had a much stronger commitment to socialism than relatively less well educated Soviet citizens and that those most favorable toward socialism were also relatively more supportive of reform. In addition, they found that rural citizens, particularly those least educated, were far less supportive of socialism than were urban dwellers and relatively less inclined toward reform. These results imply that at the end of the 1980s, support for socialism was most evident among middle- to upper-class Soviet citizens who were less favorably disposed toward a society incorporating individual opportunities than were lower-class Soviets. Nevertheless, the upper classes, despite their loyalty to socialism, were more inclined to favor reform.

Because many of the Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) results did not fit with data that we were collecting only shortly after the period when Finifter and Mickiewicz were in the field (see Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli 1993), nor with evidence reported by other scholars (Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992; McIntosh and MacIver 1992; Mason 1995), we responded by reassessing mass support for political and economic change in the former USSR based on data we had collected in 1991 and 1992 (see Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1994).

In objection to our reassessment, Finifter (1996) has more recently presented a number of methodological arguments that she believes account for the discrepancies between our two previously published articles. Briefly stated, her arguments focus on differences between the two studies in the following areas: the timing of the surveys, the structure of samples, and the survey measures used to create certain indices.

The purpose of our further commentary here is not to address in detail each of these specific counter arguments. Rather, we feel that the broader understanding of Soviet and post-Soviet politics, as well as the enhancement of comparative politics more generally, can better be served by focusing on substantive and theoretical issues. We proceed by first reexamining the hypothesized relationship between education and commitment to socialism by using a broader set of indicators of support for socialism from our 1990 study, thus allowing us to address the issue of timing for the Finifter and Mickiewicz study versus our studies. Next, we introduce data from 1995 and consider whether the education relationship has remained consistent even in the face of the tremendous change occurring in the past five years. The final topic in this section involves an alternative interpretation to that offered by Finifter for the relationship between education level and support for an individual opportunities society as revealed by the 1990–91 World Values Survey.

The second major section of the paper considers the relationship between locus of responsibility and attitudes toward political change. Clearly, what political change meant while the Soviet Union still existed is different from what political change means in the post-Soviet period. The focus of this section, therefore, is rising nationalism, the reemergence of support for communists, and growing disillusionment with democratization.

The third section then turns to the impact of changing economic conditions and circumstances on preferred locus of responsibility. Reform, as it has been and is still occurring in the newly independent states, involves economic as well as political change. Indeed, our understanding of public attitudes toward state responsibility for individual well-being would be limited without exploring the impact of economic perceptions, including beliefs about free markets and social justice, on preferred locus of responsibility. A brief conclusion drawing out the broader implications of our findings brings the paper to a close.

UNIVERSALITY AND REPLICATION

Before moving on, however, two points raised by Finifter must be addressed directly as they misrepresent both the letter and intent of our previous reassessment. The first point deals with the universality of relationships and the second with replication.

As indicated above, there are sharp discrepancies between certain correlations reported by Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) and our reassessment (Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1994). In her recent critique, Finifter recasts our previous article as claiming "*universal* status for the positive relationship" between education and preferred locus of responsibility (emphasis Finifter 1996, 138; see also pages 139–41). A revisit to our earlier article will reveal that we did not cast the relationship between education and locus of responsibility as a universal.

On the contrary, our work was based on the assumption that we were testing hypotheses that described the political reality and social relations existing within the former Soviet Union at a certain time. The reported distributions and relationships were assumed to be influenced by certain socioeconomic factors which were expected to vary over time (such as perceptions of the economic situation). We also pursued the surprising fact that the examined correlations in data from the Soviet Union were quite similar to the correlations among similar measures in the United States, despite major differences in political systems. In short, our analyses explicitly entertained the impact of context on the distribution of public attitudes as well as the associations among attitudes.

While part of any scientific endeavor is to seek generalizable findings and relationships that remain stable across time and across cultures, social scientists generally assume that social relations are dynamic. Clearly, comparative research strives to uncover general relationships, but an equally salient purpose of comparative research is to determine under which social conditions identified relationships do hold true, and what factors lead to shifts in distributions and associations. In accordance with this idea, our previous work did not rule out the possibility that education and locus of responsibility might be negatively correlated under some circumstances, for some societies, or at some point in time even though none of our data pointed to that conclusion.

Second, Finifter argues that our earlier piece was not a direct replication of the Finifter and Mickiewicz research and is therefore not directly comparable (see Finifter 1996, 139, 141–44). Our purpose was to examine the correlates and explanations of support for the old Soviet system versus desire for reform, marketization, and an individual opportunities society. We did not set out to replicate the Finifter and Mickiewicz study.[4] We were extremely candid about not using exactly the same measures with exactly the same wording, or even the same sampling frame. Our focus was testing alternative theories and thus, use of the same measure of a concept or exactly the same sample was not necessary. In order to accurately test existing theories one needs equivalent, *valid measures* of concepts and *unbiased samples* of areas where the theory should apply, not identical survey data. Our earlier work was not, and was not meant to be, a replication. It was a reassessment of a body of work we found questionable in light of our own research and theoretical orientation. While these issues are important, they are not key motivations for our paper. Thus, let us turn to a fuller examination of the evidence necessary to resolve the discrepancies that generated the original controversy.

EDUCATION AND SUPPORT FOR STATE VERSUS INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR WELL-BEING

One of the most obvious discrepancies between the Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) results and those we reported in our reassessment (Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1994) involves the correlation between education and locus of responsibility. Finifter (1996, 148–49) argues that the correlation between these two variables reversed between the end of 1989 (when Finifter and Mickiewicz found a significant negative correlation indicating that the better educated were relatively more supportive of socialism than were the less well educated) and June of 1991 (when our survey revealed a significant positive correlation indicating that better-educated Soviets preferred an individual opportunities society more than those who were less well educated). We are dubious that such a radical change could have occurred within a two-year time span. Historically, there may have been a period in Soviet society when a negative correlation existed, but we believe that this correlation began to reverse long before the fall of the USSR. It seems likely to us that this change in correlation began in the post–World War II period as overall education increased, causing a positive correlation to evolve over a number of years. This was a gradual change, not a sudden one occurring in the period between 1989 and mid-1991.

We contend that data from our 1990 study (conducted only six months after the Finifter and Mickiewicz study), in conjunction with subsequent surveys, support the continuity of correlation argument far better than the sudden change argument. Although the critical locus of responsibility measure was not included in our earliest study,[5] a number of indirect measures reflecting support and opposition to socialism were included and can be used for comparison. Moreover, some of these items were carried forward to our subsequent surveys as well. By examining the correlations between education and these items in all of our surveys, as well as the correlation between these items and the locus of responsibility measure (in those years when it is available), we can begin to determine a pattern of relationships. From this pattern we are able to make well-founded inferences about what the correlations most likely would have been in 1990 if locus of responsibility items had been available.

A factor analysis of eleven survey items from the 1990 study that measured attitudes toward socialism revealed three distinct dimensions. The first was similar to the reform dimension discussed in our 1994 reassessment.[6] The four items loading most heavily on this dimension included discomfort with the speed of reform (whether too fast or too slow), the desire for an orderly society versus more individual freedom, respect for Stalin, and discomfort with a competitive party system (remember the Communist Party was still the only allowable party in the USSR at this point in time). A second dimension captured approval or disapproval of the political and economic changes occurring in Eastern Europe. The third dimension reflected attitudes toward three different institutions: the Communist Party, and the national and local Supreme Soviets (the legislative bodies of the

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[4] Replication has a number of different meanings. Sniderman (1995) offers a definition involving the use of a different data set and comparable measures to validate earlier results and interpretations that he labels cross-validation. While the work presented here (and in our earlier reassessment) reflects this, we feel that even this form of replication was not what we intended. Our results and those reported by Finifter and Mickiewicz convey very different theories about the social processes involved in the demise of the Soviet Union. Each team is presenting and testing alternative empirical theories. Reducing these differences to a simple matter of replication, or even a cross-validation would diminish the theoretical significance of this controversy.

[5] The 1990 study was funded equally by this research team and our Soviet collaborators; thus the number of survey questions we were able to contribute to the questionnaire was more limited in that year than in subsequent years when the funding was provided predominantly by the U.S. National Science Foundation.

[6] These four items are not exactly the same as the four questions used in our 1994 Index of Reform, which was based on factor analyses of the broader set of questions available in 1991 and 1992. In the mix of eleven variables available for the 1990 surveys, a competitive parties question clearly loads with the speed of reform, orderly society, and Stalin questions. The Communist Party rating loads with an institutional factor, rather than with the reform items.

The net result of starting with the 1990 survey is that three of the four reform indicators, rather than two, are very similar to the items used by Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) to measure support for political change. Our orderly society question is very similar to their question Q22d. Our speed of reform question is like their Q18 and our competitive parties question is similar to their competitive elections (Q29) question. Again, the reader should realize that we are not attempting to replicate the Finifter and Mickiewicz measure here. Nevertheless, the four-item reform measure used in our Table 1 here does more closely resemble the Finifter and Mickiewicz measure of change, and thus can be seen as conforming with the suggestion made by Finifter (1996, 144).

TABLE 1. Correlations among Education, Attitude toward Reform, Affect toward Private Enterprises, and Locus of Responsibility

	Russia			Ukraine			Lithuania		
Year of Study	Reform	Enterprise Affect	Locus[a]	Reform	Enterprise Affect	Locus[a]	Reform	Enterprise Affect	Locus[a]
1990									
Education[b]	.41	.18	—	.23	.10	—	.38	.21	—
Reform[c]	—	.34	—	—	.18	—	—	.22	—
Enterprise affect[d]	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1991									
Education[b]	.26	.19	.17	.25	.16	.14	.12	.14	.08
Reform[c]	—	.33	.20	—	.29	.19	—	.19	.18
Enterprise affect[d]	—	—	.13	—	—	.21	—	—	.10
1992									
Education[b]	.23	.17	.14	.14	.19	.09	.14	.18	.06*
Reform[c]	—	.39	.30	—	.24	.18	—	.19	.16
Enterprise affect[d]	—	—	.25	—	—	.22	—	—	.19
1995									
Education[b]	.18	.27	.22	.13	.14	.13	.15	.05*	.19
Reform[c]	—	.19	.20	—	.20	.16	—	.07*	.17
Enterprise affect[d]	—	—	.29	—	—	.26	—	—	.25

Source: The University of Iowa Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys (PSCS). See note 8 for the sample description.

[a] The wording of the survey question used to measure locus of responsibility here and in all subsequent tables is: "Some people say the central government of the Russian Federation/Ukraine/Lithuania should guarantee everyone work and a high standard of living, others argue that every person should look after himself." The survey question scale initially ranged from 1 = government responsibility to 5 = individual responsibility for economic well-being. Here we have collapsed the scale as follows: 1,2 = state, 3 = pro/con, 4,5 = individual. The 1995 data employed a seven-point scale, so the collapsing was 1–3 = state, 4 = pro/con, 5–7 = individual.

[b] Education was coded as a 9-category variable that ranged from 1 = primary education and 9 = highest graduate degree.

[c] The reform index was comprised of four items: speed of reform, orderly society versus individual freedom, respect for Stalin and support for competitive parties.

[d] This is item Q62 noted in the Appendix.

*Not significant; all other correlations significant at $p < .01$.

USSR). One final item, an affective rating of private enterprises (recall that the state controlled the means of production in the USSR, thus rating private enterprises positively implies support for a more individualistic society) was also available but the loadings for this item were spread equally across the three dimensions (see the appendix for the exact wording of the questionnaire items).

All these survey items were positively and significantly intercorrelated for Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, as were the three indices formed from the measures that loaded together on each dimension. In short, the data show that those individuals opposed to reform were also negatively oriented toward the democratization and marketization occurring in Eastern Europe, and toward private enterprises. Thus, they were also relatively more positively oriented toward the major institutions of the Soviet government. In 1990 this antireform, pro-socialism sentiment was expressed by a substantial segment of the Soviet citizenry in Russia and Ukraine. For example, 41% of Russians and 33% of Ukrainians interpreted the changes in Eastern Europe as a threat to the interests of the USSR. Similarly, 44% of Russians and 43% of Ukrainians thought political reform was occurring too rapidly in the Soviet Union. Lithuanians, on the contrary, were largely in favor of reform and very negative toward the political institutions of the USSR—66% of this group, as compared with 31% of Russians and 29% of Ukrainians, rated the Communist Party "very negative." Most important to the relevance of the argument presented here, the better-educated survey respondents in all three former republics were significantly more pro-reform, favorable toward the change taking place in Eastern Europe, negative toward communist institutions, and more supportive of private enterprise than were less well educated Soviet citizens. In other words, as of mid-1990, education was positively correlated with a variety of measures indicating support or opposition to socialism (Pearson correlations ranging from .10 to .50).

On their own, the 1990 correlations do not definitively refute Finifter's change of correlation hypothesis because the critical locus of responsibility item is not included in the measurement. As of 1991, however, the locus of responsibility item was added to our surveys and some of the other items included in the 1990 study continued to be included as well. The four items in the index that we labeled reform, as well as the rating of private enterprises, were included in all our subsequent studies. If the items that were positively correlated with education in 1990 were also positively correlated with education *and* locus of responsibility in subsequent surveys, it would convincingly discomfirm Finifter's "change in correlation" hypothesis.

Table 1 presents the relevant set of correlation matrices for all three former republics across the period 1990–95. All of these correlations are positive and all but three are significant.[7] Moreover, education is positively correlated with all the items in all the years (1991, 1992, and 1995) including the locus of responsibility question. The fact that the pattern of correlations is similar across the three former republics is also very telling. One part of Finifter's critique (pp. 10–13, 15) is devoted to her argument that the differential weighting of the three republics in the combined sample used for our reassessment could help account for the discrepancy between our respective results. Yet the positive correlations in Table 1 for each former republic taken separately, a permissible mode of analysis because the sample from each former republic has always been self-representing,[8] demonstrate that the results are not simply an artifact of the sample weight. In short, if one were to predict backwards to 1989 from this pattern of correlations, one certainly would not predict a negative correlation between education and locus of responsibility. Given that the magnitude and direction of all the correlations remain surprisingly stable in the face of dramatic social, political, and economic change, it would be very surprising to have found a single correlation—that between education and locus of responsibility—to have made a dramatic shift from clearly negative to clearly positive between 1989 and 1990.[9]

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[7] The finding of positive significant correlations among these items provides additional support to the gradual change hypothesis because the meaning of some of these items shifted considerably between 1990 and 1995. For example, reform in 1990 meant increased freedom and

The argument for a dramatic change in the direction of the correlation between education and locus of responsibility would appear more plausible if there had been a major shift in the distribution of attitudes toward the locus of responsibility between 1989 and 1991. We find very little empirical support for this contention, however. When we previously compared our 1991 distribution of locus of responsibility attitudes with those reported by Finifter and Mickiewicz, we found almost no difference: 54 and 51% (when the distributions are dichotomized) in the respective surveys supported state responsibility for well-being (see Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1994, 400). According to Finifter's change in correlation hypothesis, the only way this high degree of similarity in the overall distribution for the two studies could have been attained is if virtually the same number of better and less well educated Soviets shifted, in opposite directions, from one side of the dichotomy to the other between 1989 and 1991. While this is not entirely impossible, it seems highly improbable.

In addition, a comparison of our 1991 and 1992 studies (see Table 2) suggests a good deal of stability in these same attitudes at a time when Finifter argues that massive changes in public opinion were taking place due to the dramatic events associated with the collapse of the USSR. Despite the very real drama associated with many of the events leading up to the Soviet demise, only minor differences occurred in the distributions for locus of responsibility between 1991 and 1992.[10] This continuity of public attitudes in the face of a major political upheaval suggests that many citizens' preferences had been formed long before 1989.

It is important at this point to clarify that the 1990–92 stability of opinion does not mean that the distributions were fixed across all time periods. In fact, among Russians and Ukrainians massive changes occur in locus of responsibility attitudes between mid-1992 and the beginning of 1995 (see Table 2). During this period, Russian and Ukrainian preferences shifted sharply in a pro-socialist (state responsible for well-being) direction. Lithuanians, for their part, exhibit relatively little attitudinal change throughout the entire time frame (see Table 2). Roughly one-third of the Lithuanians surveyed preferred state responsibility for well-being during the entire period, which is approximately half the level of support for socialism found in Russia and Ukraine at the outset of 1995.

Level of education did influence this pattern of stability and change in attitudes, but the strength of effect required to substantiate Finifter's change in the sign of the correlation argument is not apparent. As Table 2 reveals, the same overall trend in changing support for state responsibility was evident in both the better and less well educated segments of the three populations, although the dramatic shift in attitudes that occurs

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less centralized political and economic control, whereas by 1995 the meaning of reform became more multifaceted. The coherence of the four items in the reform index begins to decline after 1991 (the Cronbach's alpha declines from .54 in 1990 to .20 in 1995). Despite these changes, the correlations remain positive, thus reinforcing a gradual-change hypothesis.

[8] The design of our surveys involves examination of three particular republics: Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. The survey sample from each former republic is always selected to represent the adult population of that republic (for Russia only the part west of the Urals which incorporates roughly 75% of Russia's population was included). In our reassessment we used a sample combining data from all three republics into one sample, properly weighted in accordance with the relative populations of the three republics. We used this combined sample for two reasons: the analysis results in conjunction with the combined sample and the separate samples were so similar we decided to use only the combined sample so as to minimize the length of the report. Also, at the time of our 1990 and 1991 studies these three republics were still part of the Soviet Union, so when combined they form a sample, albeit limited, of the USSR. The Finifter and Mickiewicz sample, on the other hand, was drawn so as to represent the USSR rather than individual republics, thus when divided into republics, as in Finifter's Table 3, the respondents don't necessarily represent the populations of each of those republics.

A fuller description of the samples for the 1990, 1991, and 1992 surveys can be obtained from the University of Michigan Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research data archive which is distributing these data sets for secondary analysis. The 1995 sample, only briefly described here due to space limitations, is based on a multi-stages probability design. At the lowest level of selection, household addresses are randomly selected from voter and residence lists, within household selection of the respondent is made using the Kish method employed by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center. No substitutions are allowed. Interviews are face to face. The response rates are 80% for Russia, 83% for Ukraine, and 67% for Lithuania respectively. Detailed sample and questionnaire information can be obtained from the authors. The overall sample sizes for the surveys reported in this article are:

	1990	1991	1992	1995
Russia	600	1400	1300	1320
Ukraine	600	1000	900	1000
Lithuania	600	600	500	500

[9] Remember, Finifter and Mickiewicz also found a positive correlation between their reform index and education in 1989. The discrepant correlations thus include only those involving their locus of responsibility measure, not their measures of reform.

[10] Stability in overall distributions does not necessarily mean individual level stability. See Gibson (1995) for panel data that reveal significant individual level change in dealing with related economic and political issues.

TABLE 2. State or Individual Should Be Responsible for Work and Standard of Living

Who Should Be Responsible?	Education Group	Russia			Ukraine			Lithuania		
		1991	1992	1995	1991	1992	1995	1991	1992	1995
State	all	41.4%	35.5%	61.2	39.8%	38.1%	64.4	35.0%	35.0%	35.5
Pro/con	all	25.7	30.2	16.9	21.6	25.6	18.9	21.8	28.5	23.8
Individual	all	32.9	34.3	21.9	38.6	36.3	16.8	43.2	36.5	40.7
N	—	(1384)	(1243)	(1270)	(953)	(845)	(907)	(574)	(492)	(484)
State[a]	low	47	44	71	50	39	70	38	36	46
State[a]	high	32	26	44	34	27	53	23	25	22

Source: The University of Iowa Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys (PSCS). See note 8 for the sample description.
[a]Education is trichotimized here, those with secondary education or less versus those with at least some higher education are included in the table; those in the middle category (technical training) are excluded for parsimony of presentation.

between 1992 and 1995 is more pronounced among the less well educated. Even in Lithuania, while there is no discernible change among the better educated, a shift of ten percentage points in a socialist direction is evident for those with a secondary education only. This pattern of differential shift in attitudes is not surprising as previous studies have repeatedly demonstrated that better-educated people have more consistent and stable attitudes because their opinions are more firmly anchored in a stronger foundation of information (Converse and Pierce 1986; Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1995). The fact that better-educated individuals have more firmly anchored attitudes is, however, one more reason why a directional change in correlation between education and locus of responsibility is rather implausible.[11]

Finding a consistent correlation between education and support/opposition to socialism (with the better educated showing the least support) for the entire period of 1990–95 does not rule out the possibility of a negative correlation in 1989, but certainly makes it less probable. Given that any science centers around probabilities and the likelihood of relationships occurring under varying circumstances, we agree with Finifter that examining the World Values Study data could shed additional light on the relationship that might be expected to exist in a variety of places between education and locus of responsibility. However, our interpretation of the World Values Study data differs from that reached by Finifter. Our theory was that a positive relationship should hold between education and locus of responsibility (the better educated prefer an individual opportunities society more so than the less well educated). Finifter argues, on the basis of history, that a negative correlation would, in theory, be a more accurate representation of the underlying relationship between education and locus of responsibility. Yet, following Finifter's logic, we agree that data from the World Values Study do not present a direct comparison with the Finifter and Mickiewicz study because they were collected in 1990–91. Nevertheless, we can utilize the data for theory development by asking which of the two alternative theories would more likely be suggested by these data collected from some 40 separate countries.

Finifter's (1996) Table 1 presenting the World Values data contains 54 correlations involving education and locus of responsibility; 3 registering at zero, and 9 negative (only one of which is significant). The table also contains 42 positive correlations (78% of all correlations), 19 of which are significant. This large number of consistently positive correlations is astounding, given the wide array of different languages, multiple translation difficulties, diverse sampling approaches, and the broad variation in the quality of field work that, practically speaking, had to be involved in a study of 40 countries. In short, using the World Values Study to build a theory of the real world relationship between education and locus of responsibility would almost never produce a theory reflecting a negative correlation (only one out of 54 correlations was significantly negative). Rather, the most likely theory based upon the World Values Study is a positive relationship which would be significant about half the time.

In summary, a reexamination of our 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1995 surveys, as well as the World Values data, reveals no support for the Finifter and Mickiewicz argument that better-educated people in the former Soviet Union preferred a socialist system more than the less well educated citizens or that less well educated citizens were more likely to prefer an individual opportunities society.[12]

POLITICAL CHANGE AND LOCUS OF RESPONSIBILITY

A second major discrepancy between the two studies involves the relationship between locus of responsibility and attitudes toward political change. Much of the discussion of this relationship in the earlier articles involves the issue of whether a negative or positive correlation more accurately reflects the association between locus of responsibility preferences and attitudes toward political and economic reform.

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[11] It is interesting to note that a change in the direction of the correlation with locus of responsibility would have had to entail a major shift in attitudes toward socialism. Furthermore, this shift would have had to be systematic and differ for better and less well educated Soviets. The overall population could not simply shift in an antisocialism direction between 1989 and 1991. Rather, the better educated had to become rapidly more negative toward socialism while the less well educated became more positive at the same rate.

[12] One problem with this comparison lies in the fact that the Finifter and Mickiewicz measure was a single forced choice dichotomous item. In a situation where respondents may not be accustomed to or comfortable with voicing their opinions openly to strangers, it may be methodologically inappropriate to use forced choice questions. This is due to the fact that the respondent with less well formulated opinions is not allowed to register an opinion somewhere between the extremes of state versus individual responsibility for well-being as the items in our surveys do.

With regard to citizens' orientations toward these key reform issues, we hypothesized that the higher the level of support for policy changes designed to create a market economy in a relative short period—even at the cost of inflation, unemployment, and resulting social disruption—the more likely that person is to favor an open and competitive political system with democratic institutions. It is important to note that we do not claim that support for economic reform and support for democratic political institutions will be unidimensional, nor have we found this to be the case (Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1995). However, we do expect that these two sets of preferences will be positively correlated. Both economic and political reform can be expected to benefit citizens with certain similar skills, backgrounds, or esteemed positions in society (and to hurt or be of little value to those without those skills, backgrounds, and positions). Those who placed themselves and their families among the ranks of the intelligent, well-connected, persuasive, politically efficacious and/or marketable are, we argue, those most likely to expect advantages from both political and economic reforms. Those who believe themselves to lack marketable job skills and formal education and who are poorly connected are more likely to oppose these reforms on the basis that the present system is more responsive to their personal needs than a system oriented toward individual responsibility and a free market economy.

Following this line of reasoning, it may be true, as Finifter suggests, that "the economic hardships faced by ordinary Soviet citizens might lead many to think that political reform should be accompanied by continuation of state responsibility" (1996, 7). However, our theory leads us to expect that those most supportive of an open and competitive polity will also be more likely to support the risky, but potentially profitable, conversion to capitalism with its greater emphasis on an individual opportunities society.

What political change meant in the 1985–92 period, however, was very different than what political change has meant since 1992. In the earlier period, change focused on the introduction of basic and broad reforms such as providing more individual freedom, reducing state control over information and social communication, eliminating a single-party system, and introducing competitive elections. Since 1992 political change has become more multifaceted and complex. Constitutional reforms have been introduced, new legislative institutions have been created, new elections have been held, and many political parties have appeared; some of which have already disappeared and others, such as the new version of the Communist Party, have reemerged. As a result of all this change it is conceptually meaningless at this point in time to speak of the relationship between "democratic reform" and "market reform" in such global terms. Political and economic change as it is occurring in post-Soviet societies, as well as public reaction to that change, is more complex than is suggested by broad terms like *democratic reform*, *market reform*, or *marketization*.

Given the highly mutable nature of what political change means in the newly independent states, we focus our discussion on an exploration of the most recent period of change rather than revisiting our earlier analysis of attitudes toward reform during the 1990–92 period.[13] Three recent political trends in particular are potentially important for explaining and interpreting the shift in locus of responsibility between 1992 and 1995: rising nationalism, the reemergence of communists, and growing disillusionment with democratic reformers.

Nationalism

With the decline of Marxism-Leninism as the defining ideology of the Soviet system, alternative ideologies and political currents have found room for expression in the former republics. Nationalism is one of the ideologies that is capable of mobilizing people to engage in various forms of political participation. Recent elections demonstrate the appeal associated with a promulgation of nationalist symbols. For example, in the Russian presidential elections of mid-1991, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a rabid nationalist at the head of the Liberal Democratic Party, drew nearly 8% of the vote—third highest in the election. In the Russian parliamentary elections of late 1993, Zhirinovsky's party won a large number of seats in the State Duma on the basis of proportional representation on party lists. Similar nationalistic movements occurred in Ukraine and Lithuania during this period as well.

Empirically, nationalism has been operationalized in terms of two dimensions: exclusionary and aggressive nationalism (McIntosh, MacIver and Abele 1993; Furtado 1994; D'Anieri and Malanchuk 1995). Exclusive nationalism is aimed at keeping the nation homogeneous and excluding members of different racial or ethnic groups. Key attributes include having an official language, restricting franchisement, deporting outsiders, and perceiving that the country's nationals living abroad are discriminated against. Aggressive nationalism involves beliefs in national superiority, isolation from outside influence, and controlling the nation's destiny through force and possible domination of other countries. These two dimensions are related, yet separate as shown by correlations of .10, .21 and .32 in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, respectively, in 1995.

The three countries vary in their relative ranking on each of the two dimensions. Russians displayed the highest level of aggressive nationalism (mean of 21.5 on a six-item index, see appendix for definitions), while Lithuanians ranked lowest on this dimension (a mean of 17.9 as compared with 19.6 for Ukraine). Lithuanians, however, exhibited the highest level of exclusive nationalism (a mean of 10.4 on a five-item index; see the appendix for the items), with Russians next (9.1) and Ukrainians showing the least exclusivity (7.7). These nationalist sentiments are correlated with preferences for greater state responsibility for economic well-being, as well as relatively less positive attitudes toward the West and Western ideas. Contrary to what is often conveyed by the popular press, post-Soviet citizens are relatively accepting of the West. For example, in 1995 only 8–9% of Ukrainians and Lithuanians and roughly 15% of Russians rated the United States and Germany negatively. Nevertheless, this was an increase in negativity when compared with 1992 (about 5% for Ukraine and Lithuania and 9 percent for Russia), which helps to confirm a rise in nationalism and potentially helps to explain the 1992–95 shift toward increased demand for state responsibility of well-being.

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[13] For more on reform, the reader should refer to the correlations between reform and locus of responsibility in Table 1, all of which are positive. When these correlations are recomputed for the four categories of education by urban/rural location used in Finifter's Table 4, most of these correlations are positive and significant. Of the 36 correlations (three countries times three years times four education by urban/rural categories) 32 are significant and positive, and two are insignificant and positive. Only two negative correlations are obtained, only one of which is statistically significant. In short, a reanalysis of our earlier data and the 1995 data reveal positive correlations between a pro-reform orientation and support for individual responsibility for well-being. Reform, however, is a separate dimension, different from, but related to, nationalism, attitudes toward communists, or democratic principles.

Reemergence of Communists

The failure of the August 1991 coup in Moscow quickly led to the end of the overarching dominance of the Soviet state by the Communist Party. In some of the Soviet successor states, the Communist Party quickly lost all significant public support as did the terms *communist* and *communism*, forcing former reform communists to establish social democratic parties for survival. In other states, the political machines that had been constructed within republic Party organizations survived the downfall of the Soviet Union and continued to control most state bodies under the guise of a new name.

Although support for the Communist Party remained substantial, it was disbanded in Russia by order of President Yeltsin. However, following a November 1992 ruling by the Russian Constitutional Court declaring that Yeltsin could not ban local communist parties, more than a dozen communist parties began to organize. The largest of these new parties is the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). Headed by Gennadii Ziuganov, this party brought together a number of former local party organizations and it began to pursue far-reaching goals. The CPRF made substantial progress toward one of their goals—winning power through electoral means on a platform of strong Russian state power and an active governmental role in the economy—in the December 1993 parliamentary elections by winning 15% of the seats. The popularity of the CPRF may be due to its ability to adapt to the reform environment without straying too radically from original Communist beliefs. Even though the CPRF promotes state supervision of the economy, they do not advocate a Leninist revolutionary policy nor a return to full central planning of the economy. In this sense, the CPRF is quite similar to the emerging social democratic parties such as the party that governs Lithuania, but is also quite different in that a strong sense of Russian nationalism forms a prominent part of its foundation.

By the time of our 1995 surveys, the "reformed image" of the new communist parties may be what accounts for the public's more positive attitude toward "communists" in general. As the upper part of Table 3 reveals, the perception that communists have "too much influence" in society and politics shifted significantly between 1992 and 1995. Russians in particular were much less likely to view communists negatively in 1995, a trend that held across education levels (see Table 3). Ukrainians also expressed a more favorable view of communists in 1995, whereas the trend was in the opposite direction for Lithuanians, despite the presence of a reformed communist party governing Lithuania.

These cross-cultural differences in evaluations of communists may reflect an emerging nostalgia for the communists of old. Only a small minority of Lithuanians (11%) think of themselves as "Soviets in 1995" whereas a clear majority of Ukrainians (although only one-quarter of the better educated) still label themselves as Soviets (see Table 3). This self-identification with Soviets is strongly correlated with other indicators of communist evaluations in all three countries, including assessments of the various reformed communist parties. In addition, those who are relatively more positive toward communists are also more favorable toward state responsibility for social well-being. Again, this correlation, coupled with the apparent trend in reemerging support for communists, could help explain the change in locus of responsibility.

Disillusionment with Democratization

While support for communists rose between 1992 and 1995 in Russia and Ukraine, the opposite trend appears to be more prevalent for attitudes toward democratic reformers and democratization. A sizable proportion of Russians and Ukrainians in 1995 felt that democratic reformers have "too much influence" in society and politics (see Table 3). Also, 42%, 38%, and 25% of Russians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians, respectively, said they had "nothing" in common with democratic reformers.

Given that the difficult economic circumstances associated with shifting to a market economy have become identified as directly resulting from the policies of democratic reformers, it is not surprising to find growing disillusionment with the movement toward democratization. An even more fundamental concern, however, arises from the finding that this disillusionment is not simply directed at current democratic leaders, but also appears to have eroded support for democratic principles (see the bottom of Table 3). Between 1992 and 1995 support for democratic values such as a competitive party system, popular participation in politics, the right to organize opposition to government policies, and the protection of minority rights receded in all three of these newly independent states. Despite this decline in enthusiasm for democratic values, a clear majority of these post-Soviet citizens remain committed to democracy. Dichotomizing the index of democratic values at the

TABLE 3. Change in Political and Economic Attitudes

	Russia		Ukraine		Lithuania	
Citizen Attitudes	1992	1995	1992	1995	1992	1995
Communist Influence (% too much)[a]						
Total	46.8	15.8	40.0	30.6	49.6	61.0
Low Education	40.4	13.1	37.3	31.8	49.7	60.3
High Education	50.0	20.8	48.4	35.0	48.5	64.6
Identify Self as Soviet[b]						
Total	—	66.8	—	56.5	—	11.4
Low Education	—	64.8	—	65.4	—	13.4
High Education	—	68.0	—	28.3	—	17.2
Democratic Reformers Influence (% too much)[c]						
Total	—	42.2	—	29.6	—	10.9
Low Education	—	43.9	—	33.0	—	6.2
High Education	—	37.2	—	22.2	—	14.7
Democratic Values[d]						
Total	13.7	12.0	13.7	11.9	13.9	12.7
Low Education	13.3	11.8	13.6	11.8	13.8	12.4
High Education	14.3	12.7	14.7	12.5	14.1	13.1
Personal Financial Retrospective (% worse)[e]						
Total	60.6	56.1	63.5	66.3	44.5	55.8
Low Education	61.5	58.0	67.5	65.7	46.9	66.5
High Education	58.8	49.1	54.1	62.5	41.7	43.5
Private Enterprises (% negative)[f]						
Total	46.0	35.7	47.0	33.0	28.0	16.5
Low Education	53.0	45.2	50.6	37.8	33.9	17.4
High Education	35.5	19.1	32.7	28.7	13.0	12.5
Social Justice Attitudes: Support Income Regulation[g]						
Total	34.2	53.4	33.1	47.7	52.7	56.1
Low Education	42.4	59.2	35.0	54.6	58.3	69.4
High Education	25.8	39.7	24.8	35.3	29.7	42.1
Fear of Increased Economic Inequality[h]						
Total	35.9	64.0	38.7	48.7	23.2	41.5
Low Education	37.8	70.4	40.0	51.1	20.8	45.6
High Education	34.1	52.5	33.0	44.4	24.7	39.7

Source: The University of Iowa Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys (PSCS). See note 8 for the sample description.

[a] Do Communists have too much, too little, or the right amount of influence in politics?

[b] To what extent would you say you think of yourself as a Soviet?

[c] Do Democratic Reformers have too much, too little, or the right amount of influence in politics?

[d] See Appendix for definition of this index. Higher index values are pro-democratic.

[e] What is the current financial situation of you and your family compared to one year ago?

[f] How favorable are your feelings towards private enterprise?

[g] Should income be regulated so no one earns more than others?

[h] Is there a danger of growing economic inequality among citizens?

midpoint of the scale reveals that in 1992 roughly seven out of every ten survey respondents registered pro-democratic sentiments (that is, above the midpoint of the index). Three years later, 61% of Russians, 59% of Ukrainians, and 67% of Lithuanian respondents were pro-democratic. Hence, it seems likely that post-Soviet citizens are not ready to given up their newly acquired political freedoms and return to a more authoritarian political system. Nonetheless, those who support democratic principles more strongly are also relatively more favorable toward an individual opportunities society, thus the decline in support for democracy provides a potential explanation for the recent change in locus of responsibility.

Economic Change and Locus of Responsibility

Personal Finances. Our earlier reassessment argued that locus of responsibility preferences should be a function of economic as well as political factors. Indeed, we found that the personal financial situation experienced by the survey respondent was one of the strongest predictors for locus of responsibility attitudes. Those respondents who had suffered a deterioration in their financial situation during the past year were much more likely to support a society in which the state was responsible for well-being. We expect that this relationship should also hold true for the more recent survey period, as the hardships connected with a transition to a market economy take their toll on the quality of everyday life. Such is indeed the case when the bivariate relationship between personal financial conditions and locus of responsibility is examined for Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania in 1995. However, the trend in economic outlook does not correspond to shifts in locus of responsibility. As Table 3 reveals, economic outlook actually improved slightly between 1992 and 1995 for Russians (especially among the better educated), remained relatively stable for Ukrainians (although it deteriorated among the better educated), and became more negative for Lithuanians (particularly for the less well educated). In short, change in personal economic conditions cannot explain change in locus of responsibility for Russia or Ukraine but may do so for Lithuania.

Privatization. Just as with political change, we believe that the meaning of economic reform shifted between the end of the 1980s and the past few years. At the end of the 1980s the possibilities for individual entrepreneurship were still only possibilities for the future (Slider, Magun, and Gimpelson 1991). Between 1992 and 1995 privatization and entrepreneurship mushroomed (although in some cases this involved "nomenkaltura privatization" whereby former plant managers under the Soviet regime expropriated their factory, or turned to black-market entrepreneurship (see Motyl 1993, 142–44). Nevertheless, the survey evidence demonstrates that some decrease in the earlier negative attitudes toward private enterprise occurred between 1992 and 1995 (see the percentage rating private enterprises negatively in Table 3). Given that those who are more positive toward private enterprises also favor an opportunities society, the trend displayed in Table 3 cannot explain the shifts over time in locus of responsibility, but the fact that Lithuanians are more positive toward private enterprise than are respondents from Russia and Ukraine may help explain why Lithuanians in general are more supportive of an opportunities society.

Attitudes toward privatization, however, are broader and more complex than what can be suggested by merely examining evaluations of private enterprise. For example, on the one hand, 58% of Lithuanians prefer that the government owns the heavy industries in the country (the comparable numbers for Russia and Ukraine are 67% and 59%, respectively). On the other hand, only 6% of Lithuanians (but 26% of Russians and Ukrainians) want the government to own "local businesses like shops and restaurants." In addition, Lithuanians have been more willing than Russians or Ukrainians to adopt certain capitalistic business norms such as allowing companies to earn large profits (60% in Lithuania as compared with 50% in Russia and 52% in Ukraine), or fire inefficient workers (46% approve in Lithuania, 32% in Russia and Ukraine). Despite the growing complexity in these various attitudes, the basic correlation tends to hold—those positive toward privatization and capitalistic norms are more supportive of an opportunities society.

Social Justice. The Western press regularly carries a number of articles regarding the economic hardships that have accompanied the move toward a market economy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. High inflation, growing unemployment, periods when factories cannot pay the workers, and increasing poverty are the topics most often reported. Rarely do the media cover the growing inequality between those who are amassing huge fortunes and those who lack the skills to succeed in a capitalistic economy.

In the former communist system, the distribution of rewards was based as much on need as on merit. Despite a meritocratic incentive system, communist ideology gave strong emphasis to egalitarianism, which ensured that incomes were less highly differentiated in the former communist countries as compared to Western capitalist countries (Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener 1995). Furthermore, the differences in wealth that did exist were kept as inconspicuous as possible. In the current period of change, differences in wealth have become very visible, thereby increasing public support for regulations to control income differences (especially among the less well educated; see Table 3). Interestingly, this desire for income regulation had previously been higher in Lithuania than in the other two countries. All three countries (Russia in particular) have also witnessed a sharp increase in the percentage of individuals who view the growing inequality as a serious threat to social stability. These growing concerns about inequality may help explain disillusionment with democratic reformers, as reformers have become associated with the "rich" (or what the public perceives as the unjustified accumulation of wealth). When asked how to explain the increasing wealth of some people, roughly 40% of the survey respondents attributed the gain to illegal activities and another 20% said the newly rich were simply the old nomenklatura acquiring state property for themselves. Furthermore, those respondents who perceived the growth in wealth as the result of illegal activities were also most strongly in favor of government responsibility for general well-being, whereas those who attributed the increase in wealth to hard work or creativity (roughly 25%) were relatively more supportive of an opportunities society.

A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF LOCUS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Clearly, a number of political and economic factors are correlated with current preferences regarding the locus of responsibility in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. Moreover, these correlations are all in the direction that supports our hypothesized relationship between locus of responsibility and measures of support for economic and political change, more so than the negative correlation hypothesized by Finifter and Mickiewicz. Namely, support for an opportunities society is relatively higher among those who are more inclusionary in their nationalist orientation, more positive toward democratic reformers and democratic principles, less nostalgic about their Soviet past, less supportive of communists (even reformed communists), and more positive toward privatization and capitalistic norms. Yet, because these plausible explanatory variables are also intercorrelated

TABLE 4. Regression Testing Hypothesized Political and Economic Predictors of Locus of Responsibility for 1995[a]

Independent Variables[b]	Russia b	Russia Beta	Ukraine b	Ukraine Beta	Lithuania b	Lithuania Beta
Political						
Aggressive nationalism	−.01 (.01)	−.01	.09** (.02)	.11	.01 (.02)	.02
Exclusionary nationalism	−.09* (.03)	−.07	−.08* (.03)	−.09	−.09* (.03)	−.09
Oppose communists	.12** (.02)	.17	.00 (.02)	.01	.08* (.02)	.08
Support democrats	.03 (.01)	.04	.00 (.02)	.01	.03 (.03)	.05
Democratic values	.01 (.02)	.01	.03 (.03)	.03	.08* (.02)	.11
Economic						
Personal finances: past	−.15* (.05)	−.08	−.27** (.06)	−.15	−.45** (.10)	−.23
Personal finances: future	−.17* (.06)	−.08	−.03 (.08)	−.01	−.28** (.09)	−.13
Privatization	.08** (.02)	.11	.16** (.03)	.22	.16** (.04)	.19
Social justice	.13** (.03)	.14	.12** (.03)	.16	.02 (.03)	.03
Demographic						
Education (low to high)	.09* (.03)	.08	.05 (.03)	.04	.13* (.04)	.13
Rural/urban	.30* (.11)	.07	.64** (.15)	.12	.49* (.17)	.11
Constant	.90		1.94		10.45	
Adjusted R^2	.21		.17		.19	
(*n*)	(1020)		(907)		(422)	

Source: The University of Iowa Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys (PSCS). See note 8 for the sample description.
[a]The dependent variable is the single locus of responsibility scale with 1 = government, 7 = individual responsibility for well being. The number in parenthesis beneath b is standard error.
[b]See the Appendix for definitions of the independent variables. Age, gender, income, ethnicity, and national economic evaluations were included in the regression but are not presented in the table for reasons of parsimony.
*p < .05; **p < .001.

among themselves, each bivariate relationship may simply be a spurious reflection of some other factor. In order to safeguard against this possibility and to determine the relative power of each hypothesized explanation, we computed a multivariate regression, the results of which are presented in Table 4.

Before proceeding to a discussion of this table, it should be noted again that our analysis is not intended to duplicate either the regression that was presented in our earlier reassessment or the Finifter and Mickiewicz regression.[14] The analysis reported here uses the single locus of responsibility item as the dependent variable, rather than an index (thus the lower *R*-squared), so as to be more compatible with the earlier Finifter and Mickiewicz analysis. We do not, however, attempt to follow what Finifter and Mickiewicz did by way of independent variables, as they had only one nondemographic independent variable—life satisfaction. Our purpose is to explain preferences for a society in which the state rather than the individual is responsible for individual well-being; therefore, theory, rather than previous analysis, should dictate the hypotheses that are examined.

Overall, the results of the regressions demonstrate that both political and economic factors have a significant direct effect on locus of responsibility preferences. Among the political variables, exclusive nationalism is the only variable that is significant for each country. Aggressive nationalism, however, is significant only for Ukraine. The effect here is the reverse of that found for exclusive nationalism—aggressive nationals tend to support individual responsibility but exclusive nationals want more state responsibility for well-being. Apparently, controlling one's own destiny is in part a reflection of a broader self-efficacy which leads to a greater sense of individualism.

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[14] A second analysis employing *exactly* the same independent variables from our earlier reassessment (see Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1994, 409, Table 6) with our 1995 data reveals that political reform continues to be strongly and positively related with locus of responsibility. Between 1992 and 1995, however, the effect of reform on the single locus of responsibility measure dropped for Russia and Ukraine (the beta coefficients are .22, .16, .18, .09 in these two countries for 1992 and 1995, respectively), but remained constant for Lithuania (beta of .13 and .15 in 1992 and 1995, respectively). Support or opposition is not exactly the same as support or opposition to a number of more specific types of political changes or issues currently relevant to these post-Soviet societies. However, reform is more abstract and primarily represents support for rapid (rather than slow) change and does not reflect support for any particular type of change (Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1995).

Among Russians and Lithuanians, opposition to communists continues to be related to support for an individual opportunities society, whereas support for communists promotes support for greater state responsibility. Given that Russians have recently become more positive toward communists while Lithuanians became more negative helps explain the difference in the level of support for state responsibility observed for these two countries. This is especially important because support for communists is the single strongest predictor in the Russian regression. Support for democratic reformers or democratic values, on the other hand, failed to reach significance except for Lithuania. The zero-order correlations between these variables and locus of responsibility ranged from .15 to .21, but this association is primarily indirect, acting through some of the other variables in the equation (although it should be noted that the signs of the coefficients are positive, as we hypothesized). In short, the connection between support for democratic values and support for an opportunities society is very weak at best, but other political attitudes (evaluations of communists and exclusive nationalism) are significant predictors of locus of responsibility.

Among the predictors listed under the economic variables, the strong impact of concern about one's personal financial situation confirms a similar finding from our earlier reassessment. Again, contrary to what is often found in Western nations, evaluations of the national economy had no significant effect on locus of responsibility attitudes. Also, the exceptionally strong impact of personal finances in Lithuania helps explain why there was relatively little change in locus of responsibility between 1992 and 1995 (the increased negative assessment here, which promotes state responsibility, offsets the change in ratings of communists which promote individual responsibility).

Even more telling is the strong effect of attitudes toward privatization and social justice especially for Russia and Ukraine. These variables are far more important than the measure of personal economic situation, because when combined they reflect how post-Soviet citizens respond to fundamental changes in economic and social norms. Shifting control of the means of production and changing public beliefs about what is just and fair in society reflect major challenges to the current and future governments of these societies, as well as potential obstacles to the solidification of democracy in this region of the world.

Finally, the finding that education and rural/urban residence are significant predictors (except for education in Ukraine) is very important, as the results show independent effects for both these variables even with the other attitudinal measures in the equations. Thus less well educated and rural citizens are relatively more supportive of a society where the state guarantees well-being. This finding speaks directly to the crux of our disagreement with Finifter. But more importantly, it also suggests that locus of responsibility orientation is at least partly a function of differences in the socialization experiences of better and less well educated or urban and rural individuals. If that is indeed the case, the relationship between these variables should change more slowly as predicted by the modernization theory and as we originally stated.

CONCLUSION

We believe the foregoing results highlight how much explanatory power can be gained by attending to identifiable aspects of individuals' place in society, either concrete or perceived. Citizens of post-Soviet states, like people in any society, form their opinions and choose their behaviors based in large part on what they see as the threats and opportunities facing them and what realistic potential they have for succeeding in different courses of action. Each post-Soviet society is complex—the place of individuals in each society varies widely. Even so, the relationship between personal situation and public opinion in post-Soviet societies is neither random nor sui generis. Theoretical propositions found to be useful elsewhere for linking personal situation to political and economic attitudes can also help make sense of the diversity within post-Soviet societies. An individual's level of education, place of residence, and perception of personal financial situation tend to constrain that individual's outlook toward key political and economic issues. Given our interest in the transition to what we call an "opportunities society," we theorized that the better-educated, urban, and better-off segments of society would show greater support for policies supportive of an opportunities society. Our data consistently and strongly support these expectations. These findings do not preclude the possibility that at the end of the 1980s there were some specific Soviet republics where the elite may have favored socialism more so than did the lower classed citizens. For example, this may have been the case in the less well developed, Asian parts of the Soviet Union where the elite segments of the population may have personally benefited more from socialism than did the working class. However, lacking any Asian republics, our data do not provide a direct test of this hypothesis.

The evidence does demonstrate, however, that political and economic views among post-Soviet citizens are consistently, but not strongly, related. Those expressing stronger preferences for democratic principles and relatively more positive assessments of democratic reformers are also relatively more supportive of capitalistic norms and an opportunities society. The fact that a stronger relationship is not present is perhaps better for the future consolidation of democracy. Setting aside questions of causality, democracy could have suffered a major setback in these countries during recent years if this correlation were stronger. After all, the 1992 and 1995 comparisons reveal a substantial deterioration in support for an opportunities society while support for democratic principles remains relatively high.

While support for a state guarantees versus an opportunities society was more strongly related to economic than political factors, the impact of economics was not simply a matter of pocketbook concerns. More ideological and normatively based attitudes regarding state ownership of property, and equality in the distribution of wealth and power across social categories, were also very important predictors of locus of responsibility preferences, even after controlling for personal economic conditions and material self-interest.

Beyond these conclusions we would hope that this exchange has increased the saliency of various broader issues that are relevant to the comparative study of politics. Finifter has clearly called attention to concerns regarding what constitutes comparability in empirical studies across cultures or across time. To what extent must the study design, the samples, and the measurement instruments be exactly the same for any comparison of cross-cultural findings to be valid? These important and relevant questions must be adequately addressed by every comparative research project if the study of comparative politics is to advance as a field. Furthermore, we have pointed out the potential power of comparative studies for theory building. Testing hypotheses across cultures and across time may not provide the definitive answer to every specific research question, but it should help in developing more generalizable and dynamic theories of social and political relations.

APPENDIX

The questions used in the analysis are grouped below by index. Each index was computed as a simple additive measure after assuring that all items were coded in the same substantive direction.

AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM

Q56	How favorable or unfavorable are your feelings toward the army? (1 = Very Negative, 7 = Very Positive)
Q117	Our society is made up of many different kinds of people. I would like to find out how much you have in common (share their ideas, interests, their outlook on different events) with Russian Nationalists. (1 = Great Deal, 4 = Nothing)
Q133	Please tell me if Russian Nationalists have too much, too little or the right amount of influence on society and politics. (1 = Too Much, 3 = Right Amount)
Q138	Some people say that spending money on Russia's army should be significantly cut back. Others believe that defense spending needs to be greatly increased. (1 = Spending Sharply Decreased, 7 = Spending Sharply Increased)
Q147	Russia has always given other countries more than it got in return. (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)
Q150	The Russian government should use force, if necessary, to preserve the unity and integrity of the Russian state. (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)

EXCLUSIONARY NATIONALISM

Q91	Some people say that Ukrainians and Russians have a completely different history, culture and language. And yet others argue that Ukrainians and Russians have the same basic history, culture and language. (1 = Completely Different, 2 = Something in Common but Not Much, 3 = Basically the Same)
Q92	Do you think that only those who speak Russian should have the right to work in official (state) establishments of the Russian Federation? (1 = Yes, 2 = No)
Q98	Do you think that refugees from other countries who are now living in Russia should go home or is it all right with you if they stay indefinitely? (1 = Should Go Home, 2 = Can Stay Indefinitely)
Q101	Who should have the right to vote? (1 = Only People of Russian Nationality, 2 = Only People Born in Russia, 3 = Only People Who Lived in Russia at the Time the Soviet Union Fell in 1991, 4 = Anyone Currently Residing in Russia)
Q102	How often are Russian people living in Non-Russian republics of the former USSR discriminated against? (1 = Very Often, 2 = Sometimes, 3 = Rarely, 4 = Never)

OPPOSE COMMUNISTS

Q54	How favorable or unfavorable are your feelings toward the Communist Party of the Russian Federation? (1 = Very Negative, 7 = Very Positive)
Q114	How much do you have in common (share their ideas, interests, their outlook on different events) with Communists? (1 = Great Deal, 4 = Nothing)
Q130	Please tell me if Communists have too much, too little or the right amount of influence on society and politics. (1 = Too Much, 3 = Right Amount)
Q135	To what extent would you say you think of yourself as a Soviet? (1 = A Great Deal, 2 = Somewhat, 3 = Very Little, 4 = Not At All)

SUPPORT DEMOCRATS

Q63	How favorable or unfavorable are your feelings for democratic reformers? (1 = Very Negative, 7 = Very Positive)
Q85	Is democratization dangerous for our society? (1 = No Danger, 7 = Highest Danger)
Q116	How much do you have in common (share their ideas, interests, their outlook on different events) with democratic reformers? (1 = A Great Deal, 4 = Nothing)
Q132	Please tell me if democratic reformers have too much, too little or the right amount of influence on society and politics. (1 = Too Much, 3 = Right Amount)

DEMOCRATIC VALUES

Q157	Compromise with one's political opponents is dangerous, since it usually leads to changing one's own position. (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)
Q46	Participation of the people is not necessary if decision-making is left in the hands of a few trusted, competent leaders. (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)
Q50	Any individual or organization has the right to organize opposition or resistance to any governmental initiative. (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)
Q51	Competition among many political parties will make the political system stronger. (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)
Q52	The government has the responsibility to see that the rights of all minorities are protected. (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)

PERSONAL FINANCES: PAST

Q5	Would you say that you and your family (living here) are much better off, somewhat better off, about the same, somewhat worse off or much worse off economically compared to one year ago? (1 = Much Better Off, 2 = Somewhat Better Off, 3 = About the Same, 4 = Somewhat Worse Off, 5 = Much Worse Off)

PERSONAL FINANCES: FUTURE

Q7	Do you think that a year from now you and your family will be much better off economically, somewhat better off, about the same, somewhat worse off or much worse off? (1 = Much Better Off, 2 = Somewhat Better Off, 3 = About the Same, 4 = Somewhat Worse Off, 5 = Much Worse Off)

PRIVATIZATION

Q13	Please tell me whether in your opinion, the government, the employees or private individuals should own former kolkoz & sovkhoz property (farms and farmland)? (1 = Government, 2 = Employees, 3 = Private Individuals)

Q14 Please tell me whether in your opinion, the government, the employees or private individuals should own large industry. (1 = Government, 2 = Employees, 3 = Private Individuals)

Q15 Please tell me whether in your opinion, the government, the employees or private individuals should own local businesses like restaurants. (1 = Government, 2 = Employees, 3 = Private Individuals)

Q62 How favorable or unfavorable are your feelings for private enterprises? (1 = Very Negative, 7 = Very Positive)

SOCIAL JUSTICE

Q45 There should be a mechanism regulating income such that no one earns very much more than others. (1 = Fully Agree, 5 = Fully Disagree)

Q81 Is the growth of economic inequality among citizens dangerous for society, that is, does it lead toward destabilization in our country? (1 = No Danger, 7 = Highest Danger)

Q126 Please tell me if businessmen have too much, too little or the right amount of influence on society and politics. (1 = Too Much, 2 = Too Little, 3 = Right Amount)

Q131 Please tell me if rich people have too much, too little or the right amount of influence on society and politics. (1 = Too Much, 2 = Too Little, 3 = Right Amount)

Q163 Do you think rich people receive too much, the right amount, or too little government support? (1 = Too Little, 2 = About the Right Amount, 3 = Too Little)

Q168 Do you think businessmen receive too much, the right amount, or too little government support? (1 = Too Little, 2 = About the Right Amount, 3 = Too Little)

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BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory

Group Psychology and Political Theory. By C. Fred Alford. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. 248p. $25.00 cloth.

James M. Glass, *University of Maryland*

Group Psychology and Political Theory is extraordinary for its linking of group psychology to arguments in both traditional and contemporary political theory. C. Fred Alford reminds us of what political theory often misses: Groups and leadership are essential to an analysis and study of political theory, in particular social contract theory.

Alford's analysis derives from his work with small groups within the group relation conferences of the A.K. Rice Institute. These conferences evolve around small group events or experiences, each group composed of no more than fifteen persons; the event usually occurs over a weekend, with anywhere from 50 to 150 participants. Individuals from a variety of backgrounds meeting for the first time, are randomly placed in small groups. An A.K. Rice consultant (a person trained in Rice or Tavistock method) silently sits with the group. Toward the end of the weekend, interpretations are offered and experiences analyzed. The understanding of group dynamics (based on theories coming out of London's Tavistock clinic, largely influenced by the work of Melanie Klein and Elliot Jacques) arising from these events constitutes the foundation of Alford's approach to the psychological operation of groups and how groups perceive, choose, and depose "leaders." Or as Alford puts it: The Tavistock group is a literal doing of political theory.

For Alford, leadership is an essential aspect of political theory and analysis. It has not been a subject dealt with sufficiently or adequately by political theorists who generally ignore, he argues, the concept of leadership and the relation between leaders and followers. Alford, however, calls for a much closer and sympathetic look not only at leadership but at the group foundations of political life. The group, in his view, precedes the individual; and it makes no sense to speak of social or political experience unless it is understood in the context of groups. The greatest efforts in establishing individuality lie in the often tragic process of freeing oneself from group domination and control; his political argument here clearly comes down on the side of liberal individualism and against the constraining, often authoritarian, demands of "community."

We literally, Alford argues, are at war with our own "groupishness"; and this is what gets us into personal and political trouble. He calls this process the "schizoid compromise . . . the fundamental psychological event in the groups . . . the member tries to have his cake and eat it too: to give himself over to the group, while being separate and independent of it" (p. 52). But the compromise not only fails, it may lead to emotional and psychological disaster. Either the group may seek to destroy or smother the individual, or the individual may project into the group split off or uncontainable parts of the self, for example, rage, envy, and fear. These nasty parts of who we are then become part of what the group *is*. The objective of healthy individual and group development is to reclaim these "lost and alienated" parts of the self, to own literally our ugliness and *not* deny what we cannot accept in ourselves. All too often individuals in groups project these disowned self-images, many of which are unconscious, into an Other accorded the status of scapegoat. Individuality, tolerance, and reciprocity—values central to Alford's analysis—are terribly difficult to maintain in groups. The pressure for conformity and right thinking is too great, since groups give out their own textual messages and make extraordinary demands on individuals' allegiance and participation in the group's driving affective dispositions.

Groups are constantly involved in a struggle with real and imagined enemies. So much goes on in groups that to argue that individuals suddenly arise out of a "state of nature" or to posit state-of-nature theory without concern being given to the identity functions of group dynamics is a serious misreading, psychologically, of how self and politics are constituted. "The group is the real enemy of the individual" (p. 75). While theorists like Samuel Puffendorf, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean Jacques Rousseau should be read as if they were group theorists, Alford argues, their theories suggest a contradictory thematic that moves to convince or "persuade man (and perhaps the author himself) that he is not the group animal that he is" (p. 77). While state-of-nature theorists speak of individuals in the "state of nature," for Alford what is actually being described are the conditions of the regressed group, analogous to what occurs in the Tavistock setting when seemingly rational individuals regress to primitive emotional states and appeals. Individuality and reciprocity—the signs of a liberal democratic politics—emerge from unstructured group dynamics. But psychological and political development is accompanied by considerable conflict. This process is filled with danger for the individual: The self may be assaulted by a number of regressive forces. It is, therefore, the pivotal contribution of social contract theory to give "an account of group psychology: of man as a group animal at war with his own groupishness." What, however, is lacking is a *psychological* understanding of what these theories signify for the individual self.

The neglect of groups and theories of leadership constitutes Alford's critique of contemporary political theory. Benjamin Barber, William Connolly, Carole Porterman, John Rawls, Michael Sandel, Judith Skhlar, and Iris Marion Young all receive critical attention in Alford's analysis. For these theorists, leadership is treated as if it were a matter of small importance, "apparently the need for leadership and the desire to be led are experienced as degrading, shameful and humiliating, a reminder of how much even adults, depend on others" (p. 152). In ignoring the empirical dimension of how groups work—the focus of the Tavistock groups—political theorists sidestep a very real fact in the daily life of individuals: their associations and political choices. Alford's reading of Alexis de Toqueville on association and the place of association in the formation of identity, in this respect, is compelling.

Alford asks important questions not addressed enough in political science and political theory: Why the refusal of contemporary political theorists to acknowledge this profound psychological dimension of politics and group life? Why the flight from an understanding of politics as a dialectic between self and group involving unconscious, emotional dynamics? Why is the self only approached as being constituted by language and texts, rather than by feelings, experience, actions, and conflict? And by implication, Alford asks: Why do political theorists shy away from the knowledge-producing potential of psychodynamic operations that require an empirical and/or clinical focus? Is political theory mystifying, or better rationalizing, what happens inside the self, the messiness and dialectics of need and desire? Why is so little attention given to how "reason" can be affected not only by individual passions but by the collective demands, rages, and projective processes of the group? To reduce the affective component of the self to cognitive interests, textual analysis, or legal and rational theory minimizes the importance of group psychology on power exchanges central to political life.

Alford is not saying the Tavistock group is a model for political groups; rather, the emotional experience analyzed in these conferences may be thought of as a laboratory, as it were, for demystifying desire, fantasy, and need, their group foundations, in addition to figuring out how individual passions like envy, jealousy, rage, and despair work in group environments.

Moving out of the state of nature, which Alford sees as a regressed group, means developing reciprocal relationships with others and, above all, demonstrating a willingness to understand how negative passions drive self-identification. This is what Alford means by "reclaiming" lost parts of the self; reclaiming diminishes the affective pull of the regressed group; it means the individual takes responsibility for his or her internal conflict, rage, and despair; and politically it means the self *refuses* to project or inject into others or other groups negative stereotypes that might lead to scapegoating, exclusion, and destruction.

Alford recognizes inherent problems in his analysis, particularly the movement from the Tavistock group to civil society and the constituted, artificial quality of the Tavistock laboratory. But the laboratory is designed to provide a raw glimpse into group process and, in so doing, to reveal knowledge about the politics of authority, leadership, power, reciprocity, individualism, and community—and tensions inherent in the acting out of these concepts. Political theory can learn a great deal from this empirical reality and the psychoanalytic theories organizing interpretation of group process.

One caveat: In his appeal for looking at the importance of creative leadership, Alford may overestimate the power of the good, nurturing leader. I am reminded here of Wilfred Bion's observation that groups often choose their sickest (in a psycho-clinical sense) member as leader. If our current political landscape is any indication, leadership often appeals to the regressed group—leadership that embodies strident, atavistic sentiment, stirring up hatred and then enacting collective rage through action. It is a fact that leadership in the twentieth century has all too frequently demonstrated destructive, pathological, and annihilating properties.

Tavistock groups are essential empirical ingredients in thinking about leadership; but these groups have an out, a way to say no, to step back. In a few days, members return home. In the political environment, however, leaders do not offer to excuse groups from tough demands placed on them. In these public conditions, political space defines itself through ideological certainty, the belief that the group has the corner on the future. The leader mobilizes and draws from a variety of social groups; the members do not go home and take leave of their prejudice, hate, and bias; and individuals, for a variety of reasons, may find themselves drawn to exclusionary symbologies linked by a common ideological preference or disposition.

Alford's study is commendable, a major contribution to the theory and analysis of groups. But in relying primarily on Freud and downplaying the more pessimistic and grim determinism of Wilfred Bion's group psychology, Alford may in fact be mystifying the *place* of leadership and holding out for it what the twentieth century cannot deliver, for the most part, without wide-ranging destruction. Vaclev Havel, one of Alford's examples of a positive, creative leader, may be an exception, a notable one; more often than not, however, in modern Eastern Europe, one witnesses ethnic exclusiveness, the invocation of anti-semitism as a rallying cry, and appeals to hate motivating national politics. In these instances, leadership transforms into a celebration of death, exclusion, and a felt collective need to sacrifice the despised and denigrated other.

Even, however, with this caveat, a minor disagreement over the potential of political leadership, Alford's book creates new perspectives, establishes novel ground for a fascinating reinterpretation of social contract theory and the place of group psychology in examining central figures in the history of political thought.

After Marxism. By Ronald Aronson. New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1995. 321p. $40.00 cloth, $18.95, paper.

Brian Fay, *Wesleyan University*

By Marxism, Aronson does not just mean a theory or a set of analytical tools but a "project of revolutionary social transformation" (p. 51). A *project* is a practical endeavor by certain historical agents to alter radically a social order. In this sense, Marxism is not purely intellectual but is a visionary guide for action. Aronson's major claim is that "nowhere in the world today does Marxism remain a significant historical project. This is the exact sense in which Marxism is over: as a project" (p. 55).

For Aronson, Marxism has always been an inspiring vision of the meaning of human history, an empowering moral and political guide which answers the deepest questions and which informs political activity. In other words, it is not an academic enterprise but a profoundly personal and political one, not unlike a religion. Losing Marxism was for Aronson losing the central organizing principle of his life; this explains why his book "had its beginning during a period of mourning" (p. vii), why the book has such an urgent, committed tone, and why Aronson quite rightly details his own personal involvement with Marxism along with more objective analyses. The guiding idea of his life is suddenly over, and yet the situation to which it responded—the deep injustices in the world and the urge to rectify them—remain. This book is Aronson's attempt to come to terms with this situation for himself and others. Such an attempt is laudable and necessary, and Aronson pursues it with honesty, lucidity, and intelligence. The result is a pleasure to read, although not wholly satisfactory.

The book is divided into two parts. Part One ("Farewell to Marxism") justifies Aronson's contention that Marxism is indeed truly over, and not just experiencing a temporary hiatus. Part Two ("On Our Own") attempts to outline new ways of conceiving radical thought and action after Marxism's demise. Aronson remains committed to radical social change, but chastened, he adopts a more mature, realistic, and ultimately more sustainable sense of radical politics.

Part One provides an insightful, persuasive analysis of why Marxism as a project is indeed over, and why it ended when it did. Aronson takes account of Marxism's strengths and contributions even as he reveals the deep structural problems plaguing it. Indeed, he recognizes the important reconstructive work of Marxists like Ralph Miliband, Elliot Sober, and Erik Olin Wright, but he shows how their work weakens Marxism by "substituting ideas, analyses, perhaps memories, for Marxism as a viable historical project" (p. 67).

Particularly illuminating is the way he shows how socialist feminism anticipated its own supersession.

Part Two begins with an account of what is abandoned when Marxism is forsworn. Aronson claims that not only Marxism itself but its type of project must end (p. 166). As he puts it, "we do not need a new Marx" (p. 167). This means that we must give up searching for a universal theory that will unlock the secret of history, that will speak for all people, and that will assure us that history is on our side. Instead, "no single, decisive, and fundamental structural transformation is needed, but rather dozens of changes at dozens of sites on dozens of levels" (p. 167). The new radical project must work without historical certainty, must be about identity as much as power and economic structures, and must be open to coalition building among various groups.

It seems inevitable that Aronson is better on why Marxism failed than on where we go from here. Even given this, I found Part Two somewhat disappointing. This is unfortunate because radicals will focus on this part to get their bearings. In the first place, the remarks in Part Two are largely negative, detailing what radicalism cannot be in a post-Marxist era but not discussing its positive content. Similarly, it criticizes attempts by Foucault, Cohen and Arato, Dionne, and others to define the left, but does not offer a positive alternative. Even the positive characterizations are either largely second order (radicalism must be open; it must possess a sense of its own limits) or are largely programmatic. Discussions of actual political movements remain sketchy. Of course, Aronson supports gay rights, feminism, ecology, African-American liberation from racism, and so on, but he does not justify this support, nor does he critically examine the ways these movements may conflict.

In the second place, I wonder whether Aronson still is not in the grip of Marxism after all. In the last chapter he calls for a "new kind of hope" (p. 260), one which recognizes that the projects he endorses will take centuries to accomplish, are not guaranteed by history, and will suffer numerous defeats along the way. But Aronson still envisions a social order of full equality, one which requires a "fundamental rupture with the direction in which all of civilization is moving" (p. 281). This is still the sort of utopia that Marx envisioned. But following Aronson's own analysis, should not the death of Marxism about which he speaks so eloquently lead us to abandon this sort of utopianism? Victories for gay rights, effective measures to counter economic injustice, and improvements in our treatment of the environment need not presage a coming utopia. Nor do those engaged in such fights require a belief that they are small steps toward some great social transformation. Shouldn't we keep our eyes on the battles in front of us and let history take care of itself?

The problem with hope rooted in utopianism is how easily it degenerates into Leninism or into despair. Indeed, Aronson chronicles just this movement in the main figures considered in his last chapter, Ernst Bloch and Herbert Marcuse. Bloch was an abject apologist for the Soviet Union, and Marcuse followed *Eros and Civilization* with *One Dimensional Man* (one of the most despairing books ever written by a radical). Aronson still thinks that to act we must hope, and that to hope we must believe that the future is ultimately bright. But the death of Marxism should have made him suspicious of such eschatological thinking, however hedged and restrained it might be.

Theory of Moves. By Steven J. Brams. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 226p. $54.95 cloth, $17.95 paper.

Michael B. Nicholson, *University of Sussex, England*

Steven Brams's book represents an important step in the development of a version of game theory which is applicable to actual problems. Brams develops a "Theory of Moves" (TOM) largely in the context of simple two-person, two-choice ordinal games where the central concept is that of the Nonmyopic Equilibrium (NME). Games are presumed to be played more than once and on each occasion the players, moving in sequence, will make their choices until an equilibrium point is reached. This equilibrium, however, is reached by players who are aware that there can be a set of moves before a final point is reached and that it sometimes can be profitable to move from a point even if there is a temporary drop in payoff when the end result of a sequence of such moves results in a better payoff. Thus the Nash equilibrium is dethroned from the central role it commonly plays in this sort of analysis. A point may be a Nash equilibrium without being a Nonmyopic Equilibrium. Similarly, an NME may be, but need not be, a Nash equilibrium. Further, unlike previous models of this genre, a game starts at a particular point in the game so the analysis consists of showing the moves from this point to the equilibrium. However, there may be several equilibria and which way it goes depends on the starting point in distinction to most theories of this genre. The theory is illustrated at frequent points mainly with cases from political science and international relations with occasional forays into Brams's earlier territory of the Old Testament and the tactical problems of belief in a Supreme Being. The application of the theory is central to Brams's concerns.

Brams's work is refreshing in that the world he describes, though simple, seems to resemble the real world, at least of international relations and politics, more clearly than most other models derived from game theory. The two-person, two-choice restriction, which is largely followed in this book, is less restricting than might be supposed but, more important, is not central for the theory. Brams formulates and formalizes concepts that have clear parallels in the real world. People do in fact think that rivals will respond to their moves and look ahead in anticipation. This is one of the most satisfactory approaches so far devised to formalizing this and the book is important because of it.

My reservations are in the context of believing this to be an important book on substantially the right lines. The analysis is by its nature only applied to games where moves are possible, excluding, for example, the true, single-shot game. The original story of the prisoners' dilemma is such a game. Most of the extremely fruitful analyses of the prisoners' dilemma involve some degree of repeatedness, a feature which is necessarily also shared by the TOM analysis. Some form of iteration is necessary for it to be meaningful. Fortunately, some degree of iteration is involved in most real world interpretations of games, though we have to be careful what we mean by iteration. A game is iterated when, if there is a shift in the strategy chosen, the payoff matrix stays the same. This applies whether the game is a succession of iterations where choice is made each time, or when there is a continuum in time where a shift can be made at any point. However, perfect iteration in the real world is hard to find over significant periods of time. First, the game may be altering just because of time-dependent payoffs; second, the consequences may themselves alter as a result of the sequence of choices made with a possible alteration in the payoffs as evaluated by the actors. This may particularly apply when a player returns to a former strategy, a move which might be perceived in a variety of ways by the rival. Brams uses the first of these as a reason for being rather dismissive (in my view overly dismissive) of supergame analysis. Just as with supergame analysis, TOM requires the temporal stability of the payoff matrices in order for it to be applicable. I would defend both TOM and supergames as being able to surmount this problem in that actors have expectations about the directions in which the matrices will move and can act accordingly. Stability of expectations rather than a strict stability of matrices is what is crucial. In supergame analysis this uncertainty can be incorporated in a discount function. However, Brams is dealing with ordinal preferences alone. As a standard, exponential discount rate preserves the ranking of alternatives, and it is not quite clear what discounting would mean in an ordinal context. I do not see this as a debilitating comment but, unless Brams is working in a stable world (or a perfectly predictable world), which he is far too sophisticated to believe in, then there must be some notion of expectations about how matrices move in time.

The extent to which Brams has managed to develop his theory in an ordinal world is impressive. This has big advantages given Brams's great concern with application. While the information available to an analyst is often sufficient to provide strong presumptive evidence for ordinal preferences, for cardinal preferences this is hardly ever true. However, cardinal preferences would enable a wider set of problems to be tackled, particularly those involving time and time preferences with discounting. More information can lead to more powerful conclusions, which is a sad but true fact of life. Further extensions of TOM, for example into economics where the applications could prove very exciting, might be easier if cardinal preferences are introduced.

One final comment about this excellent book. It is very user friendly. It assumes little mathematics, though it requires careful reading. The examples are clear, the writing clear, and one does not get lost in the diagrams. The glossary at the end shows the author's concern for his readers and their limited memories.

Plato's World: Man's Place in the Cosmos. By Joseph Cropsey. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995. 227p. $29.95.

Christopher Bruell, *Boston College*

In *Plato's World*, Professor Joseph Cropsey presents interpretations of eight Platonic dialogues. Seven are set by Plato at or near the end of Socrates' life and thus "by Plato's explicit indication cohere as a Socratic valedictory" (p. x). In the eighth dialogue Cropsey drops the *Cratylus*, which may well belong to this group substituting an interpretation of the *Protagoras*, which has important links with a number of the other dialogues that he treats. Each chapter presents a single dialogue, arranged according to the order in which the conversation or episode is supposed to have occurred in Socrates' life; yet those chapters are intended to form a unified work, just as the dialogues they treat cohere in some way. This is a work likely to attract a wide and attentive audience, drawn to it not only by the distinguished reputation of its author but also by the appeal which its portrayal of Socrates as "caring philosopher" will have for many people. The reviewer's task is therefore not to praise it nor even to call attention to its finer passages, but rather to indicate what can be learned for the study of Plato from the author's approach as a whole.

The first point to note then is Cropsey's respect for Plato, whose study he takes up in order to learn *from* him, not merely *about* him. From this stance, apparently so elementary, flow large and important consequences: openness to the possibility that Plato was fully aware of flaws in the arguments of his spokesmen that a later scholar might notice (e.g., p. 202), attentiveness to the rhetorical functions that some of those arguments may serve (see especially the chapters on the *Crito* and *Phaedo*), and heightened concern with the question of the deeper coherence of arguments and themes within each dialogue and from one dialogue to another (e.g., p. 22). Cropsey does not defend or explain his respectful stance content apparently to let the results of his study speak for themselves. Cropsey's respect for Plato, inferred from his references to thinkers such as Machiavelli (p. 35) and Nietzsche (p. 176), and to doctrines regarded as modern (e.g., pp. 29, 119, 186)—namely, his view that Plato anticipated the most important insights of modern philosophy while avoiding its mistakes (e.g., pp. 144, 186)—that respectful view presupposes the reader's acceptance of the legitimacy of the philosophic enterprise to begin with.

The second feature of Cropsey's approach has already been touched on: his willingness to structure his work by the "dramatic order" of the dialogues, that is, by the order in which, according to "Plato's explicit indication" the events occurred. By proceeding in this way, Cropsey distinguishes himself from many scholars who attempt to take their bearings by the putative order of the dialogues' composition (ix). In justifying his procedure, Cropsey notes that, while the dramatic order of at least some of the dialogues can be known "beyond a doubt," the effort to establish the order of their composition is likely to "continue to generate uncertain results" (p. ix). Indeed, one might have gone much farther here than Cropsey, who grants that "it would be important to know the order in which Plato wrote his works, so that one might . . . be instructed by the progress of Plato's understanding" (p. ix), was apparently willing to go.

Plato gives not a single indication that his understanding underwent a "progress" during the period he composed the dialogues. Those same dialogues, however, call unambiguous attention to a most important change, a progress, in Socrates' thought: the so-called Socratic turn. Cropsey treats that turn when the dialogue he is discussing compels him to do so (p. 202ff, p. 206ff); but it appears to me that he does not place much weight on it. He surely regards the "safe" answers (to the question of cause) that are its first fruits as "stupid" or "simple," adding "nothing to the understanding" (pp. 220, 208–10). And it may be for this reason that he is able to conceive of Plato's having "achieved" in the dialogues treated in the book what Cropsey calls "his cosmography" (p. 2)—hence the full title of the book, as well as its unifying theme.

So far as I can tell, this "cosmography" has two principal linked teachings (p. 104–5). According to the first, the "whole" has an "impenetrable resistance . . . to being known in its entirety" (p. 34); indeed, even the "boundary" between "the accessible and the incommensurable in the whole . . . must itself necessarily belong among the mysteries" (p. 59). The second concerns "man's solitude in the whole" (pp. 42, 121, 141–43). This means, in particular, our abandonment by the (nonexistent) gods, an abandonment which is presented not merely as a matter of "conviction" (p. 42) but as something which "we know" (p. 89; compare p. 122). But, if the whole remains always to some extent mysterious, how can we know that we are abandoned in it?

Cropsey's emphasis on cosmology, ontology, or metaphysics contrasts to a relative disregard not so much of morality as of Socrates' moral investigations and of one aspect of his interrogations of his fellow citizens. Cropsey suggests that whatever Socrates may have *learned* from those interrogations could hardly have justified his long preoccupation with them (p. 156). Despite the fact, then, that Cropsey is also somewhat impatient with the interrogations insofar as they posed a threat to the beliefs that nourish civic life (p. 224; compare p. 132 as well as p. 25), he ascribes them ultimately to the "caring" for the philosopher, who, as philosopher, "understands more clearly than anyone else the human need for human caring" (pp. 147, 157, 161). Caring is, as it seems to Cropsey, the appropriate response to "the human loneliness in the cosmos, which pervades our being" (p. 121) and thus is, even more than the courage required to confront or accept the necessary limits to our knowledge (pp. 26, 70, 150; compare p. 176), the distinguishing mark of the true philosopher (pp. 110 and 147).

Our Politics, Our Selves? Liberalism, Identity, and Harm. By Peter Digeser. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 271p. $35.00.

Ronald Beiner, *University of Toronto*

Plato's question of the relation between the polis and the psyche has been at the heart of contemporary debates about the wonders or woes of liberalism. Critics of liberalism like Michael Sandel want to put the problem of theories of the self at the centre of political philosophy. Michel Foucault thinks that in order to see why, despite appearances, the liberal order puts us in a disciplinary straitjacket, we have to get back to a meditation, Stoic-style, on "care of the self." Leo Strauss and his followers believe we need an even more robust return to Plato, since adequate reflection on our current political dilemmas requires talk about the "soul" (not the communitarian or Foucaultian "self"). Liberals, by contrast, tend to want to get as far away as possible from this soultalk (or "selftalk"). "Just as Western liberal societies in the past two hundred years have been able to move questions of whether there is one god or twenty off the political agenda, we should also move questions of whether we are petty, docile subjects with the 'souls of tourists' out of discussion of political theory" (p. 228, summarizing the basic thrust of Richard Rorty's liberalism).

Peter Digeser's thesis, if it can be called a thesis, is that Rawlsian liberals like Rorty are mistaken in wanting to banish all soultalk; critics of liberalism are no less mistaken, insofar as they (at least according to Digeser's interpretation) want to authorize the state to find remedies for the misguided ways in which a liberal regime shapes or fails to shape the soul. The liberal state is not *obliged* to constitute or cultivate selfhood, but neither should it go out of its way to ensure that talk about the self is excluded from political discourse. In short, let's split the difference between those who see politics and character as inseparably joined and those who think it possible to keep them at quite some distance from each other. This, it goes without saying, is not a terribly exciting theoretical position, and so 95% of Digeser's intellectual energies go toward poking holes in the arguments of the large cast of philosophers surveyed in his book.

A book that spans the entire range of contemporary theory, addresses the largest question that a political philosopher can ask, and analyzes a ton of arguments with clarity and skill ought to be a great book. Peter Digeser's book on liberalism and its critics does all of these things, and yet somehow he has produced a book that is merely competent, intelligent, and modestly interesting. The problem isn't that he lacks a clear game plan, nor is it that he is unsure about where he stands. The game plan is clear: Digeser devotes the first half of the book to three sets of critics of liberal democracy who offer conflicting accounts of why individuals are harmed by the existing organization of life within a liberal political order. (These are Digeser's terms: He consistently employs a liberal vocabulary of harm to individuals, rather than, say, a vocabulary of desirable social goods.) Trio #1—Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel—blame liberalism for atomizing and fragmenting the self. Trio #2—Leo Strauss, Allan Bloom, Thomas Pangle—accuse liberal modernity of blindness to the natural hierarchy in the soul. Trio #3—Michel Foucault, William Connolly, Judith Butler—see the existing liberal order as a machine for imposing discipline and normalization. It is evident that these three critiques of liberal democracy are incompatible with each other; but rather than pursuing a thorough intellectual dialogue among these perspectives, Digeser deems it sufficient to his purpose to show that each of them lacks knockdown arguments to vindicate its own claims.

Having to his own satisfaction dispatched these three sets of theories, Digeser then turns to the opposite view—liberal neutralism—which seeks to banish altogether from politics talk of soul, selves, or the perfection of character. Again, the strategy is the same: to show that liberal neutralists lack arguments sufficiently powerful to warrant their conclusions. As suggested above, Digeser's own position in these debates is perfectly clear: liberal neutralists are wrong to want a politics purged of "selftalk," but critics of liberalism are wrong to insist that politics *must* address itself to the nature of the self; talk about the self is neither politically obligatory nor politically prohibited. Thesis, antithesis, and (rather drab) synthesis.

What's most striking about this book is the extraordinary contrast between the richness of the topic—what issue in political philosophy can be more substantial than the relation between politics and the soul?—and the narrowness of the questions by which Digeser chooses to address this topic. If Rousseau was right in claiming that "no people would ever be other than the nature of their government made them" (*Confessions,* Book 9), then Digeser's question of obligation versus permission is beside the point. If (as Plato and Rousseau suggest) membership in a political community shapes us, willy-nilly, to be the kinds of citizens we are within the kind of political order we inhabit, then the interesting question for theory is not *whether* this responsibility should be exercised, but how and in what direction.

Regime and Discipline: Democracy and the Development of Political Science. Edited by David Easton, John G. Gunnell, and Michael B. Stein. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995. 293p. $49.50.

James W. Ceaser, *University of Virginia*

Most political scientists today go about the task of practicing political science—conducting research, taking polls, interviewing leaders—without concerning themselves very much with the effect of their discipline on society as a whole. By its title at least, this book promises something different: to explore the connection of the "regime" to the "discipline," in particular the relationship, if one exists, between liberal democracy and political science.

The need for an inquiry of this kind would seem obvious. After all, political science in its broadest empirical aspect is devoted to understanding how different factors or variables work to support or undermine different kinds of political regimes. (The preferred word used to be *system* not *regime*, but since David Easton, who virtually coined the term *political system* for the discipline, is one of the editors of the present volume, everyone now is permitted to speak of regimes.) If political science studies the effects of various laws, institutions, and behavioral patterns on the maintenance and destruction of political regimes, why should it not also consider its own relationship to the same matters? Is the discipline of political science so inconsequential as a human enterprise that it should be exempted from the sort of analysis that political scientists ordinarily apply to all other social or political institutions? Let us hope not.

In their long introductory essay, the editors of this book, David Easton, John G. Gunnell and Michael B. Stein, have done a fine job cataloguing the topics and themes that should be included in any systematic inquiry into the relationship of political science and liberal democracy. As one of their concerns, they list the "impact not of political regimes on political science, but of political science on such regimes themselves" (p. 7). Perhaps because many of the chapters were written before the idea of the book itself had been conceived, the authors in this collection may be excused if they do not always follow their editors' lead and address this subject directly. The authors manage to stay somewhere in the demarcated area, but with twelve chapters and no fewer than fifteen different voices, the book lacks a certain coherence, not to speak of a unified concern or thesis.

The editors divide the work into two parts: "Methodological Studies" and "Substantive Studies." The reader may be surprised to learn that the section on methodology, comprising four chapters and about half the book, contains not a single graph, table, or even number (other than the endnotes). "Methodology" here refers evidently to a philosophical question: What kind of history of the discipline is possible or might somehow prove helpful? The subject of this part of the book is best indicated by the title of Malcolm Vout's essay, "Studying Developments of Discipline: A Philosophy of Method for the History of the Social Sciences." This topic, which is certain to be of keen interest to intellectual historians and some political theorists, may leave most political scientists a bit cold, and some of the issues discussed, in particular the character of "Whig history," will doubtless appear somewhat abstruse.

Important as these themes may be, the first two chapters, a well-known essay by John Dryzek and Stephen Leonard and then a discussion of that essay by John Gunnell, James Farr, and Raymond Seidleman, are actually reprints of articles that appeared in this journal in the last decade, and it would be unfair here to devote any more attention to them. The two new articles, by J. A. W. Gunn and Malcolm Vout, continue and amplify the debate about the history of the discipline, treating it with all the rigor and care that we have come to expect from philosophically minded scholars from Canada and Great Britain.

Part Two brings us to the "Substantive Studies," wherein we do find a few numbers and tables. Since most political scientists are substance men and women, they are likely to find this part of the book more to their interest. In seven chapters we are offered studies of the development of political science within those nations traditionally associated with the discipline, the United States (James Farr) and Western Europe (Michael Stein), as well as nations outside this charmed circle: two states in transition to liberal democracy, Hungary (Attila Agh) and Poland (Jerzy Wiatr); Argentina (Silvia Sigal); the Asian states (Yogesh Atal); and finally Japan (Takashi Inoguchi). The book, in short, offers an international, if not cosmopolitan, perspective on the discipline.

James Farr's fine essay on the history of political science in the United States in the nineteenth century deserves special mention. Farr, almost alone, considers the discipline of political science outside as well as inside the context of its contemporary embodiment in an academic setting. For Farr, it is not necessary to have tenure at a college or university or to be a member of APSA or IPSA in order to practice political science. One simple criterion might be to consider whether the thinkers in question identify themselves self-consciously with political science. Proceeding from this point, Farr correctly identifies the founders of American political science as the American founders; he then goes on to provide a fine discussion of the political science of Francis Lieber, before turning to some of the more familiar late nineteenth century professors inside the discipline, such as J. W. Burgess and Woodrow Wilson.

Michael Stein's chapter focuses on the growth of the academic discipline of political science inside the United States, France, Great Britain, and Germany, applying a comparative method to higher education to help explain how and why the discipline developed inside each nation. The book then moves to the cases of Hungary and Poland. Here we see that there were officially sanctioned Marxist-Leninist disciplines under the communist regimes that occupied the same "space" as political science and that went by different names (occasionally even "political science"), but that were not political science in any sense that we know it. Political science that grew up outside the control of Marxism was viewed very suspiciously and evolved into a kind of opposition discipline. The final three chapters are equally interesting in that all of them allow us to catch a glimpse of political science inside nonliberal democratic regimes.

Through no fault of the individual authors, this book as a whole may be seen as something of a disappointment. If its aim is to study the connection between regime (liberal democracy) and discipline (political science), almost the whole of it is taken up with only one side of that relationship: how the development of liberal democracy has shaped the character of political science. Very little is said, systematically at any rate, about how political science has influenced or might influence the character of liberal democracy. The focus is far more historical than political. As important as it is to understand the historical question of how our discipline has developed, surely it is equally important to ask what, if anything, political science might do for liberal democracy. Is political science the form of knowledge that supplies the best intellectual assistance for the establishment and maintenance of liberal democracy? If so, what kind of political science is it? These are the sorts of questions that certain political scientists, even before we were organized into an association, once posed as the principal "methodological" concerns for the "discipline." To answer them, it was clear political science had to reflect on its own role in a far deeper and more interesting way than we are accustomed to doing today.

Values Education and Technology: The Ideology of Dispossession. Peter C. Emberley. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995. 330p. $75.00.

Elizabeth A. Kelly, *DePaul University*

It is perhaps appropriate that this book appeared in a year marking the fiftieth anniversary of the first and to date last military deployment of nuclear weapons. The five decades since Hiroshima and Nagasaki have seen a succession of astonishing technological triumphs, from jet propulsion to human organ transplantation and the electronics "revolution." For many on the planet, life in the wake of World War II has meant being perpetually dazzled by the pace of technological innovation. Yet this aspect of our human condition has been at best a mixed blessing, often evoking Rousseau's paradox of modernity: What improves humanity may at the same time corrupt us. The moral questions posed by many aspects of technological "progress" are profound; they have, however, yet to receive full attention in political theory.

Coincident with an acceleration of technological change across fifty years of the nuclear age has been an ongoing sense of "crisis" in North American education. In the 1950s and early 1960s, Johnny couldn't read and the schools couldn't produce math and science majors at a pace equal to the Soviets. "Sputnik shock" reverberated in schools and universities in those days, just as battles over the curriculum, metaphorically expressed in terms of "culture wars" or "back to basics" resonate today. *Values Education and Technology* represents both an entry into the contemporary debates and a meditation on aspects of the contemporary crisis of technology. As such, it is an unusually ambitious and at times provocative work.

Emberley takes on several theories of "values education" that were widely in vogue for a decade or so in the 1970s. He is highly critical of the substitution of "values" for classical accounts of ethics and morals; he links the dehumanizing and deracinating impetus of these pedagogical theories to parallel processes inherent in the larger "technological environment." He argues that values, education, and technology "cooperate in eliminating the human subject, whose longings and needs sustained modernity for three centuries with ideas of autonomy, individual responsibility, and personal merit" (p. 193). The subsumption of the traditional curriculum by curricula founded not on classical verities but rather on "contemporary self-interpretation" puts politics and society in a state of "extreme danger brought on by dispossession" (p. 255).

The strongest sections of the book are those that provide detailed analyses of particular models of values education. By turn, the "values analysis" program forwarded by the Association of Values Research (AVER), the "moral development approach" of Lawrence Kohlberg, and the "values clarification" techniques associated with Louis Raths, Sidney Simon, Merril Harmin, and Howard Kirschenbaum are dissected with a keen eye to uncovering not only their metaphysical underpinnings (Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche, respectively) but also the darker "flip sides" of these putatively progressive programs. Emberley scrupulously moves beyond commonplace charges of "relativism" to engage the various proposals on philosophical terrain. Each, in turn, is shown to be founded not on authentic freedom, but on manipulation and dispossession of what makes human beings most themselves.

A theme of restoring "possession," or mutuality founded on belonging to a particular community, runs throughout the book. Emberley promotes an "ethic of possession" inspired by the political thought of Hannah Arendt and Eric Voegelin, whose ideas, taken together, provide models of human comity based on "principles of human order ... conveyed by ethical and moral life" that can be "understood as rhythms in the movement between political and intellectual life" (p. 93). This associative model might appear to offer a means of theorizing political and educational practices, which, if not exactly redolent of communitarianism, remain nonetheless founded in actual human experience. But here the specificity drops out of Emberley's analysis (as it is also absent in Arendt and Voegelin). What principles? Held by whom? If political and intellectual endeavors should dance in tandem to some rhythmic beat, will it invariably take two to tango? In other words, are politics and intellectual activity linked essentially or contingently? On whose plan? Answers to these questions would invigorate, for well or ill, the very concept of "possession" that frames Emberley's call for restoring an authentic moral sense to educational, political, and intellectual endeavors. Yet without any suggestion as to *who* might possess—or be possessed by—*what* (let alone *how*, *where*, or *when*), the "ethic of possession" remains strikingly empty.

This tendency to overabstraction undercuts the potential prescriptive power of Emberley's larger argument and is closely related to his rather one-sided, totalizing view of "technology." An implicit critique of science, particularly the social sciences, is embedded in this work, as wholly negative as the Nietzschean concepts Emberley trenchantly deconstructs in his discussion of "values clarification." Emberley's refusal to admit even the possibility of a positive moment further confuses the issues. Is "technology" really the problem? Or is it perhaps the choices human actors make with regard to how the tools and techniques at hand will be used? Are we inevitably corrupted by modernity, or can we choose to strive for the sublime?

Emberley's elision of the historical boundaries of human choice also contributes to a significant structural weakness in the work. Emberly begins with the premise that "values education is recurringly the most visible and most hotly contested" (p. 3) arena of contemporary curricular debate and reform. This might have been valid in 1980, but today values education is widely regarded by educational theorists and practitioners as an idea whose time has passed. "Values" have been eclipsed by debates over multiculturalism and diversity, along with the "back to basics" movement, the ongoing flaps over school prayers, and the privatization of public education currently favored by conservatives. The primary arena of struggle in many North American cities involves simply keeping schools and colleges *open* in a time of tight money, tax revolts, and retrenchment.

While *Values Education and Technology* carefully (and refreshingly) avoids lapsing into rhetoric, it is not entirely free from hyperbole, which occasionally disrupts the flow of an otherwise judicious argument. It is virtually impossible to conceive of *any* pedagogical theory as representing an "extreme danger" to the liberal democracies of North America. It is also difficult to credit fully Emberley's fears regarding the threats "revolutionaries behind values education" (p. 275) represent with regard to *any* existing programs or institutions. These "revolutionaries" remain largely unnamed, with the salient exception of Henry Giroux, who is repeatedly depicted as advocating "relentless negativity" (p. 45). "Relentless negativity" is taken, out of context, from Giroux's (1983) *Theory and Resistance in Education*. Giroux, a prolific and courageous scholar, has published extensively on critical pedagogy throughout the past decade, yet none of his more recent works (in which he has been highly self-critical of his earlier positions) is referenced in *Values Education and Technology*.

Indeed, few works published since 1985 appear in Emberley's bibliography, despite the vast literature engendered by—and since—Allan Bloom's (1987) *The Closing of the American Mind*. This is especially curious because *Values Education and Technology* stands very much in the tradition of Bloom. One is left wondering how much richer and more relevant a contribution Emberley might make to contemporary scholarship if he focused his lens on the pedagogical, canonical, and curricular debates of the past fifteen years or so, bringing analysis to bear on issues having greater currency in educational theory and practice.

Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics. By Anthony Giddens. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. 276p. $39.50 cloth, $14.95 paper.

Timothy Fuller, *Colorado College*

What is radicalism now if emancipatory Socialism is as dead as Old Conservatism? The Left/Right divide must be rethought and surmounted under dramatically altering conditions. What are these conditions? What do they tell us about our future?

The present age is governed first by a global/cosmopolitan awareness of a vast array of simultaneously enacted ways of living, which pressure each other, making doubtful the adequacy of national, regional, ethnic, gender, and other identities. Coupled with the domination of the market, we have, second, entered a radically "detraditionalized" world: Every received way of life is under pressure to justify itself explicitly to those who do not take it for granted, and thus traditions get recast as abstract principles, becoming disembedded from obvious choices of how to realize a life. The defense of tradition on traditional grounds produces reactionary "fundamentalisms," which are dangerous for their potential intolerance or violence in denying the unavoidably altered conditions under which we now operate. We might want to take our bearings from an inherited manner of living, but we have to decide what that inheritance means in circumstances vastly different from those of the past.

This, third, universalizes "social reflexivity," the condition in which recognition and a say in the endeavors in which they live and move are sought by all human beings, even those disposed to resist this state of affairs. Traditional organizational hierarchies, patriarchy, and claims of expertise and authority are all thrown into crisis. The exercise of authority must be persuasive and constantly legitimated through dialogue. Does this not mean that the aims of the Enlightenment are fulfilled? Giddens does not take it that way without qualifications.

The Enlightenment project has been to take our destiny into our own hands, to overcome insuperable providence or fate, to democratize, to reduce inequality. What we have actually achieved is a partial capacity to manage the risks of life through social insurance without reducing inequality much at all while, at the same time, introducing "manufactured risk," or the condition of self-imposed unintended consequences of our prodigious efforts to liberate ourselves.

Emancipation may have originally meant including those previously excluded into sharing a stable world of possibilities and expectations. Two factors preclude this outcome: First, the globalized economy means that the demands of international competitiveness on domestic industries constrains both the capacity to redistribute wealth in the welfare state and the ability to resist continual alteration under the pressure of market forces. Second, we all are expected to decide who we are for ourselves. Thus, we are emancipated into a condition where the reason for the emancipation is in doubt, where there are no answers that enjoy simple validation, and where we no longer can simply accept the tutelage of the state since that threatens our desire for personal autonomy. We cannot easily reconcile aversion to risk with the creative exploration required for autonomous life. There is a crisis of meaning when we ask, Emancipation for what?

We have made ourselves a problem to ourselves and we are driven both by a mounting anxiety that we cannot achieve self-mastery and by the belief that our dignity requires this effort. This is illustrated most forcefully for Giddens in the issues of ecology and the environment, which have arisen as a result of the productivism (making productivity, which is good, into an end in itself, which is an increasingly self-defeating commitment) of modern capitalist economies. Paradoxically, it was Old Conservatism that resisted productivism, while Marxist Socialism welcomed it as the ground for emancipating human beings from dependency on Nature. Now the prospect arises of forging a new kind of radical critique of productivism (not of productivity) based on a synthesis of the conservative critique of rationalism (along lines developed by Michael Oakeshott) with a considered strategy for responding to globalism, post-traditionalism and social reflexivity that Giddens calls "generative politics."

Generative politics foresees a condition of "post-scarcity." This is not a condition of full satisfaction without deprivation. Rather, post-scarcity means working for modest sufficiency, rejecting demands for incessant acquisition of more as counterproductive. Our heightened technological capacities have "humanized" nature. The generative politics of post-scarcity includes a commitment to preserving the natural world—as we jointly agree to define the natural world.

We can no longer see either tradition or nature as external givens. Because we think both are amenable to human manipulation, both have been drawn into interminable efforts to understand ourselves in the context of our historical and natural environment. Our efforts should be redirected toward working out ways to live together in civil relationships which are inspired by elements of the past we still can appropriate. This would be "dialogic democracy"—dialogue among ourselves and between past and present—ordering and reordering ourselves through consultation, conversation, negotiation on a cosmopolitan scale.

In the end, Giddens, by a circuitous path, reaffirms a chastened but still enlightenment view: "An ethics of a globalizing post-traditional society implies recognition of the sanctity of human life and the universal right to happiness and self-actualization—coupled to the obligation to promote cosmopolitan solidarity and an attitude of respect towards nonhuman agencies and beings, present and future. Far from seeing the disappearance of universal values, this is perhaps the first time in humanity's history when such values have real purchase" (p. 253). Not the end of history, then, but a new beginning of history?

Giddens' aspiration to universal rights coupled to universal solidarity is courageously hopeful, but seems largely a restatement of the predicament he describes adorned by an eloquent piety. At the same time, he has striven to assess honestly the limitations of the accomplishments of the past two centuries and the collapse of Socialism. What looms behind this aspiration to universal values and global solidarity is an unanswered question about the anxiety of meaning: Giddens does not just want to move on—he seems to see that we have genuinely lost something. I do not think he has fully named that something, in part perhaps because he is fearful of appearing to consort with "fundamentalists." Perhaps he is in quest of transcendence without making the question of transcendence explicit.

Democratic Theory: The Philosophical Foundations. By James L. Hyland. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995. 280p. £40 cloth, £14.99 paper.

Ross Harrison, *King's College, Cambridge, England*

Like others before him Hyland observes that "everyone purports to be in favour of democracy, but there is little agreement over what democracy is" (p. 36). Part of his answer is to produce what he calls a constructive definition. Central to this is the idea of equality. In Hyland's constructive definition, democracy is taken as a scalar concept in which the closer we approach equality of power in the determination of outcomes, the higher the degree of democracy we possess. In a completely democratic situation everyone has equally effective rights to participate in the determination of outcomes; this includes being properly informed.

Hyland believes that political theory is "a practical intellectual discipline" (p. 9), analogous to architectural theory. He holds therefore that it can only be understood in terms of goals; hence, it is inextricably both descriptive and evaluative. Therefore, a deeper part of Hyland's answer to the question of the nature of democracy is to engage in normative argument and to produce justification. He argues for political equality and so (in his understanding of the term) for democracy.

The work consists of ten closely written chapters divided into three main parts. Hyland starts with two chapters about methodology, explaining and defending his ideas about the role and possibility of political theory and constructive definition. This is fully illustrated and carefully argued, but it seems to have little to do with democracy. Then there are five chapters giving his account and justification of democracy, particularly in opposition to a liberal, rights-based conception. The last part, with three chapters on the social and economic conditions necessary for democracy, is again quite different in character. It contains considerable discussion of the nature of economic and social power, and is again only episodically concerned with democracy.

The work is designed in part as an introduction. It presupposes no knowledge either of philosophy or of political and social theory. The history of disputes that concern him is fully and clearly laid out. Hyland has a tendency to number points: There are three reasons for this; there are four problems with that. I found such organization helpful, for bringing out what he has to say and for efficiently getting on with the job of saying it.

The work is, however, not just introductory and much of the argument is Hyland's own. So, although it contains things such as a history of the dispute about the nature of power (through Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, Lukes, etc.), it also has arguments for fresh and surprising conclusions. One of these is that it is fallacious to identify democracy with majority rule. Hyland holds that they only coincide in the limiting case.

Another of Hyland's conclusions is that there is "no logically consistent synthesis of liberal and democratic principles" (p. 148). According to him, one of these must subvert the other: if we start with liberalism, then we cannot have democracy and vice-versa. Therefore, the only democratically appropriate theory of human rights is one in which these rights are derived from collective decisions. Rights-based minimal government, free-market liberalism is one of his running targets, and there is extensive criticism of Hayek and Friedman.

Another pithily put and interesting conclusion is Hyland's claim that although it may be rational for people to vote, it is not rational for them to vote rationally. That is, although he is not completely convinced by the argument of Downs and others about the irrationality of voting, he thinks that their considerations do show that it is not rational for people to take the trouble to acquire the amount of information which they would need to vote rationally.

This comes from the last chapter, in which Hyland struggles with both the need for and the difficulty of people being properly informed in a democracy. He calls the chapter "the logical limits of democracy," but I think that this is misleading. There may be logical, or necessary, limits to democracy. Possible examples are Wollheim's paradox of democracy or Arrow's impossibility theorem, neither of which are mentioned in this book. However, Hyland is here concerned with control of information by elites and Michel's iron law of oligarchy. This seems to me to be a contingent rather than a logical limit.

Although Hyland makes some criticism of the iron law, he sounds convinced by it in the end. He says that present democratic politics is a "spectator sport . . . that attracts a minuscule audience" (p. 254). The only cure he sees is a massive decentralization of authority. This is as he says a utopian answer. Lacking it, we can only look at the current systems "with a more disillusioned eye" (p. 264).

Such decentralisation would effectively eliminate the state and, in any case, Hyland thinks that the concerns of democracy go beyond the state. Democratic theory should concern itself with any disparity of power. He follows Dahl in thinking that there should be rights to worker consultation and control in economic enterprizes.

Given the importance Hyland ascribes to normative argument, it is surprising that only one of the ten chapters is concerned with the positive justification for democracy. Perhaps this is because he feels that he has to do all the work himself and not by using or criticizing others. For, or at least so he claims, "the normative theory of democracy is in such a weakened state that it hardly exists at all" (p. 162). Even if this is true, it seems to me that more still needs to be done. Hyland is concerned almost exclusively with arguments for equality, and even they are somewhat tentative. He does lay out the ways in which justification could proceed; direct, indirect, constitutive. But he doesn't attempt to draw up a balance sheet in which the good of democracy as a whole might be assessed. Nor, as part of a route to this, does he consider those studies which score how well democracy does, compared to other types of regime, in things that might be thought to be uncontentiously valuable, such as avoidance of famine or basic health care.

Critical Legal Theory and the Challenge of Feminism: A Philosophical Reconception. By Matthew H. Kramer, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994. 332p. $64.50 cloth, $23.95 paper.

Kristin Bumiller, *Amherst College*

This book challenges both critical legal theory and feminism for their failure to encounter what the author calls a *paradox-focused* metaphysics. While Kramer commends both fields of scholarship for offering critical perspectives on how domination functions in law and society, he concludes that each falls short of purporting a critical methodology that would force these scholars to take into account the "all engulfing sway of aporias" (p. 41). The overall tone of Kramer's critique is subtly chastening of these scholars' disregard for the "paradoxical energy" of their own analysis and the eclipsing of more "sophisticated" metaphysical problem by their overriding concern for politics (p. 43).

The text is written as a "work of general philosophy" (p. vii) and extensively uses idiosyncratic terminology and jargon. Rather than consider each author and text individually, Kramer's arguments depend upon characterizations that "distill" general topics from the writings of the Critical Legal Studies movement and feminist legal theorists. Consequently, the book refers to only a few texts that become the specific subject of his critique, most notably Gerald Frug's article "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law." This style permits him to convey, in a sweeping and expansive fashion, what he identifies as the methodological underpinnings of this critical scholarship (i.e., antifoundationalism, millenarianism, and social constructivism). While the book may succeed in its objective of identifying common themes, it fails to portray the complexity and vibrancy of methodological debates within the movements.

The book proceeds in its argument by identifying the primary focus of critical legal writers as uncovering the paradoxes of the legal order (i.e., contradictions within legal thought that arise from the self/other distinction, conflicts within the economic base, sexual differences). He takes issue with the way in which these scholars treat paradoxes, namely, by overlooking the "truly unsettling implications" and offering political reflections that regard these contradictions as simply unresolvable under the current regime. For example, he claims:

> When Frug argues—along with most of his fellows in the critical legal studies movement—that orthodox juridical discourse fails to harmonize conflicts and instead merely displaces them, he concedes far too much uncritically. In accord with his perception of dualisms as mixtures (rather than antinomies), he declares that efforts to draw lines between the opposing aspects of juridical structures will repeat the gnarls of classification that induced efforts at drawing lines in the first place (p. 57).

Kramer would prefer Frug and his fellows to consider a more "bold" strategy of a "paradox highlighting" approach. Kramer's preferred approach is never demonstrated in the analysis of cases or legal phenomenon but, rather, developed as a set of categories that lay out his framework for analysis. In particular, he suggests we think about paradoxes as "manifold instances of the economy of enjoining" (p. 75). Much of the book is devoted to explaining why leftists denounce enjoining critiques as incapacitating and conservative, but the reader is given little insight into how enjoining would provide richer analyses of the double binds of the legal order.

Some readers may find the critique of critical legal studies more useful when Kramer directly challenges the success of these writings to articulate political strategy. For instance, he points out how critical legal scholars' critiques of ideology rely upon prescriptive assertions of political values, without providing much insight into how these political ideals would be realized in a wide range of settings. He claims that critical legal theorists "brand as ideology" any practices that run counter to a move toward self-transcendence, egalitarianism, and community (p. 234). Moreover, he suggests that the ultimate political message of critical legal studies is to target any form of necessitarian argument that is in conflict with the values of community and fluidity (p. 235). Kramer argues that these political positions do not flow ineluctably from the metaphysical axioms and that the writings of these scholars fail to consider how community and fluidity are best obtained in the social order. He makes the important assertion, "In most areas of modern Western societies, the basic values espoused by critical legal theorists are far too open-ended and controverted to provide much clarity and direction when we confront particular issues" (p. 239). On the other hand, the book is often indulgent in its own religious belief in metaphysical skepticism and its hostility toward a form of scholarship "driven" by its politics (e.g., satirical references to imagining a critical legal studies conference in the future sporting a banner reading "Be silent, God" [p. 263]).

A final and less substantial portion of the book takes up a similar critique of feminist scholarship. Here Kramer presents himself as a sympathetic critic from outside the "orthodoxy" of feminist scholarship. While he admires what he sees as the innovations of feminism, he suggests that attention to his metaphysical approaches would result in more productive scholarship. His critique is largely based upon an assertion that feminist research relies on a conception of subjectivity that "strips women of their agency" (p. 284). While it is certainly the case that some feminist scholarship constructs women as subjects without agency, Kramer seems not to be cognizant of the lively epistemological debates within feminism and critical legal studies on questions essential to his enquiry (e.g., foundationalism, subjectivity, and essentialism). The problem with the book as a whole is illustrated by his challenge to feminism—that it relies upon a strawperson characterization of the epistemological assumptions within critical scholarship, rather than engaging with metaphysical dialogue and contention within the movements. Kramer ends with the *premonition* that "once feminists have granted their attacks on social and political domination are not *ultimate* topics, . . . they will leave themselves with something to do" (p. 316). In the here and now, feminist scholars have left Kramer with a lot to do.

John Locke: Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility. By John Marshall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1994. 480p. $79.95 cloth, $34.95 paper.

Ian C. Harris, *University of Leicester*

This ambitious book aims to provide a "contextual account of the development of John Locke's political, religious, social and moral thought," including "many of Locke's unpublished manuscripts" (p. i). One recognizes the ambition but wonders if the author does not need to argue more cautiously (and modestly: He offers "some important suggestions" [p. 62]). Marshall, like most people, naturally allocates attention primarily to what interests him, rather than "covering the ground," and quite a number of the manuscripts he thinks are unpublished have been in print, wholly or partially, for some years. He has four centers of interest: social ethics; ecclesiastical affairs; resistance theory (the *Second Treatise* is treated primarily in this connection, and a dating of 1682 or 1683 suggested); and revealed theology, primarily in relation to Socinianism. (Responsibility gets so far diffused that it fails to obtain a separate index entry).

The interesting matter here is descriptive, rather than explanatory. We have very informative accounts of Locke's social ethics and revealed theology and of items that do not often feature in the literature (although several claims to priority are misleading). Description is a prerequisite for explanation. But one element necessary to explanation is absent from this book's structure, namely, a full recognition of Locke as an autonomous thinker. While some of his reading and some putative influences upon him are catalogued, there is little to show how or why Locke went beyond these, despite a sense that he did do (pp. 32, 62, 78). Why? It is a question of method and choice of subject. Description is not complemented by much analysis of content, so that it becomes difficult to see just how and why Locke could innovate. Hence, where Marshall attempts a sustained explanation of Locke's views, little primary data are adduced, and the result is highly speculative (e.g., pp. 62–72, 250–65). Marshall's choice of subjects—perfectly reasonable in itself—tends to increase the deficit of explanation by leaving out some central matters. Much of the *Second Treatise* is bypassed. This reflects the fact that religious matters (whether in the form of ecclesiastical affairs or revealed theology), along with social ethics, are the author's principal concern. Perhaps someone told him to insert something about the *Second Treatise*. (The citations of Filmer—whom the *Second Treatise* is said to answer—in this chapter are drawn at second hand from another study [pp. 207, n. 4 and 211, n. 9], and the book's structure would be more obvious without a chapter on resistance.) Yet by leaving out so much, Marshall deprives himself of a major resource for understanding other items in Locke's thought. Again, while it's fair to say that Locke's views about the human understanding are not central to Marshall's agenda, they were certainly central to Locke's; and on the occasions when they are mentioned, explanatory statements do appear (e.g., p. 154). By the same token, the author is able to do little to *connect* his areas of interest, except when the human understanding is adduced (e.g., chap. 8).

Marshall sees Locke as an eclectic. What of the substantive categories from which the collecting is said to have been done—latitudinarism and Socinianism? Neither provides a new approach to Locke, though Marshall deploys them with a new pertinacity, so that the question is less about originality than success in explaining Locke's intentions. So far as this book takes us, latitudinarianism and Socinianism do little in this line. This much is suggested by Marshall's own words. We find Locke at once "aligning himself with the Latitudinarian wing" and "going very far beyond even the most eirenic of the clerical Latitudinarians" (pp. 58–59). A similar picture appears with Socinianism. A "general sympathy" and a "broadly Socinian" view are attributed (pp. 402, 416), and the ultimate destination of "unitarian heretic" is assigned (p. xv). Yet we are told that there is "no sign that Locke ever felt able to assert that there could not be three infinite persons of the Godhead" (p. 348). The difficulty is increased because Marshall never defines adequately either latitudinarianism or Socinianism (or most other key terms). He repels the best enquiry into the meaning of "latitudinarianism" (p. 39, n. 12); provides virtually no footnoted references to Socinian works, of which he lists very few in his bibliography; and neither quotes nor lists any work of Faustus Socinus (he never cites any foreign language text, except in translation). Locke stated, "De Socinianorum fide dubito" (see Klibansky's *Epistola de Tolerantia* [1968], p. 96).

There are inexact readings of crucial manuscript texts also. Take the view that the matter primarily requiring attention in the *Second Treatise* is resistance theory. Marshall believes that the duty to preserve others—so central to the *Second Treatise*—had been stated in a manuscript of 1680 (p. 206; cf. pp. 142–43 on Bodleian Ms. Locke f. 4 fols. 145–49). But that note concerns God's *purposes* and not any *duty*. Had Marshall seen this, he could not have relegated the bulk of the *Second Treatise* to silence. The silence is self-defeating, for it means forgoing one of the principal means of dating that text. His case on *that* topic, which is interesting (as are his remarks on Ashcraft), has so slender an evidential base that one can hardly say that enough matter has been provided to establish it.

Textual optimism is evident elsewhere. In the extended treatment of Bodleian Ms. Locke c. 34, Marshall claims that Locke was "strongly advocating comprehension" (p. 98). Yet no advocacy of comprehension, strong or weak, appears when we follow up Marshall's references (p. 100). The text Marshall uses to emphasize his Socinian hypothesis, "General Reflections" (as Marshall himself observes) is not certainly Locke's composition (p. 421). The statement that Bodleian Ms. Locke c. 27 fol. 30^a concerns toleration for English Catholics (p 110, n. 56) is curious, for that document proposes a test for *clerics* (it's entitled "The Particular Test for Priests"), requiring them to abjure tenets the writer took to distinguish Roman Catholicism. Examples could be multiplied.

It seems Marshall has not stepped clear of his doctoral thesis. Were there not a reference to "drafts of this book as an inordinately lengthy thesis" (p. xii), comparison between the book's prose and the smoother pieces he has issued elsewhere would suggest as much. One hopes that for the future, he will more definitely transcend this manner of historical enquiry.

History and the Idea of Progress. Edited by Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995. 271p. $37.50 cloth, $14.95 paper.

George Klosko, *University of Virginia*

The papers in this volume were delivered originally at Michigan State University between October 1990 and May 1991. They present a series of reflections on the well-known "end of history" thesis of Francis Fukuyama, as presented in his article "The End of History" (*National Interest*, 16 [1989]). As many readers know, under the influence of Hegel, Fukuyama argues that with the end of the Cold War history has come to an end, because there no longer exist serious ideological alternatives to liberal democracy and the free market.

The result is a somewhat uneasy collection, comprising both investigations of the historical roots of the idea of progress and reflections on Fukuyama's thesis. Contributions of the first sort are Terry Pinkard's nonmetaphysical account of Hegelian teleology, Susan Shell on Kant's idea of universal history, wide-ranging ruminations by Joseph Cropsey, Harvey Mansfield's esoteric reading of Machiavelli, and Werner Dannhauser's highly readable account of Spengler and Nietzsche. As well as a further presentation of his own view by Fukuyama, general reflections are contributed by Samuel Huntington, Richard Rorty, Jean Elshtain, Christopher Lasch, Alan Gilbert, and Conor Cruise O'Brien. In addition to dividing according to theme, contributions also break down between highly scholarly pieces suitable for specialists (especially Pinkard and Shell) and the reflections, which are stimulating and of high quality but generally suitable for a popular audience.

The book's cover depicts Caspar David Friedrich's painting "Owl in Flight before a Full Moon." The reference to Hegel is apparent. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings as a stage of civilization draws to a close. But the owl is symbolic in another, unintended sense. Fukuyama's thesis, like any moment of Spirit's progress, is a product of its own time. The end of the Cold War brought with it a sudden clarity, but with the passage of time new complexities have emerged, and the owl of Minerva has spread its wings over "the end of history" as well. Indeed, O'Brien includes an Afterword to his essay, updating his analysis in the light of a few years' additional perspective (pp. 165–66).

The datedness of Fukuyama's thesis is a consistent thread throughout the commentaries. Huntington provides an expert overview of potential sources of conflict in the post-Cold War world. As one can imagine, Huntington argues that these conflicts are generally ethnic or religious and frequently within, rather than between, states. O'Brien strikingly makes the case for Marxism-Leninism as a (relatively) progressive offshoot of the Enlightenment, in comparison to retrograde systems of belief that have replaced it in several countries. Confronting Fukuyama head-on, Gilbert argues that the end of history has been taken over from Hegel "too easily" (p. 254 n. 5). Gilbert presents an ethical critique of existing forms of liberalism, which must move in radical directions in order to realize their implicit ideals.

In their contributions, Elshtain and Lasch explore strains within liberalism. Elshtain discusses tensions in liberal feminist thought, focusing on the inadequacies of rights-based liberalism as an ultimate ideology. Lasch presents a catalogue of social and intellectual decline. Having defeated its external enemies, liberalism is crumbling from within, especially because of its citizens' lack of civic virtue. In contrast, liberal ideals are stoutly defended by Rorty, who presents a withering critique of the kind of history Fukuyama takes to have ended. Rorty argues that what has passed is the idea of "History" as a "large, conceptually graspable object," a fantasy that has impeded the less grandiose but realizable goal of reducing avoidable human suffering (pp. 214–15, 212).

The weakest contribution to the collection is probably Fukuyama's. Although his original insight retains some of its lustre, his arguments for it are strikingly unconvincing. After rejecting economic explanations of historical change, he presents his own view, which is based on the "struggle for recognition," discussed in Hegel's analysis of the Master-Slave relationship, in the *Phenomenology*. According to Fukuyama, the need for recognition, which can be satisfied only in democracy, drives history. To support this grand claim, Fukuyama relies on the authority of selected figures in the history of political thought. Not only does he run together passages from different authors concerning human motivation (though it is not clear that all discuss the same phenomenon), but several of his readings are questionable. For instance, after a brief discussion of "vainglory" in Hobbes's *Leviathan*, Fukuyama declares: "Hobbes the great materialist ends up describing the nature of the 'first man' in terms not much different from those of the idealist Hegel" (p. 22). Fukuyama's claim that Hobbes views vainglory as the "first and foremost" cause of conflict is dubious, while he also fails to recognize that vainglory, for Hobbes, in part functions instrumentally, not as an end in itself, but as a means to self-preservation. Apparently in response to criticisms of his original article, Fukuyama concedes that his reading of Hegel might not be accurate, but is based on the interpretation of Alexandre Kojeve, whom he refers to as Hegel's "great interpreter" (p. 27): "for the purposes of the present argument I am interested not in Hegel per se but in Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojeve or perhaps in a new, synthetic philosopher named Hegel-Kojeve" (p. 242 n. 11).

I close with an observation from Cropsey's essay: "For history, rather than imposing capitalism as the scourge for which socialism was to be the remedy, appears to have ordained socialism as the failure destined to precede liberal capitalism in order to attest the truth and goodness of the latter. How curious, if the socialist regime whose only speculative support lay in the end-of-history thesis were to be consumed for the strengthening of that fickle theory . . ." (p. 103).

The Missing Child in Liberal Theory: Towards a Covenant Theory of Family, Community, Welfare and the Civic State. By John O'Neill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994. 129p. $40.00 cloth, $14.95, paper.

Shelley Burtt, *Yale University*

To appreciate the merits of this ambitious, frustrating book, it is important to understand what it is not. It is not a work in political theory or the history of political thought. It is an unevenly written manifesto that rejects both liberal and communitarian visions of the good society in favor of what the author calls a "covenant theory" of political and family life. A covenant theory, in O'Neill's account, values what liberalism does not: the continuity of family and community life between generations and the moral norm of reciprocity. Do not read this book for any sustained, theoretically sophisticated elaboration of "covenant principles" because none is present. Still, O'Neill's elaboration of a covenant alternative to contract liberalism deserves attention for a number of reasons. First is his effort to place children and their families at the center of thinking about politics. This means shifting our theoretical focus from the rights and interests of "atomistic individuals" to the needs and challenges of the growing number of children at risk of poor social outcomes, something that O'Neill argues persuasively that liberal theories are unable to do. His primary focus is on the 20% of North American children who grow up in poverty, deprived of a wide range of resources provided routinely to children born into more fortunate circumstances. O'Neill's penetrating account of how liberals manage to live with such unequal beginnings for children and his explanation of why we should not are the strongest parts of his book.

By switching the focus of political theory from emancipating autonomous adults to ameliorating risky childhoods, O'Neill also provides a valuable perspective on the vexing "family values" debate. No one concerned about children's life chances could celebrate the "right" of young, low-income, low-education women to bear and raise children. (This is just one example of O'Neill's consistent rejection of the language of rights and entitlements as faulty foundations for state assistance to the needy.) Conversely, conservative moralizing about the irresponsibility of single mothers completely misses the point: The problem of "poorly resourced" families is a social one, created by our inability to nurture a "reciprocal regard for other citizens" (p. 35).

Despite an infelicitous prose style and the often rambling presentation of his ideas, O'Neill successfully presses his case against the foundational commitments of liberal society, arguing that its moral subordination of "embodied [family] ties" to "market ties" produces a world view lacking the conceptual and emotional resources required to sustain just political communities in the modern world. This critique is not unpersuasive, but it is also familiar. Much of the book's scholarly significance rests on how one evaluates the alternative to liberal contractarianism, the "covenant theory" of the book's subtitle.

Here the argument encounters a number of problems. O'Neill looks to covenant theory to "refurbish the institutions of civic sustainability" that he believes have been almost fatally weakened by the depradations of "civic-free global capitalism." But the solution he proposes—a rebuilt welfare state—asks the political community of taxpaying citizens to bear the costs of big business's civic irresponsibility. O'Neill's energetic defense of the state's central role in shaping a caring community deserves notice, but no enduring solution to the problems he so acutely diagnoses will be possible without attacking them at their economic source. Unfortunately, O'Neill writes off the world's corporate citizens as beyond the civic pale, rather than insisting on their integration into a covenant community.

As with most political manifestos, the virtues of the new regime are set forth mostly in abstract terms. However, when O'Neill does get specific, the results are unsettling. Feminists in particular should note the argument in chapter three, where we learn that a covenant theory of the family affirms a constitutive link "between (1) courtship and commitment; (2) commitment and copulation; (3) copulation and conception; (4) conception and birth... (8) family and community care" (pp. 64–65). This is a fancy way of saying that a covenant community will be both antiabortion and hostile to the use of contraceptives; the "uterine covenant... must be inviolable" (p. 67), O'Neill announces a few pages later. I commend O'Neill for following through his arguments to what he must believe are their logical antichoice conclusions (although I would dispute a necessary linkage). But the power of his argument is considerably dissipated by his failure to address any of the misgivings we might have about a polity founded on principles which explicitly repudiate reproductive choice.

American readers should also note that the book is written exclusively for a Canadian audience, in support of the generous (and expensive) Canadian welfare state. However, many of the book's points apply directly to circumstances south of the border and in its more lucid moments, the argument makes a valuable contribution to the current American debate on welfare reform.

There is no missing child in liberal theory. Hobbes, Locke, Mill, and Rawls all locate the child visibly and intentionally in the private world of the family. What O'Neill means by his somewhat misleading title is that public concern for children and children's life chances is missing in both liberal theory and practice. His book makes this point well enough. But it does not persuade us that remedying this deplorable neglect is best done through adopting a covenant theory of civic community.

Rational Choice and Moral Agency. By David Schmidt. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 283p. $35.00.

Gerald F. Gaus, *University of Minnesota, Duluth*

At the heart of this book is an important insight: A purely instrumental conception of rationality is incomplete and is unable to make sense of our moral practices. David Schmidtz, quite rightly, refuses to follow those who would derive morality from the strategic choices of *homo economicus*. The conception of practical rationality advanced by Schmidtz departs from the standard instrumental model in two fundamental ways: (1) It endorses a satisficing, rather than an optimizing, *strategy;* and (2) it insists that the choice of *ends* can be rational or irrational.

Schmidtz is adamant that optimizing and satisficing are two distinct strategies: One cannot be reduced to the other. "What distinguishes satisficing from optimizing in the dynamic context is that the two strategies employ different *stopping rules*" (p. 29). A satisficer searches for options until one meets the satisficer's aspiration level; roughly, the optimizer keeps searching as long as the expected gains of further searching are greater than the costs. Schmidtz is certainly right that thus stated, the two rules are distinct. I suspect, however, that when we add a further constraint that Schmidtz endorses, the two rules are not very different. The further constraint—call it the No Clearly Better (NCB) condition—is that choosing x can never be rational if there is a clearly better reason for choosing alternative y (p. 38). Given this condition, suppose a satisficer selects x because it is "good enough" but knows that one (and only one) member of the set $\{w, y, z\}$ is a much better choice. Has the satisficer violated the NCB condition? To be sure, there is no clear, discrete, better *alternative;* but there does seem a good clear *reason* to choose from $\{w, y, z\}$. Whether it is rational for our agent to go ahead and examine w, y, and z would seem to depend on the costs of finding out which is the better choice: In a world with no search costs, the NCB condition impels one to choose from the alternative set. But this now seems very much like the reasoning of an optimizer. Perhaps everything depends on the adverb "clearly"; even after finding a "good enough" option, an optimizer will keep searching even if there is no clear reason to believe there is a better alternative, while a satisficer will quit. But the contrast is anything but obvious. Given the NCB condition, in order to justify stopping, a rational satisficer must have good grounds to conclude that the set of remaining options does not clearly include an alternative better than x or that the costs of discovering whether it does are too high. But if the set of remaining options does not clearly include a better alternative, it would also seem that a rational optimizer is apt to abandon the search. The distinction between the stopping rules of the satisficer and optimizer begin to blur into one another—especially once we analyze just what is meant by "clearly."

Schmidtz's second fundamental revision of the instrumental model is to make the choice of ends itself the object of rational assessment. The Humean instrumentalist proclaims that "'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the world to the scratching of my finger" (p. 80). Schmidtz disagrees: Some preferences or ends are rational, and others, irrational. He believes that the means/end conception of rationality can be extended to show why this is so. Schmidtz argues that final ends—those that are pursued for their own sake—can nevertheless be *chosen for a reason*. And the reason for choosing a final end can be to further what Schmidtz calls a "maieutic end"—an end that can only be achieved by having other ends. The guiding model of rational choice here seems to be the undecided undergraduate at the end of his or her second year, who does not know what to major in but (perhaps after receiving several letters from her parents) comes to have the maieutic end of "have a major." This end can only be achieved by adopting a final end (having a particular major). Now Schmidtz seems to think there is a general purpose served by the choice of final ends—to give us something to live for, or to make life meaningful, or to feel like we have something to live for. The general picture is that we choose final ends (to be a doctor, a nature lover, a Catholic) as a way of serving the overarching maieutic end of having something to live for. And since some ends do not do this well, some *final ends* are inadequate means of satisficing this maieutic end and so are rationally flawed. I must confess that I found this pretty unpersuasive as a general model of the selection of ends. To be sure, it models some cases, for example a crisis center worker talking someone out of killing himself by showing him that after all, his family, religion, and Greenpeace membership give him something to live for. What is wrong with this as a general model is not simply that some of us seldom if ever choose any end in order to give life meaning (no doubt I am just displaying an embarrassing autobiographical fact) but that it places the self and its feelings far too much at the center of things. Except when one is talking someone out of suicide, that being a Catholic (or a socialist or an environmentalist) gives meaning to your life is a bad reason for being a Catholic, a socialist, or an environmentalist. "Feel good about yourself, give your life meaning, be a Catholic" strikes me as manifesting a misunderstanding of Catholicism, although perhaps one not uncommon in the 1990s.

I have focused on these two parts of Schmidtz's conception of practical rationality because they lay the basis for so much of the rest of the book. Schmidtz goes on to argue that since an end can be endorsed as rational (in terms of whether it serves the end of having something to live for), it is rational to adopt the end of being a moral person—to respect all others and have a concern for many. Being a moral person is thus a rational end. Schmidtz is entirely right that although we probably cannot show an amoral psychopath that he is irrational not to be moral, we can say that moral agents such as ourselves are rational to wish to remain so. Schmidtz goes on to argue that there are, as it were, two distinct moral points of view: the "I" and the "We" perspectives. The "I" perspective concerns the evaluation of an individual's own ends, while the "We" perspective concerns what is good for us all—what promotes the common good. (His analysis of the common good is interesting and instructive.) Schmidtz is thus led to what he calls a "dualistic" account of morality.

Schmidtz's valuable insight is that the instrumental account of reason is woefully incomplete and that attempts to ground morality on it are bound to fail. But his contribution to developing more adequate accounts of practical rationality and morality is greatly diminished by his devotion to the means/end conception of rationality. By modifying the means/ends model (replacing optimizing with satisficing and expanding reason to cover final ends), he believes he can ground morality in reason. But he is then forced to uphold the rationality of a moral character by showing that becoming a member of a moral community furthers the end of giving oneself something to live for: "We give ourselves more to live for by becoming important parts of something bigger than ourselves" (p. 112). After reading Schmidtz's attempt to fix Hume, it is hard not to conclude that it is high time to go back to Kant.

Timely Meditations: Martin Heidegger and Postmodern Politics. By Leslie Paul Thiele. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 263p. $49.50 cloth, $14.95 paper.

Heidegger's Political Thinking. By James F. Ward. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995. 312p. $50.00 cloth, $16.95 paper.

Hans Sluga, *University of California at Berkeley*

Martin Heidegger continues to be a writer of profound fascination to philosophers and those concerned with philosophical matters; but because of his radical challenges to the philosophical tradition and even more because of his political entanglement with the Nazis, he also remains a highly controversial figure. Following a number of recent American authors—notably Reiner Schürmann, Michael Zimmerman, Albert Borgmann, and Hubert Dreyfus—Leslie Paul Thiele and James Ward set out to show in their new books that Heidegger's philosophy can nevertheless be the source of significant political insight.

This claim is bound to be contested not only because of the evident failure of Heidegger's own political engagement, but also because there is no Heideggerian text that might be said to contain his political philosophy. Anyone seeking to draw substantive political lessons from Heidegger's writings must therefore engage in the double task of showing how Heidegger's politics can be separated from his philosophical thinking and how lessons in political philosophy can be extracted from writings that mention politics only in passing. The strategies of both kinds of argument are by now familiar. As far as the first is concerned, Thiele writes in his eminently readable book: "My claim is that there is a politics to be discovered in Heidegger's philosophy, one quite at odds with the politics that Heidegger had occasion to champion (p. 9)." He acknowledges that Heidegger's philosophy remains susceptible to a fascistic interpretation, but considers this due to the fact that no philosophical corpus is reducible to a single politics. He is therefore even ready to derive from Heidegger's texts political conclusions that their author might disown. Ward keeps the problem of Heidegger's actual politics at the periphery of his discussion in the conviction that Heidegger's "political thinking transcends his political engagement (p. xix)." What makes Heidegger politically important to him is the fact that he is one of the most revolutionary and radical thinkers in the history of philosophy. He concludes that Heidegger can therefore not be identified with the simplicities of the folkish nationalism of the Nazis.

In extracting political lessons from Heidegger's richly suggestive writings, both authors roam freely through the corpus of the Heideggerian texts. In doing so, Ward more than Thiele stays close to Heidegger's own words, following more or less their historical order. Moving from a discussion of Heidegger's lectures in 1919 and 1925 (chap. 1), through an examination of 1929–30 lectures on the fundamental concepts of metaphysics, to the notorious 1935 lectures on the introduction to metaphysics (in which Heidegger spoke of the truth and greatness of National Socialism), Ward seeks to establish how Heidegger saw the profound crisis of his age made visible in a crisis enveloping the sciences and the universities. In chapters 4 and 5, he discusses Heidegger's critique of the Nazi conception of a "political" (i.e., politicized) science. The final two chapters concern Heidegger's understanding of the Greeks and of Hölderlin, as it manifests itself in his later writings.

In the epilogue of his book Ward promises to draw out the most important political implications of the texts that he has scrutinized with such care. Most readers will find these conclusions disappointing. The problem lies in Ward's overly broad conception of the political. "In the manner of classical antiquity," he wants to understand the political as "the order of human things (p. xviii)." Accordingly, he also says of Heidegger's *Being and Time* that the book is "as a whole necessarily 'political' " simply because Heidegger considers all aspects of the question of Being in relation to possibilities for action (p. 36). Such a characterization fails to distinguish between the practical, the social, and the political and is, for that reason, unhelpful in isolating political lessons in Heidegger's work.

Thiele's discussion is less concerned with the details of Heidegger's texts and more with their political implications. In contrast to Ward who brackets out the issue of Heidegger's relation to postmodern political thought, Thiele puts this theme at the very center of his book. In the first section of his book he characterizes Nietzsche and (to a lesser extent) Foucault, as the thinkers of a postmodern conception of liberty that he regards as politically, ecologically, and metaphysically unsound. Ironically championing the West's highest political value, i.e., freedom, Nietzsche appears to Thiele as the prophet of an unrestrained individualism and metaphysical homelessness. The result is that "fellow feeling will not find safe haven in Nietzsche's universe. True community is an illusion, Nietzsche insists (p. 43)." For Thiele the question of freedom is thus the fundamental political problem, and taking up Heidegger's occasional remark that freedom is also the fundamental question of philosophy, he sets out to employ the instruments of Heidegger's thought for constructing a "postliberal" conception of politics (p. 5). Heidegger's conception of freedom, Thiele goes on to argue, is different from both the traditional conceptions of negative and positive liberty, as well as from the postmodern conception of liberty upheld by Nietzsche, Foucault, and their followers. In order to make this claim plausible, he explains in the second chapter of his book how Heidegger's analysis of Being-in-the-world in *Being and Time* can serve as the basis for an account of community. For Heidegger, to exist humanly is to exist socially and culturally. All thought, speech, and action is embedded in a shared world. "In defending these statements, Heidegger exposes the illusion of solitude and deconstructs its sovereign freedom (p. 57)."

Reflecting on Heidegger's analysis of freedom, Thiele describes him in chapter 3 as offering us "dignity in a freedom that celebrates caretaking rather than mastery (p. 72)." Thiele calls this new conception that of a "disclosive freedom." Heidegger's most important contribution to political thought is for him that he "allows us to maintain our freedom while reining in its most pernicious effects (p. 81)." Heidegger interprets freedom as an openness to the mystery of Being which, Thiele admits, might, if misunderstood, degenerate into fatalism and passivity, but which is meant to be in reality a critical engagement with our "hard-won and still insufficiently propagated freedoms," a supplementation and sublimation of them (p. 91). In the three central chapters of the book, Thiele analyzes what he calls freedom in thought, speech, and deed, respectively. This gives him an opportunity for a discussion of the Heideggerian conception of openness to Being, but also for a critical scrutiny of Heidegger's own language and of his personal political engagement.

Part 3 of Thiele's book develops a "politics of dwelling," which calls upon Heidegger as a philosopher of community and ecology and as a critic of the technological mode of thinking. Unlike others who have oversimplified the bearing of Heidegger's insights on political questions, Thiele is clear that Heidegger's project is ontological in nature rather than naturalistic and that one must therefore be wary "of a straightforward translation of Heideggerian philosophy into ecological theory (p. 183)." Critical readers may wonder whether the same should not be said about Heidegger's concern with the metaphysical homelessness of modern humanity and with the need for salvation through a new god. Heidegger's call for a new kind of thinking may sound to such readers as yet another embodiment of an idealism that seeks to interpret the world rather than change it. It is Thiele's goal to convince us that there is more substance to Heidegger's vision and that it gives us the opportunity not to become masters and possessors of freedom but its "stewards." With this understanding in mind, Thiele, like some other writers before him, finds reasons for relating Heidegger's thought finally to the Eastern traditions of philosophy. Unlike Nietzsche, he appears thus as the real critic of what has gone wrong in Western culture.

Thiele's *Timely Meditations* provides us with a clear and compelling account of what the political implications of Heidegger's thinking might be. For all that, the book does not answer the question whether these implications are not too general to be of any help in resolving actual political dilemmas. In contrast to Heidegger, one might hold, for instance, that the solution to our environmental problems is not to be found in an indiscriminate redirecting of our thinking to the question of Being, but in a discriminating technological (i.e., scientific) analysis of the nature of these problems and in the development of discriminating technologies that can resolve them. For all its persuasiveness, Thiele's book has a fashionable tone to it that makes one finally reach once again for Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations*.

Philosophy in An Age of Pluralism: The Philosophy of Charles Taylor in Question. Edited by James Tully. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 273p. $54.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

William E. Connolly, *The Johns Hopkins University*

Everybody takes issue with Charles Taylor, if not on one crucial theme, then another. Why, then, has he been such a compelling and inspiring political theorist in North America over the last third of the twentieth century? I suspect it is because the depth and breadth of his work opens up alternative possibilities of thought in the very way in engenders itself. Taylor's thinking "articulates" itself by engaging a variety of perspectives at the interconnected levels of metaphysics, epistemology, politics, and ethics. He is perhaps our most complete theorist. Trying to rethink the politics of identity? Better consult Taylor to probe the metaphysical presumptions of your effort. Posing challenges to command and teleological theories of ethics? Better engage Taylor on the history of moral *sources* in the West. And so it goes. Given this rich legacy, it is pleasing but not surprising to find a new book of essays on his work to be both thoughtful and diverse. Taylor is addressed on Descartes (James), truth (Rorty), Christianity and modernity (Skinner, Morgan, Elshtain), the relation of the human and natural sciences (Geertz), Hegel (Descombes), literary theory (Hjort), pluralism and ethics (Tuck, Weinstock and Laforest), and several other topics.

We cannot address each essay here, except to repeat that the quality is remarkably high. But consider the "re-articulations" these essays inspire by Taylor on the topics of God, ethics, and pluralism. Taylor concedes Quentin Skinner's point about the contemporary dangers of Christianity. "But I think it is very evident that we have reason to fear the Christian faith (p. 225)." Amidst this institutional fear, Taylor offers the "hunch that there is a scale of affirmation of humanity which cannot be matched by humans rejecting God (p. 226)." The juxtaposition of Taylor's "hunch" and the "rejection" of it by others does seem loaded. For to reject God would be to deny something already there in a mood of antagonism and resentment, rather, than, say, to pursue a hunch that the most profound way to appreciate dimensions of mystery at this historical juncture is in a nontheistic mode.

But let's stress the modesty in "hunch" for a moment. Taylor invokes a Christian faith while simultaneously expressing admiration for some alternatives that call its distinctive themes into question. He seems to concur that the same modern conditions that render his faith a hunch also mobilize fundamentalist energies in some sectors of Christianity to shore up its self-confidence by punishing deviations from it. Taylor resists these latter forces in the name of "deep cultural diversity" on the same territory. As Taylor says, responding to the thoughtful essay by Guy Laforest, Canada provides a testing ground for the experiment in deep diversity. If the federation holds, its bonds will express "precisely not . . . likeness, or (simply) a unity of purpose, but the sense of a partnership formed over the decades of a common history (p. 254)." Such an experiment flourishes "to the extent its members can live with complex, many-poled identities (p. 254)."

So far, so good. But Skinner may still be on to something. Why not, for instance, extend the pluralist embrace more actively to nontheistic perspectives irreducible to several contemporary forms of theism *or* secularism? If Christianity is dangerous, does it not *need* to be checked, countered and contested from perspectives outside it? Taylor does accept secular challenges, though he takes pains to demarcate their limits. (The Skinner, Geertz, Tuck, and Rorty essays are very pertinent and illuminating here.) But Taylor's interpretive generosity falters most dramatically, in my book, when his religiously anchored pluralism encounters pluralist commitments that also challenge his most fervent hunch. Those who "reject" a specific god (or is it a hunch?) in the name of a positive appreciation of the diversity of being are placed under suspicion from the start. It is the way they are *interpreted prior to ethical engagement* that is telling, as the disjunction between hunch and rejection already suggests. In a sympathetic response to Elshtain's critique of projects of "world mastery," "self-making," and "theorizing . . . that calls incessant attention to itself, even as it promotes light-headedness about our collective condition" (Elshtain, p. 80), Taylor admonishes Foucault for a series of shortcomings: "So there are ideals of self-making, such as that of the late Foucault, which seem to leave no metaphysical room for the acknowledgement that our identity is also a gift from others, that disciplines can also free us, that some things in the shape of the natural world and of human life command our respect (p. 230)." Subtract the single word "command" from that sentence and it is extremely difficult to make the charges stick. Foucault knows that identity is sometimes a gift, sometimes a burden, and often enough both; he respects a protean diversity of life that exceeds current forms of social organization; he contends that "care of the self" is one condition of care for cultural diversity and that *disciplines* of the self are vital to such an enterprise; and he specifically challenges the modern project of mastery in the last chapter of *The History of Sexuality* (1978). The (let us say) "intercultural diversity" Foucault opens up in the domains of gender, sexuality, and faith is both more bountiful and more promising in its interconnections than anything Taylor (or Elshtain) has articulated.

Such dismissive renderings of the nontheistic Other faintly echo sixteenth-century Spanish Christian interpretations of the "pagans" of that day. Christian interpretations of pagan idolatry, sacrifice, and sodomy seemed to vindicate harsh responses; but, as Bartolome de Las Casas finally recognized, they themselves reflected more the shock the Other posed to Christian self-confidence than the light-headedness of the perspectives engaged. Las Casas revised his Christianity in the light of these hard lessons. Are contemporary, minority explorations of mystery without a specific god and of respect for a protean diversity of things *still* so hard to bear? Even during a time when Christian faith is a hunch and Christian fundamentalism a danger? Taylor stretches out admirably in his interpretations of Buddhism and some other perspectives. But a contemporary culture of "many-poled" identities will include room for more expansive intercultural connections than Taylor so far admits.

Still, complaining only goes so far. And nobody's perfect. If those on my side of contemporary debates develop the range and magnanimity of thought Taylor has forged on his side, the future prospects for productive engagements between and within us will be impressive. Besides, we may soon need each other—as the fundamentalist assault on diversity gets louder and uglier.

Edmund Burke and International Relations: The Commonwealth of Europe and the Crusade against the French Revolution. By Jennifer M. Welsh. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. 247p. $59.95.

Thom Kuehls, *Weber State University*

The works of Edmund Burke, the political theorist, have long been analyzed; the works of Edmund Burke, the international political theorist, have not. On one level, Jennifer Welsh has sought to remedy this in *Edmund Burke and International Relations* by drawing out Burke's ideas on India, America, the Ottoman Empire, Europe, and the revolution in France. But on another level, Welsh has gone far beyond the title of her book. This is not a book about Edmund Burke as international political theorist. It is, instead, an illuminating book about Burke's conception of politics—one that subverts the simple boundary between domestic and international political thought. More important, this book is suggestive of a broader critique of the boundaries (explicit and implicit) that shape the field of politics, and hence political thought—be it intrastate, interstate, or elsewhere.

Welsh's engagement with this broader critique is, in this reader's assessment, the strength of this book. It is also a weakness. It is a weakness due to the insufficient treatment it receives. This should not be taken as a damning critique of the book as a whole. I am perhaps being a bit unfair by asking Welsh to engage further a topic that it is not her express purpose to address. First and foremost, this is a work on the political thought of Edmund Burke. As such, Welsh has done a superb job. It is not until the all-too-brief conclusion that Welsh presents her argument that the "reinforcing effect" of a politics of homogeneity that is present in the work of Burke is present across a broad spectrum of political thinkers: from liberal to conservative, realist to idealist. Since, to my mind, this was the most intriguing aspect of the book, I was disappointed that Welsh did not do more to develop this argument.

The work is introduced with claims about setting Burke within his context, developing his concept of international legitimacy, and ultimately identifying Burke's theoretical assumptions, with an eye toward how his ideas have been reexamined over the years. The body consists of two main parts: Burke's theory of international society and Burke's crusade against the revolution in France. According to Welsh, we mistreat Burke's thoughts on politics when we attempt to confine them to a sovereign territorial state matrix, or, in other words, if we attempt to confine them to either the field of "political theory" or the field of "international relations." Burke is neither an intra- nor an interstate thinker. As Welsh asserts over and over again, Burke's theory of politics "recognizes no analytical discontinuity between domestic and international politics" (p. 23). In other words, Burke thinks of politics in a broader context, one that exceeds the tired division between "political theory" and "international relations" theory.

Thus, when faced with the revolution in France, Burke, a member of the British parliament, sees no problems with advocating a counterrevolution against Jacobinism in France. Burke's advocation of counterrevolution is not based upon some realist balance-of-power notion that a revolutionary France will take up an opposing position on the chessboard of European politics. It is instead based upon a vision of the revolution in France as a contagion that threatens to destroy legitimate political society across the whole of Europe (Britain included). The parallels with U.S. and British responses to the Soviet Union are quite obvious, and it would have contributed a great deal to Welsh's concluding remarks had she taken the time to draw some of these parallels out a bit further in the main body of the text.

Burke's crusade against the revolution in France emerges from a notion that political society, whether intrastate, interstate, or elsewhere, is dependent upon homogeneity. Where Burke draws the boundaries of homogeneity that are necessary, in his mind, for political society to exist comes through not only in his "Holy War" against the Jacobinism, Atheism, and Regicide of the revolution in France, but also in his "Othering" of the Ottoman Empire. As Welsh points out, Burke's toleration of difference, or diversity, across the British Empire is premised on a homogeneity with respect to "the principles of legitimacy which underlie European international society. For him, 'rightful membership in the family of nations' is premised on conformity with the standards of European 'civilisation' " (p. 81).

As Welsh concludes, the "presumption of homogeneity" that is most explicit in Burke's thinking is not limited to idealistic crusaders and conservative political theorists, but resides within self-professed realists and liberal defenders of the rights of sovereignty as well, the only difference being perhaps the level of explicitness in the thinking. Welsh develops this point through a brief look at George Kennan's "requirements of membership" in the international community.

"What attributes are we, as responsible members of the world community, entitled to look for in the personality of a foreign state, and of Russia in particular?" Welsh cites Kennan as asking (p. 177). While Kennan ostensibly a realist proponent of the heterogeneity of states, Welsh draws out the presumption of homogeneity deeply embedded within his thinking. In order for states to be states, Kennan (and other realists) insists upon certain attributes or a certain personality. In short, they must mirror the characteristics of "the responsible members" of the world community. It is here where Burke the idealist and Kennan the realist coincide. Heterogeneity is only tolerable within certain limits. In short, as Welsh concludes: "Homogeneity is an assumption of international order in *both* [the idealist and the realist] . . . In one it is self-professed; in the other it is implicit" (p. 178). This is a powerful and important point. It is a shame that it is confined to the last ten pages of the book.

Edmund Burke and International Relations is a thoughtful and thorough work on the political ideas of a widely influential thinker. This book should be of interest to political theorists and international relations scholars alike—for as Welsh continually points out, in the political thought of Edmund Burke no real distinction exists between these two fields.

American Politics

Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law. By David Armor. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 271p. $35.00.

Michael Strine, *University of Colorado, Boulder*

Essentialists have argued that one characteristic of the judicial process is the polarization of the parties in dispute. Perhaps because courts often are the locus for resolving disputes over school desegregation, the scholarly literature in this field forms around the poles of compulsory, court-ordered desegregation and voluntarism. Based on research conducted in support of his expert testimony in litigation, David Armor adds to his legacy of contributing to the literature on the politics and impact of school desegregation and to the conflict among scholars in the field. As a collaborator on Coleman's early studies that "refuted" the social science evidence presented in *Brown*, designer of plans for several school districts, and a frequent defense witness in most major desegregation litigation, his career marks consistent wedding of scholarly interests to participation in public policy.

Armor constructs two fundamental pillars for most desegregation orders (legal mandates from federal courts and the harm and benefit thesis) and seeks to expose (or create) cracks in the mortar. While admitting that "just as some despots are enlightened, some court decrees . . . have undoubtedly improved the quality and equity of educational services, at least for some students" (p. 7), he believes that federal judges stretched legal mandates too far after the *Swann* decision by requiring integration, rather than simply desegregation. Armor, in a careful and concise documentation of the shifts in court decisions from *Brown* to *Pitts*, argues that ideological shifts and changing social science evidence are the forces driving the doctrinal evolution. Yet it is possible that a majority agreed with the goal of desegregation earlier, but that the demand for unanimity and realism about policy implementation delayed the expression of majority sentiments within the Court. An alternate explanation of the unanimous decisions in *Green* and *Swann* is the Supreme Court's deference to district court judges' arguments to lessen the vices of judicial policy making.

The harm and benefit theory suggested by the Court first in *Sweatt* institutionalized social scientists as central players in desegregation cases. Armor rightly concludes that evolving social science evidence heavily influenced courts (particularly federal district courts) and policymakers. Yet, the evidence on achievement does not necessarily support his conclusions that blacks have not benefited and whites may have suffered from integrationist policy. While segregated and desegregated blacks show parallel rises in achievement, it does not follow that desegregation did not help children of color. Indeed, recent literature on social movements and the law suggests that rights discourse may have its most powerful influences in spillover effects and symbolic gains. The esteem and progress of black children regardless of school may rise with the investment of resources and integration into the academic and social community. Much of the evidence supports the notion that achievement by minority students has risen without any negative impact on white achievement. Given that whites had access to quality education before desegregation, it is not surprising that white achievement remains constant (and perhaps reassuring given the increases in class sizes).

Armor, joining the growing consensus, finds the present social science knowledge supports socioeconomic class as the principal explanation of educational achievement. Yet, policymakers seem unwilling to recognize and judges unable to deal with such evidence because of the electoral and constitutional ramifications of moving toward residential discrimination and away from liberal-individualist conceptions of law, education, and property. Taken together, social science evidence and legal doctrine then represent only a part of what explains desegregation law and policy.

The goal of eroding the legal and social science justifications is to shift the policy debate toward effectiveness (in terms of both desegregative and educational impact) as the criteria for judging a plan. Armor provides substantial documentary evidence that white flight has minimized any positive effect in terms of racial balance or exposure of mandatory plans. What is missing here is analysis of alternative explanations for the ineffectiveness of plans or for white flight more generally. While white flight often accelerates after desegregation orders, it began well before the onset of integrationist policies. Other scholars have suggested the public stance of school boards, the position of principals, and conflict within social movements as causes for slow or inadequate progress toward desegregation and white flight from public schools.

To his credit, Armor identifies the subjective preferences of whites as causes of the ineffectiveness of mandatory plans and white flight. As a result, Armor feels that no compulsory plans will produce substantial integration or interracial exposure. Armor's advocacy of "equity choice" plans echoes the chorus of those supporting "voluntarist" desegregation plans. Though the studies of magnet, charter, and choice schooling are in the early stages, it is fairly clear that such programs produce little, if any, progress toward greater integration, interracial exposure, or reduced white flight. Armor acknowledges this, but hopes choice will provide a mechanism for those "locked into" ineffective, inner-city schools to have greater access to "good" schools. Still, if whites prefer not to live with or have their children go to school with large numbers of minority students, it seems likely a choice plan either will be unable to absorb all inner-city children into good schools or will spur creation of new mechanisms of avoiding integration.

The result of this marriage of social science research and participation in the policy process is the most impressive compilation of empirical evidence showing a depth of contextual knowledge published to date. Still, the inferences and normative conclusions that follow seem more conjecture than objective interpretation of the evidence presented. By the end, one wonders whether the reifying conflicts in court often drive the interpretation of evidence gathered and the normative conclusions made by social scientists in this field.

Human Reproduction, Emerging Technologies and Conflicting Rights. By Robert Blank and Janna C. Merrick. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995. 269p. $19.95.

Cynthia R. Daniels, *Rutgers University*

In *Human Reproduction, Emerging Technologies and Conflicting Rights*, Robert Blank and Janna C. Merrick provide us with a much-needed overview of the complex public policy questions raised by emerging reproductive technologies. Expanding the discussion well beyond surrogacy and abortion, they address the wide range of ethical and political questions raised by genetic testing, assisted reproduction, sterilization and contraception, fetal tissue and embryo research, maternal-fetal conflict, and intensive care for critically ill newborns. Many emergent technological developments, they argue, have complicated our notion of individual rights to privacy and procreation, introducing third parties—lawyers, physicians, judges, legislators, scientists, and social workers—into reproductive decision making. The quest for more individual control over reproduction has ironically led to the possibility that others will control reproduction.

Blank and Merrick begin with a useful discussion of the concept of rights, tracing the emergence of the idea of reproductive rights into the policy arena. They provide a brief overview of the public policy process, from issue articulation to program evaluation, and suggest the importance, in this case, of the power of the courts in mediating policy conflicts. Their introductory chapter is then followed by seven chapters that analyze the scientific and policy questions raised by a host of technological developments. The chapter on abortion, for instance, traces the history of abortion politics in the United States and provides an extremely useful summary of major court decisions on reproductive choice, shifting public attitudes on abortion, and state laws concerning abortion funding. Other chapters provide similarly well-presented discussions of controversial issues, such as a summary of state legislation concerning nonconsensual sterilization. It will come as a surprise to most, for example, that twenty-one states have statutes permitting nonconsensual sterilization, mostly for the mentally ill or mentally retarded, but in some states for epileptics and, in Delaware, for "habitual criminals" (p. 72).

Subsequent chapters address policy questions that today seem common, but which in the not-too-distant past would have crossed the line into the bizarre: grandmothers giving birth to their own grandchildren; a sister watching the birth of her twin, frozen after fertilization and born years after her own birth. Blank and Merrick provide us with useful tools to unravel the complex ethical and political questions raised by the strange brew of procreative technologies.

While their book provides a highly useful summary of the issues, they are perhaps better at clarifying the questions and paradoxes posed by reproductive technologies than at providing us with firm answers. As they ask, under what circumstances is the state justified in intervening in the reproductive process by imposing restrictions or requirements on parents or potential parents? While exploring state limitations on procreation, we're still left (as perhaps we must be) with no clear answers to questions regarding, for instance, maternal-fetal conflict or conflict over gestational versus genetic parentage.

Their work also suggests important questions about the paradox of negative and positive rights in liberal theory and practice. As they illustrate: "The development of new technological capabilities ... has created a paradox with regard to reproductive rights. Although individuals can now choose from among a wide range of technologies ... to provide these technologies to all persons as a positive right is financially prohibitive and would divert resources from other areas of health care. To deny them to individuals who desire them and need them to exercise their reproductive autonomy, however, negates their right to reproduce in any meaningful sense" (p. 224). Our inability to provide positive access thus may undermine the most basic right to reproductive choice.

Blank and Merrick's book also suggests important questions regarding liberal citizenship. How do emerging reproductive technologies, in fetal technologies or fetal surgery for instance, challenge the concept of "individual rights"? This book would perhaps be best read in conjunction with a series of more philosophical articles on the meaning of "rights" or "personhood" or "autonomy." The work of Martha Minow, Jennifer Nedelsky, Mary Shanley, or Lawrence Tribe comes to mind.

In the end, Blank and Merrick warn against the commercialization of reproduction (which threatens to widen social inequities) and the potential abuses of reproductive control (which may be used to monitor or restrict the procreative rights of less-powerful populations). Yet the answer, they argue, is not to ban their use, but to ensure that proper national standards are enforced to protect citizens. Toward this end, they call for the creation of a national commission that could address the balance between societal good and individual rights presented by new technologies.

While providing some broad recommendations, the authors are right to avoid narrow positions on the issues, providing us instead with a work that will be useful to those students (like all of us) who are struggling to sort out the technological, ethical, and political questions raised by reproductive technologies. In this, they have done a fine job.

Cultivating Congress: Constituents, Issues, and Interests in Agriculture Policymaking. By William P. Browne. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. 295p. $29.95 hard, $14.95, soft.

Scott H. Ainsworth, *University of Georgia*

As someone who teaches introductory American politics to sections with over three hundred students, I find the iron triangle concept quite handy for pedagogical purposes. Browne, however, has little use for the iron triangle concept or its numerous variations. Based on his interviews with 113 randomly selected legislative enterprises (84 members and 29 senators), Browne concludes that the relationships within the agricultural policy domain are not consistent with the relationships inherent in iron triangles. After reading Browne's *Cultivating Congress*, I am convinced that the convenience of the iron triangle metaphor comes at considerable cost. The agriculture policy domain is much more open and fluid than the iron triangle metaphor would lead us to believe. Browne argues that "agricultural policy works ... because it is accommodative to diverse and even conflicting member interests" (p. 28).

Browne's view of the post-reform Congress underpins his analysis. Browne contends that in the post-reform era legislators operate within their congressional enterprises, as first described by Loomis in his 1979 *Publius* article and Salisbury and Shepsle in their 1981 *Legislative Studies Quarterly* article. To characterize legislative enterprises, both Loomis and Salisbury and Shepsle emphasize the importance of personal staff for legislators chiefly focused on district concerns. The predominance of enterprises in legislators' day-to-day lives affected the roles of the more traditional institutional structures. As members' enterprises were becoming stronger and more central to legislators' political existence, party caucuses and committee structures weakened.

With that view of Congress as a backdrop, Browne dismantles the iron triangle metaphor one leg at a time. Within Congress, agricultural policy was not dominated by a small, exclusive set of legislators. Indeed, to Browne's surprise, virtually every respondent was active in the agricultural policy domain. Such wide-ranging activity, Browne argues, is not indicative of narrow iron triangles. Among those legislators with an active concern for agriculture policy, a large number were successful at affecting policy. For instance, approximately three-quarters of the enterprises secured changes in bill language or enabling provisions. Such across-the-board success belies the iron triangle notion of exclusion.

Browne notes that agencies have had less discretion to maintain their own independent relations with members of Congress since the 1980s when the executive branch sought to maintain better control of the Department of Agriculture. On the congressional side of the relationship, enterprises viewed agency reports as "unreadable or too difficult to scan for [politically] relevant information" (p. 153). The data were "seldom broken down by state and never by district" (p. 153). Respondents reported that they were much more likely to interact with the Congressional Budget Office or the Library of Congress. The lack of agency interactions belies the supposed iron triangle coziness between congressional committees and executive agencies.

Even the relationship between members and interest groups has changed considerably. Committee members still work with groups and value their expertise, but those members not on agricultural committees eschew groups. Through their enterprises, members "have the capacity to reach to and to listen to anyone and everyone" (p. 135). "Constituent informants appear to be replacing interest group representatives, just as group leaders replaced partisan leaders in the 1920s" (p. 135).

The results of the more open, inclusive agriculture policy domain are clear. The well-known logrolls of the 1960s between rural and urban districts yielding both food stamps and subsidies for agriculture are no longer the norm. Large omnibus bills now prevail. "Food stamps were joined, in post-reform era legislation, by world hunger, and domestic nutrition programs, consumer legislation, environmental and energy programs, regulations for animal welfare, subsidies for trade enhancements ..., and farm worker programs" (p. 34). One could argue that issue fragmentation has led to more inclusion and more logrolling, but Browne contends that logrolling itself has died. Browne writes that "explicit trades and logrolls are seldom necessary ... A member need not go into the details of trading before doing a favor for the Tennessee Walking Horse industry. To serve the farm sector broadly, and keep farm bills popular, the agriculture committees accommodate supportive members and their industries" (p. 187).

In the end, I am convinced that Browne is largely correct. The predominance of enterprises has fundamentally altered the policymaking process. Of course, given the breadth of Browne's analysis and the richness and complexity of the research area, it is inevitable that some questions and concerns remain. I would like the means of committee gatekeeping to have received more attention. For instance, Browne argues that the increased openness of floor proceedings in the post-reform Congress has greatly affected policymaking. However, Browne also reports that noncommittee members are most successful at affecting policy by working *with* the committees. Questions of jurisdiction and gatekeeping, therefore, naturally arise. Although Browne touches on these issues, the means by which noncommittee members gain access and influence to policy domains demands further exploration.

For much of the analysis, senators and House members appear to be grouped together. Of course, the House and Senate electoral concerns, staff structures, committee and leadership systems, and floor procedures vary considerably. Finally, for my taste, the tables should have been integrated into the text rather than hidden away in the appendix. I realize that in part this is an editor's choice, but it is important for editors to know that some readers want the formal details spelled out in the text.

Browne is one of the foremost experts on agricultural policy formation. However, even those not interested in agricultural policy can learn much from Browne's work. Browne gives appropriate emphasis to the fact that as Congress has changed, the tactics of the members of the policy domain also change. Given Browne's detailed discussions of the post-reform Congress, the book would be appropriate for graduate seminars or advanced undergraduate courses on Congress as well as on public policy or interest groups.

Under the best of circumstances, soaking and poking in Washington is a difficult endeavor. To our benefit, Browne has persevered and completed a compelling argument that social scientists should reevaluate the dynamics of the agriculture policymaking process. I highly recommend the book to anyone interested in policymaking, issue agendas, or lobbying and interest groups.

Congress' Permanent Minority: Republicans in the U.S. House. By William F. Connelly, Jr., and John J. Pitney, Jr. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994. 180p. $16.95.

Christopher J. Bailey, *Keele University, United Kingdom*

For five decades, political scientists have taken to heart Speaker Reeds's admonition that: "The right of the minority is to draw its salaries and its function is to make a quorum." Formal theorists have constructed models of Congress which treat legislators as interchangeable units regardless of majority or minority status. A great deal is known about "minimum winning coalitions," "structure-induced equilibria," and "shirking," but almost nothing about the behavior of a minority party in a majoritarian institution. Empirical studies have similarly concentrated on the antics of the majority party. Much has been discovered about the nature of party leadership, committee assignments, and legislative goals, but almost all from the perspective of the majority party. The minority party appears to have all but disappeared from the map of congressional scholarship.

Connelly and Pitney have taken a step to fill this enormous gap in the literature with a study of the Republicans in the House of Representatives. The book traces the recent history of the party, details the generational and ideological divisions within its membership, examines the reasons why the party had been in the minority for so long, and offers a few suggestions about how majority status could be achieved. Events obviously have made parts of the book rather redundant: A question mark might save the choice of title. It would be a mistake, however, to regard the book as simply detailing yesterday's news. Written in a lively, accessible style, the book is descriptively rich and offers a ready source of information about the motivations and divisions that are still apparent in the Republican Party.

Drawing upon material gleaned from more than 100 interviews with representatives and staff conducted between 1987 and 1992, and benefiting from their own experience as American Political Science Association Congressional Fellows, Connelly and Pitney have produced a book that will keep even the most addicted congressional junky happy. The book is full of the color, fury, and absurdities of politics. The petty jealousies, partisan scheming, and byzantine parliamentary maneuvers of politicians that are so often absent from the pages of political science are recounted in enthusiastic detail. A story of how Speaker Wright circumvented House rules to secure passage of a budget reconciliation bill in 1987 (pp. 82–83), for example, serves as a reminder of what makes Congress such a fascinating topic of study. It is a story that involved defeat of a "self-executing rule," the adjournment and reconvening of the House for a new "legislative day," and the switching of votes after voting time had expired.

Unfortunately, *Congress' Permanent Minority* is less successful as a work of political science. Although Connelly and Pitney pose a number of important questions about the nature of party leadership and member motivation in a minority party, the answers they provide tend to be impressionistic rather than systematic. Part of the problem lies in an exaggerated sense of the uniqueness of the Republicans. Demographic trends, in particular, are presented with little reference or comparison to the Democrats. The ironic result of this failure to place developments in the Republican Party in a wide context is that Connelly and Pitney fail to bring out precisely what is unique about the Republicans. Of greater concern, however, is the lack of adequate measurement in the book. Qualitative, even anecdotal, evidence has considerable value, but much of this value is lost if not backed by some quantitative data.

Examples where stronger comparisons with the Democrats would have strengthened the analysis abound in the book. A section on generational change (pp. 22–24) contains no reference to trends in the Democratic Party. Such an omission is important because it means that it is impossible to arrive at any conclusions about whether the influx of younger members is unique to the Republicans or part of a broader pattern of change. Work by Eric Uslaner suggests that the lack of comity and loss of "institutional memory" that Connelly and Pitney ascribe as a consequence of generational change is not unique to the Republicans. A similar problem besets claims about the multitude of conflicting demands upon Republicans (p. 9). All legislators have to balance a variety of calls to duty, and the Republicans are not unique in having to juggle their various constituencies.

Two basic problems of measurement are evident in the book, both flowing from the extensive use of interview data. First, the book covers only the period from 1987 to 1993. This focus means that it is nearly impossible for Connelly and Pitney to answer what is perhaps the most interesting question raised in the book. In what ways did the goals and motivations of Republicans change over time as the fact of their minority status became more and more established? Some method of comparing attitudes or behavior is desperately needed to answer this question. Second, the book contains little hard data for the main period covered. Anecdotes are wonderful for painting a picture, but more systematic evidence on such subjects as factions, leadership, attitudes, and goals would have strengthened the book.

The overriding impression gained from reading *Congress' Permanent Minority* is that an opportunity has been partially missed. The book identifies an important research area, raises a large number of questions that are of interest to congressional scholars, contains a wealth of qualitative data, and is readily accessible, but it should have been twice as long. The book, as it stands, contains sufficient insights and plenty of information to make it of value to a wide readership, but a more systematic research design would have made it an important book.

Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act 1965–1990. Edited by Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 503p. $24.95.

Mark E. Rush, *Washington and Lee University*

Davidson and Grofman have assembled a superior and comprehensive work on voting rights, which certainly belongs on the bookshelf of every political scientist who has an interest in the field. Furthermore, this work belongs in that special section of the shelves reserved for other classics on voting and representation such as Pitkin's (1967) *The Concept of Representation* and Dixon's (1968) *Democratic Representation*. Davidson and Grofman's work will certainly be to the field of voting rights what Campbell et al.'s (1960) *The American Voter* was to the field of electoral behavior.

Davidson and Grofman, along with the impressive team of researchers that were assembled for *Quiet Revolution*, demonstrate that, despite recent arguments to the contrary, the Voting Rights Act—and, specifically, its forcing southern states to shift from at-large to single-member voting schemes—is the one factor that has caused the increase in black representation in the South.

The book consists of nine chapters that detail the impact of the Voting Rights Act in the southern states (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia) and several summary chapters that draw together the implications of the state-specific ones. At the end of each chapter are sets of tables that supplement the narratives on each state.

The work is a great contribution to voting rights scholarship. It demonstrates clearly that the forced use of majority-minority districts in the South has been the most important factor in ensuring the election of black officials. In addition, the work qualifies the conclusions of Susan Welch's (1990) "The Impact of At-Large Elections on the Representation of Blacks and Hispanics." While Welch demonstrated that black representation had increased significantly in larger cities of 50,000 or more despite their use of at-large electoral systems, Grofman and Davidson show that this result does not hold for smaller municipalities (pp. 312–15).

It is no exaggeration to state that *Quiet Revolution*'s findings should put to rest any remaining controversy about the Voting Rights Act's impact upon "first and second generation" (pp. 14–17) issues of voting rights. In this respect, the book shows that majority-minority districts have a clear remedial impact in areas, such as the South, where minority enfranchisement was resisted and minority vote dilution tactics were rampant.

Having said this, *Quiet Revolution* lays the groundwork for future research. In the introduction, the authors point out that they purposely did not choose to address third- and fourth-generation voting rights issues that concern (1) the role minority elected officials are able to play in the legislative process and (2) the extent to which the policy outputs generated by the process in which they play a role actually make a difference to minority constituents. While such issues have been the focus of scholars such as Lani Guinier, *Quiet Revolution* does not offer any suggestions regarding strategies for tackling them.

In this respect, *Quiet Revolution* is chiefly an assessment of the effectiveness of tactics used under the auspices of the Voting Rights Act. It leaves to other scholars the task of deciding when and under what conditions such tactics should be employed in order to enhance a given minority group's representational opportunities. *Quiet Revolution* indicates clearly that the transition to an alternative electoral system *can* increase the representation of minority groups; however, the Voting Rights Act was a drastic measure designed solely to deal with the particularly egregious circumstances of racial discrimination that characterized the South.

I raise this issue *not* as a criticism of the book, but to emphasize its scope. By demonstrating convincingly the impact of the Voting Rights Act, *Quiet Revolution* provides a detailed, thorough response to skeptics who challenge the utility of majority-minority districting. But the skeptics are not likely to be silenced. Under circumstances such as those that occurred in the American South, drastic measures were certainly necessary to restore justice to the electoral process. But what if there is no pattern of discrimination? When and for which minority groups should electoral systems be changed?

Questions such as these remain unanswered and are the topic for debates concerning electoral reform and constitutional engineering. Scholars concerned with either topic will certainly find *Quiet Revolution* to be indispensable.

In sum, Davidson and Grofman are to be commended by their colleagues for the service they have performed in pulling together the vast amount of research that went into *Quiet Revolution*. It is no light read—getting through the empirical analysis will require perseverance for many readers—however, anyone who does sit down with *Quiet Revolution* will quickly realize that they are reading a work that is certain to become both a standard and a classic.

The Lost Promise of Progressivism. By Eldon J. Eisenach. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994. 291p. $29.95.

R. Jeffrey Lustig, *California State University, Sacramento*

The Progressive Era continues to spark intense debate because it saw not only broad political protest and economic transformation but also the forging of the modern American political identity and narrative of national destiny. In *The Lost Promise of Progressivism*, Eldon Eisenach presents a fresh account of the sources and nature of this identity, finding it rooted in the mission of America as a redeemer nation, guided by a "national public good" and distinguished sharply from that of the interest-oriented liberalism to follow.

The public doctrine that caught the essence of Progressive vision and purpose for Eisenach began to emerge already in the 1880s as a group of prominent academics, publicists, and institution builders limned the horizons of the world beyond the interest-brokered and rights-oriented regime of courts and parties. Working outside existing channels, helping build institutions of a national civil society, and still fired by the live coals of the New England narrative, they created the vision of an American now nationalized, historicized, and "spiritualized." This emerging counter-elite saw their new research universities, professional associations, journals, and philanthropic organizations, Eisenach writes, as voluntarist "parastates" destined to subvert and transform the formalistic organs of the constitutional state.

The volume focuses on the lives and works of nineteen authors of this new doctrine: Henry Carter Adams, Jane Adams, W. D. P. Bliss, John Bates Clark, John R. Commons, Charles Cooley, John Dewey, Richard Ely, Franklin H. Giddings, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Arthur T. Hadley, Edmund James, Florence Kelley, Simon Patten, E. A. Ross, Vida Scudder, Edwin Seligman, Albert Shaw and Albion Small—fifteen men and four women, eighteen Protestants (fourteen of Congregationalist backgrounds) and one Jew, many alumni of German university study.

Speaking for America's new industrial and intellectual core, this "clerisy" preached the gospel of a nation united by common commitment to public good, rather than by laws or parties, and dedicated to "integration" and duty, rather than competition and rights. "For more than a generation they went from victory to victory" (p. 45), until by World War I "all areas of American life—even business—appeared to have become moralized by the common good" (p. 248).

An extraordinarily wide-ranging and meticulously researched study, *Lost Promise* reveals a ready grasp of many areas of American history, especially religious doctrine and vision. If its contest between good and right sounds familiar, it is because Eisenach sees us caught in "oscillations of memory and imagination" about national identity and requiring guidance from our Progressive past (p. 258). Although numerous cameo portraits sometimes clog the narrative, a difficult style may discourage nonspecialists, and unanswered questions will trouble specialists, Eisenach succeeds in offering this guidance and in telling a previously untold story. He writes as a political historian, institutional analyst, scholar of political theory, and public moralist himself.

Yet the latter voices unfortunately are not as persuasive as the former. That this doctrine played a determinative role in Progressivism and expressed a sublimated religiosity he does demonstrate clearly; that this outlook *was* Progressivism he does not. The claim that these people's efforts caught Progressivism "in all its variety and inner conflict" (p. 31) is unconvincing on its face. The drift toward bureaucracy noted by Wiebe was absent from these people's concerns, as were scientific themes generally. Worker and immigrant enthusiasm for industrial democracy and antagonism to corporate power were distasteful to them, nor are the conflicts over methods of corporate regulation treated here. The "inner conflicts" between elites and grassroots or between moralists and a gospel of efficiency that saw moral discourse as obsolete are unaccounted for. One is uncertain how Eisenach regards Teddy Roosevelt or Lincoln Steffens or Hiram Johnson, for he dismisses rather than engages alternative viewpoints as products of periphery and "backwater," with an aloofness reminiscent of Hofstadter.

Woodrow Wilson emerges as the villain of the piece because he sacrificed the integrity of the new vision to expedience, brokered its fruits back into an interests framework and laid the groundwork for the New Deal's "revenge of the periphery." In the end, the victory is undone and Eisenach sees the fruits of the productive, intellectual core harvested in a "populist-peripheral appropriation" by interests bereft of any "new values, new ideas" of their own. Eisenach sought to avoid both History as Ritual and History as Jeremiad (p. 41), but his account becomes jeremiad, as proposed in its title, as he laments the "radical asymmetry between the production and use" of political ideas (pp. 259–60).

Further questions would have to be asked and a more critical analysis attempted to gauge the character of this doctrine as theory. Did the attempt to square personal freedom with solidarist association (chap. 6) succeed? Can the idea of a clerisy (evidently Coleridge's spiritual third estate) be reconciled with democracy? If these intellectuals are Puritan heirs, what has happened to the dark certainties of sin, iniquity, and predestination? Hegelian historicism provides one part of the answer. Comte's Religion of Humanity provides another, though unnoted in this account. (Gillis Harp's *Comte and the Reconstruction of American Liberalism, 1865–1920* [1995] treats this well).

More politically, if parastates, like real states, are agencies of rule, then Eisenach's public doctrine proposes the grant of public powers to informal private associations (as in World War I, chap. 7). That is the political essence, however, of corporatism and Eisenach rejects the corporatist reading of this period (though not entirely of what followed). Herbert Croly spoke clearest on matters of sovereignty and authority, and he flatly denied that voluntary associations were competent for the reconstructive tasks required. But Croly, though frequently cited, is also excluded from the sample. Finally, we need to know the reasons for the doctrine's sudden collapse and disintegration. Was the victory only illusory and the attempt to finesse power misconceived? Eisenach notes the collapse in passing but does not analyze it further.

In a period again bedeviled by questions about the public good, exposure to these arguments is instructive. Whether a consensus "that redeems all particularity" (p. 256) can be regarded as a discoverable presence rather than a task to be achieved, whether it should be conceived as a homogeneous whole, and whether public virtues can be developed by parastates or a national government is doubtful. C. Wright Mills, after Dewey and the populists, urged that the framing of a national public interest requires an already-functioning society of publics. Still, to have insisted on the inseparability of political institutions from moral life and to have connected patriotism with "mutual obligation and social justice" were indeed "no small achievements" (p. 258). Eisenach's historical retrieval enables careful consideration of these achievements and establishes a fruitful new vantage on a much-studied era.

Party Conflict and Community Development: Postwar Politics in Ann Arbor. By Samuel J. Eldersveld. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995. 271p. $19.95 paper.

William Crotty, *Northeastern University*

What can you say about Ann Arbor, Michigan, a relatively small university town in the Midwest that could be of interest to political scientists? Quite a bit it turns out if you are Samuel J. Eldersveld, the author of a number of landmark studies and, not to be ignored, a participant (as a former mayor and Democratic Party leader and party builder) in the events recounted.

In combining the tools of social science research with his own personal experiences in policymaking and in developing a competitive party politics, Professor Eldersveld has developed one of the more original contributions to a genre not currently noted for its concern with questions of mass participation and organized political conflict within constraints posed by institutional structures. *Party Conflict and Community Development*, although different in emphasis and conception, bears comparison with Robert Dahl's earlier classic, *Who Governs?*, and might well signal a return to a concern with the political structuring of policy choices, mass ties to elite decision making and, within this context, fundamental questions of the nature and quality of democratic performance.

Eldersveld's objectives were to describe carefully political organization, leadership, and decision making in Ann Arbor and, more important, to analyze the role of party competition in the achievement of an effective and attractive community in postwar America" (p. 2).

In approaching his study, Eldersveld develops a broad conceptual model, or orientation, that might well serve to stimulate inquiries in cities of comparable size and political background. He looks at Ann Arbor over a period of 45 years (1945–90) and its evolution from a staid, one-party backwater through a series of political, demographic, economic and social changes into the Ann Arbor of today. In the process, Eldersveld supplements his own experience and observations with an extensive and unique data inventory that includes the elite characteristics and views of candidates for public office; all votes cast in local elections for party, candidates and referenda; content analyses of the city's newspaper; official city council, budgetary and administrative records and reports; surveys of Ann Arbor's population in 1981 and 1984, of the Republican and Democratic party leadership in 1980, 1982 and 1986, and of student political views in 1985 and 1987; an analysis of interest group leaders and their impact on policymaking; budgetary analyses for each of the years covered in the study; and related inventories and data archives. To make his comparisons more interesting and place his research in a broader context, he includes the results of studies of other urban areas in the United States and data from Swedish, Dutch, and other related investigations. Overall, it is a formidable analytic accomplishment.

It is difficult to summarize the many significant points the study contributes. At one time or another, Eldersveld treats economic development; the shifting demographics in the city and their political implications; the emergence and significance of organized political competition; the ties between mass publics and elite decision makers; community mores and values; the role of political parties and interest groups in influencing the political agenda; elite values and behavior; the emerging importance of women and minorities in local politics; the importance of institutional factors in conditioning outcomes; differences in budgetary priorities in response to political conditions; the tension between economic development and social priorities; the social and political forces that drive change over time; and, most broadly, the significance of these concerns for a democratic politics.

The overall message is clear enough, however. Elections matter. Political parties are important. Both are critical to democratic performance. Politics is important for policymaking, even decisive in determining the alternatives to be pursued; organized political conflict is essential to informed decision making and a government responsive to its citizenry; political parties and competitive elections provide a critical function in framing choice and holding officeholders accountable; and responsive democracy is advanced through organized and balanced political conflict.

"The position we argue here is that political conflict has a critical relevance for local government. Conflict and competition among political forces, between political structures as parties, and between elected political leaders in electoral democracies can lead to elite awareness of community problems, can force leaders to listen to the 'noise' at the mass level, can force them to develop legislation to deal with human needs—in short, can make political leaders more responsive."

Ann Arbor can be seen as an urban success story. While suffering from many of the urban ills that currently afflict all cities, it has proven both pragmatic and moderate in its balancing of conflicting interests, dynamic in its policymaking and competitive and electorally responsive in its politics. Overall, its attractive life style has made it a valued place to live.

In reviewing the developments in Ann Arbor's postwar evolution one is struck by the moderation and progressiveness of its civic leadership in general and using the national party of the 1980s (and today) as a point of reference, the views of the leaders of the Republican Party in particular. There are consistent ideological differences and priority emphases between the parties (Republicans placed a higher value on economic development; Democrats favored paying greater attention to social problems), but the leadership of both was marked by a constructive and forward-looking approach to civic concerns. Is this one byproduct of the city housing one of the nation's greatest universities, or is it essentially the case for most urban areas? The university distinctively flavored Ann Arbor's positive development. Clearly it has been a factor, directly and indirectly, of consequence although the extent of its impact is difficult to measure.

Samuel J. Eldersveld has produced a masterful study of democratic representation at the urban level, one that returns the emphasis to the political forces and institutions that shape community life. Perceptive and innovative, it should take its place as one of the very best the discipline has to offer on political representation at the local level and on the political forces that shape modern urban America.

Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics. By William A. Fischel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995. 415p. $45.00.

David A. Schultz, *University of Minnesota*

Land use politics and regulatory takings issues are often ignored by political scientists. As recently as the late 1980s, this topic was confined mainly to lawyers and law reviews, leaving scholars such as myself to be told that questions about property rights were politically unimportant. However, changing court doctrine, increased environmental legislation, and a more aggressive lobby representing property interests has altered this. The result is increased saliency and visibility of conflicts surrounding the scope of permissible governmental authority to regulate or acquire private property.

Books and articles written to address land use politics reveal that several camps have emerged. Conservatives argue that current government efforts to regulate property are overzealous and that the current legal protections for property rights are inadequate. Proponents of environmental laws believe that current laws favor private property interests at the expense of the environment. A third set of arguments suggests that regulatory takings is not a legal doctrine but a political process issue. This is where Fischel's book fits in.

Regulatory Takings brings needed sanity and clarity to land use debates. Drawing upon both legal and political insights, but overall approaching the topic as an economist, Fischel moves beyond the law to examine the problem of regulatory takings. Cross-cultural comparisons show that private property is better protected in the United States than in any other country in the world. Yet its status must be examined in terms not simply of what protections the law affords it, but also of what protections the political process grants it. When the latter area is considered, property owners usually have ample opportunity to protect their interests in state legislatures and through Congress.

According to Fischel, a legal theory of takings needs to be connected to a theory of the courts and the role of judicial review in our society. He argues that scholars should assess both the efficacy of the judiciary being used to protect property interests as well as the legitimacy of it undertaking such an activity in a democratic society. In chapter one, Fischel examines *Pennsylvania v. Mahon* (1922), the controlling Supreme Court case on regulatory takings. Examining the effect of the decision upon Scranton, Pennsylvania, he finds that the Court had almost no impact upon the issues surrounding the case, leading him to wonder what role the judiciary should have.

Chapter three turns to the question of the democratic character of judicial protection of property rights. Noting that since 1938 the Court has given legislatures broad authority to regulate property, Fischel contends that the main defect in post–New Deal jurisprudence has been to "neglect the differences among the types of governments and among the objections of regulation" (p. 134). Expanding upon Ely's (1980) arguments in *Democracy and Distrust* and upon the logic of footnote four in *United States v. Carolene Products* (1938), Fischel notes that there may be times when the political process is closed to the protection of property interests, or that property owners may constitute "discrete and insular" minorities who need more extensive protection from political majorities. When property interests are "economically inelastic" they may be considered discrete and insular interests worthy of more expanded judicial protection.

It is more likely that property interests are inelastic in smaller homogenous political units than in larger ones. For Fischel, in larger political units, such as state governments and Congress, the diversity of political interests makes it less likely that property interests will be placed at a disadvantage. Yet in small political communities, especially when property interests do not have the option of either exit or voice (in Hirschman's sense of the terms), property interests may be least equipped to defend themselves. Hence, for Fischel, local governments, administrative agencies, and judges all need to be policed to ensure that they do not unfairly limit the ability of property interests to protect themselves politically.

Regulatory Takings is a strong book in many ways. Its reminder of the general support for property interests in the United States, as well its effort to reformulate the debate about the protection of property interests into a political question is a good antidote to claims that the law fails to provide adequate support for property interests. Moreover, efforts to incorporate a theory of property protection into post–New Deal trends in jurisprudence seem to parallel what the Supreme Court appears to be doing in recent cases such as *Dolan v. Tigard* (1994). Finally, reformulating many of the problems of land use politics so that they can be understood economically sheds important light on the topic.

The book is not without criticism. Stylistically, it has an annoying sense of self-promotion and reference, often noting in narrative style conferences the author has attended and debates he has had with others on the subject. Substantively, the book makes certain questionable assumptions. Even in small homogeneous political units where property interests are inelastic, such interests may still have significant political resources by the very fact that they are often better financed and organized than any other interests in the community. In fact, they may be one of the interests that closes the political process to others. Hence, using economic inelasticity may not be the most appropriate way to redefine what "discrete and insular" means. Furthermore, no evidence is offered that property interests are often closed out of the political process. Instead, the book points in the opposite direction, suggesting that perhaps no major rethinking of court doctrine is needed to address the allegations of excessive property regulation in society. One is thus left with the conclusion that if the American democratic process already gives property more protection than any other country in the world, then why do we need to reformulate constitutional doctrine or a theory of judicial review to protect property? Missing from the book, then, is a detailed analysis of what constitutes adequate protection for property interests.

Despite such criticisms, the book is an excellent addition to the debate on regulatory takings, deserving to be read by all interested in this topic.

To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation. By Scott Douglas Gerber. New York: New York University Press, 1995. 331p. $45.00.

Mark A. Graber, *University of Maryland at College Park*

Constitutional interpretation is the most mined region of contemporary legal scholarship. Hardly a week goes by without a new article or book laying claim to a new nugget of wisdom, an ore out of which the author fashions the magic key that will enable justices to make decisions on the basis of the Constitution rather than on personal fiat. More often than not, however, the subsequent title search reveals at least four previous claimants to that piece of intellectual property, and close examination reveals subtle flaws in the author's constitutional gem.

Scott Douglas Gerber's *To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation* is another in the long line of works that purports to detail the correct theory of the judicial function in constitutional cases. In Gerber's opinion, "the Constitution should be interpreted in light of the natural-rights political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence" (p. 17), and the Supreme Court is "the principle guardian of the people's natural rights" (p. 93). On this basis, *To Secure These Rights* defends a "liberal originalism" (p. 6), an originalist reading of the Constitution that calls on the federal judiciary to protect rights to gender equality, privacy, and a certain minimum of the bare necessities of life. Gerber does not, however, reflexively adopt every position fashionable on the American left. When the Constitution is interpreted consistently with the eighteenth-century liberalism of the framers, Gerber believes, capital punishment is permitted, affirmative action is forbidden, and it cannot be determined whether women have a right to an abortion. One may quibble with whether these policies are as consistent with an eighteenth-century liberalism as Gerber claims. Still, reading a work of constitutional theory that does not simply consist of new arguments for "our side" is very refreshing.

The strength of *To Secure These Rights* lies in the writing. Gerber's prose is remarkably clear and lucid. His is the first constitutional theory book in years that does not have to be read repeatedly to be understood. The key themes of the book are outlined early and plainly stated; the arguments in the book are intelligent and plausible. For these reasons, *To Secure These Rights* is a far better text for undergraduate classroom reading than recent tomes written by much bigger names in American constitutional law.

Professors who find *To Secure These Rights* rewarding pedagogically, however, may find the book frustrating intellectually. Gerber repeatedly highlights the originality of his claims, but most of his arguments have been made before and with more sophistication. Gary Jacobsohn has previously emphasized the significance of the Declaration of Independence for constitutional interpretation, Sotirios Barber and others have highlighted the role of natural rights in constitutional exegesis, the emphasis on Lockean liberalism in *To Secure These Rights* echoes Rogers Smith's *Liberalism and American Constitutional Law*, and Gerber's discussion of the distinction between the specific and general intentions of the framers seems identical to Ronald Dworkin's distinction between concepts and conceptions. To be sure, Gerber's blending of these themes (and his discussion of a Lockean duty of charity) seem distinctive. Moreover, his relatively short discussions of topics ranging from the ideological origins of the American Revolution to the nature of the impeachment power provide an excellent introduction to these subjects for the novice. Still, experienced scholars are likely to be familiar with Gerber's arguments and find them insufficiently developed to challenge their preexisting views.

Gerber's arguments also often lack a certain precision. Thus, when defending the proposition that the Supreme Court is the institution most responsible for protecting natural rights, Gerber relies on assertions by prominent framers that the Court should have the power to declare laws unconstitutional (pp. 101–3). None of the quotes he uses, however, claims that this judicial power was the most important constitutional protection for constitutional rights. There are passages in *The Federalist Papers* that do suggest that judicial review provided the most basic security for constitutional rights. Nevertheless, Publius at other points, most notably *Federalist* 10, 57, and 85, claims that other institutions play a more significant role in protecting rights. Gerber's claim may be correct, but his presentation is too brief to influence the views of those familiar with the debate over the intended place of the federal judiciary in the constitutional order.

Gerber's imprecision is particularly troubling when he looks for evidence that early courts understood themselves as protecting the natural rights of American citizens. *To Secure These Rights* does quote many early American judicial opinions that clearly used natural law to reach their legal conclusions (pp. 115–24). Gerber does not distinguish, however, between judicial assertions that statutes should be interpreted whenever possible to be consistent with natural law, judicial assertions that explicitly stated constitutional liberties should be interpreted as protecting natural law rights, and judicial assertions that courts should protect natural rights not explicitly stated in the Constitution. The last claim is crucial to the thesis of *To Secure These Rights*, but Justice Chase's controversial opinion in *Calder v. Bull* is the only judicial utterance Gerber cites that is precisely on this point.

Finally, many scholars will be annoyed by Gerber's frequent claim that justices who do not follow his constitutional prescriptions substitute "their personal and political views" for the rule of law (p. 202). Indeed, Gerber suggests that justices who do not follow his principles (i.e., virtually every twentieth-century Supreme Court justice) should be impeached (p. 149) and that Americans should stage a revolution should the Court deviate too sharply from the gospel according to *To Secure These Rights* (p. 204). The notion that alternative constitutional theories might be good faith mistakes does not occur to Gerber, as, to be fair, it does not occur to rival constitutional theorists.

To Secure These Rights is a first-rate trade book masquerading as an average academic book. Gerber's arguments, while as plausible and intelligent as the arguments in other works on constitutional theory, are not as original as he thinks and are not sufficiently developed to convince persons not convinced beforehand. Nevertheless, the book is a delight to read. Gerber states the principles of a liberal originalism far more clearly and accessibly than any other work on constitutional interpretation. For this reason, *To Secure These Rights* is a rare and welcome addition to already overcrowded bookshelves devoted to analyses of the judicial function in constitutional cases.

Democracy in the Fifty States. By Kim Quaile Hill. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994. 157p. $32.50.

Gerald C. Wright, *Indiana University*

This short book seeks to measure the level of democracy in the states. It shows how democracy has changed over a forty-year period, and it demonstrates that state differences in democratization have policy consequences. The book constitutes a challenge for Americanists who for the most part assume that politics in the United States, including the states and localities, is clearly democratic and that we just need to figure out how it works. Hill's book questions that central assumption and shows that, given his definition, many of the fifty states are not very democratic at all.

Fifty States is written for political scientists, to be sure, but also for the general public. To make the book accessible to the latter, Hill has kept jargon, detailed theoretical arguments, extended data analysis, and even citations to a minimum. This makes for an unusually readable book, but it will frustrate some readers who require all the academic detail that bores the lay reader.

Democracy here is defined entirely in procedural terms: the states are evaluated on their extension of voting rights, the competitiveness of the political parties, and the level of turnout in state elections. More of each of these makes a state more democratic. Hill lays out a continuum for classifying the states running from democracy through polyarchy to oligarchy. Through most of the book, however, the states are classified more frequently in terms of "democratic," "polyarchic," and varying degrees of "less democratic."

His evaluations of the states are generated by empirical examination of the states across two time periods: the 1940s, which preceded the extension of voting rights and the wholesale intrusion of the federal government into the "natural" processes of state politics, and the 1980s, which ought to reflect the effects of these changes. The first three of his five empirical chapters look at the coverage of voting rights, interparty competition, and electoral participation, respectively. The analysis of each is grounded in a brief historical discussion followed by an analysis and comparison of the states at the two time points. He concludes each chapter with the classification of the states in terms of democratization.

Many of the empirical patterns are familiar: The southern states fare miserably, particularly in the earlier period due to the purposeful disenfranchisement of African Americans. Obvious political and structural changes have brought the southern states closer to the non-South, so that by the 1980s the southern states do not lag as far behind.

The fourth empirical chapter of *Fifty States* combines the three indices using factor analysis to achieve overall scores for the states on their democratic quality. In the more recent period, the winners are North Dakota and Montana (judged to be only "highly polyarchic," but not democratic), while the worst of the laggard states are South Carolina and Georgia. By Hill's criteria they and quite a number of other states do not even come up to "polyarchy," but they do fare better than the label of "oligarchy" that characterized all the southern states in the 1940s.

Interspersed with the effort at rating the states are many interesting twists of findings and interpretations. For example, Hill provides an insightful discussion of the contingent nature of partisan change in the states. Rather than arguing for the inevitability of greater competitiveness, Hill spells out the mechanisms that majority parties can use to maintain their dominant status, and he integrates this with a discussion of changing patterns of partisanship and competition in national elections.

Hill's final analysis seeks to show that democracy matters for policy in the states. He does this only for the 1980s (for which appropriate data are available for his full model) by regressing measures of political equality, state welfare policy, and size of state government on his democratization index and a healthy set of control variables. States that score better on democratization also tend to provide higher welfare payments and they tend to have stronger fair employment legislation. Interestingly, democratization here does not result in an increased size of government overall. Hill concludes from his findings that faith in democracy is well placed: More democracy results in policies favorable to have-nots.

Empirically oriented scholars may be uncomfortable with Hill's normative labeling of the states as "undemocratic" or "oligarchic," and he readily admits that his operational definitions are necessarily arbitrary. Nevertheless, he is simply focusing on and developing a normative premise—the idea of democracy as popular sovereignty—that underlies the preponderance of current American political research on topics from voting to representation to interest groups. Most studies are just much less explicit about what constitutes their vision of democracy.

Hill's fundamental premise is that democracy is good and more democracy is better. Given his enthusiasm for popular participation and control, it is surprising that *Fifty States* does not consider the institutions of direct democracy: If a procedural tally is to be used, the initiative, referendum, and recall arguably should merit a few points, and about half the states have one or more of these mechanisms of citizen control.

Given his premise and goals, Hill's analysis is generally excellent. Keeping the analysis simple, however, has some costs. The demonstration that democratization has favorable policy effects is presented as a single equation system with democratization influencing welfare and civil rights policy. But the book also shows that democratization changes quite a bit over time, and Hill admits that the causes of these changes are not well understood. This suggests the possibility that democratization is endogenous because some of its components, like turnout and participation, may well be influenced by the state policies that his simplified model treats only as results. The simplified model is certainly a reasonable approximation; the problem is that one cannot go after such simultaneity seriously and still have a book that is lay reader-friendly.

This is a solid and interesting book. It formulates an insightful comparative state analysis in unabashedly normative terms. Hill is clear in his goals, in what he does, and in what he concludes. One does not have to buy either his definition of democracy or his assumption that democracy is always best when competition and participation are at their maximum to learn a good deal about variations in the nature of democratic life in the states.

Citizens, Politics, and Social Communication: Information and Influence in an Election Campaign. By Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 305p. $49.95.

Alan S. Zuckerman, *Brown University*

This is an extraordinarily powerful book, synthesizing and subverting paradigms of knowledge in political science and offering an alternative framework for the analysis of citizen politics in democracies and a pathbreaking theory that produces a bushel of fresh insights into electoral politics in the United States. At the heart of the volume rest interdependent citizens, who have families, friends, neighbors, and workmates, who attend churches, union meetings, and baseball games, and who talk about politics. Huckfeldt and Sprague move survey analysis beyond the study of isolated respondents; they refashion rational choice theory to include the constraints of political and social structures, and they insist on the stochastic characteristics of political processes. Put simply, Huckfeldt and Sprague compel us to change the way we analyze political behavior in democracies.

The volume displays multiple levels of analysis. Interdependent citizens learn about politics from those with whom they discuss issues, candidates, and events, and they choose their discussion partners from a set of persons, which is powerfully limited by how they live their lives. Citizens are rewarded and punished for political viewpoints that agree or disagree with the preferences and understandings of those whom they encounter. No matter the extent of interdependence and no matter the extent of bias and overlap in the sources of information, structural determinism does not appear in this study. Citizens always screen, interpret, and apply the information. "Rational citizens rationally decide. Social and economic structures, accidentally but nevertheless systematically, mold homogeneity by repeatedly triggering individual reassessments of political beliefs" (p. 51). As a result, processes of preference formation and decisions about political behavior are doubly stochastic, as opportunities and structures that surround individuals vary for any one person over time and across persons, and as citizens select and accept the information that reaches them. Furthermore, because discussion networks are not determined by social context, information and preferences move through communities, forming public opinion that is more than the sum of individual private views. The multiple levels of analysis uncover the interplay between voluntarism and structured opportunities that defines the paradox of democratic politics.

Huckfeldt and Sprague blend propositions drawn from alternative theories and complementary methods of analysis into an analysis of a unique data set. They draw most directly on the much neglected tradition of electoral studies that begins with Herbert Tingsten and was first elaborated by Lazarsfeld, McPhee, and Berelson, the Columbia School of electoral analysis, more than forty years ago. At the same time, they retain the Michigan school's emphasis on party identification, while Downs's proposition that rational citizens minimize the amount of information that they obtain about politics highlights their use of rational choice theory. The synthesis does not force together incommensurate theoretical positions. Rather, it moves beyond the radical simplifications inherent in those who would stay within one of these research schools. Their survey of voters in South Bend, Indiana, during the presidential campaign of 1984 covers several points in time, locates respondents and their discussion partners, and offers information on the local political context. Applying well-developed formal models and precise statistical analyses, Huckfeldt and Sprague explore this exceptional data set. In their hands, the details of a particular case provide evidence for significant theoretical claims.

The volume displays powerful and novel insights into American politics. Consider some of those insights that develop the interrelationships among political party organizations, the structure of local political dominance, voting in party primaries, and party identification.

(1) Local politics tends to be dominated by one political party, and the distribution of political strength at the local level directly affects the level of turnout in primary voting. Where there is a dominant political party, partisans of the minority party are especially likely to vote in the majority party's primary.

(2) Party organizations retain their centrality in electoral processes not by influencing individual voters directly but by building on the social organization of community life. As citizens sift through the flow of structured information, they make electoral decisions. As party workers vary in their ability to locate their future voters, the effect of party organizations on electoral choice varies. Hence, there is reason to say both that parties matter and that they do not control the electoral process.

(3) Because a party's local dominance does not guarantee success in state or national elections, citizens live in multiple electoral arenas in which Democrats and Republicans vary in their dominance.

Huckfeldt and Sprague develop some of the consequences of these generalizations: Because party organizations are especially likely to contact those who vote in their primaries, dominant parties will always be less efficient in organizing their supporters, the social characteristics of those whom they contact will be rather different than their social base in the community, and party contacting will have only a weak influence on vote choice. Furthermore, the more that partisans vote in the "wrong" primary, the weaker is their attachment to their party and the more likely are they to vote for the candidates of the other party, even if they do not identify with it. Not only does this support the claim that party identification is labile, far from the dominant source of electoral preference, but it also implies that the explanatory utility of the concept varies by local political contexts. Party identification, heretofore a concept applied to mental processes, varies in importance according to the individual's political context.

Reading this book necessarily raises general questions about research schools in political science. I read their work as subverting core assumptions of theories that rest on simplified versions of social psychology or rational choice theory and those that ignore the stochastic characteristics of political processes. Huckfeldt and Sprague themselves present more limited claims. They prefer to show that context and networks matter even after controlling for party identification and related variables, calling on political psychologists and proponents of rational choice to recognize the importance of political and social context. As new work follows their path, I would suspect that these limited claims will be replaced and a new research school will emerge.

To Build a Wall: American Jews and the Separation of Church and State. By Gregg Ivers. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1995. 272p. $37.50.

H. Frank Way, *University of California, Riverside*

Gregg Ivers has presented us with a splendid study of how three Jewish organizations—the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and the Anti-Defamation League—used the litigation process to pioneer a new path in church-state relations in the post–World War II era. In rich detail, this study in public interest law attempts to demonstrate how internal and environmental forces frequently acted to derail what was otherwise intended to be a rational and predictable policy agenda. It is also a study of leadership, in particular of Leo Pfeffer's almost singular role in pushing the United States Supreme Court in the direction of a separationist position in church-state relations. Pfeffer, either as counsel for the aggressive American Jewish Congress or in cooperation with the ACLU, relentlessly pursued his goal of taking religion out of the arena of government, especially in public education. In short, for those who are interested in a behind-the-scenes account of how many benchmark no establishment cases came to be filed and how the various litigation strategies were planned, Ivers' book is an important contribution to the literature of interest group litigation.

Ivers appears to be in agreement with the earlier study of interest group litigation by Lee Epstein and Joseph Kobylka. In *The Supreme Court and Legal Change* (1992), these authors had argued, as does Ivers, that the inclusion of legal doctrine, and not just exogenous political factors, is critical to any understanding of interest group litigation. Neither of these studies dismisses the importance of political forces, of judicial values and attitudes, in determining case results. Still the value of the Ivers study is that it underscores the critical and often neglected role that legal arguments have in channeling case results. Curiously, and I think inconsistent with the major thrust of the study, Ivers chooses to challenge Epstein and Kobylka's conclusion that litigators in public interest cases bear ultimate responsibility for the success or failure of their arguments, and overstatement of the Epstein-Kobylka conclusion. In any event, Ivers concludes "that few individuals or organizational litigants, no matter how experienced, skilled, and accomplished as practitioners of public interest law, possess the power to overcome the hostile reception their views may command on the Court during a particular moment" (p. 25). The problem with this statement is that taken to its logical conclusion it contradicts Ivers's basic proposition that legal doctrine is a significant variable. If one posits that the United States Supreme Court is a corporate entity that can be "friendly" or "hostile" to certain legal arguments, then perhaps Ivers is correct. Still, throughout his book he demonstrates repeatedly that litigators often planned their arguments around the reality that the Court is generally composed of nine mini law firms.

The only explanation that I can offer for this inconsistency is that perhaps Ivers failed to see that Leo Pfeffer and the American Civil Liberties Union in such cases as *Board of Education v. Allen* (1968) and *Walz v. Tax Commission* (1970) engaged in what Epstein and Kobylka have referred to as the "tyranny of absolutes." The Court that upheld the loan of secular texts to parochial schools in the *Allen* case was not a hostile Court. Indeed, Justices Warren, Marshall, and Brennan were generally friendly to separationist arguments, yet all voted against Pfeffer. Similarly, the Court in *Walz* had numerous "friendly" justices including Brennan, Marshall, Black, and Chief Justice Burger, yet they all voted to uphold the historic tax exemption of religious property used exclusively for a religious purpose. In short, perhaps it was not a hostile Court, but rather the absolutist position taken by the litigators, either in bringing the litigation or the arguments they employed in their briefs, that accounts for the results.

Finally, I would note that in this otherwise able study, theoretical considerations are underdeveloped. The vast body of organizational theory is totally absent from this study. This lacuna is unfortunate because some of the concepts employed in organization theory would have been useful in organizing and explaining the vast amount of data that Ivers gathered from personal interviews, the archives of the three organizations, and the papers of Leo Pfeffer. It would also have been helpful if Ivers had provided some modest background information on the history of anti-Semitism in America. One begins to understand Leo Pfeffer and the Anti-Defamation League a bit better if one knows something of the formidable legal and social obstacles that American Jews faced from the moment the first Jewish settlers arrived in New Amsterdam in 1654.

The New American Politics: Reflections on Political Change and the Clinton Administration. Edited by Bryan D. Jones. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. 316p. $65.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

Nicol C. Rae, *Florida International University*

Of late "gridlock" has become the standard characterization of the American political process by the news media, politicians, and the general public. By way of contrast, the theme of this worthy collection is the nature and possibility of change in American politics. According to the editor, "major episodic political change is not only possible in the United States, it happens with considerable frequency" (p. 2), and his contributors thus proceed to discuss the nature of change in several significant aspects of contemporary American politics. The book is divided into three parts dealing respectively with politics, political institutions, and public policy. Written by a combination of well-established and junior scholars, the fourteen chapters maintain a generally high standard of political analysis and scholarship.

Among the finest is William G. Mayer's chapter on the 1992 election that presents an excellent discussion of realignment theory, concluding that the concept is still "useful and valid" (p. 49) in any discussion of electoral change in the United States. Mayer further argues that no realignment occurred in 1992 as George Bush's defeat was a personal one rather than a repudiation of the Republican Party. Regarding the Perot movement, Mayer asserts that the most significant American third party movements have been organized around a specific issue rather than the broad personal appeal of an individual. While this is correct, Mayer underestimates the extent to which Perot's electoral support *was* based on wide public concern with the issues he raised, such as trade, the deficit, and federal campaign finance reform. The Dallas billionaire won 19% of the popular vote despite his personality, not because of it.

Also in the opening section, Frank Baumgartner and Jeffery Talbert maintain that instead of being the prime perpetrators of gridlock in American politics, organized interests can act as agents of change by forming alliances with each other on specific issues (p. 107). Unfortunately, to illustrate their thesis, the authors chose the consensus for health care reform in 1993–94, that later dissipated in the face of stiff resistance to the Clinton plan by powerful interests in the insurance industry.

Opening the very strong section on political institutions, David Mayhew updates his analysis of the contrasting legislative outputs of periods of divided rather than unified partisan control of the federal government. In *Divided We Govern* (1991), Mayhew concluded that "public moods" were more important than partisan control in determining federal legislative outputs (p. 113). Lacking such a mood, despite the unified Democratic control of the federal government, Mayhew finds that Clinton's record in passing important legislation in his first year was no better than that of Truman, Kennedy, or Carter (p. 119).

Morris Fiorina addresses the less-noticed increase in divided control of state governments, showing that this is mainly due to the weakness of Republicans in state legislative elections. Fiorina attributes this to the "professionalization" of legislatures, since competent Republicans are unlikely to be attracted to the modest salary and uncertain career prospects of being a state legislator compared to greater rewards elsewhere (pp. 127–28). In my view, however, reapportionment, hostile redistricting, and Republicans' ideological distaste for governmental activism have been equally important factors.

Lawrence Baum's chapter argues that due to the effect of presidential appointments the Supreme Court is more likely than Congress to make sudden and dramatic changes in the direction of its decisions, the prime example being the Warren Court's decisions on civil liberties (pp. 137–38). Bert Rockman's chapter on the federal executive illustrates the impediments to presidential control over the federal bureaucracy and contrasts the United States to parliamentary systems where civil servants are more involved in policy formation, but by the same token are less able to obstruct policy implementation (p. 144).

In the final section on public policy, William Thomas's excellent contribution on the role of foreign policy in the 1992 election explains that Bush's failure to get electoral credit for his foreign policy successes was not unusual given the decreasing salience of foreign policy in presidential elections since 1973 (p. 172), the American electorate's tendency to "punish" presidents who lead the United States into wars (p. 182), and Clinton's success in linking long-term economic and foreign policy issues (p. 174).

Another interesting chapter in this section by Bryan D. Jones and Billy Hall on the issue focus of Clinton's first two years explains why the Clinton administration chose to concentrate on the deficit and health care as opposed to jobs, although the latter was of more concern to the voters. Also worthy of comment is an excellent chapter by Dennis Judd on the weakness of the cities in American national politics. Judd argues that the low salience of urban issues is due to the cities' chronic legislative underrepresentation up to the 1960s, the continuing racial and economic segregation of inner cities from suburbs, and the endemic fragmentation in American local government that has made cities compete against each other for scarce resources (p. 219).

Larry Dodd's concluding chapter aptly readdresses the collection's general theme with a thought-provoking discussion of several political developments that became apparent in the early 1990s. In particular, Dodd's discussion of a "new interactive and electronic" politics where legislators do less decision making and are reduced to a role as "trouble shooters" (p. 269), raises valid questions for further study and scholarly debate.

Overall this is a very fine collection that addresses many of the most significant developments in American politics during this decade, and the editor should be commended for ensuring that his contributors adhered closely to the theme of change. There might have been a greater effort, however, to differentiate between different kinds of change and to pinpoint the essential determinants of political change. For instance, the perennial social science question as whether socioeconomic factors or the political leadership of individuals is more instrumental in effecting political change, is barely addressed here. This is nevertheless the most comprehensive and impressive general collection on American politics I have read for some time.

The New Politics of Public Policy. Edited by Marc K. Landy and Martin Levin. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 344p. $49.95 cloth, $16.95 paper.

Robert F. Rich, *University of Illinois*

This volume, edited by Marc Landy and Martin Levin and dedicated to the memory of Aaron Wildavsky, is an impressive set of essays focusing on the "new politics of public policy" (p. ix). The book is the product of a conference held at the Gordon Public Policy Center that involved practitioners and scholars. Prominent political scientists have contributed chapters to this volume including: Robert Kagan, James Morone, Shep Melnick, Paul Quirk, Peter Schuck, Martin Shapiro, and James Q. Wilson. Unlike many edited volumes, this one is well integrated and well written. It should be of great interest to students of American political institutions and the policymaking process. Almost every chapter contains a well-documented case study. Taken together, these materials provide a well-rounded picture of the new politics.

Most of the authors share the editors' view that policymaking during the last two decades is not adequately accounted for by traditional pluralist and incremental models. As political scientists, we have not been very successful in explaining major innovations and change in highly visible areas. Incremental policymaking, which is resistant to change, dominated by organized interests, and biased toward the status quo, no longer holds very much explanatory power. Almost every chapter documents that there has been a "dramatic shift" in how policy is made. As political scientists, we need to pay greater attention to the rights revolution, ideas, and policy entrepreneurs. The old models do not adequately incorporate some key variables: creativity, happenstance, sharp changes in values, persuasion through rational argument, statesmanship, self-sacrifice, and passion.

The Landy/Levin book is very well served by Martin Shapiro's introductory essay in which he successfully develops a framework for the entire volume. He summarizes the basic arguments of each author and underscores some of the important contributions of the project.

Part of the new political science emphasizes normative and moral dimensions of behavior and action. Political actors have values and these play a major role in shaping political outcomes. He argues that deliberation and discourse are critical components of the policymaking process that deserve attention. Shapiro argues that the new politics also highlights the "substantive merits of the policy that emerges" (p. 7). The old models of policymaking tend to limit judgments of merit to an analysis of procedural fairness. The new politics balks at defining merit primarily in procedural terms. Old policies were good if they followed appropriate procedures. The new politics wants to move to some sort of real or objective goodness. Substantive goodness also leads to greater openness in the decision-making process. In this context, Peter Schuck shows how new and compelling ideas in the area of immigration policy helped to formulate the agenda, define the terms of debate, and structure the conflict. In the concluding chapter, Landy and Levin argue that the major policy reforms of the 1970s and 1980s were based, in large part, on compelling ideas that reflected the consensus of experts. Compelling ideas are those that cut across partisan lines and special group interests. James Q. Wilson further develops this point about the importance of ideas by highlighting how the new politics may be rationalized, "arguing that the underlying logic of industrial policy, environmental policy, and consumer protection is that there is a unitary general interest, discoverable by reason and achievable by plan" (p. 252).

Shapiro's fine introduction is followed by three sections that further develop the notion of the new politics: "Adversarial Legalism and the Rights Revolution," "Taxing and Spending," and "Regulation and Deregulation." Three summary essays help to develop the book's overall themes.

There are three chapters devoted to the section on "Adversarial Legalism and the Rights Revolution" (Melnick, Schuck, and Kagan). Each chapter presents interesting and provocative case materials. In this part of the book, the nature of the rights revolution is developed. Melnick points out that special education policy for the handicapped was cast in terms of "individual rights." The language was introduced into a policy arena that had been dominated by the professional discretion of teachers, psychologists, and school administrators. The language of rights was instrumental in leading to program expansion. This same point is also highlighted later in the book in Landy's chapter on environmental policy and in the concluding chapter written by Landy and Levin. The new politics has drawn attention to the importance of many rights—consumer, the handicapped, endangered species, and so forth. Landy's chapter on environmental policy shows how environmental issues have been cast in terms of people's rights. Rights, in turn, lead to a doctrine of entitlements. Yet, Landy argues that expertise and ideas have "proven less powerful in the environmental realm because it has run afoul of the rights premise" (p. 293).

The next two sections of the book also present some important ideas. Conlan, Beam, and Wrightson point out that tax policy and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 seem to contradict notions of gridlock and inaction on the part of the federal government. The Tax Reform Act seems to turn interest group theory on its head. Winning in this context does not mean achieving the goals of special interest groups; instead, it means reducing the anticipated damage for particular groups. Policy professionals, political entrepreneurs and the media played instrumental roles in passing this reform bill.

Paul Quirk does an excellent job in analyzing how Congress can deliberate effectively. His analysis is enhanced by his discussion of trucking deregulation and the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. Quirk argues that power in Congress has diminished, resulting in a "vacuum." Since politicians are uncomfortable with a vacuum, policy innovation often results from efforts to fill it.

In this context it is worth noting that Landy and Levin argue that, in the new politics of public policy, gridlock is a myth. Along with Quirk, Wildavsky, Wilson, and others, they argue that major policy innovation is possible. Moreover, strategically placed policy entrepreneurs are critical for fostering policy innovation.

It is in the description of the role of professionals and experts and in the discussion of rights that this book is limited. The emphasis on rights may be related to the choice of case studies, as well as a tendency to draw too sharp a distincition between the old and new models of policymaking. There appears to be a rationalistic bias that leads to a lack of appreciation of the importance of professional organized interests, lobbies and guilds. In the delivery of human services, for example, there was a tendency in the 1970s and 1980s (the same period from which many cases were drawn for this volume) to rely on professionals and experts to exercise discretion and play a critical role in formulating and implementing policy. Indeed, the behavior of professionals (e.g., doctors, psychologists, lawyers, educators) looked very much like the behavior of the traditional organized groups identified in the pluralist models. The professionals are taking on an inherently political role.

Moreover, the rationalistic bias which I detect in this volume leads the authors to be far too optimistic about the importance of ideas and the possibilities for major innovations. Paul Quirk's chapter reflects this bias. He argues that a "legislature should have staff resources that permit the acquisition and transmission of large volumes of information" (p. 233). Members should be rewarded for specialized knowledge and (within limits) information should be shared. It is certainly true that for the cases developed in this volume, the new politics may be the framework of choice. However, I am unwilling to relegate a revised group theory model, which emphasizes professionals and experts, to the category of old-fashioned, irrelevant models.

Overall, this is an excellent volume that makes an important contribution to the literature on political institutions and public policymaking. I would have liked to see more development of the theory of ideation and a greater recognition of the overlap between the new and old politics. However, the authors, as a whole, have provided the reader with ideal types that can be used as a foundation for future analysis.

Privatizing Public Lands. By Scott Lehmann. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 248p. $45.00.

Elinor Ostrom, *Indiana University, Bloomington*

Scott Lehmann does battle with policy analysts, including John Baden and Richard Stroup, who have argued for privatizing public lands. His general strategy is to develop the arguments for privatization to the point where he argues that the weakness of the argument shows for the reader to see. He then uses these weaknesses to argue for continued ownership by the national government of all of its current domain.

After an introductory chapter, Lehmann turns, in chapter 2, to review the history of publicly owned lands and their current status in terms of which agencies are responsible for what territory. In chapter 3, he summarizes the privatization argument. Lehmann then turns to the meaning of the concept of productivity and how privatization would supposedly affect it with a critique of the evidentiary basis of the evidence presented. As a philosopher, Lehmann turns to his own mode of argument in chapter 6 to review the general ethical arguments that he finds in the privatization argument. The importance of productivity in the argument, Lehmann concludes, means that it is based on a form of rule utilitarianism (without any discussion of J. Harsanyi's foundational work on rule utilitarianism), while the secondary stress on freedom means to Lehmann a Kantian foundation. In the last chapters, he defends the current arrangement of national public lands against the critiques.

In the introduction, Lehmann introduces some warnings to his reader. The first is that he "had to develop a good deal of the argument for privatization that [he] criticize[s] here" (p. 20). He indicates that most of the "privatization literature is of a semi-popular nature," relying heavily on anecdotes. The potential reader of Lehmann's book should indeed be warned. He does indeed rely on semipopular literature of the early-to-mid-1980s (in a book published in 1995). In an era where the work of property rights theorists flourishes, Lehmann makes no reference to the work of Ashton, Barbier, Berkes, Bromley, Ciriacy-Wantrup, Clark, Dasgupta, Dixon, Eggertsson, Feeny, Folke, Freeman, Libecap, McNeely, North, Panayotou, Pearce, Repetto, Sandler, or Wilson.

Lehmann thus addresses a topic of major intellectual importance and policy significance without first immersing himself in the rich and rigorous literature that addresses exactly the issues of central importance to his book. He uses the general strategy of developing arguments based primarily on his own reconstruction until the weaknesses show. Against this weakened argument, he defends the status quo. While many property rights theorists would not fully agree with Baden and Stroup's more popular works, there are serious issues here that have been piercingly addressed in the scholarly literature. Lehmann's book is not, however, the best route into this difficult and important literature.

The Politics of Disappointment: American Elections 1976–94. By Wilson Carey McWilliams. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995. 211p. $17.95.

Bryan D. Jones, *Texas A&M University*

The Politics of Disappointment gathers together five essays written by McWilliams about presidential elections over a span of eighteen years, along with three briefer essays on the 1994 election, also previously published. McWilliams has written a new introduction for the collection.

I must confess a mixture of elation and frustration as I read the book. On the one hand, I was frustrated by McWilliams's tendency to the broad sweep—ignoring all sorts of aspects of public opinion, candidate strategies, and public policy in order to place elections in a broader context. Again and again, we read that "the public mood" was this or that "Americans felt" that. These sweeping overgeneralizations lead to all sorts of off-base interpretations and predictions. We are told, for example, that "the clearest message of 1992 was the majority's demand for active government" (p. 150). McWilliams also miscalled the increasing Republicanism in the South and actually predicted in 1976 the virtual demise of the Republican Party (p. 32). He also seems too comfortable throughout in predicting an increasingly activist government, leading him, for example, to underestimate the important reductions in domestic policies during the Reagan presidency.

Most of us, however, would find it very difficult to look over our writing of fifteen years ago and be bold enough to put it into print. Indeed, most of us would have said far less then that is relevant today than McWilliams. Because in the end these essays are not only well worth reading today, they are actually fun to read. (How often has this been said in the review pages of this journal?) What I find most impressive is how consistent the analysis is over the period and just how on-the-mark many of his critiques are. McWilliams has the knack of saying things that not only have not occurred to other analysts, but, if they had occurred to them, they would not have dared utter them. McWilliams consistently criticizes the primary process, and his best writing on the subject was in the 1980 essay. There he not only points to the failure of primaries to foster deliberation (as distinct from decision), but he indicts them for failing to allow excellent people to enter the race in order to deflect the candidacies of second-raters. (Yes, he lists the second-raters.)

McWilliams is consistent, I suspect, not because he rereads his earlier essays every four years, but because he approaches the election process from a perspective that allows him to interpret events in a broader framework, a framework that, like all frameworks, both illuminates and obscures. McWilliams tells us that "a major thread connecting these essays is the emergence of . . . the 'social issue,' " and what underlies the social issue is a public debate about "who and what is American" (p. 7). Because the public debate over culture (which "has always been a quarrel more than a given" [p. 7]) means so much, McWilliams despises the tendencies in American politics and culture that undermine the debate. Hence his positions on primaries, on media, on the decline of parties. Again and again, McWilliams forces us to confront the manner in which modern American politics contribute to and (more frequently) detract from the construction and sustenance of an American community. So his advice to parties and candidates is consistent. To the Democrats, he says: Push back toward the middle; be wary of supporting alternate lifestyles; be tough on crime ("a political society that is too gentle on crime or avarice will find, in the not so very long run, that it has lost its citizens" [p. 132]); don't be afraid of building social policy on the standard nuclear family; reform welfare to make sure the dignity of work is incorporated, rather than support a "transfer payment" approach. To the Republicans, he would caution against the overemphasis on economic liberalism and the pandering to Protestant exclusivity (but McWilliams is clearly less sympathetic to the Republicans). In 1988, he ridiculed the "managerialism" of both Bush and Dukakis (as he does Carter in an earlier essay) as a high point of liberalism's victory over community, and he chided Reagan in the same essay for promoting liberalism under the guise of "traditional" (read: communitarian) values.

The idea of serious public debate within a dense network of community organizations leads McWilliams to be extraordinarily critical of those institutions of modern society that have, in his view, undermined vigorous, sustained public discourse. These include the devaluing of the party convention (more like an old Communist Party convention, he notes) and, in particular, the increasing role of the media and the pathetic attempts at the restoration of political discourse through the "electronic town hall."

While he is quite correct in his current analyses of the role of the media, in my opinion McWilliams is led to overemphasize the existence of deliberative discourse in the past. He compares Perot's so-called prairie populism, in which the candidate went to extraordinary lengths to impose a top-down organization and to control the nature of the message by buying media time, to populism 1890's style, in which real issues were developed through what McWilliams sees as a dense network of primary groups. That strikes me as a romantic view of populism. This tendency to view the American past with some fondness—at least in regard to the nature of the public debate—lends, in my opinion, more of a generally gloomy tone to the essays than is warranted. There is little doubt that Americans are not very happy in general with the conduct of public affairs, at least in comparison to the past, as defined by political polling. But too much can be made of this distrust and too little of the problem-solving capacity of the decentralized, American federal system. Political reality is always multifaceted, and it is often terribly difficult in such a decentralized, open system to distinguish the clearly dysfunctional trends in the mixture. I hope that I will not be seen as overly Panglossian if I remark that overall faith in the American system may be something like economic gloom in the stock market—maybe it is time to put your money in.

In any case, Chataham House is to be congratulated for issuing *The Politics of Disappointment.* It is both a pithy review and a truly intelligent critique of recent American electoral history.

Fighting for Jobs: Case Studies of Labor-Community Coalitions Confronting Plant Closings. By Bruce Nissen. Albany: State University of New York, 1995. 198p. $16.95.

John Portz, *Northeastern University*

Political responses to economic restructuring have captured considerable attention in recent years. The federal plant closing law passed in 1988 is a prominent example. Even more significant, however, are the many and varied responses at the state and local level. It is in this area that Bruce Nissen's work makes a valuable contribution.

Fighting for Jobs presents five case studies of community responses to plant closings and work force reductions in East Chicago and Hammond, Indiana. In East Chicago, case studies include the shutdown of a steel foundry and the closure of an engineering plant. In Hammond, case studies cover the closure of a clothing manufacturer, the shutdown and attempted reopening of a steel mill, and a successful effort to prevent relocation of one department of a specialty steel producer. A common element in all the case studies is the evolving role of the Calumet Project for Industrial Jobs, a labor-community organization initially formed in 1984 to preserve industrial jobs and to empower workers and communities in the economic development process.

Nissen employs a common analytical framework to analyze each case. This framework focuses on five factors that help to explain the political dynamics around plant closings: early warning signs of the closure or reduction, labor-management disputes, corporate strategy and structure, economic factors, and the role of local government. In addition, the analysis incorporates problem definition as well as alliance formation and mobilization as explanatory elements.

After devoting one chapter to each case study, Nissen concludes with two chapters highlighting key lessons and theoretical conclusions. Among the lessons and conclusions are these: (1) Early warning signs can play an important role in community responses; (2) union locals that pursue traditional collective bargaining approaches are relatively impotent in the face of plant closures; (3) corporate structure and strategy, such as conglomerate ownership, are closely related to plant closures; (4) industry economic factors are important, particularly in the timing of a shutdown, but they are not all-determinative; (5) local governments can play a significant role in community responses, but only if they "break out of the strictly dependent 'good business climate' approach to economic development" (p. 151).

Nissen recognizes that private businesses hold a privileged position in the political economy. If community-based organizations like the Calumet Project hope to achieve more than temporary gains, they must "rethink and challenge the exclusively market paradigm" that dominates economic development discussions (p. 163). He argues that labor-community coalitions must build more permanent institutional mechanisms that incorporate political leaders while empowering community groups and labor organizations to play a role in economic development.

Do community campaigns against plant closures make a difference? Nissen admits that such efforts usually do not prevent a plant closure, but the situation of the affected work force is often improved through greater availability of retraining and other adjustment services. Furthermore, from a policy perspective, the benefits of individual plant closing struggles are not with individual plants, but with efforts to build regional and national coalitions. Nissen concludes the book with discussion of several such coalitions, such as the Federation of Industrial Retention and Renewal based in Chicago, that are dedicated to raising plant closings and economic disinvestment issues to a regional and national policy agenda.

This book is targeted to both practitioners and academics. Economic development practitioners and community activists, who represent the primary audience, will find particularly useful the author's discussion of early warning signs, economic changes, and other factors that help to analyze a plant-closing experience. For academics, particularly those in the policy studies area, the book offers an interesting incorporation of literature from the problem-definition and group-mobilization subfields. The author contributes to this literature by exploring the important role of problem definition and group mobilization in the context of community struggles against prevailing economic traditions.

The research design for this book—five case studies of labor-community struggles in northern Indiana—has both strengths and weaknesses. As a strength, it allows the reader to follow the historical experience of plant-closing struggles in one industrial area of the country. Nissen presents a very interesting picture of policy and political learning on the part of labor organizations, community activists, and government officials. The Calumet Project in particular is the focus of this process. This learning dimension explores how the strategies employed by community coalitions can evolve and adapt to changing circumstances.

A weakness, however, is that the relatively narrow geographic focus—northern Indiana—results in less variation in the dependent variable. In particular, the book lacks a case study in which a plant-closing struggle resulted in actually averting closure, at least for a significant period of time. The closest to this is the final case study in which a community coalition was able to prevent the transfer of a major production line. While a useful case, particularly in showing the greater sophistication of the coalition as a result of previous efforts, this case study lacks some of the ingredients of a complete closure experience. A successful closure struggle would provide the reader with an example in which key analytical variables, particularly problem definition and community mobilization, combine to avert a major closure. This would offer an even broader picture of community responses and add to our theoretical understanding of the ingredients that go into them.

Fighting for Jobs is well written and well organized, with a useful chronology to help guide the reader through each case study. Nissen is clear and concise in capturing the political dynamics of community struggles. I recommend this book to practitioners and academics interested in the growing movement of labor-community coalitions and their efforts to redefine economic development in the language of community rather than the market.

Property Taxes and Tax Revolts: The Legacy of Proposition 13. Edited by Arthur O'Sullivan, Terri A. Sexton, and Steven M. Sheffrin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 159p. $39.95.

David Lowery, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

The authors set out three tasks for themselves in this short work: providing an overview of property tax systems in the United States and around the world, analyzing the causes of the great tax revolt that swept the United States from June 1978 through the early 1980s, and exploring the consequences of fiscal decisions made during the tax revolt period. In reality, only the last goal is addressed with any depth, and then only in regard to California's highly unusual Proposition 13.

With the first two tasks, the authors try to make their work more attractive to a broad readership. The effort is not successful. Their analysis of both the causes of the tax revolt and the diverse nature of property tax systems is simply too thin. They assert, for example, that the tax revolt was a reaction to perceived abuses of the property tax, a claim they make virtually without reference to the extensive literature on the tax revolt. Oddly, given the book's focus on Proposition 13, this assertion also is grounded on only the most limited discussion of the complex history of property tax politics and referendum voting in California in the decade before June 1978. Similarly, the overview of property tax systems provided by O'Sullivan, Sexton, and Sheffrin has little more depth than that found in any public finance text.

More to the point, this contextual camouflage obscures just how unique Proposition 13 was. Only California and Massachusetts opted for severe cuts in property taxes during the tax revolt, and Massachusetts did not abandon ad valorem property taxation. Only California's Proposition 13 imposed an acquisition-value system of property taxation, basing assessments on the acquisition or purchase price of property, plus a minor adjustment for inflation. But for the very recent exception of Florida, the California experience with acquisition-value taxation is so distinctive that it can tell us little about property taxes more generally or about the causes and consequences of the tax revolt as experienced across the rest of the nation.

Still, O'Sullivan, Sexton, and Sheffrin tell us a great deal about California's system of acquisition-value taxation. This is the real contribution of the book. Even before the adoption of Proposition 13, critics charged that acquisition-value assessing inevitably would generate severe horizontal inequities in taxation. In the simplest case, two identical properties would be assessed very differently if one were purchased in 1975, the other bought in 1990. And it seemed unlikely that these disparities would be random. Because different types of consumers purchase housing with different frequencies, and because housing and other types of properties turn over at different rates, it was immediately evident that Proposition 13 would influence the incidence of the property tax. What was not known in 1978, however, was how these potential disparities would accumulate across different jurisdictions under changing rates of inflation and varying patterns of mobility, especially so since acquisition-value taxation might itself alter mobility patterns by penalizing the purchase of new property.

O'Sullivan, Sexton, and Sheffrin answer these questions by analyzing property assessments in nine California counties, assessments they were able to match with California tax returns. The combined data provide them an unparalleled opportunity to explore the incidence effects of Proposition 13. Still, the resulting analysis is a bit less than it might have been. Disparities within commercial and industrial classes of properties are only touched upon. And the authors fail to fully explore the implications of different assumptions about the economic incidence of the property tax. At least in terms of initial incidence, however, they were able to identify with some precision just who won and who lost in the switch from ad valorem to acquisition-value assessing.

Four major conclusions deserve note. First, as expected, acquisition-value taxation created major disparities among taxpayers. In Los Angeles and San Francisco, for example, the 40% of households that have not moved since 1975 pay an effective tax rate only one-fifth that of those who have purchased properties more recently. Second, since older and lower income Californians moved less frequently than their neighbors, acquisition-value assessment has had a progressive impact on the initial incidence of the property tax. Third, although acquisition-value taxation probably creates similar disparities within commercial and industrial classes of properties, it has not had a major impact on the relative tax burdens falling on these classes and on housing. And fourth, the "lock-in" effect arising from the tax penalty associated with moving does not appear to be great. The average increase in the time between moves for a typical household is estimated to be only two months. The last three conclusions are something of a surprise given early predictions of the impacts of acquisition-value taxation following the adoption of Proposition 13.

These are important findings that answer some long-standing questions about Proposition 13 and will have immediate relevance for Californians as they struggle with their state's structural budget deficit. But given the unique nature of acquisition-value taxation, it seems likely that only hard-core property tax aficionados or those interested in the public policy choices facing California will find *Property Taxes and the Tax Revolt: The Legacy of Proposition 13* of abiding interest. And even these readers should see O'Sullivan, Sexton, and Sheffrin's papers in *Journal of Urban Economics* (1995, v. 37) and *National Tax Journal* (1994, v. 47) before deciding to purchase the book.

Democratic Dilemmas in the Age of Ecology: Trees and Toxics in the American West. By Daniel Press. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994. 168p. $34.95 cloth, $15.95 paper.

Douglas J. Amy, *Mount Holyoke College*

Daniel Press is interested in the issues that lie at the intersection of democratic theory and environmental politics. In particular, he argues that our environmental crisis creates dilemmas for democracies, and he wants to explore the question of whether our current political institutions can enhance public participation and solve our environmental problems at the same time. The first few chapters of the book describe in increasing detail how environmental problems challenge democracy and the rest of the book uses in-depth interviews with participants in two environmental controversies to show how these political dilemmas play themselves out in practice.

Press begins by describing what he sees as the primary political question raised by our environmental difficulties: whether political centralization or decentralization offers the best approach to solve these problems. The centralization thesis is exemplified by Robert Heilbroner, Garrett Hardin, and William Ophuls, all of whom have little faith in traditional liberal democratic political institutions to act effectively in a period of severe environmental crisis. These thinkers share a "neo-Malthusian" analysis of environmental problems, which forecasts the development of an overpopulated world at the brink of environmental collapse. They also predict a move toward a "neo-Hobbesian" style of politics, which relies on increased centralized political control and enforced economic discipline as the only way to avoid ecological collapse. Pitted against these theorists are the more optimistic decentralists, represented here by John Passmore, David Orr, John Dryzek, and others who believe that participatory democracy is the best way to solve our environmental problems. More democracy is thought desirable in part because increased participation and public deliberation will encourage the transformation of attitudes and behavior that is necessary to usher in a more ecologically sustainable society.

Press's treatment of these competing theorists is a bit cursory and is more of a summary of their views than an analysis. The book becomes more interesting as Press begins to distill from this larger theoretical debate a specific set of political problems that he wants to examine empirically. He identifies what he calls three "challenges" to democratic environmental policymaking. In the "social justice challenge," the question is whether citizens are willing to abandon participation and appeal to centralized leadership in order to effectively solve environmental problems. The "technocratic challenge" questions whether the lack of information and expertise is an obstacle to widespread political participation in environmental decision making. And finally, there is the "economic challenge," in which the overwhelming need for economic growth in a capitalist system sharply constrains the scope of the policy options seriously considered by those participating in environmental policymaking.

To shed light on whether and how these challenges play a role in contemporary environmental politics, Press conducted fifty in-depth interviews with environmental activists, industry representatives, legislators, and administrators involved in two environmental disputes: the controversy over hazardous waste management in California and the battle over logging old-growth forests in the Pacific Northwest.

Much of what Press found in these interviews is not particularly surprising. For example, most of those interviewed did not support increased centralization of decision making. On the contrary, virtually all espoused the need for greater public participation. This would support the decentralist thesis that environmental problems have produced the call for more political participation, not less. The only evidence he offers of neo-Hobbesian proclivities is the tendency of several environmentalists to prefer litigation as a political strategy, which Press does not see as a form of participatory democracy. But while generally supportive of more participation, most respondents also reported that their participation was often ineffective and that they viewed participation not as an important end in itself, but as primarily a means to achieve their particular policy goals. Press believes these particular findings will prove disappointing to advocates of participatory democracy.

The interviews also revealed that few had any interest in leaving environmental decisions to technocratic decision makers. More interesting, most participants also believed that a lack of expertise and information was not a real obstacle to participation. It seems that even local environmental groups are finding it increasingly possible to access the information and analysis they feel they need to fight their battles.

Of all the challenges to democracy posed by environmental problems, Press found the most difficult one to be the economic challenge. Concerns about how to ensure a healthy and growing economy did seem to constrain the consideration of policy alternatives, especially in the logging case, where the debate was largely restricted to options that guaranteed a viable local economy. However, economic considerations played somewhat less of a restricting role in the toxic waste case, largely because the threats to human health posed by hazardous waste facilities seemed more important to local people than the threats to economic health posed by the lack of such facilities. This supports the argument of Robert Paelkhe and Douglas Torgerson in *Managing Leviathan* (1990) that challenges to the priority of economic growth are much more likely to come from the grassroots, where people directly experience its costs, than from political and economic elites.

The book does have a few problems. Press is attempting to cover a lot of ground here and he often moves quickly, leaving the reader wishing he had developed some of this points in more detail. In addition, the prose tends to be dense and I suspect that nonprofessionals and undergraduates would find Press's arguments hard to follow at times. More important, while the interviews do yield some interesting insights about the problems of participation in environmental decision making, they fall short of being the "test" of the neo-Hobbesian thesis that Press intends. Just because the participants denied any desire to seek out centralized authorities to make environmental decisions does not necessarily undermine the arguments of the neo-Hobbesians. Their argument is that more authoritarian approaches will develop out of necessity as the only way to assure society's survival in a world threatened by ecological catastrophe. The two environmental problems analyzed here are serious ones, but hardly the apocalyptic kind that would necessitate the demise of democratic procedures—a point that even Press admits near the end of the book.

Those problems aside, this book contributes in some interesting and useful ways to the discussion of the role of democratic participation in environmental policymaking. It provides a good overview of many of the issues debated by environmental political theorists and provides new information on how participants themselves see their role in environmental decision making.

The Constitution as Political Structure. By Martin H. Redish. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 229p. $39.95.

William Gangi, *St. John's University, New York*

Redish challenges those constitutional scholars who contend, on the one hand, that the Supreme Court should not intervene in political structure and separation of powers issues (p. 17) but, on the other hand, insist that its "paramount purpose . . . is to protect individual rights" (p. 20). The framers did not share that viewpoint, he contends, because they feared the concentration of governmental power. Accordingly, the framers assigned the federal government only limited powers (all others being reserved to the states), and those powers were carefully distributed by the framers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

I highly recommend this book. It is rich in detail, complex in argument and thorough in approach. Redish always takes the Constitution seriously, and instead of the imaginative theorizing that so often mars current constitutional scholarship, he embraces and defends the Constitution's political structures, including its emphasis on accountability and popular sovereignty. The author is not afraid to struggle openly with the tensions created by competing constitutional values, and perhaps most importantly, he accepts the principle that "at some point in the process of constitutional interpretation, immediate political objectives must give way to the broader goals of American constitutional and political theory . . . [One] must be willing to accept the loss of individual political battles in order to win the political-constitutional war" (p. 163). Redish identifies substantive issues, argues his position convincingly, and as a result, frequently prompts serious reflection from his reader.

The book's main thesis is that since the New Deal the Supreme Court, by its creation of a "dormant Commerce clause" (p. 51) (a doctrine wherein even in the absence of congressional legislation the Supreme Court may strike down state legislation judged to be incompatible with the free flow of interstate commerce), has abdicated its responsibility to maintain the separation of powers envisioned by the framers. Redish contends that the dormant commerce clause doctrine is illegitimate.

While Article I, section 8, admittedly and explicitly delegates to the federal government the power "to regulate commerce . . . among the several States," Redish contends that a textually bound analysis cannot stop there. Other portions of the text also may be relevant—as he contends is section 10, which helps us interpret section 8. Section 10 contains some instances where the states are explicitly prohibited from exercising powers (e.g., "coin money; emit bills of credit"); in other instances in that section the states are empowered to exercise powers granted the federal government in section 8 only after obtaining the permission of the federal government to do so: "keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace." Thus, Redish contends, had the framers wanted to absolutely prohibit states from regulating interstate commerce, they would have listed that prohibition in section 10. Redish deduces that in the absence of specific congressional legislation to the contrary, the states may regulate interstate commerce, because section 10 neither prohibits them from doing so nor requires that they obtain the permission of Congress before doing so. And the Tenth Amendment reaffirms the right of a state to regulate interstate commerce. He concludes that "there exists no principled basis for the Court *ever* to invalidate state regulations, at least in the absence of congressional preemption, on the basis of the text of the Commerce Clause" (pp. 75–76). (In *Federalism: The Founder's Design*, Raoul Berger affirms states' rights but ultimately accepts a stronger role for the judiciary.)

Is the Supreme Court's use of the Dormant Commerce Clause ultimately harmless, since Congress by simple statute could authorize any state interstate commerce regulation initially struck down by the Supreme Court? Redish argues persuasively that the Supreme Court's approach is far from harmless. Not only is it inconsistent with—as detailed above—a fair reading of the entire constitutional text, but it puts the "political inertia" designed by the framers in the wrong place, "directly undermin[ing] . . . the Constitution's carefully established textual structure for allocating power between federal and state sovereigns" (p. 64). Under the approach adopted by the Supreme Court, unless or until the various political obstacles (i.e., "speed bumps" that the framers' purposely built into our system of government) can be overcome by the states (p. 116), they are illegitimately denied a power that is rightfully theirs.

The cumulative effect of the Court's exercise of the Dormant Commerce Clause has been this century's unprecedented concentration of power in federal hands. Redish believes that the concentration of power so feared by the framers is as real and as dangerous today as it was at the time of the founding. Not only have we lost sight of that fact, but the framers, who understood that accretions would probably occur in such "microscopic" steps that the feared concentration might be observable only after it was too late to reverse it, better appreciated the fact that strict judicial maintenance of the separation of powers would be a "prophylactic" safety device (pp. 106–7).

Redish constructs a moderate path. He rejects those who hold too rigid a view of the framers' intentions (a position that he describes as "static originalism" [p. 9]), but insists that the "text imposes limits on judicial constitutional analysis" (p. 7). He suggests a pragmatic, formalistic approach—where one "may legitimately accept that the nature of a constitutional system imposes on the judiciary an obligation to engage in principled, consistent analysis and to make decisions that are capable of rational reconciliation with governing textual directives, yet simultaneously recognize that within those confines there exists room for the judiciary to take at least some account of pragmatic concerns" (pp. 9–10).

I have several reservations. First, Redish precipitously dismisses interpretivists (those he labels as "originalists"), who argue that if the framers' intentions are clearly discernible, they remain binding today. He does so, unfortunately, without himself exploring the range of beliefs and instead relying almost exclusively on the opinions of its opponents to formulate his own opinion. The reader may wish to contrast Gangi's (1995) *Saving the Constitution from the Courts*. Doing so permits Redish to put forth his views as moderate ones, while denying that characterization to others. Redish's approach, however, also raises several questions: Can judges go too far in "interpreting" the meaning the text had for its ratifiers? Is the Supreme Court obliged to defend the political structures and the separation of power structures created by the framers for only so long as Redish or others can persuade the justices of their continued viability? In the absence of a demonstration of the framers' intentions, why is a judicial assessment of competing separation of power values preferable to one reached by an accountable legislature?

Second, Redish specifically acknowledges that the framers' own definition of tyranny had to do with the accumulation of executive, legislative, and judicial power in a single hand (p. 107 n. 64). Furthermore, he forcefully argues that the "tyranny" defined in *The Federalist Papers* is not simply about the "*misuse* of this power, or even its exercise. Rather, it is the very fact of its accumulation that Madison equated with tyranny" (p. 107). But Redish does not explain why the same Madison considered the possible abuse of power a secondary issue (James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, No. 41, pp. 255–56). The framers in fact often defended themselves against various Antifederalist attacks not unlike those raised by Redish: e.g., regarding the application of the necessary and proper clause (pp. 50–51) (*The Federalist Papers*, No. 33). George W. Carey's (1995) *In Defense of the Constitution*, which critiques the views of modern scholars toward the separation of powers, also may be of interest.

Third, the book presents an incomplete picture of Redish's interpretive approach. He might have described, however briefly, his principles for approaching specific and restrictive textual provisions, as distinguished from his treatment here of a delegated power (i.e., commerce). Redish, I believe, is not contending that the Supreme Court's emphasis on individual rights is wrong, only that the Court should be as active in its defense of separation of power structures as it is of individual rights. But has too much power concentrated in judicial hands? How would we know? Is there anything to fear?

Divorce Lawyers and their Clients: Power and Meaning in the Legal Process. By Austin Sarat and William L. F. Felstiner. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 191p. $35.00.

Roy B. Flemming, *Texas A&M University*

Law takes shape and form in everyday life through encounters between legal officials and citizens and as citizens employ law or legal concepts in their relationships with one another. The contours of these encounters and relationships are not necessarily or inevitably fixed by law's formal rules, however, and thus law's reality is neither stable nor uniform. In order to develop an understanding of law's domain in everyday life, Austin Sarat and William L. F. Felstiner observed forty divorce cases and tape-recorded the conversations and discussions that took place during the conferences between lawyers and their clients. This allowed them to watch and listen to the lawyers and clients as they worked on the cases and managed their relationships. This is a distinctive and singular advance over previous research. At the center of all attorney-client relationships is the dilemma attorneys face of having to choose between following their professional judgment or acting solely as their clients' agents. The dilemma emerges because what is feasible or practicable often clashes with what clients prefer or expect. Most research adopts an instrumental view to show how lawyers use their professional expertise and positional resources to establish "client control" and thus find a way around the dilemma. Because of this one-sided view of the relationship, client resistance and their countermoves in this game with their lawyers are overlooked or ignored.

Sarat and Felstiner's observations of attorney-client conferences corrected this oversight with the result that they uncovered not only a more complicated process but one that in their assessment is culturally oriented. Their book reveals a process in which lawyers and clients engage in continuous and subtle negotiations over their roles and over how to proceed with the divorce. The negotiations are complex because lawyers and clients bring very different understandings of their own and each other's worlds to the conferences and their conversations reflect these contrasting views. Meanings and understandings often clash, and reconciliation is mandatory if the relationship is to continue. Equally as important, Sarat and Felstiner portray the process as indeterminate and the relationships as in flux; agreements seem secure at one moment only to have emergent ambiguities, lingering doubts, and unrecognized misunderstandings undermine them, prompting another round of negotiations. The power of neither side is fixed, but is instead transitory and shifting. The meanings giving power to one party over the other continually compete, collide, coalesce, or slip away during conversations in which the media of exchange are stories, interrogations, anecdotes, and analogies that reflect the parties' conscious efforts at constructing images they hope will sway the other. Out of this nonlinear process in attorneys' offices, law becomes reality.

Sarat and Felstiner present their perspective on lawyer-client relations in the book's four central chapters, which in varying degrees have been revised after first appearing in the professional literature. These chapters trace several aspects, or perhaps phases, of the "legal construction of clients" to show how clients come to share, sometimes reluctantly but sometimes with alacrity, their attorneys' views of law and the courts. In this sense, the conferences produce legal ideologies. The power of attorneys is not solely or entirely a matter of superior resources or expertise but of their ability to frame issues and to provide alternative meanings to situations. The process can be seen as taking place in a sequential manner, although Sarat and Felstiner warn that old issues often pop up unpredictably for recycling later in a conference or in subsequent get-togethers in the attorneys' offices. Attorneys and clients start by negotiating over the kinds of issues they should attend to. They then must reach mutual understandings of what "reasonable" means for their case, develop a shared appreciation of how the "reality" of the legal system affects them, proceed to agree on the advantages of settling out of court, and finally prepare a list of demands and positions.

Throughout the four chapters that discuss these phases, Sarat and Felstiner take pains to show how clients and their lawyers challenge and contest the meanings or interpretations of the other. For example, clients, who tend to be preoccupied with finding fault and laying blame for their marriages' failures and current problems, expect their attorneys to validate their views of their spouses. While the trauma of dissolving their marriages colors the clients' conversations, their lay and formalist conceptions of the legal system lead them to believe the law will vindicate their claims and provide them with justice. Attorneys counter these views with stories, narratives, and arguments that reflect what Sarat and Felstiner refer to as an "ideology of separate spheres," in which law and the everyday social experience of divorce are kept distinct and apart from one another. The power of attorneys is ultimately contingent on whether their clients accept their view of the law and courts embodied in this ideology.

The ideology of separate spheres is rooted in the desire of attorneys to frame divorce problems in ways that suit their professional self-image and that will facilitate settlement. Using various strategems, they struggle to keep the messy and tangled personal aspects of divorce off the agenda so that they can focus their clients' attentions on the more calculable issues of dissolving a marriage—custody, visitation, support, and property division. Lawyers press for interpretations and employ vocabularies of motive that emphasize circumstances and situations as explanations for a spouse's behavior, for example, in order to downplay what otherwise appear to be obdurate or intractable personality dispositions blocking settlements. No-fault divorce laws both reflect and reenforce this ideology, as well as establishing conventions of legal relevance that strengthen the attorney's hand. Clients soon learn through their attorneys that the law is not responsive to everyday concerns that do not satisfy these conventions. They also learn that the law is not a set of formally self-executing rules.

Attorneys introduce clients to a cynical view of courts, in which judges, lacking either skill or dedication, act arbitrarily and without regard to the specific issues in cases because they do not understand the rules or because they are motivated by extralegal factors. The key to success in this world, attorneys explain, is not knowledge of the rules but insider access, connections, and reputation. The ideology of separate spheres and the demystification of law and courts lead clients to question the wisdom of depending on their personal experiences in setting goals and tactics. Moreover, their faith in the solidity of the formal law is undermined, while their feelings of being enmeshed and vulnerable in an unpredictable, uncertain legal process concomitantly increase. The end result, of course, is that the construction of meanings in the conferences justifies and enhances the lawyers' authority, since only they have the requisite local knowledge and contacts within the courthouse that are needed to bring a client's divorce to a reasonably satisfactory conclusion. However, while clients generally acquiesce and finally accept the lawyers' meanings in all phases of their relationship, Sarat and Felstiner stress that the power of attorneys is "fragile" because the meanings supporting their power are "elusive."

Sarat and Felstiner have written a provocative, intellectually graceful book, with an occasional punchy aphorism driving home a general point that complements the many illuminating specific excerpts from the conferences that provide empirical support for their discussion. Scholars interested in the dynamics of attorney-client relationships will find these first-ever glimpses of what goes on during conferences revealing. Sarat and Felstiner offer an intriguing, perhaps compelling, cultural perspective on power between attorneys and clients based on the narrative strategies each side uses to reach understandings of their respective roles and how to proceed with their cases. There are grounds for caution and reservation about their analysis, however. For one thing, even though Sarat and Felstiner followed whenever possible the complete history of the forty cases they studied, tape-recorded 115 conferences, conducted 130 interviews, and observed numerous courtroom hearings involving the cases, they rely on just a single case in one of the four pivotal chapters. In the other three chapters they use excerpts from conferences to illustrate their impressions or conclusions about the nature of the conferences. Sarat and Felstiner, however, do not identify the excerpts according to the cases from which they were taken, nor do they indicate in any systematic way how the forty cases compare with one another, which makes it hard to know when excerpts of some cases are typical or not of others. Classifications or categorizations of the cases or conferences are avoided because Sarat and Felstiner prefer an intensive description of the process, rather than reducing it to general categories. The consequence, however, is that relationships between attorneys and clients seem to emerge without regard to the issues, their complexity, or the long-term consequences that are present in divorce cases. One is left with the impression that cases with custody and visitation questions pose no more difficulties for relations between attorneys and their clients than cases pivoting around the division of property.

The conference excerpts make for lively reading, but it is important to recognize that the book lacks the thick description of a full-fledged ethnography and that it makes a richly conceptualized argument that often relies on lean samplings of illustrative excerpts. At other times generalizations are made that fly in the face of the book's evidence or run contrary to existing research. For example, client resistance is critically important to the ongoing cultural dynamics of attorney-client encounters portrayed in this book, and yet the authors also point out that clients bridle or balk most often during the early phases of the relationship with their attorneys and that clients generally are favorably disposed or are quickly won over to the idea of settlements. Sarat and Felstiner also assert that the lawyers take over the settlement process and at one point refer to a two-stage process wherein the attorneys representing the two spouses work together on the details of the settlement and then present the settlement to their respective clients for their approval. Other literature finds that lawyers very often if not most of the time let their clients and their spouses do the negotiating. All of this makes the prevalence of client resistance over the course of the relationship with their attorney more problematic than Sarat and Felstinter let on, as well as raising questions about the general tendency, despite their many qualifications, that they see for attorneys to take the upper hand in this relationship.

The actual outcomes of the forty cases Sarat and Felstiner watched and followed for nearly three years do not interest them. They include nothing in their book about how the attorneys' clients fared in their divorces. They justify this surprising lack of curiosity by claiming that "'Who says what' is as important as 'who gets what' in revealing law's power" (p. 144). This aphorism captures in a nutshell their argument that instrumentalist, "noninterpretivist" scholarship in sociolegal studies misses the constitutive influences of law and legal concepts in everyday life, by considering law only as external to social experience and as a rationalist tool to achieve particular goals. Sarat and Felstiner's book is a worthy contribution to a recent trend toward an alternative interpretivist approach in which law and everyday life intermingle and interact in specific sites to construct commonsense meanings and understandings that structure human relationships.

Mediation, Citizen Empowerment, and Transformational Politics. By Edward W. Schwerin. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. 204p. $55.00.

Richard J. Maiman, *University of Southern Maine*

"Transformational politics" is a social and scholarly movement whose adherents share an interest in building a political community based on norms that include personal empowerment, cooperation, grassroots democracy, equality, and environmental awareness. Writing as a member and a student of that movement, Schwerin demonstrates considerable strengths as an advocate and an analyst. However, this combination of roles ultimately limits the book's value. The author's commitment to the ideology of transformational politics seems to prevent him from taking a hard look at some of the implications of his own research.

According to Schwerin, "the core concept or value of Transformational Politics" (p. 6) is empowerment. Empowerment theorists have worked at two distinct levels of inquiry—psychological (personal) and social-political—though there is some overlap between these categories. (For example, political efficacy can be seen as a component of personal empowerment.) Acknowledging that the concept of empowerment is complex and amorphous, and noting that these attributes may help explain empowerment's current popularity as a political buzzword with both liberals and conservatives, Schwerin does an excellent job of unpacking the word's many meanings.

Schwerin is interested in personal empowerment in the context of community mediation, a form of conflict resolution that is often seen as a prototypical institution of transformational politics. Advocates of community mediation have long touted its potential for empowering citizens by teaching them the skills of dispute resolution. Rather than bringing their conflicts to a formal legal system often more concerned with its own imperatives than with those of the disputants, citizens are encouraged to resolve matters themselves with the help of a nonauthoritative third party. In recent years, advocates of community mediation have shifted from the claim that mediation transforms *disputants* to an assertion that it is *mediators* who are changed by learning about and participating in mediation. But even this more modest claim has not been tested empirically. Thus, unlike the many researchers who have studied the effectiveness of mediation (community and otherwise) in resolving disputes, Schwerin sets out to consider mediation's impact on the mediators themselves.

Borrowing and adapting measures of empowerment from numerous previous studies, Schwerin examines the relationship between training and experience as a community mediator and levels of personal empowerment. (For clarity's sake, Schwerin's survey instruments should have been reproduced in either the text or an appendix.) Eschewing formal hypotheses because of the "exploratory" nature of this research, the author nevertheless posits that "specific data patterns can be expected to emerge if the mediation experience empowers those individuals who participate in it" (p. 93). Specifically, Schwering predicts that mediation trainees will have higher personal empowerment scores after their training than before; that the empowerment scores of mediators with one or more years of experience will be even higher than those of the post-trainees; and that a third group, the "leaders"—experienced mediators who have gone on to become involved in the organizational aspects of the program—will have the highest empowerment scores of the three groups.

Schwerin reports that these expectations were only partially realized in his survey. Mediator trainees' post-training empowerment scores were indeed higher than their pre-training scores. The results also showed leaders' empowerment scores to be somewhat higher than those of the mediator group. But both leaders and mediators actually scored *lower* on the empowerment scale than post-trainees. In fact, experienced mediators had even lower scores than *pre*-trainees on some dimensions of the scale.

The most obvious interpretation of Schwerin's results is that while intensive training is effective at teaching recruits "the empowering skills, attitudes, and behaviors expected of mediators" (p. 125), such empowerment is only short-lived and is negated by subsequent mediation experience. Schwerin discusses this conclusion only briefly and has little to say about its significance for transformational politics. In fact, he seems to regard his findings as more embarrassing than intriguing. For example, the author reports only aggregate mean scores for each of the three groups he surveyed. Despite the small numbers of respondents (50 trainees, 50 mediators, and 22 leaders), demographic comparisons within and between groups might have shed some light on the unexpected results.

Drawing more on other empirical research than on his own, Schwerin makes a strong case that community mediation has failed to live up to its advance billing. He also concedes that in the battle for control of the alternative dispute resolution movement, the "reformers" (those who favor increased professionalization and institutionalization of mediation) appear to have defeated the transformationalists' more radical vision of "popular justice" without formal ties to the legal system. But his analysis seems to beg the question, "Why?" Is it enough to suggest, as Schwerin does, that in the history of social movements reformers generally win out over radicals? Or is there perhaps something more specific to the transformationalist political vision that dooms it to failure? Could it be that, like the newly empowered community mediation trainees who find the real-world experience of mediation disillusioning, transformationalists are too inclined to mistake the world as it should be for the world as it is?

In his final chapter, Schwerin, assuming a stance of tough-minded realism, discusses the future of transformationalism as both a political and a scholarly project. In scholarship, Schwerin calls for more critical scrutiny of the concept of empowerment. "Just as power theory has benefited from both proponents and critics," he argues, "so too will empowerment theory" (p. 163). In politics, Schwerin advocates a strategy that embraces coalition-building and incrementalism. Based on the evidence presented here, however, one wonders whether in the long run transformationalist scholar-activists can sustain such realism. Certainly Schwerin's list of 30 "insights" about empowerment is a curious mix of hypotheses and rhetoric (e.g., "Empowerment is a journey with hills and valleys but no final destination" [p. 168]). Committed transformationalists may find Schwerin's agenda for future empowerment work and research a valuable resource. Skeptics and agnostics on the subject of transformational politics probably will want to await further developments. Meanwhile, they might ponder the meaning of Schwerin's decision to close his book on transformational politics with "inspirational words" (p. 188) from John F. Kennedy.

A Year in the Life of the Supreme Court. Edited by Rodney A. Smolla. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995. 300p. $39.95 cloth, $14.95 paper.

David M. O'Brien, *University of Virginia*

Journalists, in one charitable view, write the first drafts of history. This is a view taken seriously by Rodney Smolla, a professor at the College of William and Mary's Marshall-Wythe School of Law and director of its Institute of Bill of Rights. In *A Year in the Life of the Supreme Court*, Smolla collects, along with his introduction, nine essays principally by newspaper reporters who cover (or have covered) the Supreme Court.

With two exceptions, each essay deals with one of the cases handed down during the Court's 1992 term. Most focus on the litigants, oral arguments, the final decision, and the justices' opinions. The *Baltimore Sun*'s reporter Lyle Denniston, thus, tackles the Court's first encounter with efforts to legally restrain protests by Operation Rescue and other antiabortion groups in *Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic* (1993). Richard Carelli of the Associated Press considers the ruling in *Minnesota v. Dickerson* (1993) on the permissibility of "plain feel" searches by police. Aaron Epstein of Knight-Ridder Newspapers in turn focuses on one of the term's three pronouncements on freedom of religion in *Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District* (1993). The *National Law Journal*'s Marcia Coyle addresses the justices' rejection of Leonel Herrera's claim that executing a death-row inmate who produces new evidence of his "actual innocence" violates the Constitution, while *Los Angeles Times* reporter David Savage contributes a chapter on the "hate-speech" and *R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul* (1992). Kay Kindred, the only nonjournalist among the authors and a professor affiliated with Smolla's institute, writes about the term's decision on desegregation in Mississippi's higher education system. Finally, former *Wall Street Journal* reporter Stephen Wermiel deals with the statutory ruling on Christine Franklin's suit for sexual harassment against Gwinnett County Public Schools.

In a concluding chapter, *USA Today* reporter Tony Mauro offers a critical assessment of the Court's "cult of secrecy." Along with the issue of "cameras in the courtroom," Mauro discusses Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's ill-considered handling of controversies over, on the one hand, the Library of Congress's making publicly available the papers of retired Justice Thurgood Marshall and, on the other hand, political scientist Peter Irons's publication of *May It Please the Court* (1993), a book-and-tapes package of 23 edited recordings of oral arguments before the Court. Irons drew the wrath of the chief justice for violating his signed agreement with the National Archives not to reproduce the recordings for commercial purposes. Drawing on memoranda located in Justice Marshall's papers, Mauro admirably describes the history and internal politics of these controversies, which fortunately (and unlike the others in earlier chapters) did not become federal cases.

If the strength of these contributions is, in the editor's words, "to give readers a sense of the richness of Supreme Court litigation" (p. 1), their weaknesses remain inherent in such "journalistic snapshots." Although providing often engaging accounts of the litigants and oral arguments, most of the essays fail to probe the larger historical, political, and jurisprudential context of the cases and the Court. With the exceptions of Kindred's and one or two other essays, there is little or no treatment of the impact and consequences of the Court's rulings. At most, readers find only brief thumbnail sketches of individual justices and their judicial philosophies. Yet, alas, these do not add up to a collective portrait of the Court.

A few careless errors also appear here and there. In discussing the Rehnquist Court's defense of First Amendment free speech doctrine, for instance, Savage overreaches in claiming that "Even Earl Warren and his legendary liberal court had refused to go so far as to strike down the laws against flag burning" (p. 182). However, a bare majority (with Chief Justice Warren dissenting, to be sure) in *Street v. New York* (1969) overturned a protester's conviction for burning the flag in violation of New York's law against mutilating or casting contempt upon any flag of the United States. And the publisher of Irons's *May It Please the Court* is misidentified as "the New York Press" (p. 277) instead of the New Press, which happens to be located in New York City. These are minor mistakes that the editor, if not the authors, should have caught.

More notably, some of the cases selected are of minor significance, while other more important decisions during the 1992 term are simply neglected. Two examples suffice. First, the decision in *Bray* has been overshadowed by subsequent rulings on the activities of anti-abortion protesters. Second, while focusing on *United States v. Fordice* (1992), Kindred neglects even to mention the ruling in *Freeman v. Pitts* (1992), which arguably signals the end of the era of lower federal court supervision of desegregation efforts that was inaugurated with the landmark ruling in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954).

As a result, the eight "case studies" in this volume hold both limited long-term interest and little promise for classroom use. As a comparable collection, John Garraty's *Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution* (rev. ed., 1987) still has no match. Ever Peter Irons's *The Courage of Their Convictions* (1988) is more useful for classes because it combines sixteen case studies with extensive interviews with the litigants who took their cases "all the way to the Supreme Court."

Last but not least, *A Year in the Life of the Supreme Court* hardly does justice to the business and workload of the Court, to wit, to a year in the life of the Court. Besides the eight decisions dealt with here, the Court handed down over 100 other rulings from a docket of more than 6,000 cases. Yet there is no mention of these aspects of life in "the marble temple" or of how the Rehnquist Court has sharply cut back on the number of cases granted review, or of how the cases are screened, or of the new directions that the Court has charted in recent years. In sum, only readers largely ignorant of the dozen or so cases annually reported on by the media will gain a greater "sense of the richness of Supreme Court litigation" from this collection.

The Founders, the Constitution, and Public Administration: A Conflict in World Views. By Michael W. Spicer. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1995. 128p. $27.50.

Donald J. Maletz, *The University of Oklahoma*

This book begins with the author's distinguishing between two views about the proper powers and extent of government. One is the "distinctively optimistic and frankly almost utopian view" of American specialists in public administration. The other is a "far more skeptical and realistic view expressed by the Founders" in *The Federalist Papers* and shared today by those inclined to think that government should be stringently limited (p. xi). Because, Spicer argues, the second view lies at the basis of constitutional government, it has fostered a certain distrust of bureaucracy in both popular opinion and in some of the social science disciplines, especially economics, to which he gives a degree of priority. That distrust has only grown as public administration metamorphosed from its late nineteenth century origins into the large modern bureaucracy. Spicer's objective is to show how to establish the legitimacy of public administration within the constitutional order by rethinking its role in terms derived from the realism and skepticism he finds in the ideas underlying the constitutional order.

Two main themes characterize Spicer's project. First, he attempts to situate the ideas of both the founders and of the advocates of modern public administration within a larger debate in political science and political philosophy between those whom he calls "rationalists" and "antirationalists." The rationalists believe in the power of reason to devise institutions and programs that will improve social, political, and economic conditions. The antirationalists are convinced of the limits of reason, insist on the need for strong constraints on power, and are inclined to rely on markets and on experience and custom. Spicer contends that the founders of the constitutional system were much closer to the antirationalists than to the rationalists in their views. Furthermore, he argues that the key to establishing the legitimacy of public administration in our time lies in bringing it more deeply into harmony with the logic of constrained power inherent in the principle of constitutionalism as the antirationalists would see it.

Spicer's second main goal is to urge administrators to rethink their role in the light of this constitutionalism properly conceived. From this rethinking should come a quite practical "ethic" of constitutionalism. Contrary to what one might expect, this ethic does not require the narrowing of administrative discretion but rather an enhancement of its scope in a form that he calls "constrained discretion" (p. 79). For, Spicer suggests, we should want administrators to exercise significant administrative discretion in order precisely to help keep political leaders under control in the spirit the constitutional system demands. He proposes a kind of constitutionalist activism by administrators: They have a duty not to be mere neutral instruments of power but should raise questions, seek to persuade, take advantage of differences between the governing authorities, maintain relatively strict rules and procedures, adhere to the idea of the rule of law (which for Spicer includes drawing on common-law modes of reasoning), seek to foster consensus building through broad consultation, and generally adopt an ethic of "limiting the costs that government can impose upon citizens" (p. 43). The entities in need of constraint are both the political branches of government and the administrative side itself.

The place given to the common-law tradition reminds the reader that to some extent this original and stimulating book draws on British experience in trying to understand the particular situation of our public administration and to recommend a new approach toward it. The argument's real strength is that it brings something out of the ordinary to bear on a familiar problem. Above all, Spicer proposes that we reopen the great debate at the founding of the modern democracies about the role of reason in public affairs. This is a real debate with powerful arguments deployed on both sides, and Spicer surveys it in concise fashion to show that the problem of an appropriate ethic for public administration can hardly be resolved without addressing it seriously.

Yet characterizing this debate in terms of an opposition of "world views," of "rationalism" vs. "antirationalism," gives it a misleading basis in one important respect. Spicer's sympathies are plainly with those whom he calls the "antirationalists," among whom he numbers the founders, both Federalists and Anti-Federalists. Yet as his study proceeds, it is clear that he offers not only sympathy but a developed argument in favor of what he calls the "logic of a constitution" (p. 41) with its limitation of government power. He notes at one point that he is offering a "form of rational analysis" directed against "the excessive claims of rationalism" (p. 41). It would therefore better serve the issue to characterize the opposing alternatives more carefully. To call them "world views" makes them matters of belief and intuition rather than reason. Perhaps, however, they are best regarded as different opinions about the broad scope of government, each of which is susceptible to evaluation in terms of evidence and principles. The point is not merely one of terminology. The practical force of Spicer's overall argument lies in outlining a distinctively constitutionalist ethic for public administrators. That ethic is meant to incorporate the spirit of constitutional government more fully and more actively than other views previously debated within public administration. It will be one thing if this constitutionalist ethic is regarded by the practitioners themselves as founded on reasonable premises requiring the cultivation of reasonable attitudes in those who practice it. It will be quite another if the constitutionalist ethic is taken to be but another ideology demanding nonrational or antirational "commitment" rather than reflection, the quest for evidence, and informed, deliberate choice.

Ethics in Congress: From Individual to Institutional Corruption. By Dennis F. Thompson. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995. 246p. $32.95 cloth, $12.95 paper.

Charles Stewart III, *The Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

Congressional corruption is one of those topics that members of the public assume are central to political science, but are actually relegated to the professional periphery. Thus, when a book entitled *Ethics in Congress* appears, penned by a political philosopher, it is natural to ask two questions: (1) Why has this topic not been addressed by mainstream students of legislative politics? (2) What does a political philosopher have to say that could not (or would not) be said by an empirical scholar?

To answer the second question first, *Ethics in Congress* is a major attempt both to analyze the shortcomings of Congress in policing the behavior of its members and to delineate a system of principles to guide such regulation. The heart of the book is an argument that the system of regulating congressional ethics should first distinguish between *individual* and *institutional* corruption. Individual corruption is more easily recognized, both popularly and in Congress, and it has been the source of most efforts to police congressional behavior. Institutional corruption is more difficult to recognize, or even to define, although it is actually more corrosive of representative government. Thompson identifies institutional corruption as that in which the gain a member receives is political (not personal), the service provided is procedurally improper, and the connection between the gain and services damages the institution or the democratic process (p. 7).

The surest sign that *Ethics in Congress* was not written by a journeyman congressional scholar is what Thompson treats as axiomatic. Students of Congress who cut their eye teeth on Mayhew's *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (1974) tend to treat as axiomatic the reelection- (or more broadly, power-) seeking behavior of politicians, profit-seeking behavior of firms and individuals who lobby government, and responsiveness-seeking and information-miserly behavior of constituents. What is popularly known as individual corruption in such a framework revolves around the breakdown of the principal-agent relationship between constituents and politicians, not unlike the bookkeeper at a factory selling real estate on the boss's time.

Thompson's real interest, institutional corruption, is less easy to identify within the au courant rational choice approach. The legislative process, as a system, is surely a public good and thus subject to all sorts of assaults. What distinguishes him from most legislative scholars is that Thompson is most interested in guarding the legislative process directly for citizens; most legislative scholars would probably stop at the protection of the legislative arena for *legislators*—a difficult enough problem without considering constitutents' interests, too.

Rather than take individual motivations as axiomatic, Thompson takes institutional corruption itself for granted, a problem to be solved. This starting point frees and limits Thompson's analysis. The freedom it brings is that *Ethics in Congress*, through force of argument and a deft use of contemporary ethics cases, illustrates from many angles how the greatest harm done in cases such as Abscam, the Keating Five, and Speaker Jim Wright was institutional. They undermined the legislative process by both shortcircuiting it and by bringing it into greater popular disrepute than it deserved.

Taking institutional corruption as the starting point limits the analysis, however, for at least two reasons. First, it may cause Thompson to undervalue how citizens already reason about institutional corruption, based on reports of individual misdeeds. By emphasizing institutional corruption, Thompson seeks to draw the public's attention away from individual foibles that often affect the collective behavior of Congress not at all. Following a long tradition in political science, Thompson takes the popular obsession with individualistic traits of legislators as distracting from the truly great issues that confront the country. Yet the great virtue of focusing on individual corruption is that voters understand it. Combined with the aphorism that "he who can't be trusted in small things can't be trusted in great ones," commonsense reasoning may not serve citizens too poorly.

Second, Thompson may take too sanguine a view of his favored reform, the creation of an ethics *commission*, to regulate congressional behavior. Early in *Ethics in Congress*, Thompson asserts that ethical questions are more difficult in the modern era, not because legislators are themselves more corrupt—just the opposite. Legislative life, like society, has become more complex, and with complexity comes more opportunities to run aground on the coral reef of statute, norms, and expectations governing the ethical behavior of legislators. At the end of the book, Thompson argues that this greater complexity can most fruitfully be addressed by an independent legislative ethics commission at the national level.

The problem with this proposal is that those with the most interest in the commission's success (citizens) would have little incentive to monitor it closely; those with the most interest in its failure (legislators) would have the most to say about its functioning; and those with the most time to attend to its matters (the commissioners) would not have the capabilities to do the job expected of them. A century's experience in the United States with commissions regulating complex systems—whether they be economic (the ICC, FTC, etc.) or electoral (the FEC)—suggests that they do a worse job of regulating complex systems than a market with a few simple rules and a "fire alarm" system of adjudication. (Just the experience of the FEC alone should make one doubt the ability of an independent commission to operate effectively in such a politically charged environment.)

Therefore, even with its imperfections, the electoral system is likely to be the better arena for protecting against institutional corruption, even if many voters reduce collective matters to individual ones. Reforms intended to expose more Washington behavior of incumbents (e.g., tougher financial disclosure requirements, publication of meeting diaries) and to encourage robust opposition to incumbents running for reelection (e.g., some public financing of campaigns) may be more effective than an independent regulatory commission for ethics.

Given the objections that a journeyman might bring to a book about congressional ethics written by a philosopher, why have more empirically oriented scholars not entered the debate? Here the answer is more difficult to frame, since it involves more the personal motivations of scholars rather than an inherent limitation of their tools. One thing is clear from Thompson's analysis, however: The problem of how voters and Congress regulate the behavior of representatives is an enormous normative and positive puzzle. Thompson has done journalists, citizens, legislators, *and* empirical students of Congress an enormous favor. His

Ethics in Congress collects a comprehensive catalogue of ethics cases that are ripe for future research, draws an important distinction between individual and collective responsibility to the political system, and offers up a research path that is of more than academic importance. If others do not take up the many challenges offered up by his analysis, the profession and the nation will be the poorer for it.

Democracy's Feast: Elections in America. Edited by Herbert F. Weisberg. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995. 353p. $29.95.

Carol A. Cassel, *University of Alabama*

As editor Herb Weisberg writes in the introduction, *Democracy's Feast: Elections in America* is really about the 1992 election. The broader title fits because the volume also serves as a primer on American electoral behavior. Many of the 12 chapters contain data from both 1992 and earlier presidential election years. Ohio State University political science faculty wrote most of the chapters—and former or current graduate students coauthored a number of them—making the book largely a collaborative Ohio State effort, dedicated to former department chair Randall Ripley. This work speaks well of the human resources in the American politics subfield at Ohio State.

Democracy's Feast was designed so that it can be used as a textbook, both in the way it is written and for its high-interest content. Chapters include such topics as the Perot candidacy, women voters, black voters, and the candidates' wives. In fact, these and other chapters are insightful reading for political scientists as well. Particularly strong chapters are: "Attitudinal Correlates of the 1992 Presidential Vote: Party Identification and Beyond" by Weisberg and Kimball, which sheds new light on partisan leaners through the analysis of 1989–92 trends in party identification; "Social-Group Polarization in 1992," in which Weisberg, Haynes, and Krosnick examine changes over time in the meaning of liberal and conservative ideology and its linkage to parties; and "The Long Campaign: Senate Elections in 1992," in which Box-Steffensmeier and Franklin link incumbent performance *before* the campaign to votes on election day.

Other chapters explore two election surprises in 1992, the upswing in turnout and the vote for Perot. Nichols and Beck conclude, in textbook style, that Perot motivated part of the upswing in turnout. In a more prescient work for the 1996 election, Asher finds no explanation for Perot's success other than his well-funded ability to exploit the electorate's discontent while avoiding specific positions on issues. Unfortunately, the authors rely on limited data from the National Election Survey—questions about Perot were dropped when he left the race in July. Asher provides telling analysis by eliminating from explanations for Perot's support the issues of ideology, traditional values, economic concerns, and race.

Various authors agree that the biggest reason for Clinton's victory was a poor economy. The Ohio State authors do not agree, however, on who had the candidate advantage in 1992. Smith and Kessell find that Bush had the candidate advantage, while Weisberg and Kimball award the advantage to Clinton. One of the themes of *Democracy's Feast* is the traditional three-part explanation of presidential election outcomes (parties, issues, candidates). So in a book that's nearly flawless, disagreement exists over a central motif. But the discrepancy over the candidate advantage suggests it played a minor role. At the same time, the same authors' chapters on parties, issues, and candidates in the 1992 presidential election are valuable reading for their classic interpretations of why Clinton defeated Bush.

I was confused by Tate's argument in "Structural Dependence or Group Loyalty" about structural dependence as an explanation for strong Democratic Party support. Structural dependence refers to blacks' position to the left of the Democratic Party center and the necessity to support it in a two-party structure. Tate's premise about nonvoting especially by young registered blacks appears to neglect the high nonvoting rate of young whites as well—the only point in the chapter that lacks a white comparison.

The most innovative chapters examine the candidates' wives and the 1992 Senate elections. Mughan and Burden are guilty of stretching the data to conclude that Hillary Clinton's impact on the election stemmed largely from attitudes created by the Anita Hill testimony. However, this exploratory chapter is well done and suits the high-interest format. I was most impressed by Box-Steffensmeier and Franklin's examination of approval ratings, electoral success, and retirement decisions of senators up for reelection in 1992. This rich chapter uses the Senate Election Study of 1988, 1990, and 1992 to demonstrate that senators succeed with their constituents according to the degree that their voting ideologies in Congress represent the ideologies of their constituents, or, as they term it, "the long campaign."

A drawback of this and other chapters is the paucity of citations. It is difficult to determine what previous studies the authors extend. For example, I was unable to discern the relation between the authors' work on "the long campaign" and prior research that links senators' roll-call votes to election outcomes. In summary, despite this inconvenience, *Democracy's Feast* is a scholarly volume with unusually broad appeal—a collection of readings that I could assign to students and also find interesting and instructive myself.

The Politicizing Presidency: The White House Personnel Office, 1948–1994. By Thomas J. Weko. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995. 224p. $35.00 cloth, $17.95 paper.

G. Calvin MacKenzie, *Colby College*

Bemused and befuddled followers of President Clinton's efforts to staff his administration should read this book. They will find many clues to the difficulties that all our recent presidents have encountered in their attempts to exercise the appointment power to shape and support their policy preferences.

Weko poses two questions. First, why have presidents tried to centralize authority in a vastly larger and more specialized White House Personnel Office? Second, what are the consequences of centralization: Has it made the executive branch more responsive to presidential leadership, or has it simply yielded a bloated and unmanageable White House Office?

Weko begins the search for answers in the years immediately following World War II. He describes the primitive efforts of Harry Truman's White House staff to enlarge the president's influence on appointments, a process traditionally dominated by the political parties. From there, he follows the thread of the story through the burgeoning developments of the Kennedy and Johnson years up to the most recent administrations with large personnel staffs and institutionalized procedures and expectations.

This is very good history and even better archaeology. Weko conducted more than 100 interviews and dug deeply and wisely into document collections all over the country. He has turned up papers and reports long ago presumed to be lost, even some that attracted little notice at the time they were written. He weaves this information into a narrative that persuasively explains the efforts and frustrations of one administration after another seeking to gain leverage from presidential appointment powers. Weko's treatment of the Nixon and Reagan efforts are especially good. Nixon's White House was the first to grasp the appointment power's potential for administrative control; Reagan's was the first to fully realize that potential.

Weko doesn't spend much time here on theory. This is scholarship of a high order and good storytelling. But the brief efforts at the beginning and end of the book to connect these developments in the personnel office to broader concepts of presidential power and institutional development seem to be tacked on. Weko argues that the rational-choice explanation for the development of the modern, or postmodern, presidency is largely untested empirically, particularly its insistence that political institutions induce preferences in officeholders and that the presidency is best understood by omitting personal factors. He proposes to use the development of the White House personnel office as a case for testing the proposition. The case is beautifully drawn, but the conclusions are disappointingly brief and discursive. Weko touches down only briefly in a final discussion of the theoretical implications of his research and only superficially returns to his concern about the rational-choice approach to understanding the presidency. He piled up a lot of ammunition here, but fired little of it.

It is not hard to have a few quibbles with a work as stimulating and well written as this. The presidents of this period, ironically, are barely visible in this account. Weko refers from time to time to what presidents wanted or preferred. But this information is almost always filtered through aides reporting what they think the president wanted or preferred. Of course, everyone around a president sees and hears a slightly different version of presidential opinion. We get very little sense from Weko of how presidents actually intersected with personnel decisions, and whether the extent of their intersection had much impact on the process.

In a fashion common to first-time book authors, Weko also overstates the barrenness of the intellectual terrain that he investigates. He complains at the outset that "There is tremendous confusion and ignorance . . . surrounding presidents' use of political appointments." In fact, the past two decades have brought ample attention to the presidential appointment process among scholars, in studies by congressional committees, and in the extensive work of more than a half-dozen blue ribbon commissions. Weko contributes to this body of scholarship and understanding principally through the depth and rigor of his historical research. But his denial of the work that preceded his seems arch and self-serving.

Weko concludes with what seems an unjustified potshot at the recent legacy of reform suggestions about the appointment process. The consensus among nearly all recent studies has been that there are too many positions in the executive branch filled by presidential appointment. This overloads a feeble system. It takes much too long to get a new administration in place. Presidents and their White House aides can't possibly move quickly enough or smartly enough to find responsive and technically qualified people for all the complex positions that sit atop a modern government. Relying on political appointment to fill so many offices, a uniquely American approach, undermines the morale and squanders the talent of senior civil servants. Weko dismisses those criticisms with the reply that presidents lack incentives to decentralize or cut back on the number of positions filled by political appointment. But that's why we've had so many voices for reform: precisely because new presidents don't realize until it's too late how hard and costly it is to manage the modern appointment process.

But these qualms don't cast much of a shadow on this book. It is a major contribution to scholarship on the appointment process and the institutional development of the post–World War II presidency. It is richly detailed, yet a good read. There is still much to learn and understand about the complexities of the presidential appointment process. But a lot less than there was before Professor Weko went to work.

Comparative Politics

Comparative Political Finance among the Democracies. Edited by Herbert Alexander and Rei Shiratori. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994. 214p. $33.95.

Arthur B. Gunlicks, *University of Richmond*

This book consists of 13 chapters on the political finances of 14 countries (one chapter deals briefly with certain features of U.S. and Canadian political financing) and an introductory essay by the editors. It "took root" at a conference in Tokyo on political finance and electoral laws in September 1989. It is a typical edited work; individual chapters serve as case studies of individual countries, some chapters are more informative and better organized than others, and little attention is paid to integrating and synthesizing the materials presented.

The first chapter, by the editors, discusses the role of money, scandal and reforms, and the Tokyo Roundtable. The authors make no distinction between electoral and political finance reforms: Indeed, they appear to be the same thing. The chapter begins with a discussion of money and politics, but it moves quickly to "election reforms" as a means of securing political and economic equality: "By their nature, electoral reforms are not neutral. They are [should be?] designed to minimize economic inequalities by restricting the use of resources for political purposes and to maximize political equalities by expanding resources to increase electoral competition" (p. 2). Curiously, then, "election reforms" deal with political finance, but "public financing" is also "a favorite 'practical' political reform in many democracies" (ibid.).

I would also have welcomed a distinction between donations (legal or illegal) and outright bribery. Surely a case can be made that there is a difference between contributing to a political party or campaign on the one hand and bribery of individual politicians on the other hand. The "Keating

Five" scandal in the United States and the Flick affair in Germany, for example, did not enrich the recipients (as occurred in several other countries covered in the book). Laws regarding political financing practices do not necessarily address the separate issue of bribery of political officials. Yet in a number of chapters (especially the chapter on Japan), illegal or questionable donations for political purposes are treated as the same phenomenon as bribery.

Finally, the editors describe the 1989 Tokyo conference that dealt with political finance and election administration. They present the three-part Tokyo Declaration on electoral systems, electoral administration, and legal and institutional regulations of political funding. In spite of the assertion that the declaration "represents a framework within which the participant scholars provided individual assessments and analyses of political finance problems" (p. 9), it is in fact too general to serve this purpose and, in any case, was largely ignored as a framework by the individual authors in their separate case studies.

This is the major weakness of the book, and it begins in the preface, which promises more than is delivered. The reader will not find *a* "conceptual framework," nor can I accept the contention that the book "emphasizes the particular roles of forms of public assistance" (p. viii). The book does *not* offer "an in-depth exploration of political finances in and among mature and developing democracies of the world" (ibid.). With chapters ranging in length from 1 to 20 pages and containing from 1 to 44 notes, one can hardly speak of an in-depth analysis of political finance for each state. Indeed, the chapters on Brazil and Spain could easily have been published in the Sunday edition of a quality national newspaper.

Anyone who has ever edited a collection of studies dealing with a common theme will sympathize with the editors of this book. But it is not clear to me how we are ever going to make much progress in developing useful generalizations (let alone, engage in theory building) about political finance, unless we have a data set based on a common framework of analysis that allows us to ask and answer similar questions and permits meaningful comparisons.

This is not to deny that there are some strong chapters in this book. The chapters on Australia, the American presidential elections, campaign finance reform in the American states, and Dutch political parties are very informative. Unfortunately, some otherwise good contributions, such as the one on Great Britain, are not up to date. The chapter on Germany is now of historical interest only, since it was written before the major changes made in 1993.

Some chapters would have been strengthened by providing at least some empirical data. In the chapter on Sweden, there is a questionable distinction made between "consensus strategy" and "judicial strategy." In the chapter on India, it is not clear what "booth capturing" is or what "Rs. 1,50,000" means.

The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic. By D. S. Bell and Byron Criddle. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 294p. $44.00.

George Ross, *Brandeis University*

David Bell and Byron Criddle have produced a competent historical institutionalist review of scholarship on the *Parti Communiste Français* (PCF). After a general introduction, they review the party's political history in Part I and then move topically through the party's trade unionism, relations with the USSR, with the Socialists, and finally with the electorate in Part II. They tell us about a PCF caught in social change and inept strategizing that since the 1960s has lost more than half of its electoral support, many of its regional and municipal power bases, and much of its trade union power, leaving the party as an organization wracked with conflict and confusion. Today it gets less than 10% of the vote, has forfeited its "tribune" function (that of populist spokesperson for the grievances of ordinary people) to the racist National Front, and does not know which way to turn. Bell and Criddle narrate the various dimensions of this story in a readable volume replete with a set of capsule biographies of PCF leaders in an appendix. The book may be useful to those who know little about French Communism. Since it presents little original research, however, it will be of limited interest to informed specialists on European politics.

Why the collapse of French Communism? In their last, and most interesting, chapter, on "decline," they borrow (without rigorous analytical follow-through) a multivariate model that includes virtually every imaginable cause (p. 217). In fact, the model seems less important than the fact that the PCF's sociopolitical luck ran out. The party was fortunate in the interwar period because other forces on the French Left were too clumsy to appeal to urban, semiskilled industrial workers while the PCF had the organizational tools for the job. The felicitous ways in which the Resistance in World War II worked allowed the PCF to continue along this path. Just after the war it controlled the bulk of organized labor and 30% of the vote. The Cold War then allowed the party to monopolize popular opposition to the deep modernizing changes then reconfiguring France. The Fifth Republic's presidentialism and changed electoral system obliged the PCF to pursue an alliance strategy with the Socialists, however, and the ultimate result of the mortal combat that developed between Socialists and Communists was a Socialist victory. Loss at what had been a complex political chess game also coincided with movement toward "postindustrialism" in France plus the terminal agonies of the international Communist movement and the USSR.

The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic is full of political "attitude," as our students say these days. It frames its questions, marshals its data, and chooses its highly evaluative language in ways that would have been appropriate for the intellectual trenches of the Cold War. A demonic dragon manages to insinuate its way into France's scene, devours lots of children, and commits the unpardonable sin of preventing the shining personage of social democracy from appearing until Act IV, at which point the dragon is mortally wounded. The book wants to make sure that we are aware of the dragon's profound evilness.

It is a personal matter whether one shares Bell and Criddle's Cold War passions. They assume that the book is closed on French Communism and that theirs is the only possible reading. At the heart of this reading is what really concerns them, namely that the PCF is a Leninist party and hence totalitarian in organization and completely subordinate to the USSR, even after the USSR has ceased to exist. As such it is a foreign graft on French life, guilty, beyond its own sins, of having prevented France from developing the moderate social democratic left that they favor. The PCF deserved to collapse, in other words.

Such passions, however, may well obscure interesting matters that students of Communism could now illuminate. If the PCF was so alien, undemocratic, and inept, then why was it so successful for so long? Something about the party and the CGT, its union "mass organization," resonated with large numbers of ordinary French people and this appeal calls for further explanation. The Moscow archives would probably reveal new evidence about relationships between the Soviets and other CPs, which, while likely to confirm Bell and Criddle, may introduce new intricacies. And despite Bell and Criddle's confident claims about the all-powerful nature of PCF leadership, we still do not know very much about what went on in the little offices in Paris where everything seems to have been decided. It is particularly difficult to understand why the PCF leadership under Georges Marchais has made so many stupid mistakes over the last two decades. The PCF has been a complex, if often benighted, strategic actor, not simply an alien excrescence on France's landscape.

The Cold War time warp dimension of the book's argument is finally rather disturbing. The political heat has been turned down for students of communist parties, and one would have thought that this relaxation of tension would encourage fresh research and new conceptualization. Instead, Bell and Criddle rehearse stories from the past. This would be less disturbing if it were only Bell and Criddle doing so, but there is a larger tendency among scholars with long experience of analyzing the Communist movement to do the same, as if they wanted to make sure that their children understood the horrors of Communism. Is it not time to bracket the dangers of the dragon and investigate more deeply what transformed it into a tiny lizard flitting about without knowledge or purpose?

Radical Right-wing Populism in Western Europe. By Hans-Georg Betz. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. 200p. $45.00 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Peter H. Merkl, *University of California, Santa Barbara*

On the face of it, this book is a rather successful attempt to categorize and examine radical right populist parties in eight countries (not including Britain, Iberia, and Greece), much as others have compared conservative, liberal, or socialist parties in several countries. The difference lies in the novelty and in the burgeoning and rapidly changing character of today's European radical right, which rather resists classification and makes the drawing of boundaries hazardous. As the author points out, he did not mean to write about neo-Nazism and anti-foreign violence but this does not absolve him of the need to delimit his populist right from the extreme right parties in particular countries, or to explain extremist actions and connections, for example, of the *Front National*, *Vlaams Blok*, or *Republikaner* or of some of their leaders. Hans-Georg Betz says little to illuminate this question and, in fact, seems to obfuscate it further with dubious comparisons with interwar German national socialism—no mention of the other interwar fascist movements—which he describes without reference to World War I, the peace treaties, or militarism and violence. As a comparandum, consequently, the old Nazi movement becomes purely a construct of social and economic anti-modernism with neoliberal overtones.

In explaining the genesis and strength of radical right populism, the author's stress is on the macrosocietal, global transformations of the eighties, even though some of the relevant parties, especially the Scandinavian Progress parties, first surfaced in the seventies. The social and economic forces are richly documented in this book: the rising anti-politician and anti-welfare sentiments of the mid-eighties—which induced the German *Republikaner* to name themselves after Ronald Reagan's Republicans—the impact of global market forces on enterprises and jobs, economic individualism, the communications revolution and the new educational needs, the new lifestyles and the new politics of the New Left, and the waves of new immigrants. The twenties' modernization wave broke up the old cleavage politics and created political space for new rightwing movements, except among industrial workers and the unemployed who, according to Betz, were "most immediately dependent on modernization" (p. 25) and hence failed to rally to the Nazis in great numbers. Of course, they had their own socialist and communist parties to rally them against the "class enemy" and against nationalists, a word Betz likes to avoid. The eighties' modernization also confused and dealigned the old cleavages by loosening the traditional party ties and encouraging protest and issue voting. In fact, the confidence in public institutions and in the ability of politicians to cope with the rising problems of "individualized capitalism" (p. 170) and social fragmentation dropped to an all-time low throughout the Western world, leaving a pervasive "resentment against the political class" (p. 58), which has since been intensified by the corruption affairs and scandals of the nineties. It has been this alienation from government and the political leadership, the author believes, that has mobilized the populist right.

The neoliberal, anti-government thrust of the early to mid-eighties, however, was soon co-opted by European conservative parties who took away the better-educated, bourgeois voters of the radical populist parties, forcing the latter instead to go after a less-educated blue collar clientele with blatant xenophobic, even racist appeals. Or was it the resort of the leaders to crude xenophobia, perhaps in response to the new tidal waves of refugees and asylum-seekers, that drove out their bourgeois disciples? It left radical right populism with a sullen following from the new underclass from the ghettoes of industrial downsizing, in the urban anomie of deteriorating housing, and in fear of masses of immigrants, their alien culture, their crime, and their labor competition. By the early nineties, the populists had become heavily proletarian on a par with socialist parties and xenophobic—except for the *Lega Nord*, which seems to have traveled in the opposite direction—and they had rediscovered the welfare state with a vengeance, a xenophobic vengeance. Betz still claims to see among them traces of their earlier libertarianism, as a pedigree of their postindustrial genesis, but the label of "welfare state chauvinism"—barring foreigners from the shrinking blessings of continental welfarism—fits them much better. Still, we look for motives more particular to radical right populism than the widely shared political alienation, anti-immigrant feelings, and welfare chauvinism, or even the underclass anomie to recruit populist voters. The electorate of the *Front National* or the Danish Progress party, in fact, shows a high degree of political interest and of commitment as compared to the average voter, an indication that radical right populism has long outgrown the format of a protest vote. To show more prejudice than the conservative voters and even more than the general electorate is not enough explanation.

To link individual choice and collective endeavor better, the author stresses the role of leadership and of issue manipulation, the issues being control of immigration, law and order, housing, unemployment, and welfare chauvinism. But there remain vexing questions: Why is there such a gender gap in the populist vote but not among the xenophobes in the general public? Is it really just the intervening variable of women's religious posture, as the author maintains, or is it the anti-feminist phobia, the fright of all the uncontrollable women in the lives of the young populists? What is so postmaterialistic about an industrial underclass worrying about its jobs, housing, and welfare rights in the face of creeping multiculturalism? So what if the young radicals—who are mostly under 30—show some tolerance for the rights of abortion and of sexual deviants? Why deemphasize the role of the recent waves of immigrants as the trigger of the xenophobia gripping these societies in favor of "the transition from industrial welfare capitalism to postindustrial individualized capitalism" (p. 170)? And just what is the difference between an extreme rightist and a radical right populist at the level of individual motivations? The occasional parallels drawn by the author with interwar fascism seem too slight to make a persuasive case in the absence of the shadow of war and of the use of violence to resolve social conflicts, except for one: Turning upon alien minorities when one is under pressure from global market forces indeed is still "the stupid man's socialism" today, as it was seventy years ago.

Paths of Emancipation. Edited by Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 308p. $55.00 cloth, $16.95 paper.

Benjamin Ginsberg, *Johns Hopkins University*

This collection of excellent and stimulating essays examines the emancipation of the Jews in eight different national settings. Far from being a parochial topic, Jewish emancipation is an important event in world history and, because of the role that Jews came to play, figured significantly in the evolution of the modern state. Indeed, the interplay between Jews, their allies, and their antagonists has figured prominently in European state-building.

Jewish emancipation is, of course, closely tied to the emergence of liberal regimes. The relationship, however, between Jews and liberalism is complex. Jews were both beneficiaries of liberalism and important actors in the construction of liberal regimes. Liberal forces in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries supported legal equality and national citizenship for all Jews and as a result, Jews supported liberal movements everywhere and benefited from their success. Where liberal forces were strongest, in France, Britain and, of course, the United States, this Jewish support, while important, was not critical to liberalism's success. However, Jewish participation was crucial in southern and central Europe where liberal movements were weakest.

For example, Jews in substantial numbers supported Mazzini's "Young Italy" movement and took part in the uprisings of the 1830s. In addition, Mazzini received considerable financial aid from the Jewish banking firm of Todros in Turin. Subsequently, the Jewish banking houses of Rothschild, Bendi, and Tedesco financed Cavour's efforts to unify Italy. Jews were also important in Cavour's inner circle, serving as publicists for his cause and members of his cabinets. From early in his career, Cavour was a staunch advocate of Jewish emancipation.

Significant numbers of Jews participated in the liberal revolutions of 1848 in central Europe. In Germany, Jews fought at the barricades in Berlin and helped to lead the Prussian National Assembly and Frankfurt Parliament. Such intellectuals as Heinrich Heine and Ludwig Borne were major publicists and propagandists for the liberal cause. In Austria, Jews participated in the Vienna uprising and helped to formulate a new liberal constitution. In Hungary, 20,000 Jews enlisted in the national army formed by Louis Kossuth. The constitutions of most of the liberal regimes established in 1848 provided for the emancipation of Jews. After these regimes were overthrown, however, many of the Jews' new privileges were rescinded. Central European Jews continued to support liberal movements even after the revolutions of 1848 were defeated. In the 1860s and 1870s, Austrian and German rulers were compelled to make concessions to liberal forces and restrictions on Jews were removed as they had been earlier in France and Britain when liberal regimes were consolidated in those countries.

Perhaps the distinctive contribution of Jews to the construction and development of liberal regimes was in political mobilization and opinion formation. Liberal regimes removed religious restrictions and opened up opportunities for Jews in business and the professions. This cleared the way for a great expansion of the Jewish business class and fostered the emergence of an important urban Jewish stratum consisting of lawyers, journalists, writers, physicians, and other professionals. These businessmen and professionals became important figures in the popular politics of the liberal era as publishers, editors, writers, politicians, political organizers, and party financiers. In these capacities, Jews were staunch supporters of the liberal state and important allies for those leaders who sought to strengthen it.

In France, for example, Jews supported the liberal revolution of 1848. Two prominent Jews, Adolphe Cremieux and Michel Goudchaux, served the Second Republic as ministers of Justice and Finance, respectively. The accession of Napoleon III brought an end to this short-lived regime, and Jews played little role in the Second Empire that followed. After the rout of French forces in the Franco-Prussian War and the collapse of the Second Empire in 1870, Jews were active in the founding of the Third Republic. The Rothschilds organized the payment of the German war indemnity and a number of Jews participated in the early republican governments. Cremieux once again served as Minister of Justice; Eugene Manuel, Narcisse Leven, and Leonce Lehmann occupied important government posts, and several Jews served in the Chamber of Deputies. Throughout the history of the Third Republic, until its destruction at the hands of the Germans in 1940, Jewish politicians, financiers, and publicists actively participated in defending the Republic against such institutions in French society as the army, aristocracy, and clergy that sought its downfall.

In Britain, Jews did not figure in creating the liberal state. However, Jewish politicians, publishers, and financiers helped to strengthen the liberal regime and expand its popular base between the Crimean and First World wars. Jews also played a major role in German liberalism. Before World War I, though Jews comprised barely one percent of the German population, they constituted a major segment of the bourgeoisie and an important base of support for liberals. Jews had been particularly important in the liberal press. After World War I, Jews strongly supported the liberal Weimar Republic. Indeed, a Jewish socialist, Hugo Preuss, who served as Minister of the Interior in the provisional government established after the collapse of the monarchy, was primarily responsible for drafting the Weimar constitution.

The role played by Jews in the construction of European liberal regimes, in turn, played an important role in the evolution of at least one strain of modern anti-Semitism. Opponents of liberal regimes often used their association with Jews to attack them. This tactic was, of course, extremely important in late nineteenth century France, culminating in the Dreyfuss affairs, and in Weimar Germany. A similar phenomenon can also be observed in American history.

Some social historians have maintained that American "exceptionalism," i.e., the unusual strength of liberal values in the United States, precludes the emergence of major anti-Semitic movements in this country. The validity of this optimistic view, though, is open to question. Certainly, liberal democracy has been more firmly rooted in the United States than anywhere else in the world. It is extremely important to understand, however, that the strength of liberalism in America is not a function of some immutable ideological commitment on the part of Americans. Liberalism, rather, has prevailed in the United States as a result of the victories won by liberal forces in political struggles (sometimes pitched battles) against opponents whose values were decidedly illiberal. The triumph of liberal democracy was by no means preordained in, say, the 1860s or the 1930s. During both these periods liberal values prevailed because *and only because* the political and military forces controlled by the proponents of those values won after long and heroic conflicts whose outcomes remained in doubt for many years.

Understanding liberalism as a doctrine that has prevailed, rather than one that has never been challenged in the United States, helps to illuminate the place of Jews and anti-Semitism in American history. First, over the past century, Jews have generally supported liberal values and been linked to liberal political forces in the United States. In turn, the opponents of those forces and values have upon occasion sought to make use of anti-Semitism to discredit them. Far from being excluded by liberalism, during several periods in American history including the 1880s, the 1930s and the 1950s, anti-Semitism played a significant role in attacks launched against liberal regimes in which Jews participated. Anti-Semitism was used, in part, to delegitimate liberal democracy by exposing it as a creature of or cover for the Jews. For example, many readers will, no doubt, recall that some right-wing opponents of the New Deal labeled it the "Jew Deal" as a prominent component of their effort to undermine the Roosevelt administration. Similarly, commentator and presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan called the Democratic Congress of 1992, "Israeli occupied territory," suggesting that liberal Democracy was little more than a front for the machinations of the Jews.

Second, during these periods, the 1930s and 1950s in particular, anti-Semitism was defeated by liberal forces, rather than precluded by liberalism. Groups espousing anti-Semitism ideologies were vanquished by Jews and their allies in liberal coalitions after long and arduous political struggles whose favorable outcomes were in no sense guaranteed. During these struggles, Jews were important members of the liberal camp. Indeed, Jews helped to defend American liberalism from its foes as much as liberalism protected the Jews from anti-Semitism.

Finally, far from excluding anti-Semitism, American liberalism has itself not been entirely free of antagonism to Jews. At the end of the nineteenth century, the liberal forces of the day led by northeastern industrialists found it politically expedient to respond to their patrician and populist opponents' use of anti-Semitism by distancing themselves from the Jews. As a result, nominally liberal forces participated in a campaign to exclude Jews from American political and social life. Paradoxically, it was precisely the strength of liberal groups that allowed them to jettison their putative Jewish allies. The triumph of liberalism in the aftermath of the Civil War made Jews superfluous to the liberal coalition. A parallel to this experience is to be found in the relationship between blacks and Jews today.

In these ways, Jews have played a key role in modern world history. *Paths of Emancipation* helps to illuminate that role and to move the story of the Jews from the parochial place it has occupied to the more central place it should occupy in the study of modern Western history. This is an outstanding volume.

Democracy Within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico. By Miguel Angel Centeno. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994. 272p. $35.00 cloth, $15.95 paper.

Judith Gentleman, *U.S. Air War College*

Miguel Angel Centeno has written an important study of the rise of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's regime in Mexico that seeks to explain the people, organization, and ideology that lay behind what Centeno calls the "technocratic revolution" of the Salinas period. In part, Centeno appears to have been motivated to pursue the study because of the keen interest seen in Russia and Eastern Europe in Mexico's reform model. Salinas made no secret of his intention to avoid *glasnost* in Mexico for fear, so he alleged, of jeopardizing his own version of *perestroika*. In the wake of the Gorbachev experiment, some argued that Mexico had invented a preferable approach to achieving reform. Centeno investigates this assertion but notes at the outset his preference for those systems that place priority upon achieving democratic outcomes. His study places the Salinas program squarely outside of this profile. While events have overtaken the study with the onset of regime's multiple crises, the study provides a fine roadmap through the early stages of "Salinastroika."

Centeno argues that the Salinas initiative succeeded because of a convergence of international and domestic factors, and that a decades-long transition within the state apparatus made the technocratic revolution possible. Salinastroika needed a well-oiled preexisting authoritarian machine in order to impose the reform project and to reconfigure state-society relations and impose neoliberal economic reform policies.

The study focuses upon institutions, elites, and ideology and acknowledges that the goal is to bring the state back rather than to focus upon the society per se. As such, important state-society linkages remain outside the scope of the study, leaving the discussion of the "how" of policy implementation confined to mention of interventions made through the National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL).

The book is exceptionally strong in its explanation of the political identity of the Salinistas in terms of their professional, institutional, and political backgrounds. As has Rod Camp previously, Centeno has offered a painstaking portrayal of an increasingly politically isolated elite. He argues that this elite had become more homogeneous and convinced that, given the international realities that Mexico faced, only one programmatic prescription could serve as a remedy for Mexico's ills. Importantly, these ills were defined as financial owing to the homogeneous, technocratic perspectives brought to bear on the analysis by the rising elite.

The program that has advanced embraced three key concepts: "The New Realism" (chiefly in economic affairs), "The New Nationalism" (involving the redefinition of the means appropriate to defend national sovereignty, e.g., free trade, NAFTA, and so forth), and "Social Liberalism" (involving the redefinition of the basis for social policy involving the repudiation of populism). In Centeno's view, "Salinastroika" involved the "imposition of a model that allowed no criticism" (p. 228). Indeed, he concludes that "their (the Salinistas') economics were capitalism, but their politics were Leninist" (p. 228). Given Mexico's problems in the 1980s, the new masters of economic policy reasoned that there was neither room for ideological conflict nor for a struggle among interest groups nor for that matter, for criticism. Thus, it is not surprising that the political record for the period shows the Salinistas' willingness to cooperate with center-right elements, but a tendency to invoke lethal opposition toward left or even center-left opponents if required.

The Salinistas, according to the author, were able to impose their revolution, in the first instance, because the disputed 1988 election saw the splintering of the left and substantial division on the right. Next, as the regime set about dismantling old corporatist linkages while remodeling party and state, it created PRONASOL to insure that as social costs were felt, "strategic needs" were met and new patronage networks were elaborated.

According to the author, in order to accomplish the task at hand, the regime had to maintain political stability, to legitimate economic reform as a state responsibility albeit within a neoliberal agenda, and to generate financial and political support. It could do so because power had already been centralized within a group of state institutions that embraced the technical-analytical model that affirmed a single policy perspective.

Centeno's outstanding discussion of the bureaucratic transformation that brought the Secretariat of Programming and Budget (SPP) to preeminence in the Mexican system specifically details how the central government came increasingly to dominate regional politics, how the Interior Ministry (Gobernacion) came to be increasingly marginalized, thus changing the coloration of central-regional relations throughout much of the country, and how Salinas was able to reshape the Mexican federal bureaucracy around a presidency with unprecedented power. When completed, these changes reinforced the isolation of policymakers inside their "bureaucratic ivory tower" and rendered that isolation "practically complete."

At the same time, Centeno's study indicates that the new elite had sufficient political acumen to succeed in recruiting the so-called burocratas politicos needed to implement policy and were sufficiently politically astute to offer the "carrot" of PRONASOL where appropriate, while wielding the "stick" as the government moved decisively to crush the center-left and populist opposition. Indeed, Centeno finds that "decisiveness" proved to be one of Salinas' important legitimating attributes that helped the regime to overcome the negative impact of social and economic reforms.

Altogether, Centeno's study offers important insight into the early Salinas period and its genesis. At the same time, one finds little to suggest in this portrayal of the early Salinas period that the last act of "Salinastroika" would showcase rising levels of intraelite violence, corruption, insurgency, and financial cataclysm, with the subtext potentially that of narcopolitics. If a sequel were written focusing upon the later period, the author might well begin by revisiting his characterization regarding Salinas' ideological disposition to the effect that "Salinas appears truly committed to the Revolution, notions of nationalism, sovereignty and justice" (p. 177). While Centeno's work hardly places him in the "amen" chorus of the Salinas lobby, a sequel to this study might well offer a reassessment of both the formal as well as the informal objectives of Salinisimo.

Legislatures and the New Democracies in Latin America. Edited by David Close. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995. 173p. $40.00.

Scott Mainwaring, *University of Notre Dame*

This short book provides case studies of the legislatures in seven Latin American countries, as well as an introduction by the editor and a conclusion. The overall rationale for the book is that legislatures either have become more important under democracy than they previously were, or that they should become more important if they have not already done so. Otherwise, a key ingredient in the institutionalization of democracy would be lacking.

David Close's introduction notes that the chapters focus more on examining how the legislatures fit into the overall political system than on providing a detailed examination of their inner workings. He argues that "To focus too closely on their (the legislatures') specific dynamics would risk both losing sight of the milieux in which they function and giving a description that would soon be inaccurate. We want to know what legislatures contribute, positively or negatively, to the building of democracy in seven countries" (p. 9). Although this approach is defensible, one of the book's shortcomings also stems from it: Several chapters offer disappointingly little new information about the legislatures themselves.

The country chapters focus on Mexico (although it falls a bit short of qualifying as a new democracy), El Salvador, Nicaragua, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. As is often the case with edited volumes, the contributions vary in quality. To my mind, the most interesting is Close's chapter on Nicaragua, which defies some occasionally misleading stereotypes about the weakness of Latin American legislatures. Close shows that the Nicaraguan National Assembly has been a central actor since the election of President Violeta Chamorro in 1990. He cautions, however, that a powerful legislature is not necessarily a good thing for democratic consolidation; here, too, he challenges conventional wisdom in a refreshing fashion.

Four chapters emphasize the weakness of the national legislatures. Among them, perhaps the best is Roderic Camp's contribution on Mexico, which succeeds more than most in marshaling empirical information that demonstrates the limits of the legislature and in explaining why those limits exist. José Z. Garcia on El Salvador, and Jorge Nef and Nibaldo Galleguillos on Chile, underscore the subordination of those two congresses. Gary W. Wynia echoes the same theme for Argentina, but he unwittingly indicates that Congress blocked some of President Alfonsín's (1983–89) most important projects, which means that it *was* a significant actor.

Daniel Zirker's extensively researched chapter on Brazil chronicles the changing role of the legislature from the military regime of 1964–85 to the present. Martin Weinstein claims that the Uruguayan legislature "functions as a significant protector of the rule of law and civil liberties" (p. 137), though he provides little empirical support for this argument.

This book has the merit of calling attention to an important subject that was relatively understudied until the last couple years, when some excellent dissertations and still unpublished manuscripts have appeared. Ultimately, however, the book disappoints. Most of the chapters are insufficiently comparative and seem unaware of the comparative literature on legislatures. Despite the plethora of studies on the U.S. Congress, there are few references to that literature, and few attempts to incorporate the valuable methodological tools that have been developed to study the American legislature.

There is little effort to think systematically about which Latin American legislatures are more powerful, and little effort to conceptualize different ways in which legislatures are powerful or weak. For example, almost all Latin American legislatures are weak proactively, but in many countries legislatures have the capacity to block presidential initiatives and have been important actors in doing so. I would also have welcomed more analysis of the legislatures' constitutional prerogatives, especially in a comparative fashion. This is an important task, for we need to know in what areas legislatures are constitutionally empowered. A situation in which a legislature is weak because of constitutional design (as in Chile) differs significantly from one in which the congress is subservient because the majority consistently supports the president (as in Mexico).

National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China. By Edward Friedman. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995. 359p. $55.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

Michael Dillon, *University of Durham, England*

Seventeen essays, some of them previously published elsewhere, make up this enquiry into the present and future of China. They are arranged in three sections headed National Identity Crisis, After Socialist Anti-Imperialism, and Democratic Prospects. The value of the book lies principally in the kind of questions that the author has raised about the nature of China's continuing political, social, and psychological crises. The issues addressed are wide ranging and the treatment is provocative, but the fundamental problem is that in touching on so many issues it has not been possible to avoid treating them superficially. There is also substantial repetition of the main themes.

Implicit in the arguments in this book and indeed in its title are certain assumptions about the nature of change in China and in other Asian countries, assumptions that need careful examination. These premises, it must be said, are also shared by many contemporary political scientists writing about China. The most important of these assumptions is that the centrally controlled bureaucratic state led by a single political party, a system loosely characterized as socialist, or in Friedman's book as Leninist, will necessarily go through a process that will lead to the democratization of its policy and society. These arguments are made more explicit throughout the fourth section of the book. There is more than a touch of the Fukuyama "end of history" thesis about this hypothesis. As evidence that democratization is the Asian norm, Friedman cites the examples of Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan. Careful scrutiny of the complex changes that have taken place or are taking place in these nations and the problems that these changes have created reveal such immense differences as to raise the question of whether the term democratization means anything at all.

Citation has become a serious problem in contemporary social science writing on China. What began as a proper and careful indication that an author had read the relevant literature and considered the arguments and ideas of the previous academic generation and contemporaries working in the same field has now generated into a ritual dance, with academic authors genuflecting to each other in citations, regardless of whether the works cited are really relevant. This may become dangerously incestuous and the mutual congratulation verges on the sycophantic. At best the superfluous citations enforce diversions from the narrative and dilute the discourse. They may improve the citation count on application for tenure, but they do nothing for the quality of scholarship or for the readability of academic work. Professor Friedman's book is not, of course, the only example of this, nor the worst offender, but parts of his present book do exemplify the trend.

Friedman apparently speaks and reads Chinese well, so it is disappointing to see so little use of Chinese-language sources. It is understandable that he uses the more easily assimilated material in translations and the research of his colleagues to produce a book quickly, but one always wonders how much such reliance on sources available in English distorts the picture. The sources that he does use are rather eclectic. In addition to the work of American academics, they range from official pronouncements to contemporary literature and gossip and even the output of a Chinese heavy metal band. These are the types of sources that many scholars working in China must use, but they are fraught with problems and require careful evaluation, which is not apparent in this book. Many often controversial statements are made without attribution, and some references are bizarre. In a chapter designed to show that the kidnaping of women, forced marriage, and rape are characteristic of Confucian Leninism (although my recollection is that reports of the resurgence of what were familiar crimes during China's imperial history only began to emerge as Party control lapsed and market reforms took over), Friedman writes, "The Chinese press reported an instance where a Ms. Wu was sold against her will to a farmer named Gong, who raped her" (p. 156). The citation, however, is from the *Dallas Morning News* and Dallas, to the best of my knowledge, is still in Texas. There are other similar examples.

At times it is difficult to tell whether this book is intended to be a work of analysis or a political tract. The chapter on ethnic identity and the Leninist state is a good example. Although it contains some useful insights, it is marred by the use of the term *Leninism* as a broad-spectrum political anathema rather than as a precise instrument of scholarly analysis. When the term *Leninist* is applied with no cultural discrimination to Mao's China, to Ethiopia, and to Yugoslavia, and when it is used in phrases like "Leninist Ilan," the term, like "democratization," has clearly lost any useful meaning in this context. I am at a loss to understand the emotional forces behind an expression like "Confucian Leninists . . . the red-brown alliance of fascist socialism" (p. 17).

There are many errors, distortions, and sweeping statements without substantiation in the book, particularly where Chinese history is concerned. A few examples will suffice. It takes a peculiar kind of chopped logic to see Mao Zedong, almost an archetypal chili pepper-loving Hunanese, as a northerner (p. 38). The modernization of Japan during the Meiji period was not brought about by "state socialism." The new Meiji government did indeed initiate modern industries but these were sold off to the private sector in the 1880s (p. 39). Professor Friedman blames Li Peng for this analysis but does not correct it. In one chapter, most of Chinese history is condensed into a few paragraphs (pp. 108–9), and gravely distorted to fit into the picture of a north-south divide that the author is trying to present.

Evidence from the historical emergence of Sichuan or the ethnically mixed northwest would not allow such an oversimplification. The reader's confidence in the author's grasp of Chinese history and language is not increased by the fact that the Central Asian population of the Mongol empire in China are referred to as the "simu-dead eye or four eyes," rather than "*semu* coloured eyes." Friedman also seeks to blame the Chinese Communist Party for attempting to impose one language, Mandarin, on the whole nation. The use of *guanhua* as a national language for the ruling elite goes back well into the Qing dynasty and the battle between northern and southern languages for supremacy was fought and lost by the south, at crucial conferences in the aftermath of the 1911 revolution. (It was, in fact, the Shanghai regional language rather than Cantonese which was considered to be the serious alternative to Mandarin.) Perhaps some comparison with the current debate in the United States on the use of English and minority languages such as Spanish would put this question in perspective.

The Collapse of a Single-Party System: The Disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. By Graeme Gill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 255p. $59.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

John P. Willerton, *University of Arizona, Tucson*

This volume explores the collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) through an examination of institutional, political elite, and policy changes of the Gorbachev period (1985–91). Gill's especially detailed analysis of Gorbachevian institutional reforms, combined with a more selective treatment of the changing political leadership and evolving policy debates, yields a useful illumination of late Soviet period political causes for the collapse of the USSR.

Key to the CPSU's long-term political dominance was its organizational penetration of administrative agencies. The standing of the CPSU was predictably affected by the mounting administrative failures of the mature Soviet period. Gill does not deal with the systemic or policy roots of those failures. Social and economic conditions and policy dilemmas of the late Soviet period are only referred to in passing. Rather, Gill's account begins with the initial personnel and policy moves of the early Gorbachev regime, which were in response to those administrative failures. This discussion is straightforward and summarily describes the reconstitution of the top political leadership. The volume provides a thorough examination of reforms within the CPSU, carefully tracking the debates over the consequences of Gorbachev's political program. The dilemmas inherent in balancing strong reformist and conservative currents within the CPSU become readily evident.

The logic of the Gorbachev regime's political program is clearer for the 1985–88 period, as a relatively coherent set of institutional and policy changes was designed to rejuvenate the Party organization and mode of operation without fundamentally altering the Party's leadership position. Resultant democratization impulses, however, promoted by forces operating both inside and outside the Party, resulted in the unintended rapid breakdown of the CPSU. Gill's analysis demonstrates that from an organizational perspective Gorbachev and the leadership had lost control of the reform process by 1989. His analysis is especially effective in illuminating the growing crisis of confidence within the CPSU itself. The discussion of the mounting vertical (territorial/national) and horizontal (organized factions) organizational challenges to the CPSU is nuanced and insightful. Although Gill gives only passing attention to the reform of non-CPSU institutional actors, he makes some appropriate arguments contrasting the slow democratization within the CPSU with rapid change in the traditionally weak system of soviets and the emergence of a multiparty system.

This study reveals that even modest organizational reform was destabilizing for the Soviet-type administrative party system. The volume provides a macro-level perspective on the changing federal-level political scene, but the sense of confusion, uncertainty, and even disillusionment that overwhelmed CPSU members is appropriately conveyed. This crisis of confidence in the CPSU's ability also overtook the federal-level leadership, contributing to the widening gulf between reformist and conservative elements within the CPSU establishment. What Gill describes as the "ambiguous" nature of Gorbachev's position reflects the near-impossibility of bridging neo-Stalinist traditionalists and democratizing reformers. His characterization of the early 1990s CPSU as "imploding" is apt indeed.

Gill's well-crafted analysis would have been bolstered by a developed discussion of the broader context for the institutional and policy changes of the Gorbachev period. It would have been useful to consider both the historical roots of the CPSU's institutional position in the mid-1980s and the consequent dilemmas inherent in altering that position. Gill writes of the basic inflexibility of the administrative CPSU system, and this was arguably true for the entire Soviet period. But some discussion of past Soviet political experience is needed for a more complete explanation of the CPSU's demise. For instance, the democratic centralist norms from 1921 and the underpinnings of the Stalinist political model set out important parameters within which even post-Stalinist politicians, including reformers, operated. Moreover, the legacy of Khrushchevian reformism and Brezhnevian stagnation structured subsequent efforts to adapt the CPSU and the Soviet system to increasingly complex post-Stalinist conditions. More attention should also have been given to the growing bottom-up pressures from the republics. Pressures from subordinate communist parties—particularly the newly created (1990) RSFSR Communist Party—became important in the last years of Gorbachevian reformism, and they are given some attention by Gill. But the pressures from popularly elected government executives (in particular, Russian President Boris Yeltsin) and legislatures were even more important and merited detailed coverage.

The analysis would also have been bolstered by some discussion of the socioeconomic context within which the political institutional changes of the Gorbachev period occurred. A hallmark of the post-Stalin USSR was that system and regime legitimacy increasingly rested on system performance, with performance primarily measured in economic terms. The economic stagnation—if not long-term decline—of the 1970s and 1980s was a key development motivating early Gorbachevian reforms. Gill correctly notes that the CPSU collapsed because it proved unable to respond to such profound domestic developments. But the CPSU's inability to solve long-term economic problems was directly related to its hegemonic institutional preeminence and antiquated economic model. A discussion of this interrelationship—and the problems associated with the Gorbachev economic program—would have provided a more balanced picture and permitted the reader a fuller appreciation of the institutional decay and elite demoralization of the 1985–91 period.

Gill's analysis is at its best in explaining *how* the Soviet administrative party system collapsed in the wake of Gorbachevian institutional reforms. Readers will have a better appreciation of the critical role of party organizational changes in the collapse of the USSR. But this study would have been more compelling if it also provided an analysis of the hegemonic CPSU's failure in addressing the serious domestic problems that had been emergent for decades. It is in that failure that we find the most fundamental explanations for *why* the administrative party system collapsed.

The State in the Modernization Process: The Case of Norway 1850–1970. By Thorvald Gran. Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal AS, 1994. 415p. $55.00.

Christine Ingebritsen, *University of Washington*

Thorvald Gran has written an important book on the evolution of the modern Norwegian state. Gran analyzes the role of the state in Norway's economic development, from a peasant society to a growth-oriented, industrial-capitalist political economy. By relying on an in-depth case study approach, and a materialist approach to the study of politics, Gran establishes when, how, and why the state acts independently of social forces.

Gran counters the conclusions of a prominent Norwegian research team that analyzed political power in Norway (the Norwegian Power Study 1982). He attributes more autonomy to the state than is commonly asserted by scholars of Norwegian politics, and rejects the assumptions of rational choice or pluralism in his analysis. Instead, Gran traces how and why more and more power has become centralized in the Norwegian state, and just how the state exercises an autonomous influence.

In *The State in the Modernization Process*, Gran maintains that the Norwegian state has enjoyed substantial autonomy from social forces throughout the modern period. The state has been responsible for the formation of new social classes, structuring the political process, and developing the capitalist economy. Instead of a state subordinate to the interests of a capitalist class, Gran presents the Norwegian state as overseeing the development of the economy.

The case studies provide illustrations of independent state action from active intervention in the delivery of agricultural supports after 1990, to a clandestine state-led bailout of the Trade Bank in 1923, and finally, to the resilience of the state when it came under harsh criticism for mismanagement of the Kings Bay Coal Mine on the Island of Svalbard during the early 1960s. These historical case studies endorse the author's secondary argument that the nature of state autonomy has changed over time from a defender of laws and extractor of resources to a professional, policymaking actor with an even greater capacity to affect civil society.

By demonstrating that the state has much greater freedom of action than has been commonly perceived by theorists who focus on the role of interest group power in Norwegian politics (Gudmund Hernes *Okonomisk Organisering* 1982), or by those who focus on the effect of institutional structures on state actors and policies (Peter Katzenstein *Small States in World Markets* 1985; Johan Olsen *Organized Democracy* 1983), Gran makes a distinct contribution to the literature. He clearly defines his core concepts and moves easily from theory to evidence.

What is missing from the Gran book? The selection of cases that overwhelmingly demonstrate the presence of an autonomous state stacks the deck in favor of the central conclusions of the book. In several occasions during this century, the Norwegian state has *not* been able to act independently of social forces. For example, the state twice attempted (1973 and 1994) to join the European Community, only to be blocked by a coalition of powerful societal groups. While Gran is correct in asserting that the state structured the options available, it clearly could not act autonomously.

A second omission of the book is an analysis of perhaps the most important development in Norwegian society since its independence from Sweden in 1905: the discovery of oil and gas on the Norwegian continental shelf in the 1960s. The state played a significant role in developing the sector, yet in recent years the Norwegian state confronted an interesting paradox: The national champion company that it created (Statoil) often acts a bit *too* autonomously from the wishes of the state. By ending his analysis in 1970, Gran omits some interesting cases where there have been significant challenges to state autonomy in Norway.

Finally, as more and more theoretical work examines the effect of internationalization and Europeanization on state autonomy, Gran's book risks the comparativist's fallacy: ignoring the effects of changes in the international political economy on domestic politics. How autonomous is the Norwegian state when it depends so heavily on petroleum, with prices set by international market forces? As Norway accepts greater compliance with European policy regimes as a signatory of the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, how does this structure the choices available to the state? The answers to these questions are not provided in Gran's book. We will have to look elsewhere.

These criticisms aside, *The State in the Modernization Process* should be read along with the works of other scholars who offer theoretically informed studies of Scandinavian politics (from Jonas Pontusson's *Limits of Social Democracy* 1992 to Bo Rothstein and Tim Knudsen's study of comparative state building in Scandinavia 1994). Gran's detailed analysis of the historical development of the Norwegian state is a welcome addition to the literature.

The State, Identity, and the National Question in China and Japan. By Germaine A. Hoston, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 628p. $85.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

Suzanne Ogden, *Northeastern University*

This is a book in comparative political philosophy. It is richly comparative of the views of individual thinkers and political activists in the anarchist and socialist/communist movements of Japan and China on the issues surrounding the concepts of the state and national identity. In presenting these insights, Germaine Hoston goes far beyond an exegesis of the evolution of political thought in China and Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: she offers a treasure chest of insightful mini-biographies of these individuals. She is able to tease out the essence of each thinker, allowing us to see how the "thought" of important movements was produced both at the individual level and at the necessarily derivative level of the movements themselves. We are thereby introduced to the dilemmas these individuals confronted in trying to promote essentially European political thought in a non-European setting.

The author untangles the process by which the ideology of the anarchist and Marxist movements was changed through interaction with the conditions and culture of China and Japan. To set these movements in the proper framework, Hoston compares the existing values and cultures of Japan and China at the time the issue of the state and national identity arose. This is critical to understanding how Chinese and Japanese intellectual elites and activists—and their potential followers—evaluated the ideologies of anarchism and Marxism. For these ideologies not only challenged their respective traditional views of the state; they also challenged their perceived need for the state to assist in development rather than simply to "wither away" or be overthrown at a critical time in their history.

Hoston also uses a comparative approach to examine the contending ideologies of anarchism, anarcho-socialism, and Marxism that Japanese and Chinese individuals considered in their search for a philosophy to undergird revolutionary movements concerned both with development and "human liberation" for the individual, the individual as a member of a nation, and "the interests of humanity as a whole transcending national differences" (p. 6). As the bulk of her inquiry is addressed to the period between the two world wars, a period that begins with the energizing event of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, it is largely about Marxism in China and Japan.

An authority on Marxism in prewar Japan, Hoston poses the question of why the Japanese and Chinese responses to Marxism were so different despite sharing many cultural roots from Buddhism and Confucianism and, at least according to Marx, laboring under the same condition of an "asiatic mode of production," which necessarily led to "asiatic despotism." In unravelling the answers, Hoston examines the political thought or "consciousness" of leading revolutionary intellectuals, which she regards as essential for shaping revolutionary movements, and focuses on how they addressed the national question as of particular importance to the success of Marxism (China) and its failure (Japan). In doing so, she poses the critical question of how far these Asian revolutionaries could go in changing the form of Marxism in order to adapt it to local cultural sensitivities and local realities (such as, in the case of China, the nonexistence of a proletariat) and still call it "Marxism." She tackles head on the issue of how the "national question" posed by Marxism was interpreted and redefined in non-European contexts, contexts far different from those in which Marx discussed them. Her investigation exposes the dilemmas posed to Marxists in their efforts to reshape their societies on the basis not only of an alien ideology, but also one which at best was ignorant of, and at worst despised, their own civilizations' accomplishments. The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution did little to redress this insensitivity, with the Comintern heavy-handedly insisting on its own strategies in both Japan and China, to the nearly complete destruction of Marxism in both.

In this context, Hoston follows the course of Marxism in Japan where, in response to the powerful hold of the concept of "kokutai," Japanese Marxists abandoned class conflict for "socialism in one country," or "national socialism," which was easily worked into fascism by the country's right-wing leaders. Thus, Japan's Marxists replaced class conflict with racial conflict in their effort to gain support within Japan yet sustain their Marxist credentials. For Chinese Marxists, the critical question was how to take a Western dogma that called for the destruction of the state and use it instead to strengthen the Chinese state through an appeal to national identity so that China could stand up to the imperialism of the Western states (and Japan).

To pull together these complex themes regarding anarchism and Marxism in Japan and China is an extraordinary feat of scholarship. Hoston combines a solid understanding of the intellectual roots of anarchism, socialism, and Marxism with a remarkable breadth and depth of knowledge of Japanese and Chinese history. She relies primarily on Japanese and Chinese language sources, but she also uses French and Russian sources as well as the Marxist texts. Her ability to interweave the contrasting themes of the Chinese and Japanese experience is important, for their experiences were not just comparable but also contingent on each other, with many of the first Chinese revolutionaries being trained in Japan, and later, with the Japanese communist movement being profoundly influenced by the Chinese communist movement. Only the historian Akira Iriye has been able to handle the historical interaction of China and Japan at such a high level. And Hoston rivals the deceased historian Joseph Levenson in her command of the central cultural themes, political forces, and intellectual pacesetters in the history of modern political philosophy in China—and, in her case, Japan as well. Indeed, Hoston's work is truly "Levensonian" in its approach and accomplishments.

Contemporary Politics in Japan. By Masumi Junnosuke. Translated by Lonny E. Carlile. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. 514p. $65.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.

T. J. Pempel, *University of Washington*

Masumi is one of Japan's most prolific writers about that country's modern politics. His principal work has centered on the history and evolution of Japanese political parties and political leaders. The book under review is exemplary of his approach and offers a high quality translation of his two-volume study of the period 1955–80. It thereby serves as a sequel to a prior translation by Carlile of Masumi's work on an earlier period entitled *Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945–1955* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, Center for Japanese Studies, 1985).

The book is divided into halves. The first offers a chronological treatment of leadership struggles within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Its focus is primarily on the factional and personality clashes involved in the selection of a sequence of party leaders, and hence prime ministers, from the time of the conservative party's formation in 1955 through the double election that followed the death of Prime Minister Ohira in 1980. It is organized around several key issues that split, or were used to divide, potential leaders within LDP—security treaty revision, income doubling, Okinawa reversion, remodeling the archipelago, and political corruption.

The second half of the book is organized topically, with individual chapters devoted to the LDP, the bureaucracy and interest groups, the socialist opposition, labor unions, and minor parties. The book concludes with a thirty-one page epilogue offering an overview of the LDP during the 1980s and some fifty-odd tables that provide a rich array of data on factional membership, public opinion, cabinet support levels, official revenue for parties, and voter support orientations.

The book's sweeping title masks its very particularistic methodology. Masumi is heir to a long line of thinkers, tracing back at least to Plutarch, who believe that "politics" involves the battles among political elites and the rise and fall of "great men." Hence, this is a book principally about the actions of parliamentarians, government officials, and interest group representatives. It is their personalities, tactics, victories, and defeats that are accorded the preponderance of attention. The book is correspondingly chockfull of extensive details concerning the specific times and restaurant or hotel room locations where meetings occurred; spicy quotes by participants; extended excerpts from their diaries; the minute-by-minute memoirs of involved reporters; key phrasing changes in speeches and proposals; reflections by spouses; and extensive calculations about bribes paid, grudges revenged, and personal deals made and broken.

At the same time, the book says little about the social or institutional underpinnings of Japanese politics, except to note the major interest groups that support the country's competing political parties and to demonstrate the connections of some to specific government agencies. Little attention is given to the substance of the bills, proposals, or the change in public policy that have marked postwar Japanese political struggles. The book offers little discussion of such items as mass politics, student protests during the 1950s or the late 1960s, or battles over the siting of Narita Airport. Public policies in areas such as economics, defense and security, social welfare, trade and investment, or constitutional revision are given virtually no attention. So, too, the electoral system, parliamentary rules, the judicial system, the police, the military, or the functioning of local governments are largely ignored, except as they periodically prove to have been relevant backdrops for specific leadership shifts and intra-elite struggles. All such institutional, social, or organizational features of Japanese politics serve primarily as grist for the political mill of factional conflicts, leadership intrigue, and the continuing shifts in personal power. In short, this book offers a very specific lens through which to view Japanese politics.

To the extent that there is any single analytic thread running through the book it is that of "mass society." The author offers us that label as the explanation of many of the deeper social and institutional trends that evolve throughout the book, including broad changes in voter attitude, the decline in power of both conservatism and socialism, shifts in the strength of particular interest associations, the decline in class consciousness, an increased role for the media, and alterations in industrial structure. In reality, however, little connection is made between the specifics presented and the comprehensive umbrella under which they are asked to stand. Essentially, little analytic linkage is developed between the extensive range of particulars in Japan that took place during the twenty-five years under investigation and a carefully defined conceptualization of mass society.

Clearly, the author is not interested in engaging such problems, nor in dealing with the theoretical debates that pervade either the general field of comparative politics or the specific battles that have energized studies of Japan. Consequently, the bibliography is laden with diaries, memoirs, almanacs, and tracts, but virtually devoid of works, in either English or in Japanese, that would be taken as standard analyses in political science.

The focus on personalities and the thinness of the book's analytic underpinnings will, as a consequence, make this a frustrating work for many American political scientists. Clearly, greater concern is given to the minutiae of the interior decorating schemes of Japan's executive offices than to explaining the architecture that undergirds the entire building. Yet such a focus simultaneously provides the book's greatest strength. It offers a level of detail and specificity known to few in Japan, let alone to most analysts in the West. The book's extensive particularities serve as their own best justification. They will be a recurringly rewarding source of vignettes to liven up a heavily theoretical analysis or a classroom lecture.

America/Américas: Myth in the Making of U.S. Policy toward Latin America. By Eldon Kenworthy. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. 189p. $35.00 cloth, $14.95 paper.

Martha Cottam, *Washington State University*

America/Américas: Myth in the Making of U.S. Policy toward Latin America by Eldon Kenworthy will interest, intrigue, and frustrate those who study U.S. policies toward Latin America. The book is a thoughtful discussion of popular and elite ideas in the United States about Latin America and a thorough examination of the extent to which the Reagan administration's campaign against Nicaragua followed in the tradition of those ideas. Academics and practitioners alike will recognize the perceptual patterns pinpointed by Kenworthy and will appreciate the breadth of evidence drawn upon in illustrating those patterns. Those who work within a positivist theoretical perspective, however, will find the reliance upon notions of socially constructed discourse, as a substitute for a clear analytical framework and methodological approach, quite frustrating.

Beginning with a broad sweep of ideas about Latin America evident from the Monroe Doctrine through the new world order, Kenworthy argues that four myths predominate: that the Western hemisphere is a geographical blank slate destined by God to be molded by people of (Northern) European decent; that the region will be shaped by freedom in the form of self-determination and individual liberty; that the United States is the "vanguard" of this historical process; and that this new world must be protected from the ills and inevitable enmity of the Old World (p. 18). North Americans view Latin Americans as inferiors in need of guidance to achieve enlightened political and cultural modernity. Evidence for this argument is gathered from an interesting variety of sources, ranging from political speeches to popular press editorials and cartoons.

Central questions in this book include the role played by myths and the process of their transference from generation to generation. Kenworthy argues that some nationally shared myths are "founding myths" that transform "a part of a nation's history into a model for subsequent generations to follow" (p. 16). As time passes, myths evolve and their contradictions are dealt with through official discourse. Kenworthy argues that modern advertising both transmits and needs myths to be effective. Advertising needs anchors to which the receiving public will easily respond, and national myths provide those anchors.

It is in the context of this last point that the author examines the efforts by the Reagan administration to acquire congressional approval of funding for the Contras in 1984–86. Portions of this examination deal with Oliver North and associates' private fund-raising initiative wherein the Nicaraguan Contras were cynically presented to potential donors as heroes. The discussion of the Iran-Contra era is blurred by an understandable temptation to explore the reality of the Contras' support base, political and ethical character, and artificiality as a fighting force. The following chapter, however, is an interesting examination of the administration's successful 1986 campaign to change congressional views on Contra funding through a concerted advertising campaign. The campaign is illustrated primarily through a detailed study of Reagan's speech of March 16, 1986, and the subsequent debate in Congress, but there is also ample information on the concerted development of that campaign as an effort to sell the policy by Reagan's advisors.

There was, of course, considerable opposition to Reagan's policy. Since that opposition effectively stymied but could not defeat Reagan's policies, its nature and origin should be important for this book. If the policy was based on founding myths, is opposition also based on founding myths, or contradictions therein? Why and how do some reject the dominant view, particularly considering the extent to which it is pushed through advertisement and rhetoric? Are opposing myths promoted? These questions are avoided in part by implying that opponents in Congress really agreed with the policy, which comes close to suggesting a conspiracy. More importantly, however, the author also argues that there was an implicit acceptance of the dominant myth among those in Congress who opposed the policy. Their arguments would have been more effective and powerful had they too not implicitly accepted the founding myths. Thus, instead of arguing that Marxism is not unacceptable in Central America, that this region is not vital to U.S. security, they objected to minutiae of Reagan's policy, such as timing and amount of money. This may well be true of some members of Congress, but much of the opposition to Reagan's policy was broader and did directly address the myths supportive of American dominance of Latin American politics.

This, in turn, leads to a problem that many of us in the positivist tradition who work with perceptions as analytical tools have when reading the post-positivist equivalent: Its presentation of "discourse" appears to be a presentation of perceptions at the wrong level of analysis. Social discourse here and in many similar works is presented at the broad societal level and, indeed, one finds perceptions, assumptions, ideas, attitudes, and language to be widely shared. But in the same sense that one should not infer what the individual thinks from aggregate data, one should not infer what society thinks from individual data, even if many individuals share the same views. This point is widely acknowledged in criticisms of efforts to aggregate a national personality, but somehow escapes the post-positivist social discourse literature. The impact of individual perceptions on behavior, in whatever form, occurs at the individual level of analysis even if this includes large clusters of individuals.

The choice of location of level of analysis results from and facilitates the absence of a clear causal argument and method for substantiating the presence and impact of myths. The latter is often rejected as necessary by post-positivists, but it would compel conceptualization and operationalization on a societywide, that is, appropriate, level of analysis. The absence of such rigor is particularly frustrating in this book because it is clear that the book is based on very thorough research. Nevertheless, one does not know what systematic processes, if any, were used to evaluate the data. Unfortunately, this may mean that the book will be less convincing than it could be for those unfamiliar with the sources upon which it is based.

Venezuelan Democracy Under Stress. Edited by Jenifer McCoy, Andrés Serbin, William C. Smith, and Andrés Stambouli. Miami: University of Miami, North-South Center, 1995. 288p. $21.95.

Sylvia Maxfield, *Yale University*

This book tries to place recent changes in Venezuelan politics in comparative Latin America perspective. McCoy and Smith, who have written the summarizing chapters, argue that Venezuela is not exceptional in Latin American context. All Latin American countries, they argue, are moving away from state-guided economics and state-centered corporatist politics. The dilemmas of reestablishing democracy in Venezuela are similar to those facing countries building democracy on the grave of military authoritarianism. Such an approach raises important analytical questions. The idea that post-1958 Venezuelan politics may have been less democratic than superficial accounts and stereotypes suggest incites us to ask about the defining characteristics of democracy. When and in what ways is strong party discipline good for democracy? In what ways, precisely, is the dilemma of political change in Venezuela similar to other Latin American countries and in what ways different? If similarities do outweigh differences, what explains such cross-national convergence?

There is a natural tension in the comparative analytics of this volume between cross-regional similarities and differences. Venezuela *is* exceptional in Latin America, note several chapters, because the dilemmas of reinvigorating democracy are fundamentally different from building democracy. As McCoy and Smith note (p. 239), absent the unifying fear of dictatorship, individual sacrifice for the collective good is hard to attain.

Unfortunately, most of the chapters in this volume do not analyze Venezuela in comparative perspective. Interesting questions are raised, or implied, but not answered. The chapter by Coppedge is a noteworthy exception. He places the institutions of Venezuelan democracy in comparative perspective and sheds light on how the party system devalues institutions, such as the closed-list ballot and party discipline, that are common features of well-established democracies. The constitution guarantees democratic institutions and power is won through fair, competitive elections in Venezuela. The problem is that strong parties have subverted pluralism. Legislators, for example, are accountable to party leaders, not to their constituents.

Party politics gone sour is a theme throughout the chapters of this volume. One wishes the summarizing chapters could have made more of this story. Under what conditions are strong parties better or worse for polyarchy? Are there other attributes of party systems that can mitigate negative tendencies? Or do underlying socioeconomic conditions common to Latin America proscribe strong parties for countries struggling toward pluralism? The Crisp et al. chapter implies that nonelectoral institutions, integral to democratic consolidation in 1958, are part of the problem. Consultative commissions and bureaucratic entities facilitate democratic party politics but circumscribe pluralistic access to power. They argue, contrary to Coppedge, for eliminating the closed-list voting system in order to reinvigorate Venezuelan democracy.

On the economic front, one hidden message regards the importance of tax reform. Many of the economic and political evils of the rentier, oil state flow from a narrow tax base. To a large extent, therefore, the prognosis for Venezuelan democracy may hinge on the future of Venezuelan tax reform. Here is another point of implicit debate in the volume. Zambrano Sequin's discussion of Venezuelan stabilization and adjustment emphasizes the contradictory role of the exchange rate (generally, structural adjustment requires depreciation, stabilization appreciation). Like so many scholars of Latin American political economy before him, he also raises but does not answer the multimillion dollar question of when and why radical retreat from orthodox economic policy occurs (p. 67). Nowhere in this volume is there discussion of the financial sector crisis, which would seem to provide a highly magnified specimen of what is wrong in Venezuelan political economy and how to fix it.

The chapter by Myers provides public opinion data. It highlights the challenge that the growth of opinion polling presents for Latin Americanists. Reporting data and simple analysis is important, but the challenge lies in using the data to refine understandings of the relationship between democratic processes and outcomes and individual beliefs and behavior.

Several of the chapters are particularly disappointing. Kornbluth promises discussion of the "Public Sector and Private Sector: New Rules of the Game." This reviewer anticipated but did not find discussion of changing relations between government and business. One or two carefully chosen in-depth case studies could have shed more light on "civil society" than Salamanca's broad and superficial overview.

Overall, this volume provides a very comprehensive introduction to current issues in Venezuelan politics for the motivated observer. As with all but the most unusual edited volumes, analytic coherence is sacrificed in the name of inclusion and coverage. Nonetheless, it is a welcome addition to the growing publication list of the North-South Center at the University of Miami. It should be useful for upper level undergraduate seminars and could spawn interesting Ph.D. dissertations.

The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico. By Kevin J. Middlebrook. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 463p. $59.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Charles L. Davis, *University of Kentucky*

This study examines the role of organized labor in Mexican politics from the immediate postrevolutionary period in the 1920s to the era of economic crisis and neoliberal restructuring in the 1980s and early 1990s. The author develops an analytical framework around the concept of a postrevolutionary authoritarian regime in order to examine evolving state-labor relations in Mexico. This type of authoritarian regime is defined by the inclusion of mass actors in the ruling coalition, the use of a legitimating ideology linked to the revolutionary experience, and the presence of both a hegemonic party and an interventionist state (pp. 5–10). Because it has been incorporated into the ruling coalition, Mexican labor has gained representation in governing institutions as well as access to material benefits. Simultaneously, labor has become captive to the very state with which it is aligned. Middlebrook meticulously shows how political control has been exercised through state subsidies to labor and through administrative structures that regulate union formation, strike activity, and internal union governance.

For the reader who wishes to learn more about the historical evolution of state-labor relations in Mexico, this study is an excellent source. Middlebrook provides a detailed and comprehensive analysis of labor's incorporation into the postrevolutionary coalition, the subsequent rise of opposition unionism in the national industrial unions, the imposition of political control over these unions as well as over smaller unions, the rise of democratic unionism in the 1970s, and the impact of ISI and export-oriented development strategies on labor politics in Mexico. Middlebrook's mastery of Mexican labor history is impressive and enables him to provide an in-depth analysis of the sequencing involved in labor's evolving relationship with the Mexican state.

The study not only provides an excellent history of contemporary Mexican labor-state relations but also makes a major theoretical contribution to the literature on Mexican politics and labor. Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, Mexicanists generally have adopted a statist paradigm to analyze political phenomena in that country. This paradigm assumes a strong state and a weak civil society. Accordingly, mass actors are seen as weak, compliant, and dependent on a Leviathan state that exercises control through patron-client networks and repression. Studies of Mexican labor, whether adopting a structuralist Marxist or corporatist perspective, have often operated from this paradigm.

However, there are anomalies with this interpretation of state-labor relations in postrevolutionary Mexico. Middlebrook shows how the mainstream labor movement willingly acquiesced to the formation of a strong central state and to the eventual subordination of labor to the state. The fact that the labor movement was a willing participant hardly conforms to the statist view of a highly asymmetrical and captive power relationship that ill serves the interests of labor. Nor does a statist interpretation adequately explain why the presumably invulnerable state periodically has made major policy concessions to labor or why elements of the labor movement are now resisting political liberalization.

Middlebrook's concept of a postrevolutionary authoritarian regime is particularly useful for understanding the paradoxical character of state-labor relations in Mexico and provides a useful corrective to statist interpretations. His analytical framework utilizes statist assumptions about the asymmetry of state-labor relations, but also takes into account the mutually beneficial relationship between organized labor and the Mexican state. Both have benefited from their original alliance and subsequent social pacts. Once this factor is taken into account, one may comprehend why the mainstream labor movement has supported the postrevolutionary state and why the state has often been restrained in its response to labor.

Middlebrook also shows weaknesses in statist interpretations of opposition unionism. Political factors are not discarded, but Middlebrook exposes problems with state-centered explanations that ignore socioeconomic factors. He shows how socioeconomic factors shaped opposition unionism in both the early postrevolutionary period and the early 1970s. In the former case, opposition unionism developed in large national industrial unions that were less dependent on state subsidy and protection than were smaller unions. In the latter case, Middlebrook shows how changing workplace relations in the automobile industry contributed to the rise of the democratic union movement.

This book is likely to remain as the definitive study of Mexican labor in English for a long time. Still there are a few criticisms and questions to be raised. First, the author is to be commended for bringing a comparative dimension to the study. Detailed comparisons are drawn with other postrevolutionary regimes, namely, Russia and Nicaragua. These cases are used to assess labor's role in democratic transitions in postrevolutionary authoritarian regimes. It might have also been useful to draw more systematic comparisons with other types of regimes, both democratic and authoritarian. A basic premise of the study is that postrevolutionary regimes make a difference in policy outcomes for organized labor. More systematic comparisons with nonpostrevolutionary regimes would have allowed the author to examine this proposition empirically. Also, the author could then address the argument of the economic determinists that the political subordination of labor has far more to do with the imperatives of capital accumulation in a free market economy than with the type of political regime.

More attention to this line of argument might also help to explain why the Mexican state has felt compelled to impose control over labor in the first place.

One shortcoming of the study is the overwhelming focus on the output side of the Mexican political system. That is, the analysis tends to be far more focused on policy implementation than on policy formulation. To what degree and how the state controls labor influence at the policy formulation stage is less closely examined than is state control at the implementation stage. Indeed, it is interesting to note that presidential labor policy is examined as an independent variable but not as a dependent variable (see chapter 5). Perhaps data access problems in Mexico's relatively closed political system create difficulties in learning more about labor's role in the policy formulation process.

Overall, this study is outstanding and shows what a carefully crafted, contextually focused case study can contribute to theory development. This book can well serve as a model for future labor studies in Latin America and elsewhere. It is a book that serious students of Latin American politics ought to read.

Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change. By Leigh A. Payne. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 216p. $32.50.

Frances Hagopian, *Tufts University*

One of the most intractable questions about capitalist democracies confronting political scientists has been how to assess the political power of industrial elites. For students of developing countries in particular, the task of building theories about the role of the business elite in politics and the process of political change occupied center stage for some years after neo-Marxist paradigms came into vogue in the 1970s and democratic governments fell victim to military coups. *Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change* prompts us to conclude that many of these previous theoretical and analytical efforts consisted largely of groping in a dark cave without a flashlight. The wealth of empirical material about the political attitudes and responses of the business class of Brazil toward various regimes and regime changes in this well-written, well-organized, and perceptive book will undoubtedly serve as a touchstone for refining existing theories about the role industrialists play in political change.

Development theories in the 1960s and 1970s contended that industrialists in countries on the periphery of the world economy couldn't survive in the postwar era without state financial support and protection from foreign competition and their own workers. Because they became dependent on the state to intervene on their behalf in international trade and domestic financial and labor markets, they could not fulfill the role of the *bourgeoisie conquérante*. To the contrary, when opportunities for economic expansion shrank in the largest economies in Latin America in the 1960s, economic elites turned against democracies and invited military regimes to come to power in order to repress labor and thereby protect their profits. Inspired by this view of industrialists portrayed by dependency theory, the more recent literature on democratic transitions expresses the concern that unless the business community is converted to the moral virtues of democracy (which the literature presumes business is not), business may once again topple fragile democratic regimes.

Leigh Payne effectively challenges the assumptions on which these literatures were based by revisiting the role of industrialists in the 1964 coup in Brazil and by examining the attitudes of this elite toward military rule, its role in the transition to democracy, and its behavior in the first years of civilian rule. The investigation, based on 155 lengthy interviews with leading domestic and foreign industrialists, informs an extraordinary account of the relationship of industrial elites to authoritarian and democratic regimes in Brazil. Her well-supported central contention is that industrial elites are not authoritarians, bent on boosting economic growth rates at all costs. Rather, what they seek most is a government that can provide political stability and stable investment rules, two conditions that are necessary to protect their investments. Indifferent, therefore, to political regime type, industrial elites can "adapt" to any government that is legitimate and competent, and whose decisions they can influence. On occasion industrialists might overcome the considerable hurdles to their collective action when attempting to block some particular government policy, but they are far less capable of structuring policy alternatives. In fact, the power of industrialists is limited by their diversity, internal competition, and a paucity of allies in civil society. Only in extreme cases, when they perceive a threat to their survival that cannot be countered through constitutional procedure, will industrialists collectively support a change of regime.

Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change thus succeeds in presenting a powerful new view of the political attitudes of Brazilian industrialists as pragmatic and adaptive to different regimes rather than rigidly antidemocratic. Even so, while she appropriately corrects the earlier literatures on this score, she perhaps overstates the degree to which they were flawed on other counts. In particular, the earlier portrayal of industrial elites in Brazil and Latin America as weakened by their dependence on the state is confirmed to a greater degree than it is contradicted by her own account that business leaders subordinate to the state curbed their opposition to military government for fear of retaliation against their firms, and their appetite for forgoing state protection was diminished by the rising strength of their workers during the transition period and under civilian rule. One also wonders if industrialists elsewhere in Latin America are as potentially "adaptive" as Brazilian entrepreneurs. The book does valiantly attempt to compare the experiences of industrialists in Brazil to their counterparts in Argentina, Chile, and Spain; but in the absence of the same kind of studies of entrepreneurs in those countries that Payne conducted in Brazil, I am not completed convinced that industrialists in Argentina, who knocked on the barracks door more often, and in Chile, who stuck with military repression longer, are as tolerant of democratic procedures as their Brazilian counterparts. It is, moreover, not clear that the transitions literature was so much wrong about economic entrepreneurs as it was woefully incomplete. Granting that industrialists defected from authoritarian coalitions when authoritarian regimes turned on them, the primary fear of this literature was that industrial elites would have only qualified tolerance for democratic governance and turn against democratic regimes if property rights were threatened and economic instability became too great. In fact, Brazil's industrial entrepreneurs appear to have endured economic and political instability and labor unrest since the transition to democracy because the international context is not now favorable to authoritarian interruptions of democratic procedure (as it was in 1964 during the height of the Cold War) and business elites have had the opportunity to influence the political process. What will happen if these conditions deteriorate cannot be confidently predicted, from either the transitions literature or Payne's model.

The book's greatest challenge, however, lies in translating its insights about the political attitudes of 155 industrialists into explanations for the collective political behavior of the business elite. This task is especially difficult because of the diversity of opinion within the business community discovered by Payne's rich account. Although a narrow majority conform to the image of the "uncommitted" industrialist portrayed in the "adaptive actor" model, a minority (roughly a quarter of the community) who helped to overthrow President João Goulart in 1964 can be considered "reactionaries," and another group of equal size and importance who believe that democracy is the form of government best suited to bringing about a legitimate and stable government, that workers ought to be paid a fair wage in order to expand the internal market, and that, as one industrialist put it in a November 1987 interview with Payne, "We shouldn't be using legislation designed for fascist Italy in the 1920s" (p. 75), can be classified as "democrats." This discovery inevitably raises the question of whether or not this diversity of political opinion can be traced to the economic diversity of the business community. The argument asserts generally that this is so, and the empirical analysis at times alludes to firm size, competitiveness, and the national origins and international experience of owners to account for variance in the political attitudes of industrialists. Nonetheless, the book does not systematically attribute the divide over political preferences to these factors or to some other, such as whether the primary markets of industrialists are domestic or international, the degree to which their firms are dependent on the state, or, as suggested by recent theories of political economy, whether they can easily—or not—move their investments. It also lacks an overarching explanation for whose opinions (and interests) prevail in the collective action of business. Developing such an explanation would require a deeper investigation into the internal politics of business associations and how power is achieved within the business community.

Perhaps most important, in order to resolve some of the very important questions about the role of industrialists in the process of political change, we need to know more about the sources and limitations of their political power in a democracy. The book asserts, on the basis of a fascinating analysis of the partially successful efforts of industrialists to influence provisions of the Constitution drawn up in a Constituent Assembly during 1988 to their advantage, that business elites need to form alliances with other groups in society in order to secure their interests. But the example offered of a "social sector" with whom the business community entered into an alliance to defend successfully its interests is a parliamentary grouping of center-right to rightist politicians (called the *Centrão*) who voted, as industrialists wished, to defeat the job security provisions in the Constitution. The relationship between business elites and these members of Congress could perhaps have been better used as an illustration of the way in which the interests of business are represented under democratic governance. This theme on the whole deserved more attention in the book. Instead, the Brazilian state appears to be a flattened black box, besieged by a number of pluralist interest groups of which business is only one, and not a particularly powerful one at that. Part of this image is certainly reinforced by the litany of complaints industrialists lodge about governments that don't understand their problems. The reader cannot help but wonder, however, given their economic resources and the perpetual threat in a capitalist system of economic sabotage, if business elites are really as ineffectual in securing their interests as Payne has suggested. At the very least, the book might have placed its important findings against the broader political science literature and theories about power and state-business relations in capitalist democracies.

If Payne's ambitious *Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change* raises questions that it does not completely resolve, it nonetheless represents a considerable accomplishment, and it is, on the whole, the best book on business elites and politics in Latin America that I have read. It reaffirms the fact that careful empirical research gleaned from ambitious fieldwork produces good books, ones that provide the foundation on which to build cumulative knowledge and powerful and enduring theories.

Choosing the Chief: Presidential Elections in France and the United States. By Roy Pierce. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. 301p. $45.00.

Michael S. Lewis-Beck, *University of Iowa*

The work at hand compares presidential elections in France and the United States. The idea is a good one. While institutions, candidates, and processes are described, the focus is on voting behavior. In the main, the book evaluates an abbreviated 1988 French presidential election survey against the backdrop of the 1984 and 1988 American National Election Study (ANES) surveys. It would be more textured, but for the overlooking of relevant work by French and American political scientists. Recently, researchers at the Centre d'Étude de la Vie Politique Français (CEVIPOF) published *L'Électeur Francais en Questions* (1990), which theoretically and quantitatively analyzes survey results from their major 1988 French presidential election study. This book, published in English as *The French Voter Decides* (Boy and Mayer, University of Michigan Press, 1993) receives reference, but no discussion.

Morover, the CEVIPOF database offers a formidable opportunity—a national election survey of 4,032 respondents. The shorter Pierce survey, although conducted by the same polling firm, has only about one-quarter that sample size—N = 1,013. Further, it has a left-wing vote bias that is not trivial. (Mitterrand actually got 53.8 percent of the vote in the second round, but the Pierce raw sample estimates Mitterrand support at 60.4 percent. See Appendix A.) It would have been useful, then, to somehow include analysis from the larger 1988 French national election study itself. (The survey is obtainable from the Banque de Données Socio-Politiques, Grenoble.)

The proffered theory of vote choice does not give enough attention to the post-1960s literature. What about retrospective voting? Is party identification more of a "running tally"? Fiorina (1981), despite his seminal contributions, is not cited. There is nothing about economic voting. (The relevant literature may be dated from Kramer, 1971. For France, the work of economic and elections also began in the 1970s, especially with Lafay.) More generally, the argument that voters choose from alternatives after reasoning over the issues is never seriously engaged. What does get attention is a traditional social-psychological model of the American voter, applied and altered to the two cases.

Following that perspective, electoral forces are divided into the long term and the short term. With regard to long-term forces, party identification serves as the linchpin of the theory. For the United States, the standard measure for that concept is the ANES closed-ended item, "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?" For France, the measurement issue remains unsettled. At variance with the ANES measure, Pierce relies on an open-ended item. In his 1988 French survey, the item read, "Which party do you usually feel closest to?" For this item, "71 percent of the respondents reported a discrete partisan identification, a value that fully matches those reported for strict party identifiers ... in the United States" (p. 43). This result diverges considerably from the CEVIPOF 1988 French presidential election study party identification estimate of 42 percent. (To the question "Would you say that you usually feel very close, fairly close, not very close, or not close at all to one political party in particular?" 42 percent said "very close" or "fairly close"; Boy and Mayer, p. 5).

Of these two estimates, that of CEVIPOF seems more accurate. Like the standard ANES question, the CEVIPOF question is closed-ended. Further, it does not make the initial assumption that the respondent identifies with a party, as the Pierce item implies. In addition, there is the worry of inflation from the left-wing bias of the sample. (Socialist voters are higher identifiers than right party voters.) CEVIPOF got about the same estimate in their 1978 national election study, when it was 46 percent. These two estimates are stable in part because they are each based on samples of over 4,000 (Boy and Mayer, pp. 15, 132).

For the French electorate, it is especially important to establish the percentage with a party identification, because it has a rival social-psychological anchor—attachment to left-right ideology. Survey responses repeatedly show close to 90 percent of those interviewed can place themselves on a seven-point scale running from left to right. (In the 1988 CEVIPOF study, 97 percent placed themselves on the scale.) The implication is that French voters order the political universe in terms of left-right ideology, rather than party identification.

Nevertheless, there is still the question of which of the two anchoring variables has the stronger impact on vote choice among those who have both attachments. Professor Pierce tries to answer this question by arguing that "no one has yet done so" (p. 33). (An exception is the effort by Fleury and Lewis-Beck in the 1993 paper mentioned by Pierce, p. 277.) To provide his initial answer, Professor Pierce proposes a model with a presidential vote (first ballot) determined by party identification, left-right ideology, candidate evaluation, and issues. According to the ordinary least-squares regression results, party identification exercises about three times the impact that ideological location does (see Table 7.2, p. 126). But this tentative conclusion comes to be undercut by measurement concerns. A review of the construction of the dependent variable of vote and the independent variables of party identification and candidate evaluation reveals the core difficulty (see pp. 122–25 and Appendix B).

For vote choice, a respondent is assigned a number, according to the overall sample mean left-right placement of the candidate, e.g., the entire sample gave Mitterrand a 3.11 value on a seven-point scale, so the respondent who votes Mitterrand gets a dependent variable score of 3.11. For party identification, the procedure is the same. For example, the entire sample gave the "Parti de Mitterrand" a mean score of 3.11 on the left-right scale, so the respondent who says he or she is closest to the "Parti de Mitterrand" receives a party identification score of 3.11. For candidate evaluation, once again, the respondent is given a score based on the sample mean left-right placement of his or her favorite candidate. If, according to the affect scale, the respondent favors Mitterrand over all others, then that respondent receives a score of 3.11 on candidate evaluation. None of the three conceptual variables in the regression analysis, then, is measured directly. Rather, a respondent's actual vote preference, party identification, or candidate evaluation is assigned a left-right number on the basis of candidate and party left-right estimates from the whole sample. All three measures receive their fundamental order and structure from this preliminary manipulation, derived from citizen left-right perceptions. The respondent's placement of himself or herself on the standard left-right ideology scale, by artifactual necessity, appears in the estimated coefficient to have a lower impact than it really does.

Reflecting on the measurement construction, the results actually indicate that the left-right ideological dimension shapes, in a profound way, the political thought and action of the French masses. As Professor Pierce himself observes, "there is no escaping the fact that when party identification is scaled in left-right terms, it becomes enmeshed with ideological imagery in a virtually inseparable way" (p. 138). He goes on to show that, when the above "left-right party identification" measure is replaced with his "pseudo-two-party party identification" measure and the model rerun, "the order of the coefficients for left-right location and party identification changes" (p. 137). That is, with that measurement wrinkle, ideology now appears more important than party. This seemingly contradictory conclusion receives reinforcement in his analysis of the 1988 second-ballot choice. In his principal model of that "decisive ballot," where the choice is between two candidates, he finds that "left-right self-locations place ahead of party identification" (see Table 7.4, pp. 134–36).

These careful follow-up analyses that Pierce reports bolster a conclusion about France that has been made before. As Réne Réymond (1962), among others, has noted, "A basic fact of our political life, the traditional division in the public mind into two main contrasting tendencies remains the key to understanding our recent history" (p. 13). What gives added value here is the further scientific demonstration that, even in the face of severe statistical challenges, left-right ideological thinking can emerge as the leading ordering device for the political universe of the French voter.

The Challenge of Institutional Reform in Mexico. Edited by Riordan Roett. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995. 188p. $37.50.

Kevin J. Middlebrook, *University of California, San Diego*

This collection of essays examines the political implications of economic restructuring and social policy change in Mexico during the 1980s and early 1990s. During this period, successive presidential administrations implemented far-reaching market reforms, including trade and exchange rate liberalization, the deregulation of commercial and investment opportunities, and the privatization of state-owned enterprises. The government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–94) notably accelerated and deepened the restructuring process, redefining public policies concerning education, religion, and social welfare. The principal focus of this book is on the consequences that these developments have had for the state's relations with key social and political actors and for electoral politics.

The contributors to this volume examine these topics in diverse empirical contexts. These include: the challenges that economic restructuring poses for established patterns of state-labor relations (James G. Samstad and Ruth Berins Collier); the origins and implications of the Salinas administration's momentous 1991 decision to end Mexico's post-revolutionary agrarian reform program and permit the privatization of collectively controlled *ejido* lands (Merilee S. Grindle); the consequences of electoral reforms undertaken during the late 1980s and early 1990s for electoral competitiveness and the Mexican party system (Jorge Alcocer V.); shifting political and ideological alignments among business interests during a period of rapid economic opening (Matilde Luna); changes in church-state relations prompted by the Salinas government's 1992 decisions to establish diplomatic relations with the Vatican, recognize the right to religious association, and give clergy the right to vote (Roberto J. Blancarte); the obstacles that entrenched political interests posed to educational reform initiatives (Guillermo Trejo); the importance of socially beneficial microeconomic intervention by the state in a liberalized economy, as well as the difficulties that traditional political power brokers represent for the design and implementation of effective social policies (Wayne A. Cornelius); and the implications for civil-military relations of the armed forces' increased involvement in the Mexican government's campaign against drug trafficking and ambiguity concerning the military's national security mission (Martin Edwin Andersen).

The meanings that these authors attach to "institutional reform" differ considerably. They range from the regime-level consequences of shifts in the pacts that postrevolutionary governing elites forged with organized labor, the peasantry, and the private sector, to more specific modifications in the rules governing elections and campaign financing, proportional representation in the federal legislature, and the composition of bodies overseeing the electoral process. Despite ambiguity in some chapters concerning the precise meaning of institutional reform in a particular thematic context, these essays provide both a very valuable overview of the social and political implications of economic reforms implemented in Mexico since the mid-1980s and insightful analyses of the key challenges confronting Mexico in the late 1990s.

Several of the essays in this book make clear the complex political choices involved in, and the sometimes contradictory implications of, Mexican neoliberal decision makers' efforts to implement major policy changes and alter established patterns of state-society relations. Trejo's excellent chapter on educational policy reform, for example, carefully traces the intricate bargaining process involved in the Salinas administration's efforts to wrest control from the powerful National Education Workers' Union (SNTE) over such matters as teacher recruitment and training, siting of schools, appointments of principals and area supervisors, the administrative organization of educational policymaking (the union sought to preserve centralized decision making at the federal level because it strengthened teachers' national political influence), and parents' involvement in pedagogical matters (which the union strenuously, and for the most part successfully, opposed). Because the large and powerful SNTE had long been a bulwark of political support for the governing Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), educational reform necessarily raised sensitive questions regarding the regime's future base of electoral support. The Salinas administration's pursuit of an ambitious educational reform agenda led to the forcible removal of SNTE's long-time boss and the renegotiation of teacher-government relations with a new, pro-reform union leadership that enjoyed strong presidential support. This case also raises, then, the more troubling question of how major (often quite worthy) social policy reforms are achieved in an authoritarian regime.

This book would have benefited tremendously from a substantial introductory essay by the editor defining an analytic framework for assessing the speed, direction, and overall political significance of recent institutional changes in Mexico. By what general criteria should one judge the longer-term consequences of institutional reforms (defined broadly) in different arenas? How is one to explain significant differences in the pace of change? Why, for example, was the Salinas government unable to promote a more rapid redefinition of state-labor relations (including a much-anticipated revision of the federal labor code and its provisions regulating workplace industrial relations), even as the administration implemented a sweeping, largely uncontested reform of agrarian policy? Neither the editor's brief introduction nor the conclusion (co-authored by Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz) sufficiently draws out the implications of individual contributors' essays or adequately situates the Mexican case in a comparative context.

No single volume could have analyzed in depth the whole range of political dilemmas facing Mexico during a period of rapid transformation. Yet some of the issues that go unexamined raise fundamental, classical questions of institutional change. The reform of the judiciary, as well as future relations between the federal executive and the national legislature in what since the 1930s has been a highly centralized, presidentialist regime, are crucially important to Mexico's political future. Similarly, the reallocation of political power and fiscal and administrative responsibilities among federal, state, and municipal governments poses daunting challenges. An examination of proposals for institutional reform in these areas and the recent experiences of opposition party rule at the state and municipal levels would have provided an important complement to essays assessing the diverse national implications of economic and social policy reform.

Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives. Edited by Michel Rosenfeld. Durham: Duke University Press, 1994. 434p. $49.95 cloth, $19.95 paper.

John E. Finn, *Wesleyan University*

Originally published as a symposium issue of the *Cardozo Law Review*, this volume is a collection of essays produced for a conference on comparative constitutionalism in 1991. Conference and book alike claim as their origin the renewed interest in constitutionalism and constitutional engineering that has followed the collapse of socialist states in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, just as a flurry of similar scholarship followed the end of World War II.

Like most such collections, this one is spotty. The volume's editor, Michel Rosenfeld, succeeds in superimposing a common analytical framework over an otherwise diverse collection of essays. Rosenfeld's thesis is that the constitutional enterprise can be best understood as the effort to forge "a fruitful interplay between the reinforcement of identity and the preservation of diversity" (p. 4). Thus, the chief concern of constitution makers is to construct through constitutional forms a "predominant identity" that is shared, but which also accounts for difference and diversity.

The simplicity of this thesis is the key to its power. Under its rubric, Rosenfeld and his partners can talk usefully—and in genuinely comparative ways—about a great variety of topics. In his own essay, for example, Rosenfeld shows how the thesis both illuminates the distinction between constitutions and constitutionalism (a distinction, unfortunately, that is largely overlooked in the subsequent essays) and also helps us to understand constitutionalism in ways far more sophisticated than the simplistic and misleading definition of constitutionalism as a commitment to limited government. Instead, the commitment to limited government becomes a means to a larger constitutional end—for Rosenfeld, it is "justified as a means to acknowledge, and profitably to make use of, the conflict produced by the confrontation between the partial identity . . . that characterizes the relationship between the governors and the governed" (p. 5). Rosenfeld then moves from a discussion of constitutional philosophy to the ways in which alternative identities, structures, and stages of sociopolitical development contribute to the character of any particular constitutional order.

In all, Rosenfeld's comprehensive essay demonstrates the power and elegance that a clearly enunciated thesis can possess. Unfortunately, the book gives little or no thought to the choice of this thesis and the exclusion of others. In other words, the essays in this collection simply assume that the critical problems facing nascent constitutional orders are questions of identity. Given the book's emphasis on Eastern Europe and the level of abstraction it gives to the term *identity*, this assumption is easy to understand. Nevertheless, the collection would be stronger if other possibilities were considered—for example, that the critical problem facing such states is not one of identity, especially in terms that relate to gender or race or culture, or in terms that relate to sovereignty, but instead, as Friedrich observed fifty years ago, are problems of economic cleavage. Unfortunately, most of the essays in this collection fail to draw on the post–World War II literature.

The best essays in the book are those that share and try to act on the thesis. Among them is a piece by Elster, in which he compares the constitution-making experiences of France and the United States through a Jeffersonian lens. Elster finds in both the mechanism of "bootstrapping," or the process by which a founding generation severs political authority from antecedents while simultaneously claiming authority to bind posterity. Jefferson and Noah Webster both commented on the difficult problems of political obligation inherent in claims about perpetuity. David A. J. Richards likewise examines the relationship between constitution making and revolutionary change, finding the key in the preservation of constitutional identity enabled by the abstraction of constitutional meaning. Richards demonstrates the ways in which abstraction also subverts the possibility of constitutional government by allowing wedges to form between the abstraction of dominant identity and the concrete experience of partial identities.

The most interesting essay in the collection is by Ulrich Preuss. Beginning with the claim that constitution making is the secular equivalent of divine creation ex nihilo, Preuss contends that constitution making always includes a demotic component and an ethnicist component. The task for constitutional engineers is to constrain the prepolitical, impulsive character of ethos through institutional devices associated with constitutionalism, or in Preuss's terms, with demos.

Other essays include works by George Fletcher, Robin West, and Frederick Schauer on constitutional identity and freedom of speech; by Aharon Barak, Dominique Rousseau, and Carlos Santiago Nino on constitutional interpretation and judicial review; by Cass Sunstein on property; and by Arthur Jacobson on transitional constitutions. Most of these essays are provocative, but again, one often wishes the authors had made greater use of the literature produced in the postwar years.

Surprisingly, the weakest essay in the collection is Henkin's piece on "A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects," which is little more than a list of constitutionalism's main points. Henkin's checklist of problems endemic to western constitutionalism—including an inadequately developed theory of representation and concerns about the growth of presidential power—covers no new ground and too easily presumes to know what counts as a defect. More important, in a collection that wants to explore the cross-national transmission of constitutional norms and structures, it is disappointing not to find in Henkin's essay any serious discussion of the possibility of universal constitutional norms and what their existence—or absence—might mean for cross-national constitutionalism.

Notwithstanding some disappointments, this is an excellent collection of essays. It should do much to promote continued scholarship in the area of comparative constitutional studies.

Gender and Development: Rethinking Modernization and Dependency Theory. By Catherine V. Scott. Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 1995. 146p. $35.00.

Anne Marie Goetz, *University of Sussex, England*

Catherine V. Scott's analysis of modernization and dependency theories in development studies stands theory on its head to shake the biases out of its assumptions, and to scrutinize it from a perspective that it has excluded. In a feminist rereading of key texts on the politics of modernization and dependency, cherished certainties about the universality and desirability of "progress" and "modernity," growth and change, are revealed to be domineering projections of a Western, and above all, masculine project of self-realization in which autonomy, identity, and growth hinge on the rejection of the "feminine."

Scott's method is to unearth key dichotomies of traditional versus modern that underpin the value systems of modernity and dependency theories, and to explore the extent to which these depend upon conceptions of gender differences and the devaluation of femininity. In a rather original move for development studies, she is essentially psychoanalyzing key texts in development politics. Metaphoric dualisms are scrutinized from three perspectives: feminist analyses of the split between public and private, feminist object relations theory, and what is in essence a Jungian analysis of the hero's quest for individual self-actualization through struggle or revolution. Modernization theory's idealization of a rational, forwardlooking, new society in which human relationships are reduced to a series of impersonal market relations, is shown to resemble accounts of male psychological development through separation from the mother/other, caricatured as the "backward" or traditional rural sector and the household economy. Dependency theory, while shown to be sensitive to questions of power and domination, likewise reproduces the derogation of the "feminine" in the way the focus on production and class struggle makes women's work and gender conflicts invisible. Moreover, the classic political method, revolution, for Third World groups inspired by the dependency critique, is shown to express a masculinist heroic quest where violence and militarization leave little room for feminist values, however much women may participate in these struggles.

Proponents of the "Gender and Development" (GAD) critique of development theory and practice have long argued that women's experience of social, economic, and political change represents a fundamental challenge not just to assumptions about the justice of distributional patterns, but to the meaning of development or progress itself. Scott's book provides a theorization of this challenge to the meaning of development by revealing its fundamentally masculine logic. The trouble, however, with an analytical method that relies on reversing dichotomies is that oppositional categories can become overly rigid, so valued for what they reveal in their binary opposites that their internal inconsistencies and complexities are obscured. What exactly, for instance, is a "masculine" logic? The suggestion that most value-laden oppositions between tradition and modernity are expressive of gendered value differences produces both an overly generalized conception of what is modern man, and obscures the other values embedded in these dichotomies. Racism and elitism also inform these dualisms, and Third World dependency theorists are hardly themselves immune from this.

The problem of the gendered essentialist trap is a familiar one to feminists who work on deconstructing value-laden oppositional categories. It might have been avoided here through a theorization of a more feminist or humane alternative to assumptions about human nature, modern politics, and the meaning of tradition. For example, if dominant accounts of modernization resemble accounts of male psychological development through separation and "othering," what would an account based on theories of women's development through the creation of intersubjective human relationships look like? Unfortunately, this retheorization is left to the very last chapter, and is left unfinished and open. Admittedly, it is difficult to offer a vision of an as yet unrealized alternative. Nevertheless, enough practical experiments exist at the microlevel of development projects and local organizations to offer some indication of women's alternative approaches to and normative orientations in development, and of their drawbacks. Without attention to such efforts, and to real-world constraints, there is a danger of romanticizing tradition, rural society, the household economy, and obscuring the very real tyrannies and inequities that govern relations between people, including between different groups of women.

Scott is particularly strong when she applies her critique of the sexism of modernization theories to the analysis of actual development policies, such as those pursued by the World Bank, and when she explores the sexism of Marxist dependency theory as lived out through Third World revolutions, where she takes the case of Mozambique. Her assessment of the gendered biases informing assumptions about the "soft state" in Africa helps to make sense of the sometimes strong revulsion toward the African state expressed through World Bank stabilization and adjustment policies. In the case of Mozambique, Scott's analysis of leaders' gendered preoccupations with productivity and class struggle helps to illuminate the frustrating exclusion of feminist perspectives from decision making in policies where structural critiques of power and dominance do have public legitimacy.

In subjecting development texts and practice to a feminist and psychological reading, Scott has made an important step in challenging claims to objectivity and "science" in political analyses of development. Feminist research and analyses in development, though hardly immune to problems of projecting from a Western vision of human nature and society, has made some progress in making its assumptions and privileged standpoints transparent. If Scott's approach were to gain a reading among mainstream social scientists in the development field we might be able to move beyond the many rigid power dichotomies maintained in development practice.

Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract. By Timothy M. Sisk. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 342p. $39.50.

Timothy Shaw, *Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia*

The "remarkable convergence" (p. 6) in the early 1990s in South Africa away from legalized apartheid toward a new "social contract" (chap. 7) has been welcomed for both reasons of development inside the beloved country and lessons to be learned outside. This informed, concerned monograph exploits the fascinating, telling case study to yield comparative insights into prospects in other "divided societies" (p. 27) for constitutional change toward more democratic governance.

Timothy Sisk advocates an "institutional choice" (p. 6) framework to explain the incremental yet irreversible movement away from a zero- to mixed-sum "process of convergence" (p. 49). "Struggle" and "system" parties (pp. 168–72) alike came to recognize, albeit reluctantly, that neither of their majoritarian or consociational aspirations (p. 243) could be hegemonic in the future (p. 53). Thus, after the tentative yet crucial pre-negotiation stage (p. 56), they moved toward a "grand coalition" (p. 233), advancing a novel contract through a transitional "rule-making process" (p. 13), which constituted neither immediate defeat nor instant victory for either. Instead, both could agree on the desirability of democratic pact formation (chap. 6).

Sisk's orthodox, liberal, comparative politics perspective builds on the established theoretical contributions of Adam, Horowitz, Lipjhart, Rothchild, and Zartman and the local insights of Friedman, Giliomee, Lodge, and Schlemmer, but not those of Nolutshungu or Schrire; neither does he incorporate the latest work of Grundy or Stedman. He is concerned to advance democratic governance, tending to assume that it is sustainable. Surprisingly, there is little sense here of the continuing tensions between political and economic or social "liberalization" despite the identification of four distinct yet interrelated institutional "tracks" (pp. 250–51). Indeed, this monograph is so "revisionist" that unless you were already aware, you would not learn much here about the preceding "liberation struggle," let alone the apartheid state's counterrevolutionary regional onslaught of the previous two decades.

The strength of Sisk's contribution lies in the identification of stages in negotiations toward democratization pacts, especially his focus on consociationalism rather than power sharing (pp. 19 and 249). But if subsequent social and economic compacts prove elusive, then the brittle political peace may also crack; i.e., regression to either anarchy or authoritarianism remains possible. His pair of graphs on the cycles of negotiation and violence illustrate both these stages and scenarios (pp. 119 and 244).

However, notwithstanding such insights, Sisk's gallant efforts to advance institutional choice can be faulted for two different yet not distinct sets of reasons. First, his initial exclusive focus on constitutional debates and designs gradually comes to include extra-institutional factors, particularly the role of civil society (pp. 24, 251, and 253) (cf. the crucial role of the churches in 1991 [pp. 106–9]) and the salience of the economy (pp. 274–83). In the penultimate chapter, which considers the still problematic prospects for a "social contract," even social democracy or partnership (p. 16), he comes eventually to acknowledge this pair of forces. But their centrality to this and other transformations should have led to their integral incorporation into the framework. Their regrettable marginalization is quite compatible with Sisk's orientation and symbolizes the overall exclusion of local and global political economy. (See the belated lament at p. 275 about the "political economy considerations of institutional choice"—a promising perspective for his next project!) So he overlooks the postwar construction of Afrikaner state capitalism and its continuing demolition under prevailing international conditionalities of neo-liberalism: the crucial context of "national" negotiations. Hence the lapses in interviews and citations: There are few conversations with captains of industry or labor and no reference to current orthodox and critical treatises. (Cf. Shaw and Nhema, "Directions and Debates in South Africa's First Post-Apartheid Decade," *Mershon International Studies Review*, April 1995, pp. 97–110.)

Second, Sisk's concentration on the formal policy leads him to ignore factors that others have privileged from different perspectives. Thus, he excludes a range of regional and global forces, from regional economic and ecological structures to international financial institutions and major powers, as well as the old and new state's own "foreign policy" preoccupations. Similarly, he ignores influential internal pressures, such as the security forces (from army and police to intelligence units and vigilante groups), informal sectors (including crime, drugs, and migrants), and women. The palpable inequities of race/ethnicity/region and class/gender may not be containable; i.e., civil society may not be always able to mediate between majority and minority (pp. 253 and 264–65). In short, which "track" would be priorized (pp. 250–51)?

Timothy Sisk therefore excludes less-attractive scenarios such as anarchy or authoritarianism, let alone the slight spin on consociationalism called corporatism, which several "second track" (pp. 78 and 278) groupings, as well as the embryonic multiracial middle class, may espouse. Likewise, implicitly his monograph contributes to the burgeoning "peace-keeping/-making" literatures, treating a spectrum of "confidence-building measures" from psephological interventions to community rehabilitation. As Sisk's subtitle and final paragraph admit, despite his optimistic framework, the "new" South Africa's social contract remains elusive indeed.

True Blues: The Politics of Conservative Party Membership. By Paul Whiteley, Patrick Seyd, and Jeremy Richardson. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 303pp. $59.00 cloth, $22.00 paper.

Ivor Crewe, *University of Essex, England*

One of the minor curiosities of British political science is that until very recently virtually no serious empirical research had been undertaken on the organization of the Conservative Party, even though the party is arguably the longest enduring and electorally most successful in the world. Whiteley, Seyd, and Richardson's excellent study of Conservative Party members, based largely on a postal survey of over 2,000 members in 34 constituency associations, plugs a major gap.

Not least of the book's virtues is its destruction of the commonplace myths about Conservative members that have taken root in the absence of any hard data. The stereotypical local Conservative association was overflowing with members, especially with successful people in business and the professions; was formidably well organized; was well to the ideological right of ordinary Conservative voters; and was hand-in-glove with the local establishment. The reality, as *True Blues* reveals, is rather different.

For a start, the authors estimate that total membership in 1992 was no more than 750,000, rather than the suspiciously vague and round "one and a quarter million" quoted for so long. Moreover, a large majority consist of the elderly—their average age is 62—who merely donate money "as an insurance policy against the Labour Party." The genuine activists who attend meetings, raise money, and help in campaigns, number no more than 175,000—fewer than in the Labour Party—and their level of activity has been steadily falling for many years.

Moreover, the party is not haute-bourgeois, but petit-bourgeois, a party of (largely retired) nurses, teachers, and shopkeepers, not of active doctors, professors, and managers. Nor are they as ferociously right-wing as the televised annual conference suggests. They are only marginally more right-wing than ordinary Conservative voters (so much for May's "law of curvilinear disparity") and distinctly un-Thatcherite on most socioeconomic issues, with large majorities in favor of more welfare spending on health and poverty (and less spending on defence) and curbs on the powers of privatized industry. Mrs. Thatcher's free-market evangelism was no more successful among her activists than it was among her backbenchers or the electorate.

The party membership's relative isolation from local centers of influence is particularly eye-opening. The majority of members belong to no other voluntary organization at all. A minority of the most active are also school governors, but virtually none are local magistrates or hospital trustees or on local tribunals and quangos. The cosy small-town partnership of pulpit, bench, and boardroom has gone.

As sheer description of the origins and attitudes of Conservative members *True Blues* is invaluable. As an explanation of why a tiny minority of Conservative voters join the party while the vast majority do not, the book is less illuminating. A brave but ultimately unsatisfactory attempt is made to explain membership in terms of a "general incentives theory." But here the authors stretch concepts and measurements to the breaking point. "Incentives" include noninstrumental motives such as altruism and party identification and an expectation of collective as well as individual benefits. The "selective-process incentive" (i.e., the attraction of being involved in party politics) is measured solely by general election turnout, and the "selective-outcome incentive" is measured by self-appraisal as a potential MP or local councillor, which surely says more about self-esteem than anticipated reward. The authors acknowledge that instrumental incentives are only a small part of the explanation for joining the Conservatives, arguing that with costs so minimal (a member does not even have to pay a subscription) cost-benefit calculations are irrelevant. But they should matter for active membership, where the costs are considerable, yet Whiteley et al.'s general incentives (including "expressive" and "altruistic" incentives) account for barely more than 20 percent of the variance.

Do party members matter in the late twentieth century, with think tanks, direct mail, and television increasingly taking over the functions of policymaking, fund-raising, and campaigning? Whiteley et al. strenuously argue, as they did in their earlier parallel study, *Labour's Grassroots* (1992), that an active party membership is crucial to a party's electoral success. A larger membership, they show, means more campaign spending, and more spending means, after appropriate controls, a higher share of the vote. And whereas the upside from a growth in active membership is limited, the downside from further decline is potentially very damaging: A 25 percentage point increase in local spending and canvassing would have added 16 seats in 1992, making their overall majority absolutely secure, whereas a 25 percentage point decrease would have lost them almost 50 seats and probably deprived them of office. With the steady hemorrhaging of its geriatric membership (accelerated by the Conservative government's exceptional unpopularity since 1992), the party faces massive electoral problems unless it can recruit new and younger members.

These figures should be taken with a large pinch of salt. They are based solely on local constituency expenditure returns, which are notoriously inaccurate, subject to low upper limits, and take no account of door-to-door campaigning, which requires people, not money. And without a reliable time-series of membership figures, it is impossible to know whether the old age of current members constitutes a cohort soon to pass out of the party or a category easily replenished by new but old members.

In explaining the long-term drop in membership, the authors make imaginative if speculative use of their general-incentives framework. The emasculation of local government (perpetrated by the Thatcher governments) has reduced the benefits, while the availability of alternative but more entertaining social pursuits and the entry of middle-class women into the labor market has increased the opportunity costs. The difficulty is that equally plausible explanations could have been produced had membership steadily increased—earlier retirement, the spread of education and growth of the salariat, the incentive for right-wingers to work for a Thatcherite government, the prospect of a place on a quango, and so forth. More light on the sources of decline should be thrown by the authors' follow-up panel study.

In the 1970s, Whiteley wrote *The Labour Party in Crisis*, one of the "crises" being the steady fall in its membership. Its current membership is lower than in the 1970s, but the party is enjoying unprecedented electoral success. As Adam Smith might have said, there is a great deal of ruin in a party.

Comparative Economic Transformations: Mainland China, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Taiwan. By Yu-Shan Wu. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. 282p. $42.50.

Cal Clark, *Auburn University*

For almost two decades now since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, the People's Republic of China has had one of the most dynamic economies in the world with an average growth rate of over 10% a year. While this rapid growth has not been free of economic problems (e.g., inflationary surges and growing inequality, which exacerbated political cleavages culminating in the 1989 Tiananmen Square tragedy), it surely must be rated as a remarkable achievement, especially when compared to the chaos that economic reform brought to Russia and the nations in Central Europe. Moreover, China's striking economic performance is hard to explain by any of the contending paradigms in the political economy of development—its grossly distorted markets should lead to disaster according to neoclassical theory; it is hard to credit the regime (despite its own claims) with the enlightened economic leadership and industrial targeting attributed to East Asia's developmental states; and its strategy rejects the self-reliance and socialism championed by dependency theory. The time would appear more than ripe, therefore, to develop more novel perspectives on China's "great transformation." Yu-Shan Wu's research monograph *Comparative Economic Transformations* does just this. It presents an innovative and original model for conceptualizing the economy of the PRC in terms of its system of property rights. This model, in turn, is used as the basis for comparing China with several other nations in similar situations; and these case studies prove quite suggestive for isolating key variables influencing economic strategies.

Based upon the insight of institutional economics that the property rights regime provides the central definition of a national economy, Wu proposes a four-fold typology of economies according to whether individuals or the state owns enterprises and whether enterprise managers or government officials make key decisions concerning purchases, production, and sales. In a "command economy," the state both owns economic assets and controls decisions; relinquishment of ownership, or "privatization," creates "state capitalism"; relinquishment of control, or "marketization," creates "market socialism"; and both privatization and marketization must occur to create the fourth possible category of "laissez-faire capitalism." Under this typology, China clearly fits the pattern of moving from a command economy under Maoism to market socialism. The distinction between privatization and marketization, furthermore, appears valuable for conceptualizing the cyclical series of industrial reforms and economic/political crackdowns that occurred in China between 1984 and 1993 since it highlights important differences in each cycle.

Wu then selects three other cases that parallel China's transition for comparative analysis: (1) Hungary's New Economic Mechanism, which represents an almost precisely similar strategy of market socialism; (2) the Soviet Union's New Economic Policy in the 1920s, which proved to be an interlude of market socialism between Lenin's War Communism and Stalin's reimposition of a command economy; and (3) Taiwan's economy, which evolved from large amounts of state ownership and control to state capitalism during the 1950s and 1960s. The key factor explaining these different outcomes, according to Wu, is the political ideas of the top leaders in the regime. In China and Hungary, communist leaders (and the people) had been disillusioned with Marxism by a previous traumatic event (the Cultural Revolution and a combination of Stalinist purges and the Hungarian Revolution, respectively) but were still committed to maintaining the party's political hegemony; in the USSR, the NEP did not really challenge the leadership's belief in orthodox Marxist economics; and the ruling Kuomintang in Taiwan was both subject to the trauma of losing the Chinese Civil War and less inhibited by a rigid ideology.

Comparative Economic Transformations makes a major contribution to understanding the political economy of rapid growth in the PRC. It elucidates an important new factor, which in turn leads to an insightful comparative analysis. The typology of property rights should not be considered the final stage in this analysis, however, for two important reasons. First, Wu's own analysis demonstrates that important differences can occur within the same type of property rights regime. For example, two distinct approaches to marketization were tried at different times in China (one focusing on managerial discretion and the other on freeing prices); and market socialism generated divergent problems in China (inflation) and Hungary (suppressed wages). This suggests the need to develop a more nuanced model of systems of property rights.

More important perhaps, while Wu's model provides an innovative and valuable way for *conceptualizing* China's economic transition, it is not really an explanatory model of the PRC's economic performance. In fact, Wu's own presentation of the political economy of Deng's reforms indicates that a shift in the property rights system was not the key factor that allowed the PRC to break out of its "political business" cycle—reform-(marketization or privatization) stimulated inflation, balance-of-payments problems, inequality, and political discontent, which in turn provoked economic and political repression. Rather, the shift to an "outward economy" based on labor-intensive manufacturing for export in the late 1980s proved to be quite successful at breaking many of the bottlenecks that stymied more internally oriented strategies. Indirectly, of course, the rapid growth of these firms promoted both privatization and marketization, albeit businessmen still had to rely on "political contacts" in many instances in what might be termed "*guanxi* capitalism," but here the property rights regime becomes the dependent, not the independent, variable. From this perspective, then, the most similar case to China is not Hungary, but the dynamic sector of small, extremely entrepreneurial firms in Hong Kong and Taiwan, calling to mind theories of Confucian capitalism and the political culture approach associated with them. More broadly, such a line of argument represents what has been called "historical institutionalism"—that is, the important elements of an economic system are inevitably influenced by the sociopolitical institutions in which they are embedded. Wu's book makes a strong case for including the property rights regime among the former and elite philosophy among the latter. By so doing, he makes an innovative and important contribution to our understanding of China's political economy.

The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. By Crawford Young. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. 356p. $40.00.

Nicolas Van de Walle, *Overseas Development Council*

Professor Young's impressive new work attempts to trace certain characteristics of contemporary African politics back to the colonial era. His central argument is that the political structures erected during the colonial era have powerfully conditioned present day institutions and helped to bring about the continent's current crisis.

The book's argument unfolds gradually, beginning with a long theoretical chapter on the nature of the state. Professor Young discusses several essential attributes before defining five "imperatives" that shape the behavior of all states. He then examines the colonial state, focusing on the nature of authority in colonies from those of ancient Roman to the European age of empire in the nineteenth century, and argues that it can be conceived of as a distinctive type of state. Chapters 4 through 7 present a political history of the colonial state in Africa, from the period of conquest at the end of the nineteenth century to the institutionalization of authority after World War I and the subsequent demise of the colonial political order in the 1950s.

Chapter 8 compares Africa's colonial states with their counterparts in other regions of the world. Based on the evidence provided in the previous four chapters, Young argues convincingly that African colonial states were different in a number of key respects; in particular, they were more ruthless in their extractive strategies and established much tougher mechanisms of coercion to subjugate the population and ensure accumulation. The chapter's erudition is impressive. Truly comparative scholarship on Africa must simultaneously compare and contrast some fifty states, and assess the continent's exceptionalism relative to other continents. This twin comparison is no easy task since the two comparative exercises may be partly incompatible, requiring detailed knowledge of quite distinct scholarly literatures. Yet Young does an impressive job of weaving back and forth skillfully between continents and historical periods while never losing grip of his main themes. I think he tends to understate intraAfrican differences and overstates the contrast between colonialism in Africa and elsewhere, most notably Japanese colonialism in Asia, but he has produced a study of scholarship that is stunning in its breadth and comparative nuance.

The book's defining image of the colonial state in Africa is that of "Bula Matari," or "he who crushes rocks," the nickname that Henry Stanley allegedly earned from the local population for managing to get entire steamers transported by land to a navigable part of the Congo River several hundred miles from the ocean between 1879 and 1890. As the Belgian Congo emerged in the following years, the local population transferred the name to the European soldiers and functionaries who ruled them and Bula Matari came to symbolize the "crushing, relentless force of the emerging colonial state" itself (p. 1).

Young views the colonial state as rooted in "exclusionary hegemony" (p. 218); repressive and intolerant of opposition, the European powers in Africa (the Belgians, British, and French, but also the Germans and Portuguese) imposed themselves by eliminating various independent indigenous organizations that might have contested the state's hegemonic ambitions. He shows in a carefully argued seventh chapter how the resulting weakness of civil society at the time of independence abetted the construction of authoritarian states. In sum, it was all too tempting for the new African political elites to rely on the colonial institutions to consolidate and then maintain their power. The book's central argument is that "this difficult legacy" (p. 244) helps explain the continent's current crisis.

This argument of the essential continuity between the colonial and postindependence African state has a long pedigree in Africanist scholarship, although it has rarely been treated as comprehensively as in this work. For instance, in the 1970s, the new left theories of the "overdeveloped state" similarly argued that African state structures had been imposed externally and were essentially alien and divorced from African societies. Such arguments are inspired by the undisputable institutional continuity between the colonial state and its successor; present day legal codes, administrative structures, education and legal systems and industrial standards all retain the colonial imprint to a remarkable extent. The colonial army quite literally became the national army, while the French or British colonial administrator converted himself into a ministerial technical assistant, often without having to change offices.

At the same time, it seems to me that over the last thirty-five years of independence, African state elites have completely altered the political project embodied in these institutions to fit their own needs and ambitions. As a result, without denying the historical continuity emphasized in this work, it can be argued that national deviations over time are just as striking as continuity and uniformity. Because of his emphasis on the latter, Young's analysis offers little insight to help us understand why Botswana's political history after independence evolved so differently from neighboring Zambia's, or the Ivory Coast's from Ghana's.

More important, the book does not explain how the "hard" colonial state became, over time, the "soft" neopatrimonial state, to adopt Myrdal's still useful terminology. The colonial state Young describes is a coercive, austere, and extremely autonomous creature, extracting revenue and labor out of the population in order to promote accumulation. Twenty years after independence, most African states were on the contrary thoroughly permeated by various societal interests, slowly drowning in their own patronage and corruption, and reliant on foreign aid to survive because of their failure to equilibrate expenditures and revenues. In sum, the African colonial state had a developmental project, however flawed, while its contemporary counterpart has none: It is neither able nor willing to defer private consumption in order to promote public investment. The book fails to explain this evolution from hard to soft state. Indeed, the discussion of the "integral state" (pp. 287–90) that closes the book suggests that the current states have retained their extractive capacity, a view I do not find compelling in light of the sharp decline in revenues as a proportion of GNP that characterizes virtually all the states in the region.

Such a criticism does not undermine the book's central contention. Young has convincingly demonstrated that the modern African state has to be understood as historically constructed. Even if I am not convinced that he has explained exactly how Bula Matari became the Mobutu regime, as it were, he has persuasively argued the plausibility of a lineage between the two states. His book constitutes an important contribution to the comparative analysis of colonialism and its political legacy.

International Relations

Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States: The United States, Israel, and Britain. By Uri Bar-Joseph. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. 392p. $55.00 cloth, $18.95 paper.

James J. Wirtz, *Naval Postgraduate School*

The relationship between policymakers and intelligence officials is a delicate one. To maintain their analytical detachment, intelligence officers must not become too involved in the day-to-day formulation and conduct of policy. Too much collaboration can produce "intelligence-to-please," a situation in which analysts respond to subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, cues by simply saying what policymakers want to hear. Yet, without some awareness of their government's goals and initiatives, analysts cannot ensure that their work will fill policymakers' need for relevant intelligence assessments.

The tension created by this effort to offer timely estimates while overcoming incentives to pander to policymakers, is well recognized in the literature on intelligence. It also serves as a point of departure for Uri Bar-Joseph's comparative study of civil-intelligence relations in the United States, Israel, and Great Britain. Bar-Joseph is especially interested in situations in which intelligence agencies spiral out of control and undertake unauthorized activities that overstep policy bounds. He explores how intelligence officials, using their monopoly on secret information or covert activity, can present policymakers with a fait accompli which prompts a policy response. "Policy-to-please," to coin a phrase, may result from this breakdown in civil-intelligence relations: Intelligence officials may attempt to alter policy to suit their preferences, disregarding the national objectives identified by legitimate political authority.

Bar-Joseph suggests that three factors influence the likelihood that intelligence officials will intervene in policymaking: (1) a deterioration in the distinction between policymaking and intelligence analysis; (2) the form and strength of government oversight and control of intelligence agencies; and (3) borrowing from Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* (1959) and Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* (1971), the level of professionalism among intelligence practitioners.

To support this argument, *Intelligence Intervention* surveys four instances in which intelligence officials exceeded their authority. During the 1961 U.S.-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion, officials at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) failed to apprise members of the Kennedy administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of developments in Cuba that reduced the likelihood the CIA-trained Cuban exiles would spark a revolt against Castro. CIA officials, in Bar-Joseph's analysis, assumed that if the invasion force faltered, the Kennedy administration would have no choice but to intervene with U.S. forces. In the 1954 "Unfortunate Business Affair," Israeli intelligence officials activated a network of Egyptian Jews to conduct terrorist attacks against American and British installations and personnel in Egypt. Intelligence agents hoped to block British withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone. The decision to undertake this provocation, however, was made by intelligence officials alone directly contradicting the wishes of Israeli politicians who accepted the inevitability of the British withdrawal. The final two cases involve British intelligence in the 1920s: the "Henry Wilson Affair" and the Zinoviev letter. In both these incidents British intelligence officials compromised intelligence sources and methods by making public secret messages passed between the Soviet government and Soviet delegations within Great Britain. In Bar-Joseph's view, intelligence officials sought to embarrass Labour governments and to change British policy toward the USSR by showing how Labour's response to Comintern efforts to stir up domestic strife in Great Britain was woefully inadequate.

Clearly, Bar-Joseph has identified an important topic that would benefit from a comparative perspective; most of the literature on intelligence oversight focuses on the relationship between the U.S. intelligence community, the executive branch, and Congress. The potential contribution made by *Intelligence Intervention* to developing a theory of civil-intelligence relations, however, is limited by several shortcomings in execution and conception. Despite repeated introductory, summary and concluding sections, Bar-Joseph's argument is not easily identified. Similarly, ancillary discussions of several phenomena—cognitive explanations of decision making, the impact of personality and personal experiences on the events in question, and a survey of various explanations for intelligence officials' threat perceptions—seem to receive as much attention as the stated theoretical purpose of the work.

One could also object to Bar-Joseph's case selection. To his credit he acknowledges that the American and Israeli cases, which involve covert, paramilitary operations, might fundamentally differ from the events involving British intelligence, which involve the analysis and dissemination of intelligence. Bar-Joseph fails to acknowledge, however, that by selecting breakdowns in civil-intelligence relations in only one type of system of intelligence oversight and control, he misses an opportunity to demonstrate how variation in his independent variables affects the willingness of intelligence officials to interject themselves into the political process. Similarly, because several of the factors he identifies as a source of "policy-to-please" often confront states, he cannot explain exactly what triggers intelligence intervention in politics.

In sum, this is an ambitious book that does a fine job in identifying several factors which affect the willingness and ability of intelligence officials to place their preferences into the policy arena. *Intelligence Intervention* also offers a compelling warning about the management or, in this case, the mismanagement of covert operations. When responsibility for intelligence analysis, policy development, and policy implementation is placed, or falls, into the hands of intelligence officials, policymakers are likely to lose control not only of intelligence organizations, but of national policy itself.

American Hegemony: Political Morality in a One-Superpower World. By Lea Brilmayer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. 263p. $30.00.

Bruce Russett, *Yale University*

As any student of Gramsci knows, the exercise of hegemony depends not solely on raw physical power, but also on shared normative perceptions about legitimate action. The less the disparity in physical power between the hegemon and other actors, and the weaker the formal institutional structure governing the exercise of power, the more dependent is the hegemon on the articulation and observation of accepted principles of legitimacy. Contemporary international relations is an arena characterized by such a hegemony: a system of states in a hierarchy of power with the United States at the pinnacle, the absence of a formal system of rule substantially limiting states' sovereignty, yet with normative principles (however amorphous and sometimes contradictory) which both encourage and legitimate hegemonic action in the international interest. These principles and their binding power remain unsettled. Nevertheless, they are continually brought to bear, whether as applied to particular interventions (e.g., Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia) or to debates on the proper composition and procedures of the UN Security Council. Hegemony provides both the opportunity for oppression and the need for the potential oppressor itself to be constrained by perceptions of legitimacy.

Some Americans might like to have it otherwise. Isolationists might prefer not to exercise hegemonic power at all, but they are not always ready to live with the consequences of inaction. Unilateralists are prepared to exercise power, especially military power, in pursuit of vital interests without great concern for the niceties of international consent. This strain is evident in those in Congress who would expand the military budget while simultaneously cutting support for multilateral institutions like the United Nations and its associated agencies. But lacking the power to impose a true *pax romana* by dint of total military superiority, they risk having their reach exceed their grasp, and thus the need to invoke not just the approval but the active support of allies. Thus there is also the need to bolster the claims of interest with claims of legitimacy. Multilateralists, however, readily see the necessity for acting within some generally acceptable normative framework. In the post–cold-war world, the framework for international governance is a liberal one, deriving from the same ideology of liberal democracy that dominates the international discourse of governance within states. Within that discourse Lea Brilmayer attempts, with substantial success, to lay out the justification for, and the constraints on, the exercise of hegemonic power by the United States. Her attention to that normative system is fully as relevant as any argument about the asymmetry of physical power characterizing hegemony; it constitutes a powerful defense of multilateralism.

Brilmayer offers four levels of argument whereby actions of a hegemon may be normatively acceptable. The strongest is contemporaneous consent, whereby states agree to certain kinds of actions taken through certain procedures (as when members of the Security Council agree to collective security operations). Prior consent (as by the states who, though not members of the Security Council, agree in advance to be bound by its decisions) is typically the act of weaker states, implying consent to hegemony. A still weaker form is hypothetical consent, whereby a hegemon pays most of the cost of a collective good presumably desired by the weaker states but unachievable by their own acts. This needs to be distinguished from actions in which the hegemon coerces the weaker states to pay their "share" of the costs. Finally, there is the claim that the hegemon's action is consistent with a wide moral consensus even though it is not authorized by explicit consent. In this progression of levels the weaker states' ability effectively to protest the action declines. In laying out these arguments, Brilmayer shows that, while none is flawless, together they are often coherent and persuasive. She notes, however, that underlying them further is a debate about the right of a sovereign government, which may or may not be constituted democratically, to give consent on behalf of its people.

In turn, the hegemon, while having no obligation to act (I'm not necessarily persuaded of this), has an obligation to rule justly. That is, it must apply the principles permitting intervention evenhandedly, and not act selectively in accordance with its own immediate interests. This may be the weakest link in contemporary justifications of America's exercise of its hegemonic power.

I wish Brilmayer had done still more with the book. It is written overwhelmingly within the liberal tradition, and does not extensively engage others, such as the realist one. Moreover, and perhaps oddly for a lawyer, she gives us little concreteness about the implications of her argument for particular international institutions, such as the Security Council, human rights agencies, or the Bretton Woods financial institutions. But what she has done deserves wide attention: In *Guide Michelin* terms, to fellow liberals, it is interesting; to all international relations theorists, worth the detour; to realists, worth the trip.

The Political Economy of Power: Hegemony and Economic Liberalism. By Anthony Tuo-Kofi Gadzey. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. 205p. $45.00.

Kathleen R. McNamara, *Princeton University*

Hegemonic stability theory (HST) has been one of the most influential approaches in the contemporary field of international political economy, yet recently its academic popularity has waned. One reason may be the tendency of HST to be all things to all people: While it appears to be a parsimonious theory, using one variable (the distribution of state power) to explain important outcomes (cooperation or conflict in the international system), its broader argument masks a range of theories with quite different, and often contradictory, logics and empirical implications. This book offers a useful corrective to the literature on hegemony by clearly defining the main competing strands of HST, probing their analytical logic, and using both quantitative and qualitative methods to test their predictions in the post-1945 era. It also provides an array of suggestive insights beyond the confines of the HST debate, on topics including the linkages between economic and security policy, the larger normative issues raised by the role of the United States in the postwar era, and implications for future stability in the international system.

Gadzey's main question is whether the liberal international economic regimes that developed in the postwar era are best viewed, as has been argued by some international relations theorists, as public goods provided by U.S. hegemony. The book begins, laudably, by examining the commonly used definitions of "hegemony" and "public goods" and presenting explicit models derived from those definitions. Alongside the familiar models of the benevolent hegemon, which provides undisputable public goods, and the mercantilist hegemon, which sets up international regimes as mechanisms to enhance its own power, Gadzey presents an alternative understanding of hegemony. He calls his version "embedded hegemony," and defines it as a situation where power concentration is not automatically translated into systemic stability, but is closely dependent on the nature of bargaining between states. In this model, one state may be preponderant, but rarely can it achieve its goals without the consent of the weaker states and thus must engage in a series of bilateral bargains. Gadzey argues that the resulting hegemonic regimes tend to reflect a series of exclusionary arrangements between hegemon and follower states that do not always produce true system stability. Thus, instead of viewing the postwar system as a series of public goods provided by the United States, we should see these regimes as indicating a much more restrictive U.S. commitment to a liberal international order, one tempered by broader American security concerns and solidified through multilateral bargains.

Subsequent chapters examine the post–World War II experience to compare the author's version of "embedded hegemony" with the more common public goods theories of hegemonic stability. Chapter 2 provides quantitative assessments of the correlation between concentration of power and trade openness in the OECD from the late 1940s to late 1980s. Gadzey's measures of hegemony are useful confirmations of the convention wisdom—that the United States moved from a position of multi-issue dominance in the first decades after the war to a position of military, but not economic, preeminence by the mid-1970s. More innovative is his analysis of which states have borne the cost of keeping the international trading system open, a key test of the predictions of the coercive and benign strands of HST. He compares the average share of OECD trade captured by each state with its share of overall OECD subsidies and tariffs, and argues that his results indicate that the pattern of costs and benefits from the postwar trading system are most reflective of the particular security interests of the United States. That is, those states strategically important to the United States have been allowed to free ride, with high levels of both trade and subsidies and tariffs.

The balance of the book is devoted to case studies, all of which take issue with the characterization of U.S. postwar hegemony as one of public good provision. Chapter 3 briefly surveys the history of U.S. tariff policy, contending that the GATT enshrined a series of bilateral concessions and compromises meant to shore up U.S. security interests with the onset of the Cold War. A chapter on the Marshall Plan focuses on the compelling U.S. national security interests at stake in the reconstruction of Europe, and somewhat provocatively argues that the Marshall Plan was a relatively unsuccessful instrument for containing the Soviet Union, so it cannot be considered as providing the public good of security to U.S. allies. A final empirical chapter surveys the literature on the Bretton Woods system. Here, the author rejects the public goods interpretation of U.S. policy by focusing on the unilateral nature of U.S. policy and the costs the system placed on the follower states. By calling attention to the overarching national security interests shaping U.S. policy, these case studies provide a somewhat different angle on familiar material.

The concluding chapter focuses on some implications of Gadzey's findings for the future of the international system. He notes that his analysis "cautions against too much reliance on the effects of power for the successful formation and operation of international regimes," and instead points to the complex interaction between large and small states, and between security and economic issues, in producing the bargains that bring about cooperation. He also offers some thoughts on the role of the United States in NATO and the relationship between U.S. hegemony and bipolarity.

Gadzey's book would have been strengthened by a tighter focus on the main thesis, as both the theoretical and empirical chapters sometimes become overburdened with a multitude of lines of inquiry. For this reviewer's taste, a more narrowly defined analysis of U.S. economic statecraft focusing more closely on bargaining dynamics in one issue area, instead of providing a macrohistorical overview of the range of postwar regimes, might have produced a more satisfying and original work. Yet in calling attention to the need to examine the mechanics of hegemony and in critically probing the nature of U.S. power and its exercise in the postwar era, this book is a useful addition to the hegemonic stability literature.

Contexts of International Politics. By Gary Goertz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 296p. $59.95 cloth, $21.95 paper.

Harvey Starr, *University of South Carolina*

On the first page the author says simply: "This book examines some contexts and how they influence the way states act." The rich, complex, and important analyses that follow belie the simplicity of that statement. In this book Gary Goertz confronts the reader with an array of issues that are central to the logic of inquiry—how are we to think about theory?—and the logic linking theory to both research design and its consequent methodology. Goertz does this by focusing on the "*problematique* of context" (p. 2).

That is, he is concerned with the possible relationships between entities and their environments, with the mechanisms that connect decisionmakers, governments, and/or states, and with the environments in which they are nested.

This book's utility to all scholars who attempt to theorize about international phenomena, and especially to graduate students who are learning the craft (and art) of theory and research, resides in the complexity of its conceptualization of context. Goertz provides three broad meanings: context as cause, context as barrier, and context as changing meaning. The core of the book is found in chapter 2, "Modes of Context," where the author elaborates on these different perspectives on context. Goertz displays a deep concern with *which* metaphor to use, and how each different approach to context affects the way we think about the entity and the environment, the individual and its context. This type of appreciation for context is crucial. For many realist and neorealist thinkers context is confined to system structure (either in its overall "anarchic" condition or in terms of the distribution of military capabilities). Goertz goes well beyond such realist views of context, which can be encompassed in his notion of context as cause. Context as cause is seen as a "default category," where context is neither necessary nor sufficient, but in combination with other factors makes certain outcomes more or less likely.

With his conception of context as barrier (elaborated in chapter 6), Goertz goes into the complexities of context as constraint and opportunity, context as both constraining and enabling the behavioral entities under study. Here he draws upon the Sprouts' idea of environmental possibilism (as well as elaborations such as opportunity and willingness (p. 111), to view context as a necessary condition. As is developed in earlier work on the logic of inquiry, Goertz also distinguishes between barrier-possibilism-opportunity-necessity and causal views of context that are stated in terms of sufficiency. This is vital if theory and research design are to be compatible and coherent. For instance, Goertz points to some neorealist analyses of international security that set up their arguments in terms of sufficiency but then treat the central concepts as necessary conditions. Goertz also provides a compelling demonstration of how context as barrier can explain both stability and rapid change: "Barrier models provide one possible answer to the question about dramatic change. The collapse of a barrier presents new opportunities that are quickly seized upon by interested parties" (p. 95). Barrier models are then used to structure case studies of oil nationalization in the 1918–80 period (chapter 7), and the continuity and change in Eastern European politics, 1945–89 (chapter 8).

Context as changing meaning (elaborated in chapter 3) raises the additional complication that changing contexts alter the *meaning* of concepts as well as their indicators (with the discussion of indicators developed in chapter 4). Similar to ideas such as Most and Starr's "nice laws" (*Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics* 1989), context is here concerned with which theories or relationships hold under what specific conditions. How meanings change (what is the "same"?) is critically important in designing comparative studies, particularly cross-temporal comparisons. One of the especially valuable aspects of Goertz's work is his demonstration of how the different views of context affect the conduct of analysis. He does this by showing how the different views of context could be translated into regression models. Thus, he demonstrates how context not only affects the logic of the research design, the nature and meaning of the indicators used, but also the form of the relationship under study.

A second valuable feature of the presentation is Goertz's use of diffusion models and rational actor models as two "different visions" of entity-environment relationships with their different emphases and metaphors (developed in depth in chapter 5). While I think Goertz overemphasizes the distinctions between the two approaches early in chapter 5, he does a good job of bringing them together at the end of the chapter (a section on "Mixed Models") and in chapter 6 on barrier models. Playing off the two approaches effectively strengthens and clarifies his overall argumentation.

Finally, various strands of this argumentation are pulled together in the discussion of two forms of international context often overlooked in standard (especially realist) studies of international relations. First, Goertz addresses historical contexts (chapter 9) as necessary elements in explanation or prediction, and how they are particularly important in understanding forces of inertia. One key component of a state's historical context is the existence of enduring rivalries, which are considered specifically as elements of context in chapter 10. Both chapters 9 and 10 return to questions of temporal context, changing meanings, and their theoretical-methodological implications. Secondly, the context of international norms is examined in chapter 11 (with the norm of decolonization specifically considered in chapter 12). Again, context as changing meaning demands understanding the normative or rule-based environment of actors (in my terms, such elements of opportunity have crucial effects on willingness through their impact on the incentive calculus of policymakers).

In this well-crafted book Gary Goertz has addressed the central question of entity and environment, of individual and context. The issues raised by this question have been addressed in the philosophy of science as well as the various social sciences. These issues are at the heart of the agent-structure discourse. Goertz has, however, raised such fundamental theoretical and epistemological issues *without* having to stand outside the enterprise of systematic empirical research. As in Most and Starr, the challenges Goertz presents to the social science researcher are severe, but they are both understandable and potentially solvable through careful specification of theory and creative research design. Goertz has provided a number of clues as to how we can address many of the problems of social science research without abandoning social science.

When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics. By Benjamin Miller. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. 354p. $49.50.

Stephen R. Rock, *Vassar College*

Whither the post–Cold War world? Neorealists, citing changes in the structure of the international system, especially the breakdown of bipolarity, predict increasing turmoil and conflict. Liberals, focusing their attention on unit-level developments, particularly movement toward democratization and the establishment of interdependent capitalist economies, foresee a more stable future. In this impressive work, Miller employs an innovative synthesis of these competing viewpoints to offer a nuanced, sophisticated vision of what lies ahead.

Miller seeks to resolve the paradigmatic debate—and the related level-of-analysis problem in international politics—by distinguishing between two contexts in which states interact. In times of crisis, he suggests, structural factors account for outcomes. In "normal" times, unit-level factors are determining. This broad claim rests upon his explanation of four specific outcomes, defined according to whether they are cooperative or conflictual, on the one hand, and intended or unintended, on the other: (1) premeditated war (intended conflict), (2) inadvertant war (unintended conflict), (3) conflict resolution (intended cooperation), and (4) crisis management (unintended cooperation). Premeditated war and conflict resolution, argues Miller, are intended, normal-times outcomes conditioned by unit-level factors, while inadvertant war and crisis management are unintended, crisis outcomes, dependent upon the structure of the international system.

Miller's model rests on strong logical and empirical foundations. He explains at length why the expectations of structural theory regarding states' behavior are likely to be fulfilled in times of crisis and why, conversely, unit-level factors are likely to dominate in noncrisis situations. He then tests and finds support for his propositions through an examination of international politics in the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe system and an analysis of Cold War diplomacy between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

With respect to system structure and its impact on crisis outcomes, Miller's central conclusion is that bipolarity is preferable to multipolarity. Bipolar systems, characterized by simplicity and clarity, by the great powers' tight control over allies and their own militaries, and by the relative immunity of decision makers from domestic political considerations, are conducive to successful crisis management. By contrast, multipolar systems, because of their complexity, the increased stress they place on decision makers, the tendency of the great powers to lose control over allies or their own military forces, and the constraints imposed on governments by domestic politics, are prone to inadvertant war. With respect to unit-level factors and their implications for outcomes in normal times, Miller contends that similarity of and moderation in ideology, among other factors, favor concerted cooperation in conflict resolution, while ideological dissimilarity and immoderation make premeditated war more likely. The implications for the post–Cold War world are thus clear. The trend toward democratization and the establishment of capitalist economies means that cooperation in conflict resolution will be possible and that premeditated war will be unlikely. However, should a crisis erupt, increasing multipolarity will make it difficult to manage, thereby raising the probability of inadvertant war.

Miller enters the debate over the importance of nuclear weapons as a source of the postwar Long Peace, attempting to disentangle the effects of polarity and military technology on system stability. He argues that polarity matters only with respect to the problem of inadvertant war. Bipolarity helps to prevent it, while multipolarity increases its likelihood. Military technology, on the other hand, is central to the issue of premeditated war. Conventional weapons permit such conflict, but nuclear weapons, with their awesome destructiveness, render it obsolete. The Cold War international system—nuclear and bipolar—was therefore doubly stable, while nineteenth-century Europe—conventional and multipolar—was doubly unstable. The emerging system—nuclear and multipolar—will be one in which premeditated war is unlikely, but inadvertant conflict remains possible.

This analysis is compelling, but it creates difficulties for Miller's claim that unit-level factors determine intended outcomes in normal times, while system structure is critical to understanding unintended crisis outcomes. Only if nuclear weapons are a unit-level element is their decisive, dampening effect on the possibility of premeditated war consistent with the model. Yet Miller rejects this notion, advanced by Waltz, writing that "nuclear weapons are an indispensable part of the overall distribution of capabilities" (p. 256 n. 17). What he means by this is not entirely clear, but for most realists the distribution of capabilities has two components: (1) polarity and (2) the degree of equality with which power is apportioned among the poles. Nuclear weapons affect each of these, but because of their absolute destructiveness have especially profound implications for the latter, tending to reduce power asymmetries in both bipolar and multipolar systems. Such asymmetries are, of course, regarded by balance-of-power theory as a prime cause of premeditated war, which results from the conscious decision to exploit them. Thus, if distribution of capabilities refers not just to the polarity of a system but also the equality or inequality with which power is divided among its poles, this factor appears crucial to the explanation of intended, noncrisis outcomes as well as unintended, crisis ones. Ultimately, Miller's tidy resolution of the level-of-analysis problem requires defining system structure in terms of polarity alone.

In addition, while Miller's distinction between normal-times and crisis diplomacy is analytically useful, it begs a question. Why do normal times become times of crisis? How is crisis, as a type of normal-times—and thus intended—outcome, to be explained? The question, to be fair, lies beyond the scope of Miller's inquiry, but it is troublesome because his model seems to suggest that crises should not arise, at least not very often. According to the model, two (intended) outcomes occur in normal times. The conflictual outcome is premeditated war, which, Miller argues, is usually not preceded by a crisis. The cooperative outcome is conflict resolution, which has the effect of preventing crises. In the end, Miller's analysis leaves one wondering why crises erupt and how, consistent with his model, unit-level factors might explain them.

None of this detracts substantially from Miller's accomplishment. He has produced a superb piece of work, one of uncommon ambition and even rarer achievement. The book goes beyond any previous volume toward providing a synthesis of realist and liberal perspectives and resolving the thorny level-of-analysis issue. Miller's command of diverse literatures (international relations theory, cooperation theory, and crisis management theory, among others), his capacity to relate them to one another, and his ability to bring them to bear on specific questions of great power cooperation and conflict are truly impressive. So too is his analysis of nineteenth- and twentieth-century diplomacy. One of the best books on international relations theory to be published in recent years, *When Opponents Cooperate* is essential reading.

Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers. By T. V. Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 248p. $54.95 cloth, $19.95 paper.

Ben D. Mor, *University of Haifa, Israel*

War initiation by weaker powers against their stronger opponents appears to be a classic case of pathological decision making. Indeed, in most circumstances, weaker states prefer to accept an objectionable status quo rather than wage war against a more powerful rival. However, as this book argues, when certain conditions apply, war initiation can become a rational strategy for the weaker state, even when its leaders are fully aware of their opponent's military and economic superiority. When this occurs, the deterrence strategies of status quo powers, which are based on preponderance in overall capability, cannot dissuade the weaker state from attacking. Such was the case in six asymmetric conflicts, the analysis of which constitutes the bulk of this study; the Japanese offensive against Russia, 1904; the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 1941; the Chinese intervention in Korea, 1950; the Pakistani offensive in Kashmir, 1965; the Egyptian offensive in the Sinai, 1973; and the Argentine invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas, 1982. Explaining war initiation by the weaker state in these conflicts and similar ones is the objective of the study.

The author restricts the theoretical and empirical analysis to situations in which the parties are locked in a serious conflict of interests and the weaker side is dissatisfied with the status quo, fears that it may not change—and may even deteriorate—in the future, and values higher the disputed issues. Once these "requisite conditions" are assumed to apply, the decision to initiate can be explained by means of four "independent variables" (the author does not maintain a clear distinction between variables and the values they assume): (1) the belief of the leadership that its political and military objectives can be achieved by means of a limited-aims strategy (in contrast to a strategy of attrition/maneuver or blitzkrieg); (2) the possession of short-term offensive capability, especially when coupled with the belief that attacking first confers a decisive advantage; (3) the defensive support of a great power; and (4) a change in the domestic power structure, which brings the state under the control of "militaristic decision-making groups that lack political legitimacy" (p. 35). Time pressure—the perception of a rapidly closing window of opportunity—is an intervening variable that links the four factors and enhances their impact on the dependent variable.

In the empirical part, the author tests each of the six historical cases for the existence of these conditions prior to war initiation. Although the analysis could have benefited from greater rigor in the specification of controls and the measurement of variables, it is overall structured, focused, and comparative to a greater degree than is usually encountered in similar qualitative studies. And although the author selects his cases on the dependent variable (all involve war initiation), he is careful to extend the analysis to previous periods in which the same actors considered war but an attack was not launched. The application of this research design, supplemented by process tracing, leads the author to conclude that the existence of the hypothesized conditions—especially the limited-aims strategy and the alliance support—in fact prompted war initiation in the six cases.

This explanation, however, rests on a theoretical structure that presents some difficulties. First, one may object that the "requisite conditions," taken together, treat the *motivation* to initiate by way of assumption rather than explanation, thus excluding this important dimension of state decision from the purview of the theory. Indeed, the first three explanatory variables address conditions related to "opportunity" rather than "willingness," to apply Harvey Starr's useful distinction. If the fourth explanatory variable—changes in domestic structure—could be interpreted strictly in this way, then the theory could be cast as a consistent and coherent treatment of *opportunity conditions*, in which case the author could assume various levels of motivation and deduce their implications for initiation. However, the fourth variable, whose definition and application are nearly all-inclusive, relates both to opportunity (e.g., "it took several rounds of internal purges for Sadat to recruit a small group of people who concurred with him on the feasibility and necessity of a limited war" [p. 139]) and to motivation (e.g., "the lack of a strong civilian base and the fear that the declining support among the masses and the army might erode his position were evident in Sadat's calculations in 1973" [p. 141]). Moreover, although the theoretical discussion implicitly acknowledges that the source and intensity of motivation may vary, no attempt is made to hypothesize about the likely effects that this may have on the initiator's behavior.

A second problem concerns the structure of the theory, which turns out to be a causal model that Hubert Blalock called "inventories of causes" (*Theory Construction*, 1969): a list of possible factors that influence the dependent variable but that are not considered to be interrelated. This model, however, is at odds with the author's professed preference for a decision-making perspective (pp. 15–17), which promotes a much more integrative conception of the determinants of decision (whether in rational choice or procedural models). In fact, the author is not unaware of possible intercorrelations among the independent variables, suggesting, for example, that "militaristic decision-making groups" (variable 4) may "exhibit greater willingness to utilize opportunities provided by the acquisition of offensive weapons systems [variable 2] and by changes in alliance and strategic configurations" (variable 3) (p. 33). Likewise, strategy (variable 1) and weapons (variable 2) are not unrelated. But other than casually noting these important possibilities, the author does not acknowledge their implications for the theory he is constructing or for the validity of his empirical analysis: When intercorrelations exist, ignoring them seriously distorts estimates of the relative importance of each independent variable. Precisely such inferences, however, are made in the concluding chapter (p. 173).

The author should also be more concerned with clarifying the direction of causality. This problem arises due to an ambiguity in the definition of the dependent variable. Because it is possible for a leader to make a strategic decision to initiate war but to *act* upon it at a later date—presumably, when appropriate conditions have presented themselves—it is important to define precisely what one means by "decision to attack," "decision to commit to war," and "war initiation," which are used interchangeably (e.g., p. 19). The author argues that his objective is to explain not only why weaker states initiate but also why they do so "at particular junctures" (p. 12). But if the former meaning is employed, then there is a very real possibility that the dependent variable *affects* some of the independent variables. Thus, the strategic decision to go to war may induce the leadership to perfect its limited aims strategy, to acquire certain weapon systems, and to secure great-power guarantees. Indeed, the author's analysis of the 1973 Egyptian offensive (to take one case) bears out this sequence of events. It also suggests that the theory he develops—with the direction of causality it assumes—is more suitable to the explanation of the *timing* of war. In fact, accounting for this aspect of war initiation is consistent with the analysis of opportunity conditions, as suggested above.

These problems indicate the need for greater clarity and precision in theory formulation; they also raise doubts about the validity of some causal inferences in the case studies. However, they do not detract from the importance of the study's substantive concerns and the lessons that it stands to offer. In highly structured, richly detailed case studies, the author convincingly shows that rational considerations can underlie behavior that does not follow from the logic of deterrence theory. In particular, the historical analysis suggests that weaker challengers, who are expected to be deterred by clear evidence of preponderant power, may think in terms other than victory and defeat: War initiation for partial political gains, even at the risk of limited military loss, is sometimes the only way to effect a change in an unbearable status quo. A major contribution of the study is its careful empirical reconstruction of the often complex and multidimensional decision calculus of weaker initiators, providing thereby a highly differentiated context for the evaluation of national security policies. Within this context, the author clarifies not only the behavior of the challenger but also the outlook of the status quo power, which usually fails to realize the limitations and long-term consequences of its deterrent posture. This latter observation is ripe with theoretical and policy implications that deserve the close attention of researchers in the field.

Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989. By Robert S. Ross. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. 349p. $39.50.

David Shambaugh, *University of London*

At a time when relations and difficulties with China are assuming a central position in post–Cold War U.S. foreign policy, it is instructive to review the record of Sino-American relations as a guide to understanding the dynamics in the relationship that will shape the future. Robert Ross has contributed a timely and sophisticated study that is likely to become one of the standard works on Sino-American relations between the historic Nixon visit of 1972 and Beijing massacre of 1989. While theory is not the strong suit of the study, it also contributes significantly to the international relations literature on negotiation, cooperation, and conflict management.

Ross's study goes far beyond a description of two decades of United States–China diplomatic interactions, by exploring the negotiating record as no scholar has previously done. To accomplish this, the author exhaustively mined the available sources on the U.S. side—drawing on memoirs, oral histories, and an unprecedented set of interviews with virtually all the principal policymakers and officials (including one former president, two national security advisors, three secretaries of state, and all of the key second-tier officials responsible for China policy). It seems that only Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, George Shultz, and Henry Kissinger escaped Ross's net. Gaining access to officials at this level (even after they leave office) is no small feat, and Ross's success offers an empirical basis that sets his work apart from others and gives it lasting historical value. He has handled these interview and documentary data judiciously and in a balanced fashion, not being drawn into self-serving justifications for individual's cases or bureaucratic missions. The result is a rich texture and extraordinarily detailed blow-by-blow account of U.S. decision making.

But this is not just a work in decision-making analysis or U.S. diplomatic history. Ross brings his background in Chinese foreign policy studies and Chinese language capabilities to bear on Beijing's side of the relationship as well. Ross draws upon a wide range of Chinese published sources—including unearthing many sources limited to internal (neibu) circulation. Interviews on the Chinese side are, however, curiously missing. Many former officials involved in making China's America policy are available for interviews—although some key figures, such as Zhang Wenjin and Han Xu, have died in recent years. This is a small shortcoming, whereas Ross's use of Chinese published material (previously untranslated) is to be commended; it adds an interactive and perceptual dimension so often lacking in most historical works on the subject.

Thus, the sources used is one of the principal strengths of this study. The text is also clearly and fluidly written, although it sometimes has a descriptive quality to it. Only on occasion does the author offer an independent judgment as to his views of the efficacy of a certain policy approach, rather reserving his assessments for the conclusion.

As the title indicates, Ross is concerned with the ability of Beijing and Washington to cooperate and forge a productive relationship. In assessing this ability, the author considers a range of variables across several levels of analysis. His data support the conventional wisdom that national security concerns (e.g., the Soviet Union) sustained cooperation (especially for China) at times of distrust and disagreement in other issue areas, but he also reveals the extent to which domestic political pressures influenced each side. Much attention is paid to the decision-making milieu and process, and the roles of particular individuals. While Ross goes farther than previous scholars in opening the "black box," his study is stronger on policy output than input. It carefully tracks negotiating tactics, signalling, policy actions and reactions, and the substantive issues on the agenda.

He portrays Chinese negotiators as persistently tough bargainers and shrewd negotiators with a clear sense of their own national interests (something he does not credit to U.S. negotiators). Whenever they got the sense that the United States was trying to stall or manipulate them, Chinese interlocutors became truculent (this was particularly the case with Kissinger—whom they grew to profoundly mistrust). Yet Beijing was not prone to provoking or pushing the United States, given the large strategic and economic benefits they derived from the relationship. Instead, Ross concludes that China was often able to extract concessions from the United States while giving little, if anything, away in return. While the weaker party, China proved the stronger negotiator.

Ross also reveals how tenacious and uncompromising Beijing has been over the Taiwan issue. He shows that Beijing has given very little on the Taiwan issue and has employed "salami tactics" (p. 258) to slice a little more off the U.S. commitments to the island during successive rounds of negotiations.

It is also interesting to note that, unlike the present, the Chinese military rarely weighed in on Chinese elite policy deliberations. Beijing's America policy was dominated by a handful of senior officials in the Communist Party and Foreign Ministry. While on the U.S. side policy was necessarily made by a broader set of actors, Ross shows clearly the involvement of presidents and secretaries of state in fashioning policy toward China. At numerous junctures, presidential involvement proved decisive. It is equally clear, however, that when such high-level attention waned, the relationship floundered and fell prone to self-serving agendas of subordinate bureaucracies. Moreover, China knew who its friends (e.g., Schlesinger, Brzezinski, Brown, Haig, Weinberger) and foes (e.g., Vance, Allen, Clark) in U.S. administrations were and often sought to influence U.S. policy through them.

Given the importance Ross ascribes to strategic imperatives in forging cooperation, it is not surprising that the United States–China relationship has atrophied in the absence of the Soviet Union. Ross's study of the record of United States–China relations leads him to an appropriately sober assessment of relations in the future: "In the post–Cold War era, there will be persistent conflict and only limited and tentative cooperation in U.S.–P.R.C. relations" (p. 260). This observer would agree with this prognosis and learned much from Robert Ross's commendable study.

Simulating Sovereignty-Intervention, the State, and Symbolic Exchange. By Cynthia Weber. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 147p. $49.95 cloth, $16.95 paper.

Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Arizona State University*

Cynthia Weber's *Simulating Sovereignty* is an important and innovating work that warrants a careful reading by international relations theorists of all epistemological orientations. This book is important for several reasons, of which three are particularly noteworthy. The first regards its substantive contribution. Beginning where mainstream international relations theory leaves off, Weber asks the question that international relations scholars have deferred because of its troubling implications: "How is the meaning of state sovereignty fixed in theory and practice?" She answers this question through a careful and detailed empirical investigation into practices of political intervention. As sovereignty's conceptual opposite, intervention practices and the discourses surrounding these practices function to stabilize the meaning of sovereignty, though this meaning varies historically. Through a careful and detailed empirical analysis of interventions by the Concert of Europe, the Wilson administration, and the Reagan and Bush administrations, Weber does an excellent job of showing that sovereignty is not a given as international relation theories generally presume. Rather, the foundations of sovereignty must be constructed, and how this occurs differs over time and across cases.

The other two reasons for this book's significance have to do with the critical framework within which Weber works. All too often, critical approaches such as Weber's have been judged as capable of offering only negative and destructive critiques, with no positive contributions based upon concrete historical and empirical research. *Simulating Sovereignty* should put to rest such critiques. This book should also serve as an awakening to those who believe that poststructuralism is a closed, internally coherent paradigm. The fallacy of such a belief is revealed by Weber's own critique of Foucault and her elaboration of Baudrillard's critique. *Simulating Sovereignty* demonstrates that a poststructural critical analysis can be critical not only of mainstream international relations but also of others who are considered poststructuralists.

Weber's framework of analyses is drawn from the work of Michel Foucault and Jean Baudrillard. Weber finds important differences in the work of these two icons of postmodernism, differences that she suggests are important for understanding contemporary productions of sovereignty and the state. A Foucauldian analysis is put to work in all of the cases. These analyses disrupt conventional understandings of sovereignty and the state, which are based on the acceptance of pregiven and fixed foundations. The interpretive power of the Foucauldian approach shows us how, in each of these cases, the "true" sources of sovereign authority were undecidable and ambiguous and had to be discursively produced in order to justify intervention practices. These analyses in themselves are important contributions to international relations theory, demonstrating that international relations is—and has always been—an arena where what counts as foundational meanings are contested, constructed, and drawn upon to legitimate various international practices.

Weber, however does not stop here. Lest we have begun to feel too comfortable with Foucault's conception of representation and the power/knowledge nexus, Weber seeks to push critical international relations scholarship a step farther by asking what happens when representation is no longer possible? For this portion of her analyses, she relies upon the work of Jean Baudrillard, introducing the concepts of *simulation* and *seduction*. This is a key part of *Simulating Sovereignty*. In contrast to representation, which must ultimately refer to meanings that are taken to be true, simulation involves the manipulation of appearances that are endlessly substituted and exchanged for one another. Seduction is the mastery of this manipulation. Weber applies a Baudrillardian approach to the analyses of the Reagan and Bush administrations' interventions into Grenada and Panama, respectively, demonstrating that the representation of sovereignty is no longer possible. Rather, what we have is a situation in which meanings can be endlessly exchanged but never grounded. The sovereignty/intervention boundary becomes blurred, and sovereignty and intervention become interchangeable.

Simulating Sovereignty makes substantial contributions to the field of international relations that are both theoretical and ethical. Weber's careful theoretical and empirical investigation into these three cases reveals the limitations of theories that refuse to go beyond the conceptual givens upon which international relations theory has been built. *Simulating Sovereignty* radically shifts the grounds of the debates about sovereignty and the state.

The book also has important ethical implications that are not explicitly discussed by Weber but are nonetheless implied. *Intervention* is generally regarded as the derivative term in the sovereignty/intervention hierarchy, a term that can only be understood in reference to sovereignty. Intervention is understood as a deviation from, and violation of, the norm of sovereignty. In *Simulating Sovereignty*, Weber reverses this hierarchy and demonstrates that intervention is, in fact, crucial to sovereignty. Rather than violating sovereignty, intervention practices are *necessary* in order to prove sovereignty. Any grounds, representations, or truth effects that enable intervention practices are arbitrary. This should alert us to the possibility that these grounds and truth effects work in the interests of those who control the representations and codes by which they are produced.

We should be careful not to misread what Weber is suggesting is being simulated. It is sovereignty that she suggests is not "real," has no foundational essence, and is simulated. This is quite different from suggesting that the interventions into Grenada and Panama themselves were not real. It is crucial that these two things not be confused. For those who are familiar with, and critical of, Baudrillard's writings on the Gulf War, this point is important (see, e.g., Christopher Norris's *Uncritical Theory* [1992]). Weber's Baudrillardian analysis in no way suggests the material unreality of U.S. intervention in Grenada and Panama. To deny the reality of U.S. actions in Grenada and Panama would be to deny the suffering and deaths of scores of human beings. To deny the reality of sovereignty implies something quite different.

Simulating Sovereignty is an innovating, critical interpretive analysis of one of the very important foundational elements in both the theory and practice of international relations. For that, Weber deserves much credit. My criticisms center on Weber's interpretation of the differences between Baudrillard and Foucault. The contribution of a Baudrillardian approach over a Foucauldian approach depends upon an acceptance of Baudrillard's own reading of Foucault, a reading that some would argue falls short of a full appreciation of Foucault's ideas. One could argue that many of Baudrillards ideas, rather than being opposed to Foucault's, are a radical extension of ideas that are, in fact, immanent in Foucault's own work. It is possible to read Baudrillard's simulation as an idea that is prefigured in Foucault's work on panoptic logic. Weber seems to recognize this in places, for example, where she suggests that Foucault "does not follow through on the implications of the productive aspect of power" (pp. 37–38), which suggests that the simulacrum is really already implied by the productive aspect of power. This insight, however, tends to get lost when she contrasts Foucault and Baudrillard.

None of this really detracts from Weber's analysis or the contribution it makes to international relations scholarship. Whether or not Baudrillard misreads Foucault and whether readers agree with Weber's reading of the differences between Baudrillard and Foucault or not, Weber has engaged in powerful, empirical analyses that puts these ideas to work regardless of where they come from. For that, she should be applauded.

There are two points, however, that I think deserve further scrutiny (as Weber would probably agree). These two points are related and center on the historical sequence of the cases, coupled with the contrasts Weber draws between Foucault and Baudrillard. The contrasts made between Foucault and Baudrillard and the fact that a Baudrillardian approach is only applied to the invasions of Grenada and Panama opens up the possibility of reading Weber as suggesting a historical break in the practices of statecraft that produce practically effective interpretations of sovereignty. One might interpret Weber as suggesting that the concerns expressed by Foucault are no longer relevant in a "postrepresentational" age. The question arises as why simulation would not be applicable to the Concert of Europe and Wilson interventions, as well as the U.S. invasions of Grenada and Panama. The suggestion seems to be that statecraft was at one time (i.e., prior to our current postrepresentational age) able to find that transcendental signified or ultimate ground. This, I believe, downplays the importance of state practices that have, throughout the history of the state system, produced the kind of truth effects that were produced by the Reagan and Bush administrations in Grenada and Panama.

The second point concerns the relationship between truth and power. Weber suggests that Baudrillard's notion of simulation implies that in contrast to Foucault's understanding of power as *productive* of truth, truth is neither repressed nor produced by power. Rather, truth appears as a simulacrum (a truth effect) (p. 125). This could be taken as suggesting that in a logic of simulation, we have somehow moved beyond power. But is not power very much involved in the production of truth effects? Further, do not these truth effects also require a referent or signified even though that signified is always unstable, contingent, and provisional? It is perhaps true that in a world increasingly dominated by media hype and obfuscation, signifieds/referents are increasingly unstable and increasingly ineffective in the sense that we no longer really believe they are the ultimate transcendental foundational reality. In a world where the center no longer holds, we may, in fact, be witnessing multiple and mobile practices that function to produce centers/signified/referents whose artificiality is increasingly apparent. Still, very "real" practices (e.g., the invasions of Grenada and Panama) are made possible and justified by these openly artificial signs and truth effects. One cannot but suspect that power is still there somewhere and is implicated in the production of truth effects. I do not think that Weber would necessarily disagree with this, but her Baudrillardian analysis is open to such an interpretation.

These two points should be regarded as issues for further intellectual conversation and elaboration. That the conversation has moved to this plane is to Weber's credit. The issues raised in this work usher in, and indeed make possible, this kind of intellectual debate. *Simulating Sovereignty* most definitely moves beyond the kind of international relations scholarship that silences or reduces such concerns to the margins of theoretical discussion.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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
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